Sanders v. Strata

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

EASTERN DIVISION

______________________________________________________________________________

ANTONIO SANDERS,

Plaintiff,

vs. Civil No. 1:24-cv-01033-SHM-tmp

FRANK STRATA, ET AL.,

Defendants.

______________________________________________________________________________

ORDER DIRECTING CLERK TO MODIFY THE DOCKET; DISMISSING THE

COMPLAINT (ECF NO. 1) WITHOUT PREJUDICE IN PART AND WITH PREJUDICE

IN PART; GRANTING LEAVE TO AMEND CLAIMS DISMISSED WITHOUT

PREJUDICE, AND DISMISSING PENDING MOTIONS (ECF NOS. 6 & 7)

______________________________________________________________________________

On February 8, 2024, Plaintiff Antonio Sanders, an inmate currently incarcerated at the

Northwest Correctional Complex (the “NWCX”), in Tiptonville, Tennessee,1 filed a pro se

complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF No. 1 (the “Complaint”).) On February 15, 2024,

the Court ordered Sanders to comply with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(A)(1)-(2) or pay the entire civil filing

fee. (ECF No. 3.) On March 14, 2024, Sanders filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF

No. 4.) On May 3, 2024, the Court granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis and assessed the

civil filing fee pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915, et seq. (the

“PLRA”). (ECF No. 5.) On August 7, 2024, Sanders filed a motion for service of process,

appointment of counsel and combined memorandum of law. (ECF No. 6.) On August 26, 2024,

Sanders filed a motion for preservation of evidence, appointment of counsel and combined

memorandum of law. (ECF No. 7.)

1 See Tennessee Department of Correction (“TDOC”), Felony Offender Information,

https://foil.app.tn.gov/foil/search.jsp (last accessed Jan. 23, 2025).

The Complaint (ECF No. 1), the motion for service of process and appointment of counsel,

and the motion for preservation of evidence and appointment of counsel (ECF Nos. 6 & 7 (the

“Pending Motions”)) are before the Court.

The Complaint is construed to allege claims of failure to protect and failure to train

resulting in Eighth Amendment violations. (ECF No. 1 at PageID 3-7.) Sanders sues Defendants:

(1) TDOC Commissioner Frank Strada2; (2) NWCX Warden Brandon Watwood; (3) NWCX

Officer in Charge John Doe 1; (4) NWCX Shift Commanding Sergeant John Doe 2; and (5) NWCX

Corrections Officer John Doe 3. (ECF No. 1 at PageID 1-3.) Sanders sues the Defendants in their

individual and official capacity3. (See ECF No. 14 at PageID 229-32.)

The Clerk is DIRECTED to add the State of Tennessee as a Defendant.

Sanders seeks: (1) five hundred thousand dollars ($500,000.00) “for injuries [Sanders]

sustained as a result of Defendants negligent conduct”; and (2) any other additional relief the

interest of justice may require. (ECF No. 1 at PageID 7.)

For the reasons explained below, the Court: (1) DISMISSES the Complaint in part WITH

PREJUDICE and in part WITHOUT PREJUDICE for failure to state a claim to relief (ECF No.

1); (2) DENIES the motion for service of process and appointment of counsel (ECF No. 6) and the

motion for preservation of evidence and appointment of counsel (ECF No. 7); and (3) GRANTS

leave to amend the claims dismissed without prejudice.

2 Sanders names Frank “Strata” commissioner as a defendant. The Court construes this to

name TDOC Commissioner Frank Strada as a defendant. See https://www.tn.gov/correction/

about-us/commissioner-frank-strada.html (last accessed Jan. 23, 2025). The Clerk is DIRECTED

to modify the docket to show Frank Strada as a defendant and to remove all reference to Strata as

a defendant.

3 Sanders alleges the defendants are sued in their “individual and professional capacities[.]”

(See ECF No. 1 at PageID 2-3.) The Court liberally construes the Complaint to allege that Sanders

is suing each defendant in that defendant’s official and individual capacity.

I. BACKGROUND

Sanders alleges that on January 14, 2024,4 at 10:30 a.m. in unit twelve, cell sixty-two at

NWCX, he was attacked by a “masked assailant” and struck in the face with a lock wrapped inside

a sock. (ECF No. 1 at PageID 3-4.) Sanders alleges that eight “additional assailants” then attacked

him. (ECF No. 1 at PageID 4.) Sanders “fled to the bottom of the stairs within the unit” and was

struck again. (Id.) Sanders alleges “the officer who observed the incident didn’t call a security

disturbance code [or] otherwise try to ass[i]st Plaintiff.” (Id.) Sanders “fled the unit” to “get away”

and “secure medical aid.” (Id.) Sanders was attacked again. (Id.) An unnamed inmate notified

security personnel, and Sanders was taken Dyersburg Hospital. (Id. at PageID 4-5.)

Sanders alleges that he suffered a broken eye socket, broken nose, abrasions, contusions,

and mental and psychological injuries from the attack. (Id. at PageID 5.) At the hospital, Sanders

was told he would require reconstructive facial surgery for his injuries. (Id.) Sanders alleges that

“his attackers” robbed him of over two-hundred dollars in “commissary items” taken from his cell

during the attack. (Id. at PageID 6.)

Sanders alleges NWCX is a “pervasively violent institution, run by gangs, that has

developed a custom of failing to train its employees creating dangerous and unsafe conditions”,

violating Sanders’ Eighth Amendment rights by failing to protect Sanders and by “maintaining a

dangerously understaffed prison that allows the assault of offenders[.]” (Id. at PageID 5.) Sanders

alleges Strada is “aware of the [d]angerous and lawless atmosphere at [NWCX], as well as the

state of the poorly trained, understaffed security pers[onnel.]” (Id. at PageID 6.) Sanders alleges

4 Sanders does not allege a year, but has attached what appears to be a hospital

identification bracelet dated January 14, 2024, to the Complaint as Exhibit “A.” (See id. at PageID

8.)

Strada has the “power” to correct the conditions at NWCX, and that Strada has failed to do so.

(Id.)

Sanders alleges that Watwood is aware of the conditions at NWCX and “has also failed in

his duty to [e]nsure that officers are adequately trained and that [NWCX] is adequately staffed to

protect offenders from assault.” (Id.)

Sanders alleges Defendants “John Doe 1-3” and “supervisors are poorly trained and

deliberately indifferent to the health and safety of inmates within [NWCX].” (Id. at PageID 7.)

II. SCREENING THE COMPLAINT

A. LEGAL STANDARD

The Court must screen prisoner complaints and dismiss any complaint, or any portion of

it, if the complaint—

(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or

(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

In assessing whether the complaint states a claim on which relief may be granted, the Court

applies the standards under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), as stated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662, 677-79 (2009), and in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-57 (2007).

Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010). Under those standards, the Court accepts the

complaint’s “well-pleaded” factual allegations as true and then determines whether the allegations

“plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief.” Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011)

(quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681). The Court does not assume that conclusory allegations are true,

because they are not “factual,” and all legal conclusions in a complaint “must be supported by

factual allegations.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement

of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” It also requires factual allegations to

make a “‘showing,’ rather than a blanket assertion, of entitlement to relief.” Twombly, 550 U.S.

at 555 n.3 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)).

Courts screening cases accord more deference to pro se complaints than to complaints

drafted by lawyers. “Pro se complaints are to be held ‘to less stringent standards than formal

pleadings drafted by lawyers,’ and should therefore be liberally construed.” Williams, 631 F.3d at

383 (quoting Martin v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 712 (6th Cir. 2004)). Pro se litigants are not exempt

from the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594

(6th Cir. 1989); see also Brown v. Matauszak, 415 F. App’x 608, 612, 613 (6th Cir. 2011)

(affirming dismissal of pro se complaint for failure to comply with “unique pleading requirements”

and stating, “a court cannot ‘create a claim which [a plaintiff] has not spelled out in his pleading’”

(quoting Clark v. Nat’l Travelers Life Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975))).

B. REQUIREMENTS TO STATE A CLAIM UNDER § 1983

Sanders sues under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF No. 1 at PageID 1.) To state a claim under

§ 1983, a plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) a deprivation of rights secured by the

“Constitution and laws” of the United States, and (2) that a defendant caused harm while acting

under color of state law. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150 (1970).

III. ANALYSIS

A. John Doe Defendants

Sanders names “John Doe 1”, “John Doe 2” and “John Doe 3” as Defendants. Sanders fails to

allege a cognizable claim against anyone. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 10(a) requires a plaintiff

to “name all the parties” in a complaint. Service of process cannot be made on an unidentified

party. See Wiggins v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 641 F. App’x 545, 548-49 (6th Cir. 2016). Before

Sanders can proceed against any unnamed individuals, he must first identify the individuals and

re-allege his claims against them.

Sanders’s allegations against “John Doe 1”, “John Doe 2” and “John Doe 3” fail to state a

claim to relief, and those claims are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

B. Individual Named Defendants Sued in Their Official Capacity

To the extent Sanders asserts claims against Strada and Watwood in their official capacity,

those allegations are treated as claims against their employer, the State of Tennessee. See, e.g.,

Owens v. Weirich, No. 21-cv-2041, 2021 WL 4234937, at *2 (W.D. Tenn. Sept. 26, 2021). A state

is not a person within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Lapides v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ.

Sys. of Ga., 535 U.S. 613, 617 (2002); Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989).

Section 1983 does not authorize suits against state entities. See Will 491 U.S. at 58, 65. “Will

removes persons acting in their official capacities on behalf of the State from the scope of § 1983

altogether, thereby eliminating the need for a court to undertake any sort of immunity analysis

with respect to such a claim[.]” Gean v. Hattaway, 330 F.3d 758, 766–67, 2003 WL 21295019

(6th Cir. 2003).

Sanders does not state a claim to relief against the State of Tennessee. For the reasons

explained above, Sanders’s § 1983 claims against the State of Tennessee and against Strada and

Watwood in their official capacity are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE for failure to state a claim

to relief.

C. Individual Named Defendants Sued in Their Individual Capacity

To the extent Sanders asserts failure to train claims against Strada and Watwood in their

individual capacities, he fails to state a claim to relief. Sanders’s conclusory allegations that Strada

and Watwood failed to train NWCX employees do not demonstrate that Strada or Watwood

directly participated or implicitly authorized, approved, or acquiesced in the unconstitutional

conduct alleged in the Complaint. (ECF No. 1 at PageID 3-7.) Absent evidence of personal

involvement in the alleged underlying misconduct, a defendant cannot be individually liable based

on his failure to train or supervise. Heyerman v. Cnty. of Calhoun, 680 F.3d 642, 646–48 (6th Cir.

2012). The Sixth Circuit has found that an attempt to hold an officer liable in his individual

capacity for his “alleged failure to adequately train employees ... ‘improperly conflates a §

1983 claim of individual supervisory liability with one of municipal liability.’” Harvey v.

Campbell Cnty., 453 F. App'x 557, 563 (6th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted).

Sanders fails to allege sufficient facts stating a claim of failure to train against Strada and

Watwood in their individual capacity. Sanders’s § 1983 claims against Strada and Watwood in

their individual capacity are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for failure to state a claim to

relief.

IV. AMENDMENT UNDER THE PLRA

The Sixth Circuit has held that a district court may allow a prisoner to amend his complaint

to avoid a sua sponte dismissal under the PLRA. Lucas v. Chalk, 785 F. App’x 288, 291 (6th Cir.

2019) (citing LaFountain v. Harry, 716 F.3d 944, 951 (6th Cir. 2013) (“[W]e hold, like every

other circuit to have reached the issue, that under Rule 15(a) a district court can allow a plaintiff

to amend his complaint even when the complaint is subject to dismissal under the PLRA”)); see

also Brown v. R.I., 511 F. App’x 4, 5 (1st Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (“Ordinarily, before dismissal

for failure to state a claim is ordered, some form of notice and an opportunity to cure the

deficiencies in the complaint must be afforded”). Leave to amend is not required where a

deficiency cannot be cured. Gonzalez-Gonzalez v. United States, 257 F.3d 31, 37 (1st Cir. 2001)

(“This does not mean, of course, that every sua sponte dismissal entered without prior notice to

the plaintiff automatically must be reversed. If it is crystal clear that ... amending the complaint

would be futile, then a sua sponte dismissal may stand.”); Curley v. Perry, 246 F.3d 1278, 1284

(10th Cir. 2001) (“We agree with the majority view that sua sponte dismissal of a meritless

complaint that cannot be salvaged by amendment comports with due process and does not infringe

the right of access to the courts”). The Court grants leave to amend the complaint under the

conditions set forth below.

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above:

A. The Clerk is DIRECTED to add the State of Tennessee as a defendant;

B. The Court DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE Sanders’s § 1983 claims against

Strada and Watwood in their official capacity and the State of Tennessee for failure

to allege facts stating a claim to relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)-(iii);

C. The Court DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Sanders’s § 1983 claims against

Strada and Watwood in their individual capacity and the John Doe Defendants for

failure to allege facts stating a claim to relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)

and 1915A(b)(1);

D. Leave to amend claims dismissed without prejudice in the Complaint is

GRANTED. Amended claims must be filed within twenty-one (21) days of the

date of this Order. An amended pleading must comply with the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure, including but not limited to Rule 8’s requirement of a short and

plain statement of Sanders’ claims. An amended complaint supersedes the

Complaint and must be complete in itself without reference to the prior pleadings.

Sanders or his counsel must sign the amended complaint, and the text of the

amended complaint must allege sufficient facts to support each claim without

reference to any extraneous document. Any exhibits must be identified by number

in the text of the amended complaint and must be attached to the amended

complaint. All claims alleged in an amended complaint must arise from the facts

alleged in the Complaint. Each claim for relief must be stated in a separate count

and must identify each Defendant sued on that count. If Sanders fails to file an

amended complaint within the time specified, the Court will dismiss the Complaint

with prejudice and enter judgment. For § 1915(g) analysis, the Court recommends

that any such dismissal should be treated as a strike pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).

See Simons v. Washington, 996 F.3d 350, 353 (6th Cir. 2021). The “three strikes”

provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) prevents a court from granting in forma pauperis

status to a prisoner who “has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated . . .

brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on

the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief

may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g);

E. Sanders fails to state a claim for relief. Because he has no pending claims at this

time, the motion for service of process and to appoint counsel and the motion for

the preservation of evidence and appointment of counsel (ECF Nos. 6 & 7) are

DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE; and

F. Sanders must promptly notify the Clerk, in writing, of any change of address or

extended absence. Failure to comply with these requirements, or any other order

of the Court, may result in the dismissal of this case without further notice.

IT IS SO ORDERED, this 23rd day of January, 2025.

/s/ Samuel H. Mays, Jr.

SAMUEL H. MAYS, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE