Cicchiello v. Dauphin County Prison Board

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

JOAN CICCHIELLO, : No. 3:24-CV-0509

Plaintiff :

: (Judge Munley)

V. :

DAUPHIN COUNTY PRISON BOARD, :

et al., :

Defendants :

MEMORANDUM

Plaintiff Joan Cicchiello initiated the above-captioned pro se action under

42 U.S.C. § 1983," alleging constitutional violations by officials at Dauphin

County Prison (DCP), in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. The court will dismiss

Cicchiello’s complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) for failure to state a

claim upon which relief may be granted but will provide leave to amend.

l. BACKGROUND

Cicchiello lodged the instant complaint in March 2024. (See generally Doc

1). However, she failed to pay the requisite filing fee or submit a properly

completed application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP). (See Doc. 4

&n.1). The court gave Cicchiello thirty days to comply with either filing

1 Section 1983 creates a private cause of action to redress constitutional wrongs committed b

state officials. The statute is not a source of substantive rights; it serves as a mechanism fo

vindicating rights otherwise protected by federal law. See Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273

284-85 (2002).

requirement, (see id. at 1), but she did not submit a properly completed IFP

application or the full filing fee within the thirty days allotted by the court's

administrative order. (See Doc. 7 at 1-2). The court accordingly dismissed

Cicchiello’s lawsuit without prejudice, as previously warned. (See id. at 2 □□ 1).

Instead of refiling her complaint and submitting a properly completed IFP

application or the full filing fee, Cicchiello filed a notice of appeal. {See Doc. 9).

That appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. (See Doc. 18). Cicchiello

then moved to reopen her case, which motion the court granted. (See Doc. 21).

She eventually submitted the full filing fee on November 14, 2024, (see Doc. 24)

thus rendering her complaint filed and subject to preliminary review pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1915A.2

In her complaint, which is extremely difficult to follow, Cicchiello appears to

assert two Section 1983 claims. She first notes that she filed a previous Section

1983 lawsuit in this court, Cicchiello vy. Dauphin County Prison, No. 1:23-cv-540

(M.D. Pa.). (See Doc. 1 J 10). In that case, she raised claims sounding in denia

of access to the courts, unconstitutional conditions of confinement, procedural

due process, and (possibly) deliberate indiffererice to serious medical needs.

See Cicchiello, No. 1:23-cv-540, Doc. 52 at 4-5 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 26, 2024).

2 At the time Cicchiello lodged the instant complaint, she was incarcerated at Dauphin County

Prison. (See Doc. 1 at 7). She has since been released from incarceration. (See Doc. 16).

Summary judgment was granted in favor of the DCP Defendants and against

Cicchiello because she had failed to exhaust administrative remedies for any of

her claims. See generally Cicchiello, No. 1:23-cv-540, Docs. 52-54 (M.D. Pa.

Jan. 26, 2024). No appeal was filed in that case.

In the instant complaint, Cicchiello asserts that an unspecified DCP official

caused her to miss her appeal deadline and thus violated her right of access to

the courts. She alleges that she mailed a notice of appeal in case number 1:23-

cv-540 but that it was returned to sender due to an improper mailing address.

(See Doc. 1 J 10; Doc. 1-4 at 2). According to Cicchiello, this returned mail “sat

in someone’s office for over a month” and she did not receive it until March 12,

2024, after the time to appeal the January 26, 2024 judgment in case number

1:23-cv-540 had expired. (Doc. 1 Jf] 11-12).

Cicchiello also appears to assert an equal protection claim regarding the

grievance system at DCP. Although her complaint is difficult to decipher, she

alleges that “women at Dauphin County Prison... had a different Grievance

Procedure than the men did.” (Id. J 20). However, Cicchiello does not explain

how the grievance procedure for men differed from the grievance procedure for

women, or how this purported difference detrimentally affected her.

Cicchiello lists five defendants in her caption: Dauphin County Prison

Board, Warden Briggs, Officer Crider, Officer Kelly, and Gabridela Van-Lier. (Id.

at p. 1). She seeks “5.3 million [dJollars” as relief. (Id. at p. 5). Cicchiello,

however, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, so the court

must dismiss her complaint.

ll. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Courts are statutorily obligated to review, “as soon as practicable,”

unrepresented prisoner complaints targeting governmental entities, officers, or

employees. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). One basis for dismissal at the screening

stage is if the complaint “fails to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted[.]” Id. § 1915A(b)(1). This language closely tracks Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(6). Accordingly, courts apply the same standard to screening a

pro se prisoner complaint for sufficiency under Section 1915A(b)(1) as they

utilize when resolving a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). See Grayson v.

Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 109-10 &n.11 (3d Cir. 2002): O’Brien v.

U.S. Fed. Gov't, 763 F. App’x 157, 159 & n.5 (3d Cir. 2019) (per curiam)

(nonprecedential); cf. Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000).

In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, courts should not inquire

“whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to

offer evidence to support the claims.” Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236

(1974); see Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 66 (3d Cir. 1996). The court must

accept as true the factual allegations in the complaint and draw all reasonable

inferences from them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Phillips v.

County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 229 (3d Cir. 2008). In addition to the facts

alleged on the face of the complaint, the court may also consider “exhibits

attached to the complaint, matters of public record, as well as undisputedly

authentic documents” attached to a defendant’s motion to dismiss if the plaintiff's

claims are based upon these documents. Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 230

(3d Cir. 2010) (citing Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., 998

F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993)).

When the sufficiency of a complaint is challenged, the court must conduct <

three-step inquiry. See Connelly v. Lane Const. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 787 (3d

Cir. 2016) (internal citations, quotation marks, and footnote omitted). At step

one, the court must “tak[e] note of the elements [the] plaintiff must plead to state

a claim.” Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 675 (2009) (alterations in

original)). Second, the court should distinguish well-pleaded factual allegations—

which must be taken as true—from mere legal conclusions, which “are not

entitled to the assumption of truth” and may be disregarded. Id. (quoting Iqbal,

556 U.S. at 679). Finally, the court must review the presumed-truthful allegations

“and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.”

Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679). Deciding plausibility is a “context-specific

task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and

common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681.

Because Cicchiello proceeds pro se, her pleadings are to be liberally

construed and her complaint, “however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less

stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers[.]” Erickson v.

Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citations omitted).

lll. DISCUSSION

As best as the court can discern, Cicchiello is asserting a First and

Fourteenth Amendment claim of denial of access to the courts and a Fourteenth

Amendment equal protection claim. Her Section 1983 claims are deficient for

multiple reasons. The court will address Cicchiello’s pleading deficiencies in

turn.

A. Personal Involvement

It is well established that, in Section 1983 actions, liability cannot be

“predicated solely on the operation of respondeat superior.” Rode v.

Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988) (citations omitted); see also

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556. U.S. 662, 676 (2009) (affirming same principle in Bivens

context). Rather, a Section 1983 plaintiff must plausibly plead facts that

demonstrate the defendant’s “personal involvement in the alleged misconduct.”

Dooley v. Wetzel, 957 F.3d 366, 374 (3d Cir. 2020). Personal involvement can

include direct wrongful conduct by a defendant, but it can also be demonstrated

through evidence of “personal direction” or “actual knowledge and

acquiescence”; however, such averments must be made with particularity. Id.

(quoting Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207). Furthermore, it is equally settled that

involvement in the post-incident grievance process alone does not give rise to

Section 1983 liability. See id. (affirming dismissal of claims against prison

officials for lack of personal involvement when officials’ “only involvement” was

“their review and denial of [plaintiff]’s grievance”); Lewis v. Wetzel, 153 F. Supp.

3d 678, 696-97 (M.D. Pa. 2015) (collecting cases); Brooks v. Beard, 167 F. App”

923, 925 (3d Cir. 2006) (nonprecedential); Alexander v. Gennarini, 144 F. App’x

924, 925 (3d Cir. 2005) (nonprecedential) (explaining that prisoner’s claims

against certain defendants were “properly dismissed” because the allegations

against them “merely assert their involvement in the post-incident grievance

process’).

Cicchiello’s first and primary deficiency is that she fails to allege personal

involvement by Defendants for the purported constitutional violations. Her

complaint is silent as to the alleged unlawful action (or inaction) of any of the

Defendants she identifies in the caption of her complaint. In fact, besides being

listed in the caption, the entity and officials Cicchiello sues do not appear

anywhere else in her complaint. Accordingly, the court must dismiss the Section

1983 claims against all Defendants pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) for lack

of personal involvement.

B. “Person” for Section 1983

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege “the

violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and

must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under

color of state law.” Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 361 (2012) (emphasis

added) (citing Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 417 (1976) (citing 42 U.S.C. §

1983)). Only “persons” are subject to suit under Section 1983, and entities such

as prisons, agencies, and private businesses do not qualify as “persons.” See

Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64-65, 71 (1989); Slagle v.

County of Clarion, 435 F.3d 262, 264 n.3 (3d Cir. 2006) (affirming on other

grounds and observing that district court properly “dismissed Clarion County Jail

as a defendant in this case,” quoting district court’s reasoning that “‘it is well

established in the Third Circuit that a prison is not a “person” subject to suit unde

federal civil rights laws’”); Stankowski v. Farley, 487 F. Supp. 2d 543, 554 (M.D.

Pa. 2007) (finding that PrimeCare Medical is not a “person for purposes of

Section 1983” and thus not subject to liability under that statute); see also

Fischer v. Cahill, 474 F.2d 991, 992 (3d Cir. 1973) (holding that “New Jersey

Prison Medical Department” was a state agency and not a “person” under

Section 1983); Ali v. Ann Klein Forensic Center, No. 21-CV-316, 2022 WL

138084, at *3 (D.N.J. Jan. 14, 2022) (finding that state hospital “is not a ‘person’

within the meaning of § 1983”).

Cicchiello purports to sue the “Dauphin County Prison Board.” (See Doc. 1

at p. 1). This entity is not a “person” within the meaning of Section 1983 and

therefore Cicchiello has failed to assert a viable constitutional tort claim against it

Moreover, Cicchiello does not allege an unconstitutional policy or custom by the

Board such that a Section 1983 suit could be maintained against Dauphin

County. See, e.g., Natale v. Camden Cnty. Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 583-84

(3d Cir. 2003).

C. First and Fourteenth Amendment Access to Courts

Under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States

Constitution, “prisoners retain a right of access to the courts.” Monroe v. Beard,

536 F.3d 198, 205 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 346

(1996)). Inmates, however, may only proceed on access-to-courts claims in two

situations: “challenges (direct or collateral) to their sentences and conditions of

confinement.” Id. (citing Lewis, 518 U.S. at 354-55). To adequately plead an

access-to-courts claim that is backward-looking in nature,° the prisoner must

3 There is also a category of access-to-courts claims that is forward-looking, in which plaintiff

allege that “systematic official action frustrates a plaintiff or plaintiff class in preparing and filing

suits at the present time.” Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 413 (2002).

allege “(1) that they suffered an ‘actual injury—that they lost a chance to pursue

a ‘nonfrivolous’ or ‘arguable’ underlying claim; and (2) that they have no other

‘remedy that may be awarded as recompense’ for the lost claim other than in the

present denial of access suit.” Monroe, 536 F.3d at 205 (quoting Christopher,

536 U.S. at 415). The underlying claim must be described well enough to

demonstrate that it is “more than hope,” and the complaint must set out the “lost

remedy.” See Christopher, 536 U.S. at 416-17.

Cicchiello has not plausibly alleged an access-to-courts claim for at least

two reasons. First, Cicchiello has not asserted which named Defendant or

Defendants (if any), allegedly violated this constitutional right.

Second, Cicchiello has not plausibly alleged facts showing that she lost the

chance to pursue a nonfrivolous or arguable underlying claim. In Cicchiello’s

prior lawsuit, the court granted summary judgment in the defendants’ favor

because Cicchiello had failed to exhaust administrative remedies for any of her

Section 1983 claims. See Cicchiello, No. 1:23-cv-540, Doc. 52 (M.D. Pa. Jan.

26, 2024). Cicchiello does not plausibly plead facts in the instant complaint that

establish how an appeal of that decision—if filed—would have been nonfrivolous

or had arguable merit.

In her prior case, the court examined Cicchiello’s arguments and evidence

regarding administrative exhaustion and—in a detailed and comprehensive

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opinion—rejected those claims. See Cicchiello, No. 1:23-cv-540, Doc. 52 at 5-14

(M.D. Pa. Jan. 26, 2024). Notably, the court found that Cicchiello had repeatedly

availed herself of the prison grievance process at DCP and her grievances were

“addressed on the merits rather than rejected on procedural grounds.” Id. at 11.

Furthermore, Cicchiello’s own exhibits undercut her assertion that she was not

informed of the prison’s grievance process. See id. at 9-10 (noting that, on the

prison’s response to one of Cicchiello’s grievances, a clear explanation of the

next step in the appeal process was expressly written, a step which she did not

undertake). Other grievances were never appealed to or considered by the

warden. See id. at 10; Cicchiello, No. 1:23-cv-540, Doc. 19-6. Consideration of

the claim by the warden is required for administrative exhaustion even under

Cicchiello’s current allegations. (See Doc. 1 at p. 5 (alleging that grievance

process posted stated that the “Warden's response to your complaint is □□□□□□□□□

Cicchiello’s access-to-courts claim thus fails because she has not identifiec

who allegedly violated her rights. It likewise fails because she has not plausibly

alleged that she lost the chance to pursue a nonfrivolous appeal of her prior civil

rights lawsuit.

D. Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection

The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that

“[n]o State shall... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection

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of the laws.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. To state a Fourteenth Amendment

equal protection claim, a prisoner must allege “that he was treated differently

than other similarly situated inmates, and that this different treatment was the

result of intentional discrimination based on his membership in a protected

class[.]” Mack v. Warden Loretto FCI, 839 F.3d 286, 305 (3d Cir. 2016). An

equal protection claim can also be asserted under a “class of one” theory,

whereby a plaintiff alleges that a state actor intentionally treated him differently

than others who are similarly situated “and there is no rational basis for the

difference in treatment.” Phillips, 515 F.3d at 243 (quoting Village of Willowbrook

v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000)).

Cicchiello asserts that female inmates at DCP are treated differently than

male inmates with respect to the prison grievance process. She does not,

however, allege how the grievance processes are different, who is responsible

for the purportedly disparate treatment, or how the alleged disparate treatment

detrimentally affected her.* Thus, to the extent that Cicchiello is attempting to

assert an equal protection claim, she has failed to plausibly allege such a cause

of action.

4 In this regard, Cicchiello’s complaint—by failing to allege harm or injury—presents a standin:

deficiency with respect to her equal protection claim. See Clemens v. ExecuPharm Inc., 4!

F.4th 146, 152 (3d Cir. 2022) (“Article Ill standing requires a plaintiff to demonstrate: (1) that he

or she suffered an injury in fact that is concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent, (2) tha

the injury was caused by the defendant, and (3) that the injury would likely be redressed by the

requested judicial relief.” (emphasis added) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).

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E. Potential Policy-Related Claim

Cicchiello’s complaint may also be liberally construed as raising a Section

1983 claim regarding DCP’s alleged violation of its own internal policy as to

prisoner clothing. (See Doc. 1 Jf] 3-9, 14). However, it is axiomatic that “a □□□□□

policy manual does not have the force of law and does not rise to the level of a

regulation” and that “a violation of internal policy does not automatically rise to

the level of a Constitutional violation.” Atwell vy. Lavan, 557 F. Supp. 2d 532, 556

n.24 (M.D. Pa. 2007) (citations omitted); see Bullard v. Scism, 449 F. App’x 232,

235 (3d Cir. 2011) (nonprecedential) (explaining that, even if prison officials

violated a regulation, such a violation “is not actionable”); Jordan v. Rowley, No.

1:16-CV-1261, 2017 WL 2813294, at *2 (M.D. Pa. June 29, 2017); Williamson vy.

Garman, No. 3:15-CV-1797, 2017 WL 2702539, at *6 (M.D. Pa. June 22, 2017);

see also United States v. Jiles, 658 F.2d 194, 200 (3d Cir. 1981) (noting that

even violations of state law will not automatically have a “constitutional

dimension”). Moreover, Cicchiello has not pled facts showing that the policy □□□□□

creates a liberty or property interest such that its violation could infringe her

procedural due process rights. See Millhouse v. Bledsoe, 458 F. App’x 200, 203

(2d Cir. 2012) (nonprecedential) (citing Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 487

(1995)). Thus, to the extent that Cicchiello is asserting a Section 1983 claim

13

based on a violation of DCP policy concerning prisoner clothing, that claim must

also be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

F. Leave to Amend

Generally, “plaintiffs who file complaints subject to dismissal under [the

Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995] should receive leave to amend unless

amendment would be inequitable or futile.” Grayson, 293 F.3d at 114. The cour

will grant Cicchiello leave to amend. However, any claim regarding DCP’s failure

to follow internal policy with respect to clothing will be dismissed with prejudice,

as such policy violations do not have a constitutional dimension.

If Cicchiello chooses to file an amended complaint in conformity with this

Memorandum, it should be a stand-alone document, complete in itself and

without reference to any previous pleadings. The amended complaint should set

forth Cicchiello’s claims in short, concise, and plain statements, and in

sequentially numbered paragraphs. Cicchiello must address the pleading

deficiencies identified in this Memorandum. In particular, she must name

appropriate defendants and must specify the offending action (or inaction) by

those defendants, thereby establishing the defendants’ personal involvement in

the alleged unconstitutional conduct.

Cicchiello must also sign the amended complaint and indicate the nature of

the relief sought. She may not include claims that have been dismissed with

14

prejudice. She also may not include unrelated claims against different

defendants in violation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20(a)(2). For example,

if her access-to-courts claim targets different officials than her seemingly

unrelated equal protection claim, those disparate claims cannot be joined

together in the same Section 1983 lawsuit. See FED. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2).

If Cicchiello does not timely file an amended complaint, dismissal of any

claims without prejudice will automatically convert to dismissal with prejudice anc

the court will close this case.

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the court will dismiss Cicchiello’s complaint

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) for failure to state a claim upon which relief

may be granted. Limited leave to amend will be granted. An appropriate Order

follows.

Date: / BY TH □□

JUDGE JULIA K. MU

United States Distriét Court

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