holding that an inmate did not 5 state a constitutional claim based on dissemination of his mental health records to the parole 6 board
How later courts described this case
- holding that an inmate did not 5 state a constitutional claim based on dissemination of his mental health records to the parole 6 board
- affirming district court dismissal 7 of inmate’s informational privacy claim connected to a parole board hearing
- “In making parole decisions, the government must balance 21 the prisoner’s liberty interest with the government’s interest in protecting the public.”
- holding that state officials did not violate the Constitution by reviewing an inmate’s 3 medical records in determining whether to commit the inmate as a sexually violent predator
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
10
11 STEPHEN F. SNOW, No. 2:23-cv-02117-KJM-EFB (PC)
12 Plaintiff,
13
v. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
14
JEFF MACOMBER, et al.,
15
Defendants.
16
17 Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding without counsel in an action brought under 42
18 U.S.C. § 1983. He has paid the filing fee. On December 19, 2023, the court dismissed plaintiff’s
19 complaint with leave to amend. ECF No. 7. Plaintiff has filed an amended complaint. ECF No.
20 12.
21 Screening Standards
22 Federal courts must engage in a preliminary screening of cases in which prisoners seek
23 redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C.
24 § 1915A(a). The court must identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion
25 of the complaint, if the complaint “is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which
26 relief may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such
27 relief.” Id. § 1915A(b).
28
1 A pro se plaintiff, like other litigants, must satisfy the pleading requirements of Rule 8(a)
2 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 8(a)(2) “requires a complaint to include a short and
3 plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, in order to give the
4 defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v.
5 Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 554, 562-563 (2007) (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957)).
6 While the complaint must comply with the “short and plaint statement” requirements of Rule 8,
7 its allegations must also include the specificity required by Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
8 U.S. 662, 679 (2009).
9 To avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim a complaint must contain more than “naked
10 assertions,” “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of
11 action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-557. In other words, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of
12 a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
13 678.
14 Furthermore, a claim upon which the court can grant relief must have facial plausibility.
15 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual
16 content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
17 misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. When considering whether a complaint states a
18 claim upon which relief can be granted, the court must accept the allegations as true, Erickson v.
19 Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007), and construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the
20 plaintiff, see Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974).
21 Screening Order
22 Plaintiff alleges that, on July 31, 2017, he discovered that state Board of Parole Hearings
23 psychologist, defendant Weiss, had accessed his confidential mental health records without his
24 knowledge or consent. ECF No. 12 at 27-28. The Board denied his bid for parole based, in part,
25 on Weiss’s “risk assessment” report. Id. at 34. Plaintiff alleges that these actions violated his
26 equal protection, due process, and Fourth Amendment rights.
27 As the court informed plaintiff in the original screening order, “prisoners do not have a
28 constitutionally protected expectation of privacy in prison treatment records when the state has a
1 legitimate penological interest in access to them.” Seaton v. Mayberg, 610 F.3d 530, 534 (9th
2 Cir. 2010) (holding that state officials did not violate the Constitution by reviewing an inmate’s
3 medical records in determining whether to commit the inmate as a sexually violent predator); see
4 also Coleman v. Martin, 63 Fed. Appx. 791, 793 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding that an inmate did not
5 state a constitutional claim based on dissemination of his mental health records to the parole
6 board); Wilson v. Wheeler, 584 Fed. Appx. 365 (9th Cir. 2014) (affirming district court dismissal
7 of inmate’s informational privacy claim connected to a parole board hearing). Plaintiff has not
8 alleged facts showing that any defendant lacked a legitimate penological justification for
9 accessing his records to determine his suitability for parole. Indeed, such a claim would be
10 difficult to make, as the Ninth Circuit has found that protection of the public and management of
11 rehabilitative efforts are legitimate interests. Seaton, 610 F.3d at 534-35.
12 Plaintiff claims that he has an interest in the confidentiality of his psychiatric treatment
13 records granted by California law that is also protected by the federal Constitution. But whatever
14 privacy rights plaintiff has in his treatment records is not absolute, as the Ninth Circuit provided
15 in Seaton. See also Endy v. City of L.A., 975 F.3d 757, 768 (9th Cir. 2020) (neither federal nor
16 California privacy rights are absolute). Contrary to plaintiff’s arguments, governing law holds
17 that an individual’s privacy rights may indeed be outweighed by governmental interests. Id. at
18 769. And, in particular, a prisoner’s privacy rights in records considered by a parole board are
19 circumscribed by the government’s interest in protecting the public. Murphy v. Thompson, 15
20 Fed. Appx. 417, 418 (9th Cir. 2001) (“In making parole decisions, the government must balance
21 the prisoner’s liberty interest with the government’s interest in protecting the public.”).
22 As plaintiff’s claim is foreclosed by the law, leave to amend would be futile.
23 Accordingly, the court should dismiss the first amended complaint without leave to amend.
24 Plumeau v. Sch. Dist. 40 Cnty. of Yamhill, 130 F.3d 432, 439 (9th Cir. 1997).
25 Conclusion
26 Accordingly, IT IS RECOMMENDED that:
27 1. Plaintiff’s amended complaint (ECF No. 11) be DISMISSED without leave to amend;
28 and
] 2. The Clerk of Court be directed to administratively terminate all pending motions! and
2 close the case.
3 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge
4 | assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within fourteen days
5 || after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written
6 || objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned
7 || “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Failure to file objections
8 | within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Turner v.
9 || Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Yist, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).
Hy / Lz Ps
11 | Dated: January 21, 2025 Zot □ til TeLlACL*
12 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27 | | Plaintiff has filed a motion for a temporary restraining order that would prevent the parole board
28 from considering his psychiatric records in its upcoming hearing concerning his suitability for
parole. ECF No. 15. As discussed above, plaintiffs claim is legally foreclosed.