Dunn v. Pietraszkiewicz

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

MICHAEL DUNN, ) Case No. 1:24-cv-00303

)

Plaintiff, ) Judge J. Philip Calabrese

)

v. ) Magistrate Judge

) Jennifer Dowdell Armstrong

ANN PIETRASZKIEWICZ, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

)

OPINION AND ORDER

This case arises out of the arrest and prosecution of Plaintiff Michael Dunn for

alleged domestic violence and burglary against his ex-girlfriend. After the State court

dismissed the charges against him, Plaintiff brought suit in State court without a

lawyer. His lawsuit alleged various civil rights violations against five Defendants:

Officers Ann Pietraszkiewicz and John Marincek, who were responsible for his arrest;

Sergeant Gregory Williams, who took part in the investigation; Assistant Prosecuting

Attorney Margaret Graham, who litigated the criminal case against him; and Judge

Daniel Gaul, who presided over his criminal case. The prosecutor and judge moved

to dismiss. Then, the officers timely removed this action to federal court before filing

their own motion to dismiss. In this ruling, the Court takes up both motions.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

On Defendants’ motions to dismiss, the complaint alleges the following facts,

which the Court accepts as true and construes in the light most favorable to Plaintiff,

as it must in the present procedural posture. On a motion to dismiss, the Court’s

inquiry is limited to the content of the complaint, although it may also consider

matters of public record, orders, items appearing in the record of the case, and

exhibits attached to or made part of the complaint. Amini v. Oberlin College, 259

F.3d 493, 502 (6th Cir. 2001). In this case, Plaintiff attached to his brief several

documents providing additional factual background. (ECF No. 6-1; ECF No. 6-2; ECF

No. 6-3; ECF No. 6-4.) Defendants did not object to consideration of these materials.

(See, e.g., ECF No. 7, PageID #192.) Because these documents are integral to the

allegations of the complaint, and arguably matters of public record in any event, the

Court considers these documents without converting the motion to dismiss into one

for summary judgment.

A. Initial Investigation

On December 18, 2019, Officers Pietraszkiewicz and Marincek responded to a

domestic violence complaint involving the alleged victim and Plaintiff Michael Dunn,

the alleged assailant. (ECF No. 1-1, ¶ 7, PageID #8.) When they arrived, the officers

could not locate the suspect. (ECF No. 6-1, PageID #185.) The alleged victim advised

the officers that Mr. Dunn entered her residence while she was outside and that the

two began arguing, which escalated to them shoving each other. (ECF No. 1-1,

¶¶ 9–11, PageID #8.) She claimed that Mr. Dunn allegedly grabbed her hair and

choked her. (Id., ¶ 11, Page ID #8.) The alleged victim told officers that she poured

hot sauce on Mr. Dunn and chased him from the residence with a four-foot carpenter’s

level. (Id., ¶ 12, PageID #9.) A neighbor advised the officers that he believed the

alleged victim was moving furniture and “could not hear her asking for help.” (Id.,

¶¶ 13–14; ECF No. 6-1, PageID #185.)

The officers reported that the alleged victim refused medical attention, was

slurring her words, and appeared to be intoxicated. (ECF No. 1-1, ¶ 15; ECF No. 6-1,

PageID #185.) Further, based on the police report, the alleged victim’s “story was

inconsistent as she described what had occurred,” and “she had no apparent signs of

injuries” that the officers could see. (ECF No. 1-1, ¶ 16; ECF No. 6-1, PageID #185.)

On December 19, 2019, Sergeant Williams—a detective at the time—was

assigned to investigate the matter and, in doing so, spoke with the alleged victim and

took pictures of her injuries. (ECF No. 1-1, ¶¶ 17–18, PageID #9; ECF No. 6-3,

PageID #188.) That day, the alleged victim signed a “no prosecution” form, as well

as a domestic violence waiver, stating that she did not “want to deal with the process.”

(ECF No. 6-2, PageID #186.) Later, Sergeant Williams reviewed the case with the

prosecutor’s office, seeking a felony domestic violence charge. (ECF No. 1-1, ¶ 20,

PageID #9–10.)

B. Indictment and Prosecution

On January 27, 2020, Mr. Dunn was indicted for both burglary and domestic

violence, in violation of Section 2911.12(A)(1) of the Ohio Revised Code and Section

2919.25(A), respectively. (Id., ¶ 21, PageID #10.) After seven days of pretrial

detention, on February 6, 2020, the State court released Mr. Dunn on bond. (Id.,

¶¶ 22–24, PageID #10.)

On September 24, 2020, Mr. Dunn was taken into custody, and he remained in

custody for nearly a year and a half—until February 23, 2022. (Id., ¶¶ 25–26, PageID

#10.) On his release, Mr. Dunn was placed on house arrest enforced with electronic

monitoring for over seven months—until November 7, 2022, when the burglary and

domestic violence charges were ultimately dismissed on the State’s oral motion. (Id.,

¶¶ 26–27, PageID #10.)

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Based on these events, Plaintiff filed a pro se complaint in the Cuyahoga

County Court of Common Pleas (Case No. 23-cv-989140), raising claims against each

Defendant in both their individual and official capacities under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

(ECF No. 1-1, PageID #5.) Counts One through Three bring claims against Officer

Pietraszkiewicz, Officer Marincek, and Sergeant Williams for false arrest and false

imprisonment. (Id., ¶¶ 28–52, PageID #11–15.) Counts Four and Five bring claims

against Ms. Graham, the prosecutor, and Judge Gaul for false imprisonment. (Id.,

¶¶ 53–68, PageID #16–18). Counts Six through Ten bring claims against each

Defendant for malicious prosecution. (Id., ¶¶ 69–92, PageID #19–26.) In his

complaint, Plaintiff seeks both compensatory and punitive damages. (Id., ¶¶ 93–97,

PageID #26–28.)

In State court, the prosecutor and the judge moved to dismiss the complaint.

(ECF No. 1-2, PageID #75.) Plaintiff opposed the motion. (Id., PageID #89.) Officer

Pietraszkiewicz, Officer Marincek, and Sergeant Williams timely removed this action

to federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) based on federal question jurisdiction.

(ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 2–4, PageID #2.) Ms. Graham and Judge Gaul consented to the

removal. (Id., ¶ 2; ECF No. 1-4, PageID #120.) Then, Officer Pietraszkiewicz, Officer

Marincek, and Sergeant Williams moved to dismiss. (ECF No. 3.) Each motion to

dismiss has been fully briefed.

ANALYSIS

Under Rule 12(b)(6), a court may dismiss a complaint if it fails to state a claim

on which a court may grant relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A motion under Rule

12(b)(6) tests “the plaintiff’s cause of action as stated in the complaint,” and is “not a

challenge to the plaintiff’s factual allegations.” Golden v. City of Columbus, 404 F.3d

950, 958–59 (6th Cir. 2005). A complaint must “contain sufficient factual matter,

accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570

(2007)). A claim is plausible where “the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows

the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). To survive a motion to

dismiss, a complaint must “raise a right to relief above the speculative level” into the

“realm of plausible liability.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557 n.5.

On a motion to dismiss, the Court construes factual allegations in the light

most favorable to the plaintiff, accepts them as true, and draws all reasonable

inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. Wilburn v. United States, 616 F. App’x 848, 852

(6th Cir. 2015) (citing Directv, Inc. v. Treesh, 487 F.3d 471, 476 (6th Cir. 2007)). But

a pleading must offer more than mere “labels and conclusions,” and “a formulaic

recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678

(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Nor is a court required to accept “[c]onclusory

allegations or legal conclusions masquerading as factual allegations.” Eidson v.

Tennessee Dep’t of Child.’s Servs., 510 F.3d 631, 634 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Twombly,

550 U.S. at 544).

Therefore, the Court must distinguish between “well-pled factual allegations,”

which must be treated as true, and “naked assertions,” which need not be. Iqbal, 556

U.S. at 678 (cleaned up); see also, e.g., Center for Bio-Ethical Reform, Inc. v.

Napolitano, 648 F.3d 365, 375 (6th Cir. 2011) (determining that because some of the

plaintiff’s factual allegations were not well-pled, their conclusory nature disentitled

them to the presumption of truth). Rule 8 “does not unlock the doors of discovery for

a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79.

Although the pleadings and documents pro se litigants file are liberally

construed and held to less stringent standards than the formal pleadings of lawyers,

Martin v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 712 (6th Cir. 2004), pro se litigants are not exempt

from the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Wells v. Brown, 891

F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989). Even a pro se complaint must “contain sufficient factual

matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face’” to

avoid dismissal. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).

I. The Motion to Dismiss of the Prosecutor and the Judge

The prosecutor and the judge move to dismiss Plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims

against them for false imprisonment and malicious prosecution, arguing that (1) the

statute of limitations bars Plaintiff’s false imprisonment claim; (2) Plaintiff’s

complaint fails to state on its face a claim for malicious prosecution; and

(3) Defendants have immunity against this suit in their official and individual

capacities. (ECF No. 1-2, PageID #76.) The Court begins and ends its analysis with

the last issue, involving judicial and prosecutorial immunity.

I.A. Official Capacity Claims

An official capacity claim “generally represents only another way of pleading

an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473

U.S. 159, 165–66 (1985). A suit against a State official in his or her official capacity

“is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official’s office.” Will

v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989); see also Doe v. Claiborne

Cnty., 103 F.3d 495, 509 (6th Cir. 1996).

Under Ohio law, the determination whether a political subdivision is immune

from liability requires a “three-tiered analysis.” Ruffin v. Cuyahoga Cnty., No. 1:16-

cv-640, 2016 WL 4543144, at *3 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 31, 2016) (citing Lambert v. Clancy,

125 Ohio St. 3d 231, 2010-Ohio-1483, 927 N.E.2d 585, ¶¶ 8–9). In the first tier, Ohio

law grants general immunity: “a political subdivision is not liable in damages in a

civil action for injury, death, or loss to person or property allegedly caused by any act

or omission of the political subdivision or an employee of the political subdivision in

connection with a governmental or proprietary function.” Ohio Revised Code

§ 2744.02(A)(1). At the second tier, the court examines whether any of the five

exceptions in Section 2744.02(B) to the grant of general immunity apply. See

Lambert, 2010-Ohio-1483, ¶ 9. Should an exception apply, the third tier analyzes the

defenses to liability in Section 2744.03, which may “reinstate immunity.” Id.

Plaintiff offers no argument about the availability of official immunity under

Ohio law. (See ECF No. 1-1, ¶¶ 53–68 & 77–92, PageID #16–18 & 23–26; ECF

No. 1-2, PageID #97–98.) Instead, Plaintiff cites Section 2744.03(A)(1) and (2),

stating, without any further explanation, that these statutes provide the reasons why

“Defendants’ arguments are misplaced.” (ECF No. 1-2, PageID #98.) But these

statutes reinstate immunity if an exception to immunity applies. So, Plaintiff’s

position begs the question. In Ruffin, the court found that Section 2744.02(A)

prohibited the plaintiff from bringing claims against the defendants in their official

capacities because “plaintiff ha[d] not shown or even argued that any of the

exceptions to liability in § 2744.02(B) apply.” Ruffin, 2016 WL 4543144, at *4. Such

is the case here. Because Plaintiff has failed to make any argument that an exception

under Section 2744.02(B) applies, Section 2744.02(A) precludes Plaintiff from

bringing his claims against the prosecutor and the judge in their official capacities.

I.B. Individual Capacity Claims

The prosecutor and judge contend that they also have absolute immunity

against suit in their individual capacities. (ECF No. 1-2, PageID #85–87.) The Court

addresses each in turn.

I.B.1. Absolute Judicial Immunity

Judicial officers are generally “absolutely immune from civil suits for monetary

damages under § 1983 for their judicial actions” because judicial officers should be

able to make “controversial decisions and act upon their convictions” in their judicial

capacity without being subject to personal liability. Cooper v. Parrish, 203 F.3d 937,

944–45 (6th Cir. 2000) (citing Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9–10 (1991); Stump v.

Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355–56 (1978)). Defendants bear the burden of establishing

absolute immunity. See Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 486 (1991); Howell v. Sanders,

668 F.3d 344, 350 (6th Cir. 2012).

Absolute immunity for judicial officers does not apply in only two

circumstances: (1) “actions not taken in the judge’s judicial capacity” and (2) “actions,

though judicial in nature, taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction.” Mireles,

502 U.S. at 11–12 (citing Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 227–29 (1988); Stump, 435

U.S. at 356–57, 360; Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335, 347 (1872)). A judge’s act counts

as judicial where “it is a function normally performed by a judge,” and the parties

“dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity.” Stump, 435 U.S. at 362. In making

this determination, courts look to “the particular act’s relation to a general function

normally performed by a judge.” Mireles, 502 U.S. at 288–89. Generally, where a

court has “some subject matter jurisdiction, there is sufficient jurisdiction for

immunity purposes.” Barnes v. Winchell, 105 F.3d 1111, 1122 (6th Cir. 1997) (citing

Adams v. McIlhany, 764 F.2d 294, 298 (5th Cir. 1985)).

Plaintiff alleges that the judge handling his criminal case “granted the

Prosecution’s oral motion to dismiss the Burglary and Domestic Violence charges

against Plaintiff” and that the judge “should have known” through the course of

discovery and the pandemic that “Plaintiff would suffer incarceration for eighteen

months . . . in exchange for a misdemeanor plea for case disposal, only to dismiss the

case nine months later.” (ECF No. 1-2, PageID #99; ECF No. 1-1, ¶ 27, PageID #10.)

When presiding over a criminal matter, such as Plaintiff’s, a judge discharges

the “general function[s] normally performed by a judge.” Mireles, 502 U.S. at 288–89.

Those functions include disposing of parties’ motions. The “paradigmatic judicial act

is the resolution of a dispute between parties who have invoked the jurisdiction of the

court.” Cameron v. Seitz, 38 F.3d 264, 271 (6th Cir. 1994) (quoting Morrison v.

Lipscomb, 877 F.2d 463, 465 (6th Cir. 1989)). Deciding a case is “the quintessential

judicial act.” Id. Here, the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas had jurisdiction

over the criminal charges against Mr. Dunn. Therefore, neither exception to judicial

immunity applies. The judge enjoys absolute judicial immunity against Plaintiff’s

claims against him in his individual capacity.

Plaintiff argues that the judge should be found liable to his Section 1983 claims

against him in his individual capacity because he is not entitled to qualified

immunity. (ECF No. 1-2, PageID #98–100.) But the judge has absolute immunity,

such that the Court need not determine whether qualified immunity also bars

Plaintiff’s claims.

I.B.2. Absolute Prosecutorial Immunity

Generally, a prosecutor’s actions in bringing a criminal case are “intimately

associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process, and thus were functions to

which the reasons for absolute immunity apply with full force.” Imbler v. Pachtman,

424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976). In Imbler, the Court held that “in initiating a prosecution

and in presenting the State’s case, the prosecutor is immune from a civil suit for

damages under § 1983.” Id. at 431. Prosecutorial immunity does not extend to

certain investigatory or administrative acts. Id. at 431 n. 33. These functions “do not

relate to an advocate’s preparation for the initiation of a prosecution or judicial

proceedings,” and therefore “are not entitled to absolute immunity.” Buckley v.

Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273 (1993) (citing Burns, 500 U.S. at 494–96).

Plaintiff alleges that the prosecutor “lacked probable cause to pursue and

prosecute charges in the resulting indictment of charges” against him, and that she

“should have known” through the course of discovery and the pandemic that “Plaintiff

would suffer incarceration for eighteen months . . . in exchange for a misdemeanor

plea for case disposal, only to dismiss the case nine months later.” (ECF No. 1-2,

PageID #99; ECF No. 1-1, ¶ 55, PageID #16.) But prosecutors are “entitled to

absolute immunity for initiating a prosecution and . . . presenting the state’s case,”

which is all that Plaintiff alleges the prosecutor did here. See Lomaz v. Hennosy, 151

F.3d 493, 499 (6th Cir. 1998) (quoting Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430) (cleaned up). Plaintiff’s

complaint, even read generously and construed in Plaintiff’s favor, does not allege

that the prosecutor engaged in conduct that removed her from the protections of

absolute immunity. All she did was prepare for and initiate judicial proceedings

against Mr. Dunn. Therefore, she is entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity

against the claims Plaintiff brings against her in her individual capacity.

* * *

For these reasons, the Court GRANTS the motion to dismiss of Ms. Graham

and Judge Gaul.

II. The Officers’ Motion to Dismiss

Plaintiff alleges that the remaining Defendants, Officer Pietraszkiewicz,

Officer Marincek, and Sergeant Williams, are liable in their official and individual

capacities under Section 1983 for alleged violations of Plaintiff’s Fourth and

Fourteenth Amendment rights. (ECF No. 1-1, ¶¶ 28–52 & 69–92, PageID #11–15 &

19–26.) To state a claim under Section 1983, Plaintiff must allege: (1) “a right

secured by the United States Constitution;” and (2) “the deprivation of that right;” (3)

“by a person acting under color of state law.” Troutman v. Louisville Metro Dep’t of

Corr., 979 F.3d 472, 482 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting Watkins v. City of Battle Creek, 273

F.3d 682, 685 (6th Cir. 2001) (abrogated on other grounds)). Defendants do not

dispute that they were acting under color of state law. Therefore, this motion to

dismiss turns on whether Plaintiff alleges that each Defendant deprived him of a

constitutional right.

Defendants argue that Plaintiff fails to state a claim on which relief can be

granted for false arrest and false imprisonment (Counts 1–3), as well as malicious

prosecution (Counts 6–8). (ECF No. 3, PageID #133–37.) Further, Defendants

maintain that they are entitled to qualified immunity in their individual capacities

and that Plaintiff fails to plead facts giving rise to liability against them in their

official capacities. (ECF No. 3, PageID #137–42.)

II.A. False Arrest / False Imprisonment

The Fourth Amendment affords the people the right to be “secure in their

persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.”

U.S. Const. amend IV. When he was arrested, Plaintiff was seized within the

meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Torres v. Madrid, 592 U.S. 306, 311 (2021). This

seizure must be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. U.S. Const. amend. IV.

If an arrest is not “’based on probable cause’ to believe that the individual has

committed a crime,” then it is “unreasonable.” Bailey v. United States, 568 U.S. 186,

192 (2013) (quoting Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 213 (1979)). This probable

cause standard “applies to all ‘seizures’ up to the jury trial.” Jones v. Clark Cnty.,

959 F.3d 748, 770 (6th Cir. 2020) (Murphy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in

part) (citing Manuel v. City of Joliet, Ill., 580 U.S. 357, 369 n.8 (2017)).

Section 1983 does not make an unreasonable seizure actionable by itself.

Courts “look to the elements of the most analogous tort as of 1871 when § 1983 was

enacted” to “determine the elements of a constitutional claim under § 1983.”

Thompson v. Clark, 596 U.S. 36, 43 (2022); Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 483

(1994). At common law, false arrest and malicious prosecution are the most

analogous torts to an unreasonable seizure of a person. Heck, 512 U.S. at 484. False

arrest and malicious prosecution are distinct common law torts. False arrest applies

to detention without legal process, while malicious prosecution applies to

“confinement imposed pursuant to legal process,” such as an arrest warrant or

indictment. Id. False arrest and malicious prosecution provide apt analogies because

they represent “specific versions of a general unreasonable-seizure claim alleging the

same constitutional theory: that the officers seized . . . [Plaintiff] without probable

cause.” Dibrell v. City of Knoxville, 984 F.3d 1156, 1161 (6th Cir. 2021). Under

Section 1983, “the general ‘common law of torts’” bridges the gap between a

constitutional right and the elements of a cause of action. Id. (citing Manuel, 580

U.S. at 370).

False arrest and false imprisonment claims against officers “are essentially the

same” because “the alleged false imprisonment arises out of and logically follows the

arrest” of the plaintiff. Walker v. Schaeffer, 854 F.2d 138, 142 (6th Cir. 1988)

(citations omitted). To establish a false arrest claim under federal law, a plaintiff

must “prove that the arresting officer lacked probable cause to arrest the plaintiff.”

Voyticky v. Village of Timberlake, Ohio, 412 F.3d 669, 677 (6th Cir. 2005). A showing

of probable cause “provides a complete defense to a claim of false arrest.” Tlapanco

v. Elges, 969 F.3d 638, 652 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting Halasah v. City of Kirtland, 574

F. App’x 624, 629 (6th Cir. 2014)). “In general, the existence of probable cause in a

§ 1983 action presents a jury question, unless there is only one reasonable

determination possible.” Gardenhire v. Schubert, 205 F.3d 303, 315 (6th Cir. 2000)

(quoting Pyles v. Raisor, 60 F.3d 1211, 1215 (6th Cir. 1995)).

Determining probable cause depends on “the facts and circumstances” within

the officers’ knowledge, of which they “had reasonably trustworthy information

sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the [plaintiff] had committed

or was committing an offense.” Id. (quoting Wesley v. Campbell, 779 F.3d 421, 429

(6th Cir. 2015). While officers “must show more than mere suspicion, the probable

cause requirement does not require that they possess evidence sufficient to establish

a prima facie case at trial, much less evidence sufficient to establish guilt beyond a

reasonable doubt.” United States v. Strickland, 144 F.3d 412, 415–16 (6th Cir. 1998).

Officers must take account of “both the inculpatory and exculpatory evidence”

to determine probable cause under the totality of the circumstances. Wesley, 779 F.3d

at 429 (quoting Gardenhire, 205 F.3d at 318). In making this determination, officers

cannot “ignore information which becomes available in the course of routine

investigations.” Id. (quoting Fridley v. Horrighs, 291 F.3d 867, 873 (6th Cir. 2002).

“[A] crime victim’s accusation standing alone can establish probable cause.” Huffer

v. Bogen, 503 F. App’x 455, 460 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Gardenhire, 205 F.3d at 322).

An arrest that does not result in a conviction “does not necessarily mean that the

arrest itself was unlawful.” Giannini v. Erie Cnty., Ohio, No. 3:15-cv-01379, 2016 WL

659894, at *3 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 18, 2016).

* * *

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants falsely arrested and imprisoned him. Counts

One and Two allege that Officers Pietraszkiewicz and Marincek “lacked probable

cause for his warrantless arrest . . . on December 18, 2019.” (ECF No. 1-1, ¶¶ 31 &

39, PageID #11–12.) Further, Plaintiff claims that he “was detained and held . . .

against his will and without lawful justification on January 31, 2020, through the

time he was released after his arrest.” (Id.) Yet Plaintiff’s statement of facts makes

no mention of any arrest on December 18, instead writing that “Plaintiff was arrested

and jailed in the Cuyahoga County Corrections Center” on January 31, 2020. (Id.,

¶ 22, PageID #10.) Defendants do not dispute either arrest date in any of their

pleadings, instead contesting probable cause. (ECF No. 3, PageID #134.) According

to the police report from December 19, 2019, which Plaintiff attached to his brief,

Sergeant Williams “completed and filed with the clerk of court a registered warrant

for the arrest of Michael Dunn for the crime of Domestic Violence” that same day.

(ECF No. 6-3, PageID #188.) Because the pleadings identify three distinct “arrest

dates,” the Court addresses probable cause for each in turn.

II.A.1. The Initial Investigation

Ohio law embodies a “preferred arrest policy in domestic violence situations.”

Thacker v. City of Columbus, 328 F.3d 244, 256 (6th Cir. 2003). Where an officer in

Ohio has “reasonable grounds to believe that the offense of domestic violence . . . has

been committed and reasonable cause to believe that a particular person is guilty of

committing the offense, it is the preferred course of action in this state that the officer

arrest and detain that person.” Id. (quoting Ohio Rev. Code § 2935.03(B)(3)(b)).

Under Ohio law, no person shall “knowingly” or “recklessly” cause “physical

harm to a family or household member” or cause such a person “to believe that the

offender will cause imminent physical harm” with the “threat of force.” Ohio Rev.

Code §§ 2919.25(A)–(C). Although the alleged victim in Plaintiff’s criminal matter is

his ex-girlfriend, courts in the Sixth Circuit have found that officers have probable

cause for an arrest for domestic violence involving persons in former relationships.

See, e.g., Scott v. City of Bexley, 11 F. App’x 514, 515 (6th Cir. 2001) (determining that

probable cause existed after the plaintiff drove to the home of his former girlfriend

and caused her to believe that he might break her door down).

In this case, Plaintiff alleges that when Officers Pietraszkiewicz and Marincek

arrived at his ex-girlfriend’s residence, she told them that Mr. Dunn had “just

assaulted her” after he entered her home. (ECF No. 1-1, ¶¶ 8–9, PageID #8.) She

claimed that she and Plaintiff “began an argument” and “began shoving each other.”

(Id., ¶¶10–11, PageID #8.) Further, she claimed that “Plaintiff allegedly grabbed her

by her hair and started choking her,” and that she chased him out of her home with

a four-foot carpenter’s level after pouring hot sauce on him. (Id., ¶¶ 11–12, PageID

#8–9.)

Plaintiff contends that Officers Pietraszkiewicz and Marincek “would or should

have known upon investigating the incident” that the alleged victim “(1) refused

EMS, (2) appeared to be intoxicated and was slurring her words, (3) had no apparent

signs of injury, and (4) [her] story was also inconsistent as she was describing what

occurred.” (ECF No. 6, PageID #182–83.) The totality of these facts and

circumstances provides the officers with probable cause, as a matter of law. They

provide “reasonable grounds to believe” that Mr. Dunn knowingly or recklessly

caused physical harm to a family or household member. Ohio Rev. Code

§§ 2919.25(A)–(C); Thacker, 328 F.3d at 256.

The police report confirms these observations. (ECF No. 6-1, PageID #185.)

Also, it shows that Defendants “articulate[d] concrete facts from which they infer[red]

a probability that illegality ha[d] occurred.” Strickland, 144 F.3d at 415; see also, e.g.,

Scott, 11 F. App’x at 515; Bringman v. Village of Fredericktown, No. 16-4295, 2017

WL 5564675, at *2 (6th Cir. June 29, 2017) (finding that a reasonable officer would

find probable cause existed where the alleged victim stated that the plaintiff “shoved

her in the back and caused her to fall to the ground”).

Plaintiff relies on a general police order by the Cleveland Division of Police

which states that City policy requires that the police “shall thoroughly investigate

any incident of domestic violence and in cases where there is evidence of domestic

violence, members shall arrest the primary physical aggressor ensuring compliance

with” Ohio law. (ECF No. 6, PageID #181; ECF No. 6-4, PageID #189.) Plaintiff

makes no argument how this police order undermines probable cause. At the time of

the initial investigation, the facts—construed in Plaintiff’s favor—provided

reasonable grounds to believe that Mr. Dunn had engaged in domestic violence.

Therefore, Officers Pietraszkiewicz and Marincek had probable cause to arrest

Mr. Dunn. See Voyticky, 412 F.3d at 677.

II.A.2. The Grand Jury’s Indictment

In Count Three, Plaintiff alleges that Sergeant Williams “lacked probable

cause to present charges to the Cuyahoga County Prosecutor’s Office which resulted

in the indictment . . . against Plaintiff.” (ECF No. 1-1, ¶ 47, PageID #14.) As a result,

Plaintiff claims that he “was detained and held, against his will and without lawful

justification on January 31, 2020, through the time he was released after his arrest.”

(Id. ¶ 48, PageID #14.)

Generally, “the finding of an indictment, fair upon its face, by a properly

constituted grand jury, conclusively determines the existence of probable cause.”

Webb v. United States, 789 F.3d 647, 660 (6th Cir. 2015) (quoting Barnes v. Wright,

449 F.3d 709, 716 (6th Cir. 2006)). Similarly, “[a]n arrest pursuant to a facially valid

warrant is normally a complete defense to a federal constitutional claim for false

arrest or false imprisonment made pursuant to § 1983.” Voyticky, 412 F.3d at 677

(citing Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 143–44 (1979)).

A plaintiff may rebut an indictment’s presumption of probable cause where he

can demonstrate: “(1) a law enforcement officer, in the course of setting a prosecution

in motion, either knowingly or recklessly makes false statements or falsifies or

fabricates evidence; (2) the false statements and evidence, together with any

concomitant misleading omissions, are material to the ultimate prosecution of the

plaintiff; and (3) the false statements, evidence, and omissions do not consist solely

of grand jury testimony or preparation for that testimony.” King v. Harwood, 852

F.3d 586, 587–88 (6th Cir. 2017). In short, where the defendant fabricates evidence

or knowingly or recklessly makes a materially false statement outside of the grand

jury, a plaintiff may rebut the presumption of probable cause. Lester v. Roberts, 986

F.3d 599, 608 (6th Cir. 2021). But absolute immunity protects grand jury testimony,

as well as the “preparatory activity” of a witness who testifies before the grand jury.

Id. (quoting Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 370 (2012)); see also King, 952 F.3d at

587–88.

Sergeant Williams does not raise absolute immunity for grand jury testimony

or any preparatory activity as a defense. Absolute immunity in this context “must be

affirmatively pleaded, or it is forfeited.” Id. (quoting Parnell v. City of Detroit, 786 F.

App’x 43, 47 n.3 (6th Cir. 2019)). Therefore, Sergeant Williams forfeited this defense,

and the Court will proceed with analysis of Plaintiff’s claim.

“[F]ailing to disclose potentially exculpatory evidence differs from

affirmatively falsifying evidence.” Id. (quoting Costino v. Anderson, 786 F. App’x 344,

348 (3d Cir. 2019)). In Lester, the plaintiff attempted to rebut the presumption of

probable cause arising from his indictment by arguing that the detective “recklessly

failed to disclose” problems with a witness’s statements. 986 F.3d at 608. The Sixth

Circuit concluded that “this purported ‘omission’ of exculpatory evidence (as opposed

to affirmative ‘false statements’) may not suffice to defeat this presumption.” Id.

(quoting King, 852 F.3d at 587) (cleaned up). Sergeant Williams’s report does not

include the details from the officers’ police report that the alleged victim appeared to

be intoxicated, had no apparent signs of injuries, and gave an inconsistent story.

(ECF No. 6-1, PageID #185; ECF No. 6-3, PageID #188.) However, the police report

indicates that Sergeant Williams “spoke to the [alleged] victim” and “took photos of

her injuries.” (ECF No. 6-3, PageID #188.) This is the sort of evidence that supports

probable cause. See Wiley v. Oberlin Police Dep’t, 330 F. App’x 524, 528 (6th Cir.

2009) (citing Thacker, 328 F.3d at 257). Plaintiff fails to allege that Sergeant

Williams falsified or fabricated evidence or knowingly or recklessly made false

statements. To the contrary, crediting Plaintiff’s allegations and taking them as true

in the present procedural posture, the record shows that Sergeant Williams

conducted his own investigation and drew his own conclusions. In his view, the

evidence sufficed to establish probable cause, and a grand jury agreed.

Plaintiff relies on inconsistencies in the story of the victim and other evidence.

He contends that Sergeant Williams “would or should have known that with further

investigation,” and, coupled with the police report stating that the alleged victim

appeared intoxicated and made inconsistent statements, that “Defendants violated

the Plaintiff’s clearly established constitutional right.” (ECF No. 6, PageID # 183.)

As the Sixth Cirucit has noted, “alleged inconsistencies, even considered collectively,

do not show the absence of probable cause.” Lester, 986 F.3d at 611. “Once probable

cause is established, an officer is under no duty to investigate further or to look for

additional evidence which may exculpate the accused.” Id. (quoting Ahlers v. Schebil,

188 F.3d 365, 371 (6th Cir. 1999)).

Because the Court finds that Sergeant Williams did not “knowingly or

recklessly make false statements or falsifie[d] or fabricate[d] evidence,” the Court

need not reach whether such statements were material to Plaintiff’s ultimate

prosecution. King, 852 F.3d at 587–88. As a matter of law, Plaintiff has not rebutted

and cannot rebut the presumption of probable cause from his indictment. Therefore,

the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims for false arrest

and false imprisonment against Officer Pietraszkiewicz, Officer Marincek, and

Sergeant Williams.

II.B. Malicious Prosecution

In Counts Six through Eight, Plaintiff brings claims for malicious prosecution.

(ECF No. 1-1, ¶¶ 69–76, PageID #19–23.) He alleges that Officer Pietraszkiewicz,

Officer Marincek, and Sergeant Williams “instituted criminal prosecution, charges

and/or proceedings against Plaintiff, maliciously in violation of his rights guaranteed

under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.” (Id., ¶¶ 71, 79, 87, PageID #19–20

& 22.)

Malicious prosecution occurs where: “(1) the defendant made, influenced, or

participated in the decision to prosecute the plaintiff; (2) there was no probable cause

for the criminal prosecution; (3) as a consequence of the legal proceedings, the

plaintiff suffered a deprivation of liberty apart from the initial arrest; and (4) the

criminal proceeding was resolved in the plaintiff’s favor.” Webb, 789 F.3d at 659

(citing Sykes v. Anderson, 625 F.3d 294, 308–09 (6th Cir. 2010)). Defendants do not

contest the latter two elements, focusing instead on the first two. (ECF No. 3, PageID

#135–37.) For his part, Plaintiff argues that Defendants sought an indictment and

arrest warrant despite lacking probable cause. (ECF No. 6, PageID #181–83.)

Accordingly, the inquiry focuses on: (1) whether each Defendant individually

participated in the decision to prosecute, and (2) whether probable cause to prosecute

did not exist.

However, the same probable cause principles apply to malicious prosecution

and false arrest. See Weser v. Gordon, 965 F.3d 507, 513 (6th Cir. 2020). Claims for

malicious prosecution and false arrest claims proceed analytically on a “parallel

course.” Hart v. Hillsdale Cnty., 973 F.3d 627, 642–43 (6th Cir. 2020). Because the

Court already concluded that probable cause supported Mr. Dunn’s indictment, that

analysis disposes of his claims for malicious prosecution under Section 1983.

Therefore, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s malicious

prosecution claims against Officer Pietraszkiewicz, Officer Marincek, and Sergeant

Williams.

II.C. Official Capacity Claims

Finally, Plaintiff brings suit against Defendants in their official capacities.

Plaintiff did not respond to Defendants’ argument that the official-capacity claims

against them fail as a matter of law. (Compare ECF No. 3, PageID #139–42, with

ECF No. 6, PageID #175–83.) Because Plaintiff failed to respond to Defendants’

argument, the Court finds that he has abandoned his official-capacity claims.

* * *

For these reasons, the Court GRANTS the motion to dismiss of Officer

Pietraszkiewicz, Officer Marincek, and Sergeant Williams.

CONCLUSION

For all the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motions to

dismiss (ECF No. 1-2, PageID #75; ECF No. 6, PageID #170).

SO ORDERED.

Dated: January 23, 2025

J.Philip Calabrese”

United States District Judge

Northern District of Ohio

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