Opinion

Cox v. City of Oakland

Court: California Supreme Court
Filed: Jan 23, 2025
Status: Published
Cited by: 0 cases
Authority: More cited than 33.8%

The opinion

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF

CALIFORNIA

ALVIN COX, as Trustee, etc.,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

CITY OF OAKLAND,

Defendant and Respondent.

S280234

First Appellate District, Division One

A162465

Alameda County Superior Court

RG20068131

January 23, 2025

Chief Justice Guerrero authored the opinion of the Court, in

which Justices Corrigan, Liu, Kruger, Groban, Jenkins, and

Evans concurred.

COX v. CITY OF OAKLAND

S280234

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

The Subdivision Map Act (the Act; Gov. Code, §§ 66410–

66499.41)1 “is ‘the primary regulatory control’ governing the

subdivision of real property in California.” (Gardner v. County

of Sonoma (2003) 29 Cal.4th 990, 996 (Gardner).) In general,

the Act requires a landowner wanting to divide real property to

first seek local governmental approval of a map detailing

various aspects of the proposed subdivision. (Gardner, at

p. 997.) Such approval can only be obtained after a local agency

conducts an “extensive review” of the proposed subdivision with

respect to numerous land use and development criteria. (Ibid.)

To enforce the important public policies furthered by such

review, the Act prohibits the sale, lease, or financing of any

parcel of subdivided real property until an approved map is

recorded. (Gardner, at p. 999.) The filing of such a map was

formerly only required when dividing land into five or more

parcels during a one-year period. (See, e.g., Stats. 1929, ch. 837,

§ 1, p. 1791.) But the Legislature amended the Act, effective

March 4, 1972, to require the filing of a “parcel map” when

dividing land into fewer than five parcels. (Stats. 1971,

ch. 1446, § 5, pp. 2854–2855; see Fishback v. County of Ventura

(2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 896, 904 (Fishback).) Currently, with

some exceptions, pursuant to section 66426, a “tentative and

Subsequent undesignated statutory references are to the

Government Code.

COX v. CITY OF OAKLAND

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

final map shall be required for all subdivisions creating five or

more parcels,” and a “parcel map” is generally required for

subdivisions involving four or fewer parcels (id., subd. (f); see

§ 66428).

Modern-day recordation of an approved map under the Act

ordinarily creates the parcels depicted on the map. (Gardner,

supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 1002.) But where a subdivision map was

recorded prior to 1893 — the first year of statewide regulation

of the subdivision of real property in California — a lot generally

obtained no independent legal status based on such depiction on

an antiquated map. (Id. at p. 1001.) The recordation of an

antiquated map did not itself divide the land or create the

separately identified parcels. Instead, a lot depicted on an

antiquated map generally gained independent legal status as a

separate parcel when the owner “conveyed the lot separately

from the surrounding lands.” (Ibid.)

Section 66412.6, subdivision (a) (section 66412.6(a))

confirms the legality of parcels lawfully created by such historic

conveyances. Specifically, section 66412.6(a) establishes a

conclusive presumption of the legality of any parcel “created

prior to March 4, 1972 . . . if the parcel resulted from a division

of land in which fewer than five parcels were created” and “there

was no local ordinance in effect which regulated divisions of land

creating fewer than five parcels.” Thus, section 66412.6(a)

provides that lawful parcels “created” by a “division of land”

prior to the effective date of the Act’s parcel map filing

requirement continue to be lawful parcels. (Fishback, supra,

133 Cal.App.4th at p. 904.)

In this case, we consider the circumstances under which

section 66412.6(a)’s requirement of past “creat[ion]” may be

COX v. CITY OF OAKLAND

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

satisfied by historical conveyances from a grantor to a grantee

at common law. A landowner claims that a conveyance

occurring prior to March 4, 1972 — that identified the property

being conveyed as contiguous land described as Lot 18, Lot 17,

and a portion of Lot 16 on an antiquated subdivision map —

created separate parcels consisting of each of the conveyed lots

within the meaning of section 66412.6(a). Specifically, the

landowner maintains that the conveyance “created three

separate parcels” through a “division of land” under

section 66412.6(a), and it seeks to confirm Lot 18 as a separate

legal parcel. After the trial court rejected the landowner’s

contention, the Court of Appeal agreed with the landowner and

concluded that Lot 18 was a parcel entitled to the conclusive

presumption of legality under section 66412.6(a).2 (See Cox v.

City of Oakland (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 850, 870–871 (Cox).)

In reviewing the Court of Appeal’s decision, we consider

whether the landowner is correct that the conveyance at issue

created three separate parcels for purposes of section

66412(a) — consisting of Lot 18, Lot 17, and a portion of

Lot 16 — rather than a single parcel encompassing all three

lots. We conclude the Court of Appeal misperceived the meaning

of section 66412.6(a) and therefore erred in holding that Lot 18

constitutes a lawful separate parcel. As explained below, the

phrase “division of land” in section 66412.6(a) should be

interpreted in light of similar language contained in the Act’s

general definition of “subdivision” provided in section 66424.

Properly understood, when applied to a common law conveyance

We need not consider the statute’s requirement of the

absence of a relevant local regulatory ordinance because it is

undisputed that this requirement was met in this case.

COX v. CITY OF OAKLAND

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

from a grantor to a grantee, the conveyance of one portion of an

original parcel constitutes a division under section 66412.6(a) if

the conveyance “create[s]” a new parcel comprised of the

conveyed portion of property. However, for purposes of section

66412.6(a), a conveyance does not “create[]” multiple parcels

merely by referring separately to lots of the contiguous property

being conveyed.

Because Lot 18 was always conveyed together with

contiguous land, it has never been separately conveyed. The

mere use of multiple lot numbers in the description of property

being conveyed does not amount to a “division” of land that

“create[s]” parcels for each of the individual lots. (§ 66412.6(a).)

Thus, Lot 18 was never itself a parcel “created” as a result of “a

division of land” during the time period specified by the statute.

(Ibid.) Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeal’s judgment.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The land at issue was initially depicted as Lot 18 on a

subdivision map entitled “[M]ap of San Antonio” (Map),

recorded in 1869.3 (Cox, supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at p. 852.) The

Map depicts numerous “blocks,” each containing many smaller

units of land denominated as “lots.” (Ibid.)

Because many of the relevant chain of title documents in

the record are either illegible or difficult to read and the parties

do not dispute the relevant facts, our factual background is

drawn primarily from the Court of Appeal’s opinion. (See Cox,

supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at pp. 852–856.)

COX v. CITY OF OAKLAND

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

After the Map was recorded, Lot 18 was conveyed several

times by name, along with various other contiguous lots.4 (See

Cox, supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at pp. 852–853, fns. 3–9.) In 1944,

Lot 18, together with Lot 17 and a portion of Lot 16, were

conveyed in a single deed by a single grantor to a husband and

wife as joint tenants.5 No other conveyances occurred prior to

the March 4, 1972 effective date of the Act’s parcel map filing

requirement. Many years later, in 2015, plaintiff acquired this

same property (Lots 18 and 17 and part of Lot 16) by a single

deed. (Cox, at p. 853.)

Plaintiff applied for a certificate of compliance6 requesting

that the City of Oakland (City) certify that Lot 18 was a

separate parcel that had been legally created prior to March 4,

For example, an 1887 conveyance described the property

being conveyed as follows: “ ‘Lots Fifteen, Sixteen, Seventeen,

and Eighteen (15, 16, 17, and 18) in Block No. Sixty Six (66) of

what was formerly the Town of San Antonio as per Map thereof,’

followed by a mete[s] and bounds description that encompassed

all four lots.” (Cox, supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at p. 853, fn. 6.)

Although the Court of Appeal stated that the 1944 deed

transferred the property to a singular “grantee” (Cox, supra,

91 Cal.App.5th at p. 853), the record indicates that the deed

transferred the property to a husband and wife as joint tenants.

However, for the reasons explained in footnote 23 post, we

conclude the discrepancy is immaterial.

Section 66499.35, subdivision (a) authorizes a real

property owner to ask a local agency to determine whether the

owner’s property complies with the provisions of the Act and

local ordinances enacted pursuant to the Act and, if so, to issue

a certificate of compliance that establishes that the parcel can

be sold, leased, or financed in compliance with the Act.

(Gardner, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 995.)

COX v. CITY OF OAKLAND

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

1972. After the City denied the application, plaintiff filed a

petition for writ of mandate asking that the trial court direct the

City to issue the certificate. The trial court denied the petition.

plaintiff appealed. The Court of Appeal reversed the judgment

and remanded the matter to the trial court with directions to

grant the petition and issue a writ requiring the City to issue a

certificate of compliance for Lot 18. (Cox, supra, 91 Cal.App.5th

at p. 871.)

We granted the City’s petition for review.

II. DISCUSSION

The City claims the Court of Appeal erred in concluding

that plaintiff was entitled to a certificate of compliance

establishing Lot 18 as a lawful parcel pursuant to

section 66412.6(a).

The City maintains that Lot 18 has never been created as

a separate parcel under the Act because it was never separately

conveyed from contiguous land. Plaintiff, in turn, contends that

Lot 18 was so created through a conveyance that separately

described Lot 18 as one of a group of lots conveyed. We agree

with the City.

The Act “has three principal goals: ‘to encourage orderly

community development, to prevent undue burdens on the

public, and to protect individual real estate buyers.’ [Citation.]

It ‘seeks “to encourage and facilitate orderly community

development, coordinate planning with the community pattern

established by local authorities, and assure proper

improvements are made, so that the area does not become an

undue burden on the taxpayer.” ’ ” (Pacific Palisades Bowl

COX v. CITY OF OAKLAND

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

Mobile Estates, LLC v. City of Los Angeles (2012) 55 Cal.4th 783,

798–799 (Pacific Palisades).)

“The Act ‘grants to local governments the power to

regulate the manner in which their communities grow.

Although the Act itself contains few, if any, substantive growth

regulations, it requires every landowner who wishes to divide a

single parcel of land into smaller parcels for individual sale —

thereby increasing the density of settlement on the land — to

obtain the approval of the local government before doing so.

[Citations.] At the same time, the Act vests “[r]egulation and

control of the design and improvement of subdivisions’ in city

and county governing bodies, requiring them to adopt

ordinances regulating the manner in which growth will occur.

[Citation.] By requiring proposed new subdivisions to comply

with these regulations as a condition of approval, local

governments can ensure that new real estate development

conforms with their communities’ general and specific plans and

other regulations adopted to guide growth.” ’ ” (Save Mount

Diablo v. Contra Costa County (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 1368,

1377 (Save Mount Diablo).)

The Act “legitimizes property divisions under processes

that are both forward and backward looking.” (Save Mount

Diablo, supra, 240 Cal.App.4th at p. 1377.) With respect to

forward looking processes, the Act requires “an owner who

wants to subdivide property to apply for a final or parcel map

effecting the subdivision.” (Save Mount Diablo, at p. 1377.) The

Act “enforces the requirement of map approval by prohibiting

the sale, lease, or financing of a lot until an approved final or

parcel map, as appropriate, has been recorded with respect to

the lot.” (Witt Home Ranch, Inc. v. County of Sonoma (2008)

165 Cal.App.4th 543, 551.) Upon recordation of the appropriate

COX v. CITY OF OAKLAND

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

map, the single parcel of land is subdivided into however many

separate parcels appear on the approved map. (Gardner, supra,

29 Cal.4th at p. 1002.)

With respect to backward looking processes, the Act

recognizes that “the regulation of real property subdivision and

development in California has evolved significantly over the last

150 years.” (Abernathy Valley, Inc. v. County of Solano (2009)

173 Cal.App.4th 42, 47 (Abernathy Valley).) The Act gives effect

to prior property divisions, which were legal at the time they

were made, by allowing “an owner to legitimize a division of

property that has already occurred by obtaining a certificate of

compliance with the Act.” (Save Mount Diablo, supra,

240 Cal.App.4th at p. 1378.) “Once a certificate of compliance

has been issued, the property ‘may be sold, leased, or financed

without further compliance with the . . . Act or any local

ordinance enacted pursuant thereto.’ [Citations.] In other

words, the certificate of compliance clarifies the legal status of

property that is not reflected on a recorded final or parcel map,

thereby facilitating transactions involving the property.” (Ibid.)

The Act’s provision for the issuance of such certificates reflects

an “ ‘effort to provide a fair and equitable scheme to settle the

validity of divisions of land occurring in decades past under

earlier provisions of law.’ ” (Save Mount Diablo, at p. 1379.) “A

certificate of compliance is properly issued . . . when a statutory

exemption from the map requirements applies.” (Save Mount

Diablo, at pp. 1378–1379.) One such statutory exception is

section 66412.6(a). (Save Mount Diablo, at p. 1379.)

Section 66412.6(a) provides: “For purposes of this division

or of a local ordinance enacted pursuant thereto, any parcel

COX v. CITY OF OAKLAND

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

created prior to March 4, 1972, shall be conclusively presumed

to have been lawfully created if the parcel resulted from a

division of land in which fewer than five parcels were created

and if at the time of the creation of the parcel, there was no local

ordinance in effect which regulated divisions of land creating

fewer than five parcels.”

“ ‘ “The interpretation of a statute presents a question of

law that this court reviews de novo.” ’ ” (Davis v. Fresno Unified

School Dist. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 671, 687.) “ ‘Our fundamental

task in interpreting a statute is to determine the Legislature’s

intent so as to effectuate the law’s purpose.’ [Citation.] ‘We first

consider the words of the statutes, as statutory language is

generally the most reliable indicator of legislation’s intended

purpose.’ [Citation.] ‘We consider the ordinary meaning of the

relevant terms, related provisions, terms used in other parts of

the statute, and the structure of the statutory scheme.’

[Citation.] If the relevant statutory language permits more than

one reasonable interpretation, we look to appropriate extrinsic

sources, such as the statute’s purpose, legislative history, and

public policy.” (Prang v. Los Angeles County Assessment Appeals

Board (2024) 15 Cal.5th 1152, 1170 (Prang).)

When the Legislature enacted the requirement that the

creation of a parcel result from a “division of land”

(§ 66412.6(a)), it adopted language similar to what it had used

for more than half a century in defining the applicability of the

Act (or the Act’s statutory predecessors).7 In fact, when the

See, e.g., Stats. 1929, ch. 837, § 1, p. 1791 [“A ‘subdivision’

is a tract of land composed of five or more lots of one acre or less

in area, provided that when any person within one calendar year

COX v. CITY OF OAKLAND

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

Legislature first adopted section 66412.6(a) in 1980,8

section 66424 provided, as it does currently, that “ ‘Subdivision’

means the division, by any subdivider, of any unit or units of

improved or unimproved land . . . .” (Stats. 1979, ch. 1192, § 1,

p. 4691, italics added; § 66424.) In other words, “[s]ubdivision”

under section 66424 “generally refers to a division of land for

sale, lease, or financing.” (van’t Rood v. County of Santa Clara

(2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 549, 565 (van’t Rood), italics added.)

Given that the Act both “defines ‘subdivision’ ” (van’t

Rood, supra, 113 Cal.App.4th at p. 565) in section 66424 and

“provides a mechanism for determining the legality of a

previously established subdivision” through section 66412.6(a)

(van’t Rood, at p. 565), it may be said that the two statutes relate

to the same subject, namely the division of land under the Act.

This relation is further evident from the fact that the

Legislature made the operative date for section 66412.6(a) —

March 4, 1972 — identical to “the effective date of legislation

adding the requirement of a parcel map to the [Act] for divisions

divides any tract into five or more parts of one acre or less in

size, such tract shall be deemed to be a subdivision” (italics

added)]; Stats. 1937, ch. 670, § 2(g), p. 1864 [“ ‘Subdivision’ shall

mean any land or portion thereof shown on the last preceding

tax roll as a unit or as contiguous units which is divided for the

purpose of sale, whether immediate or future, by any subdivider

into five or more parcels within any one year period” (italics

added)].

The Legislature added section 66412.6(a) to the Act in

1980 by way of Assembly Bill No. 978 (1979–1980 Reg. Sess.).

(Stats. 1980, ch. 403, § 1, p. 788.) The 1980 version of

section 66412.6(a) is identical to the current version of the

statute, except for one comma prior to the final clause. (See

Stats. 1980, ch. 403, § 1, p. 788.)

COX v. CITY OF OAKLAND

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

of land into four or fewer parcels.” (Fishback, supra,

133 Cal.App.4th at p. 904.)

A review of the legislative history of the Act further shows

the interconnectedness of sections 66424 and 66412.6(a). When

it extended the Act to cover divisions of land creating four or

fewer parcels beginning March 4, 1972 (Stats. 1971, ch. 1446,

§ 5, p. 2854; Bus. & Prof. Code, former § 11535, subds. (b), (d)),

the Legislature initially maintained the definition of

“ ‘[s]ubdivision’ ” as encompassing land divided “into five or

more parcels,” thus distinguishing the two situations. (Stats.

1971, ch. 1446, § 5, p. 2854; Bus. & Prof. Code, former § 11535,

subd. (a).) However, the Legislature later removed the

numerical parcel qualification when it defined “ ‘[s]ubdivision’ ”

in newly added section 66424. (Stats. 1974, ch. 1536, p. 3467.)

Thereafter, in 1980, when the Legislature initially enacted

section 66412.6(a), it did so in response to “[c]onfusion . . . over

the legality of parcels created prior to March 4, 1972.” (Rep. on

Assem. Bill No. 978 (1979–1980 Reg. Sess.) as amended May 22,

1980, p. 2.) Thus, the legislative history reveals that the

Legislature harmonized the Act’s “ ‘[s]ubdivision’ ” definition in

section 66424 with the expansion of the Act to cover divisions of

land into four or fewer parcels on which the enactment of

section 66412.6(a) was based.

For all these reasons, it seems plain that the two statutes

are in pari materia. (See Lexin v. Superior Court (2010)

47 Cal.4th 1050, 1091 [“Two ‘ “[s]tatutes are considered to be in

pari materia when they relate to the same person or thing, to

the same class of person[s or] things, or have the same purpose

or object” ’ ”].) “ ‘ “ ‘[W]hen statutes are in pari materia similar

phrases appearing in each should be given like meanings.’ ” ’ ”

(United Educators of San Francisco etc. v. California

COX v. CITY OF OAKLAND

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd. (2020) 8 Cal.5th 805, 815.) This

principle supports the conclusion that the similar phrases

“division of land” in section 66412.6(a) and

“division . . . of . . . land” in section 66424 should be given the

same meaning.

Further, by interpreting the two statutes in harmony, we

advance section 66412.6’s purpose of “clarif[ying] that parcels

legally created without a parcel map are legal even after the

parcel map requirement was added to the [Act].” (Fishback,

supra, 133 Cal.App.4th at p. 904.) In contrast, if section

66412.6(a) were interpreted as confirming the legality of a

parcel from a division of land that would not constitute a parcel

under section 66424, we would be interpreting section

66412.6(a) as recognizing parcels that never would have been

recognized under the Act prior to the enactment of section

66412.6(a). Even plaintiff agrees that this result would subvert

the purpose of section 66412.6(a), which is to recognize and

confirm the legality of previously created parcels from prior

divisions of land rather than to create new parcels.

In addition, both the Court of Appeal and the Attorney

General have interpreted “division of land” in section 66412.6(a)

by considering what it means to divide land under section 66424.

(See Lakeview Meadows Ranch v. County of Santa Clara (1994)

27 Cal.App.4th 593, 597–599 (Lakeview Meadows);

86 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 70, 71 (2003) [citing 58 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen.

593, 594 (1975) in which the Attorney General considered

whether a condemnation action resulted in a division of land for

purposes of § 66424].) Because we agree that “division of land”

in section 66412.6(a) should be interpreted in the same manner

as the similar phrase in section 66424, we look to authorities

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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

that have interpreted section 66424 to inform our

understanding of section 66412.6(a).

Those authorities have uniformly required that, in order

to divide land and create a separate parcel, a conveyance must

create a separate and exclusive property right over the parcel.

For example, in Gardner, in addition to our conclusion regarding

the legal effect of an antiquated subdivision map,9 we held that

a multi-lot property had not been divided into its constituent lots

because it had “remained intact under sequential owners

throughout its history.” (Gardner, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 1003.)

We explained that “a subdivided lot shown on [an antiquated

subdivision] map generally enjoyed no independent legal status

until the owner actually conveyed the lot separately from the

surrounding lands through a deed or patent.” (Id. at p. 1001,

italics added; see id. at pp. 1001–1002, citing, inter alia,

Lakeview Meadows, supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at pp. 596–598, John

Taft Corp. v. Advisory Agency (1984) 161 Cal.App.3d 749, 756–

757 (Taft), and 81 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 144 (1998); see also

Abernathy Valley, supra, 173 Cal.App.4th at p. 54 [concluding

that the plaintiff was not entitled to certificate of compliance

under the Act because “[a]lthough [plaintiff] points out that a

In Gardner, this court concluded that, absent the existence

of an applicable local ordinance, subdivision maps recorded

prior to the first statewide authorization of such recording in

1893 do “not in themselves establish subdivisions or create legal

parcels.” (Gardner, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 1006.) We explained

that case law established antiquated maps recorded before that

year “could not alter the legal status of those properties without

the attendant conveyances.” (Id. at p. 1002.) Thus, we

concluded that the plaintiffs could not establish that their

property had been legally subdivided by virtue of a subdivision

map recorded in 1865. (Ibid.)

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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

portion of the property . . . that includes Lot 12 has been

conveyed . . . , [plaintiff] offers no evidence that Lot 12 was ever

separately conveyed as an individual parcel”].)

As in Gardner, in Lakeview Meadows, supra,

27 Cal.App.4th 593, the Court of Appeal considered whether a

parcel of land (parcel 4903) had been created by a conveyance.

It applied the general definition of “ ‘[s]ubdivision’ ” in

section 66424 and concluded that parcel 4903 had been created

because it had been placed into separate ownership from the

contiguous units of land surrounding it. (Lakeview Meadows, at

pp. 597–598.)

The Lakeview Meadows court reasoned: “Plaintiff alleged

and proved that parcel 4903 was ‘created’ when it was separated

from the other units of land with which it was contiguous by the

1891 federal patent which conveyed title to parcel 4903 to [the

plaintiff’s predecessor in title]. ‘ “Subdivision” means the

division . . . of any unit or units of improved or unimproved

land . . . for the purpose of sale, lease or financing . . . .’

([§ 66424].) Hence, land is ‘subdivided’ when one unit is

separated from the contiguous units surrounding it. Because

the federal patent which conveyed parcel 4903 to [the plaintiff’s

predecessor in title] did not convey any of the contiguous parcels

surrounding parcel 4903 to [the plaintiff’s predecessor in title],

this conveyance was a ‘subdivision’ of land which ‘created’ parcel

4903 as a separate lot. Accordingly, parcel 4903 was created by

a lawful subdivision of land in 1891.” (Lakeview Meadows,

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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at pp. 597–598; see Gomes v. County of

Mendocino (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 977, 983.)10

We also find particularly instructive an Attorney General

opinion that we cited favorably in Gardner and that considered

a question very similar to the one we face here. (See Gardner,

supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 1002, citing 81 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen., supra,

144; accord, California Building Industry Assn. v. State Water

Resources Control Bd. (2018) 4 Cal.5th 1032, 1042 [describing

persuasive value of Attorney General opinions].) In that

opinion, the Attorney General considered the following question:

“If a federal patent[11] conveying government property into

private ownership describes the property being conveyed in

terms of multiple, contiguous ‘lots’ depicted on an official United

In addition, the Attorney General has considered whether

“a physical division of land in 1965 that resulted in the granting

of a deed of property from the owner to [an] irrigation district”

in an eminent domain proceeding created two legal remainder

parcels in the land divided pursuant to section 66412.6(a).

(86 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen., supra, at p. 71.) Just as in Lakeview

Meadows, the Attorney General concluded that the two new

parcels were created when they were placed into separate

ownership from the land contiguous to the parcels.

(86 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen., supra, at p. 72 [noting that “[t]he two

parcels of land retained by the owner are separated by 700 feet

of the district’s property,” and that the condemnation resulted

in a “division of land . . . created by the recording of a deed and

transfer of ownership”].) Thus, the Attorney General reasoned

that “these two separate remainder parcels were lawfully

created . . . by the condemnation proceedings as conclusively

presumed under the mandate of section 66412.6.” (Ibid.)

“A patent is a deed of the United States, the conveyance

by which title to portions of the public domain is passed.”

(Gardner, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 1001, fn. 8.)

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Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

States Government Survey Map,[12] does each lot constitute a

distinct legal parcel that a county must recognize for purposes

of the [Act]?” (81 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen., supra, at p. 144.) The

Attorney General answered the question in the negative,

concluding that “lots described . . . collectively constitute one

parcel for purposes of the Act, not multiple legal parcels.” (Id.

at p. 146.)

In concluding there had been no “subdivision of land”

(81 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen., supra, at p. 145) under section 66424,

the Attorney General relied on Taft, supra, 161 Cal.App.3d 749.

The Attorney General noted the Taft court’s conclusion that

“three contiguous lots [depicted on an 1878 United States

Government Survey Map] that were later included in a patent

conveying approximately 140 acres of property into private

ownership” did not subdivide land for purposes of the Act.

(81 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen., supra, at p. 145.) The Attorney General

stressed that in Taft, “Subsequent conveyances were

accomplished by a single instrument that separately identified,

but did not divide, ownership of the lots.” (Ibid.; accord, Taft, at

p. 755 [stating that the Act “regulates the manner in which an

owner of a contiguous block of land may ‘subdivide’ or convey a

portion of land while retaining the balance”].) And the Attorney

General specifically distinguished the conveyance at issue in

“The [United States] Survey Map was prepared pursuant

to the federal survey law which was enacted to provide a

common method of property description. . . . [¶] After

California became a part of the United States in 1848 all of its

public lands — those not encompassed by the boundaries of a

pueblo or a Spanish or Mexican land grant — were surveyed

utilizing the system prescribed by the federal survey law.” (Taft,

supra, 161 Cal.App.3d at p. 754.)

COX v. CITY OF OAKLAND

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

Lakeview Meadows, explaining that in the matter before the

Attorney General “there [was] but one patent that encompasses

several contiguous parcels.” (81 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen., supra, at

p. 146, fn. 3, italics added.)13

While plaintiff contends that the Attorney General’s

opinion does not address the “issue of division by conveyance,”

and maintains that the opinion “only holds that a Survey Map

does not establish a subdivision for purposes of the [Act]” (italics

added), that is not a tenable reading of the opinion. The

Attorney General expressly stated that the opinion was

addressing whether “when a federal patent conveys the lots into

private ownership, each of the lots must be recognized by the

county for purposes of the Act” (81 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen., supra, at

p. 145, italics added), and the Attorney General relied on the

fact that there was “but one patent that encompasses several

contiguous parcels.” (Id. at p. 146, fn. 3, italics added.)

Moreover, the Attorney General’s determination in

81 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen., supra, 144 is consistent with numerous

other opinions that office has issued concerning what it means

to divide land under section 66424. In these opinions, the

Attorney General has frequently found a conveyance to

effectuate a division of land for purposes of section 66424

because the conveyance granted a right to exclusively occupy a

portion of an existing parcel. (E.g., 57 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 556,

557 (1974) [reasoning that because conveyance designated as a

permit granted members “ ‘sole and exclusive right to occupy,’ ”

it constituted division of land under the Act];

As noted ante, the parcel at issue in Lakeview Meadows

was created through a conveyance of several noncontiguous lots.

(See Lakeview Meadows, supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 597.)

COX v. CITY OF OAKLAND

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

39 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 82, 84 (1962) [“Since ownership in fee

encompasses the ‘right of exclusive occupancy,’ . . . the division

of a parcel of real property into ‘parcels’ of air space to be owned

in fee constitutes a ‘subdivision’ which if not specifically

excepted, is subject to the provisions of . . . the . . . Act”];

38 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 125 (1961) [“The conveyance . . . which

gives the grantee the exclusive right to occupy a unit or parcel

therein is a ‘subdivision’ to which the provisions of the . . . Act

apply”].)14 And courts have frequently relied on Attorney

General opinions when determining whether there has been a

division of land under the Act. (See, e.g., Gardner, supra,

29 Cal.4th at p. 1006; Save Mount Diablo, supra,

240 Cal.App.4th at p. 1381.)

Here, none of the conveyances at issue conveyed an

exclusive property right over Lot 18 alone. Instead, in each

instance the conveyance granted the ownership of Lot 18 along

with additional contiguous land. Therefore, since Lot 18 has

never been conveyed “separately” (Gardner, supra, 29 Cal.4th at

Courts and commentators read these Attorney General

opinions the way we do. (See Blackmore v. Powell (2007)

150 Cal.App.4th 1593, 1605 [stating that each of these Attorney

General opinions “concern[ed] a scheme of joint or collective

ownership of land that also accorded its members exclusive

rights to reside on a portion of the land”]; Curtin & Merritt, Cal.

Subdivision Map Act and the Development Process

(Cont.Ed.Bar 2d ed. 2016) § 2.5 [“Attorney General opinions

have stressed that the key to whether a division has occurred is

whether a person has been granted exclusive occupancy of the

property”]; 1 Lindgren & Mattas, Cal. Land Use Practice

(Cont.Ed.Bar 2023 supp.) § 9.13 [citing these Attorney General

opinions and stating, “In general, a conveyance constitutes a

‘division of land’ if it grants a right to exclusive ownership or

occupancy of a portion of an existing parcel”].)

COX v. CITY OF OAKLAND

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

p. 1001), but instead has remained part of contiguous land

“under sequential owners throughout its history” (id. at

p. 1003), Gardner as well as authority from the Courts of Appeal

and the Attorney General all support the conclusion that the

mere identification of Lot 18 as part of the description of

contiguous land being conveyed did not “create[]” Lot 18 as a

separate parcel from a “division of land.” (§ 66412.6(a).)

Although both the City and an amicus curiae contend,

persuasively in our view, that sections 66412.6(a) and 66424

should be read analogously, plaintiff provides no response to

this argument. Indeed, plaintiff does not discuss or cite

section 66424 in its briefing in this court.

The arguments which plaintiff does provide to support its

contention that Lot 18 was created as a parcel that “resulted

from a division of land” are unpersuasive. (§ 66412.6(a).)

Instead of reading section 66412.6(a) in context (see Prang,

supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 1170), plaintiff argues that we should

eschew what it characterizes as a “restrictive” definition of

“division of land.” (§ 66412.6(a).) In support of this contention,

plaintiff asserts that land is “often” legally divided from

contiguous parcels without being transferred to a separate

owner. Yet, the only relevant authority that plaintiff cites

involved the transfer of property with a change of ownership.

Specifically, plaintiff cites 86 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen., supra, 70 and

contends that “[l]and belonging to a single owner can . . . be

legally ‘divided’ by a physical separation that does not affect

ownership.” However, as noted in footnote 10 ante, and as

expressly stated in the Attorney General’s opinion, that case

involved a “condemnation” (86 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen., supra, 70)

COX v. CITY OF OAKLAND

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

caused by a “court order resulting in two new remainder parcels

of land created by the recording of a deed and transfer of

ownership.” (Id. at p. 72, italics added.) Thus, the Attorney

General’s opinion stands for the proposition that a “division of

land” under section 66412.6(a) arises where parcels are placed

into separate ownership from contiguous lands. It does not

support plaintiff’s contention that Lot 18 was divided by

conveyance without being separately transferred to an owner

different from the owner or owners of contiguous lands. 15

Plaintiff also argues that “[c]ourts have adopted an

expansive definition of ‘division of land’ in other land use cases.”

(Citing La Fe, Inc. v. County of Los Angeles (1999)

73 Cal.App.4th 231.) In La Fe, the Court of Appeal concluded

that a lot line adjustment amounted to “development” under a

provision of the California Coastal Act of 1976 (Coastal Act; Pub.

Resources Code, § 30000 et seq.) that was expressly broader

than the meaning of “subdivision” in the Act. (See La Fe, at

p. 235 [“ ‘ “Development” means, on land, in or under

water . . . change in the density or intensity of use of land,

including, but not limited to, subdivision pursuant to

the . . . Act . . . and any other division of land, including lot

splits’ ” (quoting Pub. Resources Code, § 30106)].) Further, the

La Fe court relied on the fact that the definition of

“ ‘development’ ” under the Coastal Act was not limited to a

“ ‘division of land’ ” under the Act. (La Fe, at pp. 240–241.) The

La Fe court’s understanding of the meaning of “division of land”

Plaintiff does not argue that Lot 18 was ever divided for

purposes of section 66412.6(a) by a property owner without a

conveyance to a separate person. Thus, we need not consider

whether such a division was possible at common law.

COX v. CITY OF OAKLAND

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

under the Coastal Act (Pub. Resources Code, § 30106) is simply

inapposite to determining the proper interpretation of “division

of land” under the Act (§ 66412.6(a)).16

Next, and more generally, plaintiff asserts that “[t]o

evidence an intent to divide land under the common law, a deed

could identify the land as separate parcels with reference to an

antiquated map, even if those parcels were conveyed

simultaneously on one deed.” But plaintiff cites no authority to

support this proposition, and we are not aware of any opinion

holding that a deed’s mere identification of separate lots

effectuated a division of contiguous land under common law.

People ex rel Brown v. Tehama County Bd. of Supervisors

(2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 422 (Tehama), which plaintiff relies on

heavily, does not support its position. In Tehama, the Court of

Appeal concluded that a 1904 deed that described the property

being conveyed using a single metes and bounds description

conveyed a single parcel, notwithstanding that the property

conveyed consisted of parts of two preexisting parcels. (Id. at

p. 438 [“by all appearances, the deed conveyed a single new

parcel created from parts of the two parcels [grantor]

owned . . . , rather than two new parcels, each created from one

of those parts”].) Although the Tehama court rejected a claim

that the deed did not “evince an intention to merge heretofore

Plaintiff also states that “modernly, the [Act] requires

division on paper, through recording a compliant map.”

However, the fact that the Act provides for the division of land

by the recording of a compliant map on a going forward basis is

not informative about whether a conveyance “created” a parcel

through a “division of land” (§ 66412.6(a)) through this

“backward looking” provision of the Act. (Save Mount Diablo,

supra, 240 Cal.App.4th at p. 1378.)

COX v. CITY OF OAKLAND

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

separate pieces of land” (id. at p. 440), the court did not opine

about the creation of new parcels through the division of land.

And plaintiff has neither argued nor established that the

common law governing the merger of parts of existing parcels is

analogous to the common law that governs the creation of

entirely new parcels. In sum, Tehama is not common law

authority that supports plaintiff’s argument.

The case law cited by the Court of Appeal below,

supporting the uncontroversial proposition that a single

conveyance can transfer multiple separately described lots, also

fails to support plaintiff’s argument. (Cox, supra,

91 Cal.App.5th at p. 867 [citing Yuba City v. Mausoleum

Syndicate (1929) 207 Cal. 587, 588 (Yuba City), Martin v. Holm

(1925) 197 Cal. 733, 738, 740–741 (Martin), and McCullough v.

Olds (1895) 108 Cal. 529, 530–532 (McCullough)].) None of

these cases considered whether a reference to multiple

contiguous lot numbers constituted a division of land

corresponding to the lots. In other words, the mere fact that

multiple lots can be transferred using a single deed says nothing

about the legal effect of identifying the lots in such a deed.

In sum, aside from the Court of Appeal below, we are not

aware of any court that has concluded that a grant deed’s

description of a contiguous property by reference to lot numbers

on an antiquated subdivision map divided the contiguous

property into multiple parcels corresponding to the lot lines on

the map.

In addition, there is a compelling reason why grantors at

common law might have included lot number references from

antiquated subdivision maps in deeds that is distinct from an

intent to divide the land conveyed. Namely, such references

COX v. CITY OF OAKLAND

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

serve to identify the land conveyed. (See Cox, supra,

91 Cal.App.5th at p. 866 [stating “a deed can sufficiently

describe the property conveyed by referencing the map

(including an antiquated map) that depicts it and that a metes

and bounds description is not required,” and observing that “this

practice is reflected in very early cases,” citing Yuba City, supra,

207 Cal. at pp. 588–589, Martin, supra, 197 Cal. at pp. 741–742,

and McCullough, supra, 108 Cal. at pp. 530–531]; see also

Gardner, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 1001 [noting the existence of

common law decisions that “recognized the principle that

subdivision maps could properly supply the legal description of

property conveyed by deed”]; accord, Taft, supra,

161 Cal.App.3d at p. 757 [explaining that California cases “hold

not that [a] U.S. Survey Map established ‘subdivisions,’ but that

it supplied monuments and lines essential for the description of

property which might be subdivided or conveyed in the future”].)

While citing no examples of such lot number references

effectuating a division of deeded property, plaintiff

acknowledges that “maps were commonly used descriptively to

identify deeded parcels” (italics added), and states this “was

superior to a metes and bounds description.” (Boldface and

italics omitted.)

The City explains why referring to block and lot numbers

from a subdivision map is superior to utilizing a metes and

bounds system: “Metes-and-bounds descriptions consist of

directional coordinates and references to landmarks to describe

a property and generally are not intelligible on paper alone.

Indeed, they often require mapping — likely by a surveyor — to

be comprehensible.” In addition, the City cites authority, which

plaintiff does not dispute, supporting the proposition that

“ ‘[d]escriptions by map reference are much less subject to error

COX v. CITY OF OAKLAND

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

than descriptions by metes and bounds or other methods.’ ”

(Quoting California State Board of Equalization’s Assessors’

Handbook Section 215: Assessment Map Standards for Manual

Systems (2015) at p. 1 (Assessors’ Handbook).)17

For example, with respect to the 1944 deed on which

plaintiff relies,18 the desire to easily identify the property

explains why references to lot numbers may have been used. On

the other hand, solely referring to lot numbers would not have

adequately described the land conveyed since only a “portion” of

Lot 16 was conveyed, and therefore a metes and bounds

description was included as well. (Cox, supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at

p. 853.) There is also another reason for including a reference

to the Map in the 1944 deed — apart from an intent to divide

the property into the lots referred to on the Map. Namely, the

Map was used to explain where the metes and bounds

description of the property conveyed in the 1944 deed began.19

We granted the City’s unopposed request to take judicial

notice of the Assessors’ Handbook.

Plaintiff explains why it focuses on the 1944 deed, stating:

“Before the [Act] or a local ordinance regulated divisions of land,

each division ‘re-created’ the parcels. Parcels had no

permanence and could be unilaterally restructured by

owners . . . . In 1972, when the [Act] began to regulate small

divisions of land, Lot 18 had been most recently ‘created’ by the

1944 deed. Thus, in 1972, those borders became permanent and

subject to change only through compliance with the [Act].” We

express no opinion regarding plaintiff’s parcel re-creation

theory.

As the Cox court recounted, the 1944 deed described the

property as follows:

“ ‘BEGINNING at the point of intersection of the south

eastern line of 22nd Avenue, formerly Peralta Street, as said

COX v. CITY OF OAKLAND

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

Accordingly, we are not persuaded by plaintiff’s argument that

the identification of individual lot numbers in the 1944 deed

demonstrates an intention to convey something other than a

single parcel.

We are also unpersuaded by plaintiff’s argument that

adopting the City’s interpretation of section 66412.6(a) would

render the “fewer than five” language of the statute a nullity

because only a single new parcel of land could be created by any

single division of land. Specifically, plaintiff argues that the

City’s “interpretation allows for the creation of only one parcel

(two, if the remaining parcel is counted); it does not allow for a

division creating three or four parcels.”

To begin with, the City identifies several examples in

which more than one parcel would be created by a single

conveyance under its interpretation of section 66412.6(a), even

if, as in this case, a deed listing contiguous lots from an

antiquated subdivision map to a grantee would not create

multiple parcels. For example, the City notes that a single

Peralta Street is shown on the map hereinafter referred to, with

the Southwestern line of East 21st Street; running thence

Southeasternly along said line of East 21st street 62 feet; thence

at right angles Southwesterly 140 feet; thence at right angles

Northwesterly 62 feet to said Southwesterly line of 22nd

Avenue; thence Northwesterly thereon 140 feet to the point of

beginning.

“ ‘BEING a portion of Lot Numbered 16, and all of Lots

Numbered 17 and 18 in Block Numbered 66, as said lots and

block are delineated and so designated upon that certain map

entitled “Map of San Antonio,” filed September 12, 1854 and

recorded April 27[,] 1869 in book 1 of maps at pages 2 and 3 in

the office of the County Recorder of Alameda County.’ ” (Cox,

supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at p. 853, fn. 8.)

COX v. CITY OF OAKLAND

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

transfer might convey four noncontiguous lots to a single

purchaser and that each of those lots would be a separate parcel.

In fact, in Lakeview Meadows, the Court of Appeal noted that

the parcel at issue there was created through a single

conveyance that also conveyed several noncontiguous lots as

multiple separate parcels to the plaintiff’s predecessor in title.

(Lakeview Meadows, supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 597.) The City

also notes that a conveyance from an existing parcel might

result in three new parcels if the conveyance transfers property

from the middle of the existing parcel. This latter scenario fits

the fact pattern of 86 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen., supra, 70, discussed

ante, in which the Attorney General concluded that the

condemnation of a portion of a parcel of land created two

remainder parcels in the land retained by the parcel’s original

owner. (Id. at p. 72.)20

Further, while plaintiff argues that section 66412.6(a)

“anticipates a scenario whereby four or fewer parcels were

created in a single act,” it provides no authority for this

assertion. (Some italics omitted.) In fact, plaintiff’s contention

is directly contradicted by the historical practice of

“ ‘quartering,’ ” which contemplated the creation of four or fewer

parcels by multiple acts within a given assessment period. (Cox,

supra, 91 Cal.App.5th at p. 859, fn. 17.)21 By including the

The City also offers the example of “a will dividing a

property between up to four heirs and thus effectuating a

division that [section 66412.6(a)] could validate.”

The Court of Appeal explained quartering as follows:

“Because the pre-1972 versions of the Subdivision Map Act

defined ‘subdivision’ to exclude subdivisions of ‘fewer than five’

parcels within a given assessment period . . . . [a] parcel would

COX v. CITY OF OAKLAND

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

“fewer than five” language in section 66412.6(a), the Legislature

recognized this practice and ensured that parcels quartered at

common law remained legal parcels. This too provides a clear

reason for the Legislature’s inclusion of the “fewer than five”

language in section 66412.6(a) and refutes plaintiff’s theory that

its interpretation of the statute is required in order for such

language to have practical effect.

Our interpretation of section 66412.6(a) also furthers the

statute’s purpose, as well as the Act’s purpose more generally.

(See Save Mount Diablo, supra, 240 Cal.App.4th at p. 1383

[noting that its interpretation of the Act was “supported not only

by the Act’s plain language, but also by sound policy”].) The

Court of Appeal in Save Mount Diablo explained that the Act’s

“grandfather clauses,” including section 66412.6(a), provide an

exemption from the Act’s requirements in “ ‘an obvious effort to

provide a fair and equitable scheme to settle the validity of

divisions of land occurring in decades past under earlier

provisions of law.’ ” (Save Mount Diablo, at p. 1379.) Similarly,

we have explained that such provisions protect those “ ‘who have

detrimentally relied on an earlier state of the law.’ ” (Gardner,

be subdivided into four parcels, and these four parcels would, in

turn, each be divided into four more parcels prior to the

preparation of the next assessor’s map.” (Cox, supra,

91 Cal.App.5th at p. 859, fn. 17; see Fishback, supra,

133 Cal.App.4th at p. 902 [“Because the definition of subdivision

[under prior versions of the Act] required a division of a unit of

land into five or more parcels in any one year, a division of a

parcel into four or fewer parcels within a year was not governed

by the [A]ct” (italics added)]; see also, e.g., fn. 7, ante [quoting a

former version of the Act and its statutory predecessor, each

containing such a definition of “subdivision”].)

COX v. CITY OF OAKLAND

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 1003.) But that purpose is “ ‘hardly

served by allowing later purchasers of property which has never

been sold in subdivided form to’ ” invoke these protections.

(Ibid.) In that instance, “ ‘the later purchaser placed no reliance

on the prior state of the law.’ ” (Ibid.)

Plaintiff argues that the Act should be interpreted to

protect its reliance interests. But as discussed ante, no common

law authority supports plaintiff’s contention that Lot 18 has

ever existed in subdivided form. Moreover, plaintiff has not

identified any reason that parties to a property transaction at

common law would have used lot references from a subdivision

map to divide property conveyed to a grantee into distinct

parcels. That is, there would have been no reason for a grantor

to specify in a conveyance that a contiguous piece of property

contained multiple parcels since the new owner could divide the

land along different lines in a future transaction.

In Tehama, the Court of Appeal recognized this point in

concluding that, absent knowledge by the parties that the law

would change to restrict the grantee’s subsequent division of

property, the parties to a transaction unregulated by the Act

would not have been concerned with the number of parcels a

particular conveyance transferred. (Tehama, supra,

149 Cal.App.4th at p. 439, fn. 13 [“it is difficult to imagine why

the parties to the 1904 transaction would have been concerned

about maintaining existing patent parcel boundaries as a means

of protecting themselves against future regulation they ‘could

never have predicted’ ”]; see id. at pp. 438–439.)

Given the lack of reasons for such a transaction, and the

lack of any authority suggesting such a division by conveyance

were possible, it makes little sense to ask whether the parties to

COX v. CITY OF OAKLAND

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

a transaction might have intended such a result. Thus,

whether, as in this case, a historical conveyance identified each

internal lot by reference to a subdivision map, or whether such

a conveyance identified each lot within a contiguous parcel with

its own metes and bounds description or some other method, we

see no basis for concluding simply on that basis that such a

conveyance created legal parcels in the separately described lots

at common law.22 As we explained in Gardner, it was only when

the “owner actually conveyed the lot separately from the

surrounding lands” that a division by conveyance was

effectuated. (Gardner, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 1001, italics

added.) In contrast, here, where a contiguous piece of property

“has remained intact under sequential owners throughout its

history,” the common law does not support the conclusion that

the property is, in reality, multiple legal parcels “within the

decisions recognizing the establishment of subdivisions by

conveyance.” (Id. at p. 1003.)

In the absence of any common law support for the

recognition of the parcel creation theory that plaintiff proposes,

As one treatise explained, in summarizing the law

governing the creation of parcels at common law, “However the

land is described, the deed or patent creates only the parcel’s

outer boundaries — the internal description of the land is of no

consequence.” (1 Lindgren & Mattas, Cal. Land Use Practice,

supra, § 9.142.)

We note that the internal description of land in a deed may

be relevant in other contexts, such as where the land has already

been subdivided. (See Tehama, supra, 149 Cal.App.4th at

pp. 437–438 [considering the parties’ intent in determining the

number of parcels where the land had previously been divided].)

However, we express no opinion on this issue since it is not

present in this case.

COX v. CITY OF OAKLAND

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

there is no reason to interpret section 66412.6(a) in a manner

that would protect plaintiff’s reliance interests. Plaintiff’s

reliance interests are nonexistent and are not contravened by

our interpretation of the Act.

Our interpretation also advances the Act’s goals of

encouraging orderly community development and preventing

undue burdens on the public. (Pacific Palisades, supra,

55 Cal.4th at pp. 798–799.) Under plaintiff’s interpretation, by

contrast, vast numbers of parcels could be free from “further

compliance with the . . . Act or any local ordinance enacted

pursuant thereto.” (§ 66499.35, subd. (f)(1)(E).) This

circumstance risks causing undue and unexpected burdens on

public infrastructure and preventing communities from

ensuring that growth is orderly and in the public interest. These

considerations further weigh against adopting plaintiff’s

interpretation. (See Gardner, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 1005

[noting that to adopt the plaintiffs’ position and hold that local

agencies were required to issue certificates of compliance would

mean that affected parcels could be sold, leased or financed

without regard to land use and public health consequences and

without affording notice and opportunity to be heard to persons

and landowners affected by such actions].)

To summarize, section 66412.6(a) provides that lawful

parcels “created” by a “division of land” prior to the effective date

of the Act’s parcel map filing requirement continue to be lawful

parcels. We conclude that a conveyance does not “create[]” a

parcel that results from a “division of land” merely by referring

separately to constituent parts of the contiguous property being

conveyed. (§ 66412.6(a).) Like similar text in section 66424, the

COX v. CITY OF OAKLAND

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

phrase “division of land” in section 66412.6(a) refers to a

conveyance that alienates one portion of an original parcel,

which creates a single new parcel comprised of the conveyed

portion of property.

While plaintiff argues that “[e]very deed transferring

Lot 18 from 1885 to 1972 satisfied the requirements of

[section 66412.6(a)],” it is undisputed that Lot 18 has always

been conveyed together with at least one other contiguous lot.

Thus, none of the pre-1972 deeds separated Lot 18 as a distinct

unit of land from all other land conveyed and there has been no

prior “creation” of Lot 18 as a separate parcel. (§ 66412.6(a).)

For example, the 1944 deed on which plaintiff focuses its

briefing conveys a portion of Lot 16, Lot 17, and Lot 18. Because

Lot 18 was only a part of the property carved out of an existing

parcel and conveyed, we conclude that Lot 18 was never created

as a distinct “parcel” that “resulted from a division of land”

under section 66412.6(a).23 Thus, plaintiff cannot establish a

“subdivision[] by conveyance.” (Gardner, supra, 29 Cal.4th at

p. 1003.)

As noted, while the Cox court stated that the 1944 deed

transferred the property to a “grantee” (Cox, supra,

91 Cal.App.5th at p. 853), it appears from the record that the

1944 deed transferred the property to two grantees as joint

tenants. However, such discrepancy is immaterial to our

analysis because a joint tenant “simultaneously possesses both

the entire tenancy and an equal, undivided share of the tenancy”

(Estate of Propst (1990) 50 Cal.3d 448, 455), and thus a joint

tenant is indistinguishable from a single grantee for purposes of

our decision.

COX v. CITY OF OAKLAND

Opinion of the Court by Guerrero, C. J.

III. DISPOSITION

We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal.

GUERRERO, C. J.

We Concur:

CORRIGAN, J.

LIU, J.

KRUGER, J.

GROBAN, J.

JENKINS, J.

EVANS, J.

See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who

argued in Supreme Court.

Name of Opinion Cox v. City of Oakland

__________________________________________________________

Procedural Posture (see XX below)

Original Appeal

Original Proceeding

Review Granted (published) XX 91 Cal.App.5th 850

Review Granted (unpublished)

Rehearing Granted

__________________________________________________________

Opinion No. S280234

Date Filed: January 23, 2025

__________________________________________________________

Court: Superior

County: Alameda

Judge: Paul D. Herbert

__________________________________________________________

Counsel:

Chandler & Shechet, Aaron Nathan Shechet and Leigh Anne Chandler

for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Law Offices of Thomas J. Gearing and Thomas J. Gearing for Thomas

J. Gearing as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant.

Jarvis, Fay & Gibson, Jarvis Fay, Rick W. Jarvis, Christie Crowl;

Barbara J. Parker, City Attorney, Maria Bee, Chief Assistant City

Attorney, Allison Ehlert, H. Luke Edwards and Patrick Brian Mulry,

Deputy City Attorneys, for Defendant and Respondent.

Rural County Representatives of California and Arthur J. Wylene for

California State Association of Counties and League of California

Cities as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent.

Bernadette Curry, County Counsel (Solano), Carrie Blacklock,

Assistant County Counsel, and James W. Laughlin, Deputy County

Counsel, for the County of Solano as Amicus Curiae on behalf of

Defendant and Respondent.

Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for

publication with opinion):

Aaron Nathan Shechet

Chandler & Shechet, LLP

P.O. Box 7244

Beverly Hills, CA 90212

(310) 339-1354

Allison Ehlert

Deputy City Attorney

1 Frank H. Ogawa Plaza

Oakland, CA 94612

(510) 238-3601

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.