Parfaite v. Lippincott

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

WALTER PARFAITE, : CIVIL NO: 3:22-CV-00316

:

Plaintiff, :

: (Magistrate Judge Schwab)

v. :

:

:

KIM LIPPINCOTT, :

:

Defendant. :

:

MEMORANDUM OPINION

I. Introduction.

Plaintiff Walter Parfaite claims that the defendant violated his rights in

connection with criminal proceedings against him. Currently pending is the

defendant’s second motion for summary judgment. For the reasons set forth

below, we will grant that motion. We will also sua sponte dismiss some claims for

failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. And we will decline to

exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Parfaite’s state-law claim.

II. Background.

Parfaite began this action by filing a complaint. See doc. 1. He also filed an

application to proceed in forma pauperis, which we granted. See docs. 5, 7. After

the defendant waived service and counsel for the defendant entered an appearance,

the parties consented to proceed before a magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 636(c), and the case was referred to the undersigned. See doc. 18. Thereafter,

Parfaite filed an amended complaint, see doc. 20, and then a second amended

complaint, see doc. 22. The second amended complaint is the operative complaint.

See doc. 26 (order so stating).

The second amended complaint names one defendant: Kim Lippincott.

Parfaite mentions the Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments in his

second amended complaint. As we noted before in connection with Lippincott’s

first motion for summary judgment, it is extremely difficult to ascertain the exact

nature of Parfaite’s claims because he does not clearly set forth what is alleged to

have happened; he seems to assume—incorrectly—that the court is aware of

underlying events and how his allegations fit into those events. We have,

nevertheless, done our best to piece together Parfaite’s allegations to try to make

sense of what he is claiming.

Parfaite alleges that on February 23, 2021, Lippincott and other non-

defendant officers arrested him, and Lippincott charged him with drug violations.

Doc. 11 ¶ 4. According to Parfaite, Lippincott made numerous misrepresentations

and falsified evidence in connection with those charges, the events leading up to

those charges, and the events following those charges. Id. ¶¶ 1–5, 7, 8. More

specifically, he alleges that Lippincott falsified a statement from her informant

C.M. Id. ¶ 1.1 In this regard, he alleges that although C.M. said that a Marli

Plattenburg2 may have been the woman using drugs in a hotel bathroom, he was

unsure. Id. But, Parfaite asserts, Lippincott turned that purported uncertain

identification into a “positive false identification, of Marli Plattenburg.” Id. And

according to Parfaite, that false identification was used against him on October 7,

2021, and November 8, 2021. Id.3 He also alleges that Lippincott ran a “JNET

search on a silver SUV as well as taking [] photographs of the woman that was

driving.” Id. According to Parfaite, Lippincott falsely identified the woman as

Marli Plattenburg, even though the woman did not fit Plattenburg’s description,

and Lippincott knew it was not Plattenburg. Id.

Parfaite also alleges that Lippincott failed to properly fill out a drug-task-

force-activity form, that she mishandled drug purchase money, and that her

“changed and false reports” in this regard were used against him on October 7,

2021, and November 8, 2021. Id. ¶ 2. He further alleges that on February 23,

2021, “Lippincott fabricated physical evidence in regard to a bill from [a] February

1 Although Parfaite uses C.M.’s full name, in her second motion for

summary judgment, Lippincott makes a point to only use the informant’s initials—

C.M. We will do the same.

2 Parfaite does not allege who Marli Plattenburg is or how she otherwise fits

into the events.

3 Parfaite does not allege who used the identification against him or in what

context it was used.

22, 2021, controlled purchase she mishandled.” Id. ¶ 3. He asserts that the “false

and fabricated evidence” has been used against him from February 23, 2021, till

the last week of March 2022,” when a superseding information was filed against

him. Id.

Parfaite also alleges that on February 23, 2021, Lippincott “maliciously

charged” him with controlled substances that another person had admitted were his

and with “controlled substances that were found in a little black purse with the

owners identification card next to them.” Id. ¶ 4. Further, according to Parfaite,

Lippincott included false statements in her affidavit4 regarding what a Matthew

Luce said about the drugs at issue, and she charged him with drugs that belonged

to others. Id. According to Parfaite, “[t]he fabricated claim and added weight of

controlled substances onto what [he] admitted to, tainted the probable cause in her

filed affidavit and made it stronger.” Id. And he contends that “[t]he defendants

[sic] added weight, fabricated and misrepresented statements and facts have been

used against [him] from the start, and violated [his] rights.” Id.

Parfaite also alleges that on February 23, 2021, Lippincott falsely claimed in

connection with a bail-criteria form that he was convicted of possession with intent

to deliver in New Jersey and that he had misrepresented his identity. Id. ¶ 5.

4 It is not clear whether Parfaite is referring to an affidavit in support of a

search warrant or an affidavit in connection with the criminal charges allegedly

filed by Lippincott.

According to Parfaite, given Lippincott’s false statements, he had no chance of

making bail on February 23, 2021. Id. On March 12, 2021, Parfaite was removed

from the Monroe County Prison and taken to the Scranton Federal Courthouse,

“where [he] was denied bail altogether do [sic] to the defendants [sic] compounded

actions in regard to this matter.” Id. Parfaite further alleges that Lippincott

testified falsely before the grand jury. Id. ¶ 8.

Parfaite also alleges that during a search preceding the charges, Lippincott

failed to intervene when other officers hid exculpatory evidence and threw and

destroyed his property. Id. ¶ 6. He asserts that Lippincott “failed to intervene and

protect [his] 4th and 5th Amendment rights, as well as [his] rights under brady.”

Id.5

Parfaite contends that Lippincott’s actions caused him severe mental and

emotional distress. Id. ¶ 7. He is seeking compensatory and punitive damages. Id.

at 5 (Prayer for Relief). He is also seeking an apology from Lippincott and to have

her terminated from her job. Id.

5 We construe Parfaite’s reference to “brady” as a reference to Brady v.

Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (holding “that the suppression by the

prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process

where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the

good faith or bad faith of the prosecution”).

Liberally construed, it appears that Parfaite is bringing a federal claim based

on the manner in which the search was executed; multiple federal claims of

fabrication of evidence; federal claims of hiding exculpatory evidence; and a

federal claim of testifying falsely before the grand jury. He also appears to be

bringing a state-law claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress.6

Lippincott filed an answer to the second amended complaint. See doc. 25.

We set case management deadlines, see docs. 27, 71, 89, and the parties had a full

and fair opportunity to conduct discovery, with the court issuing numerous orders

on the issues that arose during discovery, see docs. 39, 46, 48, 49, 57, 58, 62, 63,

82, 93, 101.

Lippincott filed a motion for summary judgment. See doc. 107 (“first

motion for summary judgment”). In connection with that motion, Lippincott

argued, among other things, that she has testimonial immunity from Parfaite’s

claim based on her alleged false testimony. See doc. 111 at 8–9. Parfaite agreed.

See doc. 118 at 10. And we granted summary judgment to Lippincott as to

Parfaite’s claim based on her alleged false testimony. See doc. 133 at 1. We

6 Given that Parfaite alleges that Lippincott “maliciously charged” him, see

doc. 22 ¶ 4, the second amended complaint can also reasonably be construed as

raising a malicious prosecution claim. But in his brief in opposition to Lippincott’s

first motion for summary judgment, Parfaite disclaimed any intent to raise a

malicious prosecution claim. See doc. 118 at 10. Thus, we do not construe the

second amended complaint as raising a malicious prosecution claim.

otherwise denied Lippincott’s first motion for summary judgment. Id. at 1.

Because the nature of Parfaite’s claims were unclear, but Parfaite provided some

clarification in his response to Lippincott’s motion, we granted Lippincott leave to

file a second motion for summary judgment. Id. at 1; doc. 132 at 33.

Currently pending is Lippincott’s second motion for summary judgment. See

doc. 137. That motion has been briefed. See docs. 141, 142, 151, 152.

III. Summary Judgment Standards.

Lippincott moves for summary judgment under Rule 56(a) of the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that “[t]he court shall grant summary

judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material

fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(a). “Through summary adjudication the court may dispose of those claims that

do not present a ‘genuine dispute as to any material fact’ and for which a jury trial

would be an empty and unnecessary formality.” Goudy-Bachman v. U.S. Dept. of

Health & Human Services, 811 F. Supp. 2d 1086, 1091 (M.D. Pa. 2011) (quoting

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)).

The moving party bears the initial responsibility of informing the court of

the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the record that

demonstrate the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact. Celotex Corp. v.

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). With respect to an issue on which the

nonmoving party bears the burden of proof, the moving party may discharge that

burden by “‘showing’—that is, pointing out to the district court—that there is an

absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.” Id. at 325.

Once the moving party has met its burden, the nonmoving party may not rest

upon the mere allegations or denials of its pleading; rather, the nonmoving party

must show a genuine dispute by “citing to particular parts of materials in the

record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information,

affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the

motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials” or “showing

that the materials cited do not establish the absence . . . of a genuine dispute.” Fed.

R. Civ. P. 56(c). If the nonmoving party “fails to make a showing sufficient to

establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which

that party will bear the burden at trial,” summary judgment is appropriate. Celotex,

477 U.S. at 322.

Summary judgment is also appropriate if the nonmoving party provides

merely colorable, conclusory, or speculative evidence. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,

Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). There must be more than a scintilla of evidence

supporting the nonmoving party and more than some metaphysical doubt as to the

material facts. Id. at 252. “Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a

rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for

trial.’” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586

(1986).

The substantive law identifies which facts are material, and “[o]nly disputes

over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will

properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. A

dispute about a material fact is genuine only if there is a sufficient evidentiary

basis that would allow a reasonable fact finder to return a verdict for the non-

moving party. Id. at 248–49.

When “faced with a summary judgment motion, the court must view the

facts ‘in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.’” N.A.A.C.P. v. N.

Hudson Reg’l Fire & Rescue, 665 F.3d 464, 475 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Scott v.

Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007)). At the summary judgment stage, the judge’s

function is not to weigh the evidence or to determine the truth of the matter; rather

it is to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at

249. The proper inquiry of the court “is the threshold inquiry of determining

whether there is the need for a trial—whether, in other words, there are any

genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact

because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party.” Id. at 250.

Summary judgment is warranted, after adequate time for discovery, against a

party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an

element essential to that party’s case and on which that party will bear the burden

of proof at trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. “Under such circumstances, ‘there can

be no genuine issue as to any material fact, since a complete failure of proof

concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders

all other facts immaterial.’” Anderson v. Consol. Rail Corp., 297 F.3d 242, 247 (3d

Cir. 2002) (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323). “[S]ummary judgment is essentially

‘put up or shut up’ time for the non-moving party: the non-moving party must

rebut the motion with facts in the record and cannot rest solely on assertions made

in the pleadings, legal memoranda, or oral argument.” Berckeley Inv. Group, Ltd.

v. Colkitt, 455 F.3d 195, 201 (3d Cir. 2006).

IV. The Material Facts.

Local Rule 56.1 requires a party moving for summary judgment to file “a

separate, short and concise statement of the material facts, in numbered

paragraphs, as to which the moving party contends there is no genuine issue to be

tried.” M.D. Pa. L.R. 56.1. The Rule, in turn, requires the non-moving party to file

“a separate, short and concise statement of the material facts, responding to the

numbered paragraphs set forth in the statement required [by the moving party], as

to which it is contended that there exists a genuine issue to be tried.” Id. The

“[s]tatements of material facts in support of, or in opposition to, a motion shall

include references to the parts of the record that support the statements,” and “[a]ll

material facts set forth in the statement required to be served by the moving party

will be deemed admitted unless controverted by the statement required to be served

by the opposing party.” Id. “Local Rule 56.1 was promulgated to bring greater

efficiency to the work of the judges of the Middle District.” Weitzner v. Sanofi

Pasteur Inc., 909 F.3d 604, 613 (3d Cir. 2018). “[T]he Rule ‘is essential to the

Court’s resolution of a summary judgment motion’ due to its role in ‘organizing

the evidence, identifying undisputed facts, and demonstrating precisely how each

side proposed to prove a disputed fact with admissible evidence.’” Id. (citations

omitted).

Here, in accordance with M.D. L.R. Pa. 56.1, Lippincott filed a statement of

material facts, see doc. 141, and supporting documents, see doc. 141-1. Parfaite

filed a response to that statement of material facts along with his declaration. See

doc. 152.7 Although Parfaite responded to Lippincott’s statement of material facts,

where he has not cited to record evidence to create a genuine factual dispute, we

consider the facts sets forth by Lippincott to be undisputed. Considering the

7 Parfaite also submitted one page from a Monroe Court of Common Pleas

docket sheet from a case titled Commonwealth v. $1,340. See doc. 152 at 19. And

in response to several statements of material fact, Parfaite points to documents

previously filed in this case. See e.g. doc. 152 ¶ 1 (citing to doc. 85-1 at 17).

above, as well as our duty to “construe all facts and inferences in favor of the

nonmoving party[,]” Peroza-Benitez v. Smith, 994 F.3d 157, 164 (3d Cir. 2021)

(quoting Santini v. Fuentes, 795 F.3d 410, 419 (3d Cir. 2015)), the following are

the material facts upon which we analyze Lippincott’s second motion for summary

judgment.

On February 23, 2021, Parfaite was arrested as part of an FBI sting operation

supported by the Monroe County Drug Task Force (“MCDTF”). Doc. 141 ¶ 1;

Doc. 152 ¶ 1.8 The MCDTF is a collaborative effort between the Office of the

District Attorney, the Pennsylvania State Police, the Pennsylvania Office of the

Attorney General, and local police departments focusing their combined efforts on

combating the sale and possession of illegal drugs. Doc. 141 ¶ 3; Doc. 152 ¶ 3.

Lippincott was employed as a detective by the Monroe County District Attorney’s

office, and through her employment there, she was a member of the MCDTF. Doc.

141 ¶ 2; Doc. 152 ¶ 2.

8 Parfaite purports to dispute this fact in part stating that he was already

being detained due to an outstanding parole warrant. See doc. 152 ¶ 1 (citing

Affidavit of Probable Cause in support of Police Criminal Complaint—doc. 85-1 at

17). Although the document that Parfaite cites states that Parfaite was wanted by

the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole and that the Board “will be

lodging a detainer against him because he is an absconder,” doc. 85-1 at 17, that

document does not create a genuine factual dispute about whether Parfaite was

arrested on February 23, 2021, as part of an FBI sting operation supported by the

MCDTF.

Lippincott, other members of the MCDTF, and agents from the FBI

conducted a surveillance operation in Monroe County based on reports from a

confidential informant of drug activity. Doc. 141 ¶ 4; Doc. 152 ¶ 4. On January 6,

2021, Lippincott received information from a confidential informant who stated

that he was able to purchase methamphetamines and heroin from Matthew Luce,

who was on state parole. Doc. 141 ¶ 5; Doc. 152 ¶ 5.9 The informant purchased

drugs from Luce on January 6, 2021, and January 8, 2021. Doc. 141 ¶ 6; Doc. 152

¶ 6.10

On February 17, 2021, the same informant told Lippincott that he was able

to purchase drugs from Luce in Room 3 of the Paramount Motel. Doc. 141 ¶ 7;

Doc. 152 ¶ 7.11 The FBI set up surveillance outside the hotel and discovered that

9 Lippincott asserts that January 6, 2021, was when the investigation began.

Doc. 141 ¶ 5. Parfaite contends that the investigation began earlier with a failed

attempt to purchase narcotics from Matthew Luce through a confidential

informant. Doc. 152 ¶ 5. Whether the investigation began on January 6, 2021, or

earlier, is not material to the issues in this case.

10 Parfaite purports to dispute this fact in part asserting that it has nothing to

do with him. Doc. 152 ¶ 6. But he does not cite to any record evidence that would

create a genuine factual dispute about whether the informant purchased drugs from

Luce on these dates. Id. Thus, we consider this fact undisputed for purposes of the

present motion for summary judgment.

11 Parfaite purports to dispute this fact in part. See doc. 152 ¶ 7. But he does

not cite to any record evidence that would create a genuine factual dispute about

what the informant told Lippincott. Id. Thus, we consider this fact undisputed for

purposes of the present motion for summary judgment.

people were going in and out of the location, including Luce. Doc. 141 ¶ 8; Doc.

152 ¶ 8.12 On February 22, 2021, the same informant once again told Lippincott

that he was able to buy drugs from Luce at Room 3 of the Paramount Motel. Doc.

141 ¶ 9; Doc. 152 ¶ 9.13 Once again, a buy was arranged by the informant. Doc.

141 ¶ 10; Doc. 152 ¶ 10. The informant told Lippincott that Luce was going to be

staying in Room 3 of this motel for some time. Doc. 141 ¶ 10; Doc. 152 ¶ 10.

On February 22, 2021, Lippincott prepared a federal search warrant for

Room 3 of the Paramount Motel. Doc. 141 ¶ 11; Doc. 152 ¶ 11.14 She sent the

search warrant to Assistant United States Attorney (“AUSA”) James Buchanan,

who approved it. Doc. 141 ¶ 11; Doc. 152 ¶ 11.15 She then presented the warrant

12 Parfaite purports to dispute this fact. See doc. 152 ¶ 8. Although he cites

to several paragraphs of his declaration, those paragraphs do not create a genuine

factual dispute about the surveillance of the hotel room. Id. Thus, we consider this

fact undisputed for purposes of the present motion for summary judgment.

13 Parfaite purports to dispute this fact in part. Doc. 152 ¶ 9. But he does not

cite to any record evidence that would create a genuine factual dispute about what

the informant told Lippincott. Id. Thus, we consider this fact undisputed for

purposes of the present motion for summary judgment.

14 Parfaite purports to dispute this fact in part asserting that neither a warrant

nor a warrant application was provided to him during discovery. Doc. 152 ¶ 11.

But Parfaite had adequate time to raise any discovery disputes to the court. And he

has not shown that he raised a dispute with the court regarding the warrant or the

warrant application. Thus, we consider this fact undisputed for purposes of the

present motion for summary judgment

15 See supra note 14.

to then United States Magistrate Judge Saporito, who approved it. Doc. 141 ¶ 11;

Doc. 152 ¶ 11.16 Luce was the original target of the investigation, and AUSA

Buchanan was overseeing the prosecution of Luce and then later the prosecution of

Parfaite. Doc. 141 ¶ 12; Doc. 152 ¶ 12.

On February 23, 2021, at approximately 6:05 a.m. the search warrant was

executed at Room 3 of the Paramount Motel. Doc. 141 ¶ 14; Doc. 152 ¶ 14.

Because of the criminal history of one of the occupants and because of information

regarding possible firearms in the room, the Pennsylvania State Police’s Special

Emergency Response Team executed the warrant. Doc. 141 ¶ 13; Doc. 152 ¶ 13.17

Six people were in the room, including Parfaite. Doc. 141 ¶ 15; Doc. 141 ¶ 15.

Parfaite and some others found in the room were detained. Doc. 141 ¶ 15; Doc.

16 See supra note 14.

17 Parfaite purports to dispute this fact in part. See doc. 152 ¶ 13. But he

does not cite to any record evidence that would create a genuine factual dispute. Id.

Thus, we consider this fact undisputed for purposes of the present motion for

summary judgment.

152 ¶ 15.18 A search of the room revealed the presence of heroin and

methamphetamines. Doc. 141 ¶ 16; Doc. 152 ¶ 16.19

Lippincott completed and filed the criminal complaint against Parfaite in

Monroe County state court. Doc. 141 ¶ 22; Doc. 152 ¶ 22. Assistant District

Attorney Rich White approved the state criminal complaint against Parfaite. Doc.

141 ¶ 23; Doc. 152 ¶ 23.20 Lippincott obtained a criminal history report from

18 Lippincott asserts that all six people in the room were detained. Doc. 141

¶ 15. Parfaite asserts, however, that two of the individuals were not detained. Doc.

152 ¶ 15. And he points to his declaration to support that assertion. See doc. 152 at

16, ¶ 16. Thus, Parfaite has presented a genuine factual dispute about whether all

the occupants were detained. But that dispute is not material to Parfaite’s claims

in this case.

19 Although Parfaite disputes the exact location of the drugs found in the

room and which drugs were his, he does not dispute that drugs were found in the

room. Doc. 152 ¶ 16.

20 Lippincott asserts that the ultimate charging decisions against Parfaite

were made by the AUSA, and it was not her decision to charge Parfaite or what

those charges should be. Doc. 141 ¶¶ 22, 49. But as set forth above, it is

undisputed that the state charges were filed by Lippincott and approved by

Assistant District Attorney Rich White. Lippincott states in her declaration that

“AUSA Buchanan decided that the charges against Parfaite should be pursued in

federal court rather than before the Monroe County Court of Common Pleas[,]”

and “[a]s a result, he instructed me to withdraw the Monroe County criminal

charges against Parfaite.” Doc. 141-1 at 135, ¶¶ 13, 14; see also doc. 141 ¶¶ 30, 32.

Lippincott also asserts that “the charges against Parfaite in federal court arose out

of the same investigation and seizure of drugs that prompted the filing of the

Monroe County case.” Doc. 141-1 at 135, ¶ 14; see also doc. 141 ¶ 31. While the

AUSA may have been involved in discussions about the decision to withdraw the

state charges, that does not show that the AUSA made the decision to file the state

charges against Parfaite in the first place. Rather, as set forth above, it is

JNET,21 which confirmed that Parfaite had convictions for drug-related offenses.

Doc. 141 ¶ 26; Doc. 152 ¶ 26.22 Magisterial District Judge Brian Germano set bail

for Parfaite in the county court in the amount of $100,000. Doc. 141 ¶ 24; Doc.

152 ¶ 24.

AUSA Buchanan decided that the state charges should be discontinued in

favor of pursuing the prosecution of Parfaite in federal court, where Matthew Luce

was also being prosecuted. Doc. 141 ¶ 30; Doc. 152 ¶ 30.23

undisputed that the state charges were filed by Lippincott and approved by

Assistant District Attorney Rich White.

21 Lippincott notes—and Parfaite does not dispute—that “JNET, the

Pennsylvania Justice Network, is the Commonwealth’s primary public safety and

criminal justice information sharing system. JNET provides authorized users with

access to a variety of criminal justice and public safety data sources through a

single, integrated portal. This includes the ability to search for criminal history

records, warrants, and juvenile data, access to court docket information and

statewide warrant searches, and sharing of police records and data between

agencies.” Doc. 141 at 6 n.3.

22 Parfaite purports to dispute this fact asserting that he did not receive the

JNET report in discovery. See doc. 152 ¶ 26. But he does not cite to any record

evidence that would create a genuine factual dispute that Lippincott had obtained

the JNET report. Id. Thus, we consider this fact undisputed for purposes of the

present motion for summary judgment.

23 Parfaite purports to dispute this fact asserting that Lippincott cannot point

to anything on the record to support the fact. See doc. 152 ¶ 30. But Lippincott

points to her affidavit to support the fact. See doc. 141 ¶ 30 (citing to doc. 141-1 at

135). And Parfaite does not cite to any record evidence that would create a

genuine factual dispute in this regard. Thus, we consider this fact undisputed for

purposes of the present motion for summary judgment. Parfaite also asserts that

the state case remained in place for over a month after he was indicted in federal

court. Although Parfaite has not cited to anything to support that assertion, we

On March 3, 2021, AUSA James Buchanan filed a grand jury indictment in

the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania (3:21-CR-

56-MEM) against Matthew Luce and Parfaite. Doc. 141 ¶ 28; Doc. 152 ¶ 28. The

seven-count indictment charged Parfaite in three of those counts. See United States

v. Parfaite, 3:21-cr-00056 (M.D. Pa.) at doc. 1.24 In Count 1, the indictment

charged that from November 26, 2020 to February 23, 2021, Luce and Parfaite

conspired “to knowingly and intentionally distribute and possess with intent to

distribute 50 grams or more of a mixture or substance containing a detectable

amount of methamphetamine, a Schedule II controlled substance, in violation of 21

U.S.C. Section 841(a)(l) and 841(b)(l)(B), and to knowingly and intentionally

distribute and possess with intent to distribute 100 grams or more of a mixture or

substance containing a detectable amount of heroin, a Schedule II controlled

substance, in violation of 21 U.S.C. Section 841(a)(l) and 84l(b)(l)(B). All in

violation of Title 21, United States Code, Sections 846.” Id. at 1–2. In Count 6, the

indictment charged that on or about February 23, 2021, Luce and Parfaite “did

knowingly and intentionally possess with intent to distribute a substance

note that in connection with Lippincott’s first motion for summary judgment, he

submitted a copy of his state court docket sheet, which shows that the state charges

were withdrawn on April 7, 2021. See Doc. 118-1 (Commonwealth v. Parfaite, MJ-

43401-CR-0000074-2021 (Monroe Ctny.)).

24 We refer here to the actual indictment, instead of Lippincott’s incomplete

summary of the indictment.

containing a detectable amount of methamphetamine, a Schedule II controlled

substance. All in violation of Title 21, United States Code, Sections 841(a)(1).” Id.

at 4–5. And in Count 7, the indictment charged that on or about February 23,

2021, Luce and Parfaite “did knowingly and intentionally possess with intent to

distribute a substance containing a detectable amount of heroin, a Schedule II

controlled substance. All in violation of Title 21, United States Code, Sections

841(a)(1).” Id. at 5. The indictment also contained forfeiture provisions. Id. at 5–7.

On March 12, 2021, Parfaite was arraigned in federal court, and then Chief

Magistrate Judge Mehalchick ordered Parfaite detained. Doc. 141 ¶ 33; Doc. 152

¶ 33.

In the federal case, Parfaite was represented, at various times, by Attorneys

Carl J. Poveromo, James Scanlon, and Gino A. Bartolai, Jr. Doc. 141 ¶ 45; Doc.

152 ¶ 45. Parfaite’s attorneys filed various pretrial motions including an omnibus

motion for pre-trial relief. Doc. 141 ¶ 35; Doc. 152 ¶ 35. That motion included an

exhaustive list of items that Parfaite’s defense team wanted to prepare for trial.

Doc. 141 ¶ 36; Doc. 152 ¶ 36. The motion asked the AUSA for information that

included the following:

a. a comprehensive request for written or recorded statements

by Parfaite;

b. the substance of all oral statements Parfaite made that the

AUSA intended to offer into evidence;

c. Any statement, confession, or admission, made by Parfaite

to investigation officers or to third parties.

d. investigators’ reports;

e. photographs and videos;

f. tangible evidence of all items seized from Parfaite’s Motel

room.

g. All documents subject to production pursuant to Brady v.

Maryland, and its progeny, including United States v. Agurs,

427 U.S. 96 (1976), Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 105

(1972), and United States v. Bagley, 469 U.S. 1016 (1985).

Doc. 141 ¶ 35; Doc. 152 ¶ 35.

On March 21, 2022, Judge Mannion granted in part and denied in part

Parfaite’s omnibus motion. Doc. 141 ¶ 37; Doc. 152 ¶ 37. In his opinion, Judge

Mannion noted that the Government provided Parfaite with the following:

a. a CD containing 125 pages of documents, photographs, and

videos from the execution of a search warrant on February 23,

2021, a USB flash drive containing an audio file, digital

forensic reports, 12,667 pages of Facebook records and

documents from the Monroe County District Attorney’s office,

and fifty-two pages of additional discovery materials.

b. police reports and investigation paperwork for recorded

calls, pictures of the pre-recorded buy money, pictures and

video from the execution of the above-described search

warrant, criminal histories of the defendants, a copy of the

search warrants and applications for the above-described

Paramount Motel Room, and search warrant materials for

relevant social media accounts.

c. the audio [] recording of his February 23, 2021, statement to

investigators, digital forensic reports of the cellular phones

recovered from the motel room on February 23, 2021,

Facebook records from social media accounts, the consent to

search paperwork from Ashley Grimes, Amy Beth Gearhart,

Kayla Fields, the Miranda waiver form of Amy Beth Gearhart,

and the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") 302 form

regarding the execution of the search warrant on February 23,

2021.

d. On July 16, 2021, the government provided “the complaint

affidavit and detention order concerning Defendant Luce,

interview notes from the February 23, 2021, police interviews

with Ashley Grimes and Ryan Yesner, a second copy of the

FBI 302 described above, the paperwork regarding the

consensualization of phone recordings, . . . , and two laboratory

reports from the Drug Enforcement Agency laboratory.”

e. on August 10, 2021, the government provided “a summary

of the expected testimony of the CIs in this case to Defendant

Parfaite,” and “[i]n that summary, the Government also

disclosed the expected testimony of the other individuals who

were either present in the [motel] room with the defendants on

February 23, 2021, or who bought controlled substances from

the defendants prior to February 23, 2021.”

f. Finally, on November 5, 2021, the government provided the

full, unredacted statements of both defendants, the digital

forensic report of Michael Sparano to Defendant Parfaite, the

jail calls from Parfaite from Lackawanna County Prison,

excerpts of the text conversations between co-conspirators

Luce, Parfaite, and Sparano, the MCDA incident report, the

recorded interview of unindicted co-conspirator Michael

Sparano, and additional criminal history paperwork regarding

Parfaite.

Doc. 141 ¶ 38; Doc. 141 ¶ 38. Judge Mannion also noted that the Government

provided Parfaite with significant amounts of discovery:

In sum, as of November 8, 2021, the government has provided

Parfaite with 1145 pages of discovery, in addition to six digital

forensic reports, Facebook records from five social media

accounts, approximately 140 photographs, all the recorded

interviews of the co-conspirators in this case, and all the

laboratory reports from the analysis of any controlled

substances currently in the Government’s possession.

Since Parfaite’s pre-trial motions and the briefs of the parties

were filed, the court recognizes that the government has now

provided defendant with significant additional amounts of

discovery, and that Luce has pled guilty. Also, Parfaite now

has new counsel. Thus, some of Parfaite’s motions appear to be

moot.

Doc. 141 ¶ 39; Doc. 152 ¶ 39.

The production of discovery during the criminal prosecution was handled by

the U.S. Attorney’s office. Doc. 141 ¶ 50; Doc. 152 ¶ 50. The U.S. Attorney’s

Office represented to Judge Mannion that it understood its Brady obligations and

would comply with all legal mandates. Doc. 141 ¶ 40; Doc. 152 ¶ 40.25

A superseding information—filed on March 29, 2022—charged Parfaite

with one count of possession with intent to distribute methamphetamines. See

United States v. Parfaite, 3:21-cr-00056 (M.D. Pa.) at doc. 78. More specifically,

it charged that on or about February 23, 2021, Parfaite “knowingly and

intentionally possessed with intent to distribute 5 grams and more of

methamphetamine, a Schedule II controlled substance. All in violation of Title 21,

25 Parfaite purports to dispute this fact in part. See doc. 152 ¶ 40. But he does

not cite to any record evidence that would create a genuine factual dispute. Id.

Thus, we consider this fact undisputed for purposes of the present motion for

summary judgment.

United States Code, Sections 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B)(viii).” Id. at 1. The

superseding information also contained forfeiture provisions. Id. at 2–3.

On March 29, 2022, Parfaite signed a plea agreement with the United States.

Doc. 141 ¶ 42; Doc. 152 ¶ 42. In his plea agreement, Parfaite made the following

representations to the court:

a. Parfaite agreed to plead guilty to a felony information which

charged Parfaite with violations of Title 21, United States Code,

§ § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B)(viii), Possession with Intent to

Distribute 5 grams and more of methamphetamine.

b. Parfaite agreed that at the time the guilty plea was entered,

he would admit to the Court he was guilty of the offenses

charged in the Information.

c. Parfaite agreed to a forfeiture of assets listed in the forfeiture

allegation of the indictment;

d. Parfaite agreed not to pursue or initiate any civil claims or

suits against the United States of America, its agencies, or

employees, regardless whether he knew who they were, arising

out of the investigation, prosecution or cooperation, if any,

covered by this Agreement, including but not limited to any

claims for attorney’s fees and other litigation expenses arising

out of the investigation and prosecution of this matter.

e. Parfaite agreed that by entering a guilty plea in his criminal

case, he acknowledged that the Government’s position in his

prosecution was taken in good faith, had a substantial basis in

law and fact and was not vexatious.

Doc. 141 ¶ 43; Doc. 152 ¶ 43. On March 31, 2022, Parfaite pleaded guilty to the

superseding information. Doc. 141 ¶ 44; Doc. 152 ¶ 44.

On November 15, 2023, Judge Mannion entered a judgment, sentencing

Parfaite to 72 months imprisonment to be followed by a four-year term of

supervised release. Doc. 141 ¶ 51; Doc. 152 ¶ 51; see also United States v.

Parfaite, 3:21-cr-00056 (M.D. Pa.) at doc. 129. Although Parfaite filed an appeal,

on October 7, 2024, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

dismissed that appeal pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 42(b).26 See United States v.

Parfaite, 3:21-cr-00056 (M.D. Pa.) at docs. 137, 142.

V. Discussion.

Parfaite’s remaining claims are multiple federal claims of fabrication of

evidence; federal claims of hiding exculpatory evidence; a federal claim based on

the manner in which the search was executed; and a state-law claim of intentional

infliction of emotional distress. We will address the federal claims first.

A. Federal Claims.

Parfaite’s constitutional claims are brought as 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims.

Section 1983 imposes civil liability upon any person who, acting under the color of

state law, deprives another individual of any rights, privileges, or immunities

secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.” Shuman v. Penn Manor

26 Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 42(b) deals with voluntary dismissal

in the Court of Appeals. See Fed. R. App. P. 42(b).

School Dist., 422 F.3d 141, 146 (3d Cir. 2005). Section 1983 “does not create any

new substantive rights but instead provides a remedy for the violation of a federal

constitutional or statutory right.” Id. To establish a claim under §1983, the

plaintiff must establish a deprivation of a federally protected right and that this

deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. Woloszyn v.

County of Lawrence, 396 F.3d 314, 319 (3d Cir. 2005).

Lippincott contends that she is entitled to summary judgment as to the

remaining federal claims because she did not make any misrepresentations outside

of her testimonial immunity; because Parfaite cannot state a constitutional claim

for misrepresentations at a bail hearing; because Parfaite’s claims are barred by the

favorable-termination rule of Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994); and because

she is entitled to qualified immunity. We address each of Parfaite’s claims, but

before we do so, we set forth the law applicable to Heck’s favorable-termination

rule and the law applicable to qualified immunity.

1. The favorable-termination rule of Heck.

In Heck, the United States Supreme Court held that “in order to recover

damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other

harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence

invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been

reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state

tribunal authorized to make such [a] determination, or called into question by a

federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254.” 512 U.S. at

486–87 (footnote omitted). “Thus, when a state prisoner seeks damages in a

§ 1983 suit, the district court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the

plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it

would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that

the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.” Id. at 487. The

“favorable-termination requirement is rooted in pragmatic concerns with avoiding

parallel criminal and civil litigation over the same subject matter and the related

possibility of conflicting civil and criminal judgments.” McDonough v. Smith, 588

U.S. 109, 117–18 (2019). “The requirement likewise avoids allowing collateral

attacks on criminal judgments through civil litigation.” Id. at 118.

When Heck applies, even if the plaintiff has exhausted available state

remedies, he has no cause of action under § 1983 unless and until the conviction or

sentence is reversed, expunged, invalidated, or impugned by the grant of a writ of

habeas corpus. Heck, 512 U.S. at 489. “[A] state prisoner’s § 1983 action is barred

(absent prior invalidation)—no matter the relief sought (damages or equitable

relief), no matter the target of the prisoner’s suit (state conduct leading to

conviction or internal prison proceedings)—if success in that action would

necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of the confinement or its duration.”

Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81-82 (2005).

Heck applies to a conviction based on a guilty plea. See Gilles v. Davis, 427

F.3d 197, 209 n.8 (3d Cir. 2005) (“[U]nder Heck, both a guilty plea and an ARD

are sufficient to bar a subsequent § 1983 claim.”).

Claims barred by the favorable-termination rule of Heck, must be dismissed

without prejudice. See Curry v. Yachera, 835 F.3d 373, 380 (3d Cir. 2016)

(explaining that a dismissal with prejudice based on Heck was error and modifying

the order of dismissal based on Heck “to reflect that these claims are dismissed

without prejudice”). “[A] § 1983 claim that attacks the validity of a plaintiff’s

conviction or sentence does not accrue for statute-of-limitations purposes until the

underlying criminal case is favorably terminated.” Coello v. DiLeo, 43 F.4th 346,

353 (3d Cir. 2022). And when a claim is barred by Heck’s favorable-termination

rule, the plaintiff can renew such a claim ‘“if he ever succeeds in overturning his

conviction[.]’” Curry, 835 F.3d at 379 (quoting Perez v. Sifel, 57 F.3d 503, 505

(7th Cir. 1995)). That is why a dismissal based on Heck is without prejudice. Id.

2. Qualified Immunity.

Despite their participation in constitutionally impermissible conduct,

government officials “may nevertheless be shielded from liability for civil

damages if their actions did not violate ‘clearly established statutory or

constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’” Hope v.

Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818

(1982)). Qualified immunity ensures that before officers are subjected to suit, they

have notice that their conduct is unlawful. Id. “Qualified immunity balances two

important interests—the need to hold public officials accountable when they

exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment,

distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably.” Pearson v.

Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009). “If the law was clearly established, the

immunity defense ordinarily should fail, since a reasonably competent public

official should know the law governing his conduct.” Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818–19.

The qualified immunity analysis has two prongs. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232.

One prong of the analysis is whether the facts that the plaintiff has alleged or

shown make out a violation of a constitutional right. Id. The other prong of the

analysis is whether the right was clearly established. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194,

201 (2001).

“To determine whether a right was ‘clearly established,’ we conduct a two-

part inquiry.” Peroza-Benitez v. Smith, 994 F.3d 157, 165 (3d Cir. 2021). “First,

we must ‘define the right allegedly violated at the appropriate level of specificity.’”

Id. (quoting Sharp v. Johnson, 669 F.3d 144, 159 (3d Cir. 2012)). “This requires

us to frame the right ‘in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad

general proposition.’” Id. (quoting Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201). “Second, we must

ask whether that right was ‘clearly established’ at the time of its alleged violation,

i.e., whether the right was ‘sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would

understand that what he is doing violates that right.’” Id. (quoting Saucier, 533

U.S. at 202). “This is an ‘objective (albeit fact-specific) question,’ where ‘[an

officer]’s subjective beliefs . . . are irrelevant.’” Id. (quoting Anderson v.

Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641 (1987)).

“To be clearly established, a legal principle must have a sufficiently clear

foundation in then-existing precedent.” D.C. v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 63 (2018). In

other words, “[t]he rule must be ‘settled law,’ which means it is dictated by

‘controlling authority’ or ‘a robust ‘consensus of cases of persuasive authority.’”

Id. (internal citations omitted). “It is not enough that the rule is suggested by then-

existing precedent.” Id. Rather, “[t]he precedent must be clear enough that every

reasonable official would interpret it to establish the particular rule the plaintiff

seeks to apply.” Id.

If the law did not put the defendant on notice that his conduct would be

clearly unlawful, qualified immunity is appropriate. Bayer v. Monroe County

Children & Youth Services, 577 F.3d 186, 193 (3d Cir. 2009). “In other words,

‘existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional question

beyond debate.’” Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664 (2012) (quoting Ashcroft

v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011)). “This exacting standard ‘gives government

officials breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken judgments’ by

‘protect[ing] all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the

law.’” City & Cnty. of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 575 U.S. 600, 611 (2015)

(quoting al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 743).

“Defendants bear the burden of establishing qualified immunity.” White v.

Dauphin Cnty., No. 1:22-CV-1241, 2024 WL 3046718, at *4 (M.D. Pa. June 18,

2024). “Officials demonstrate they are entitled to qualified immunity only if they

can show that a reasonable person in their position at the relevant time could have

believed, in light of clearly established law, that their conduct comported with

recognized legal standards.” E. D. v. Sharkey, 928 F.3d 299, 306 (3d Cir. 2019).

3. Fabrication-of-Evidence Claims.

Parfaite claims that Lippincott denied him due process by fabricating

evidence against him. “Fabricated evidence is an affront to due process of law,

and state actors seeking to frame citizens undermine fundamental fairness and are

responsible for ‘corruption of the truth-seeking function of the trial process.’”

Black v. Montgomery Cnty., 835 F.3d 358, 370 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting United

States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)); see also Halsey v. Pfeiffer, 750 F.3d

273, 293 (3d Cir. 2014) (“We emphatically reject the notion that due process of

law permits the police to frame suspects.”). Whether a plaintiff is convicted or

acquitted, he or she may have a claim based on fabrication of evidence. Black, 835

F.3d at 371. But the Third Circuit has “cautioned . . . that there are ‘hurdles facing

a plaintiff alleging a due process violation for fabrication of evidence.’” Boseman

v. Upper Providence Twp., 680 F. App’x 65, 69 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Black, 835

F.3d at 372). “A plaintiff must demonstrate a ‘meaningful connection’ between

the injury and the use of the fabricated evidence.” Id. (quoting Black, 835 F.3d at

372). “There is also a requirement that the evidence be ‘so significant that it could

have affected the outcome of the criminal case.’” Id. (quoting Black, 835 F.3d at

372). Further, “the standard required to demonstrate that evidence is fabricated is a

‘notable bar.’” Id. (quoting Black, 835 F.3d at 372). “[T]testimony that is incorrect

or simply disputed should not be treated as fabricated merely because it turns out

to have been wrong.” Halsey, 750 F.3d at 295. Rather, a “fabrication-of-evidence

claim requires persuasive evidence [the defendant] formulated or submitted false

evidence willfully, knowingly, or with a reckless disregard for its truth.” Mervilus

v. Union Cnty., 73 F.4th 185, 194–95 (3d Cir. 2023).

a. Statement of the Confidential Informant.

Parfaite contends that defendant Lippincott fabricated a statement from

confidential informant C.M. See doc. 22 ¶ 1. More specifically, he contends that

C.M. said that Marli Plattenburg may have been the woman using drugs in the

hotel bathroom, but he was not sure. Id. But, according to Parfaite, defendant

Lippincott changed that “may have been” identification into a positive false

identification. Id. And Parfaite alleges that this false identification was used

against him on 10/7/21 and 11/8/21. Id. He further alleges that Lippincott knew

that the woman in question was not Marli Plattenburg. Id.

Parfaite he has not shown the significance of this purported false

identification or how it injured him. Nor has he pointed to evidence that Lippincott

willfully, knowingly, or with a reckless disregard for its truth falsified the

evidence. And given that Parfaite was arrested and charged after he was found in

the hotel room with drugs, a reasonable trier of fact could not conclude that this

purported mischaracterization of the CI’s statement was so significant that it could

have affected the outcome of the state criminal case. Thus, to the extent that

Parfaite is asserting a claim based on this this purported false identification in

connection with the state charges, his claim fails on the merits.

Although Parfaite alleges that this purported false identification was used

against him on 10/7/2127 and 11/8/21,28 as mentioned, he has not shown the

significance of this purported false identification or how it injured him. Moreover,

given that Parfaite alleges that this purported false identification was used against

him after the state charges were dismissed and while the federal charges were

pending and given that he pleaded guilty to the federal charges and his conviction

has not been vacated or otherwise drawn into question, a fabrication-of-evidence

27 Lippincott points out that October 7, 2021, is the date that the United

States filed a motion in limine and brief in support in Parfaite’s federal case. See

doc. 142 at 7–8; See also United States v. Parfaite, 3:21-cr-00056 (M.D. Pa.) at

docs. 37, 38. We note that the United States’ motion in limine concerned the

United States’s intent to submit prior felony convictions of Luce and Parfaite if

they testified at trial. See doc. 37. And in the United States’ brief in support of its

motion in limine, the only mention of Plattenburg is as follows about an arranged

buy by the confidential informant from Luce on February 17, 2021:

The CI stated that there were other individuals in the hotel

room, including a young girl, and a woman who the CI

observed shooting heroin in the hotel room bathroom. Three

cars were also observed parked outside the room, including one

belonging to Marli Plattenburg, (PA # LLY2948 2004 Hyundai

Sante Fe) who the CI identified as the woman shooting heroin.

Doc. 38 at 5 in 3:21-cr-00056.

28 Lippincott also points out that November 8, 2021, is the date that the

United States filed a brief in opposition to Parfaite’s pretrial motions in the federal

case. See doc. 142 at 8–9; see also United States v. Parfaite, 3:21-cr-00056 (M.D.

Pa.) at doc. 47 (brief in opposition to both Parfaite and Luce’s pretrial motions).

That brief contains the same, single reference to Plattenburg as set forth in the

United States’ brief in support of its motion in limine and as quoted above. See

doc. 47 at 6-7 in 3:21-cr-00056; see also supra note 27.

claim based on this purported false identification in connection with the federal

charges is barred by the favorable termination rule of Heck. See McDonough, 588

U.S. at 119–24 (concluding that similar to the claims in Heck, a due process

fabrication-of-evidence claim is “most analogous to a claim of common-law

malicious prosecution,” and thus, such a claim accrues “[o]nly once the criminal

proceeding has ended in the defendant’s favor, or a resulting conviction has been

invalidated within the meaning of Heck”).

b. Bail-Criteria Form.

Parfaite also contends that Lippincott fabricated a bail-criteria form. See doc.

22 ¶ 5. He asserts that on that form, Lippincott stated that he was convicted of

“PWID” in New Jersey, which Parfaite contends is false. Id. He also asserts that

on that form, Lippincott stated that he misrepresented his true identity, which

Parfaite contends is false. Id.

Lippincott asserts that she did not lie on the bail-criteria form, and she

asserts that she obtained Parfaite’s criminal history from JNET. Doc. 141 ¶¶ 25,

26. Parfaite replies that the JNET report does not show that he was convicted of

PWID. Doc. 152 ¶ 25. Rather, it shows that he was convicted of “USE/POSS

W/INTENT TO USE DRUG.” Id.; see also doc. 141-1 at 131. We agree with

Parfaite that there is a difference between what the JNET report and what was

written on the bail-criteria form. But although we understand that Parfaite disputes

where certain drugs were found and which drugs were his, given that it is

undisputed that heroine and methamphetamines were found in the hotel room

where Parfaite was, a reasonable trier of fact could not conclude that this

misstatement on the bail-criteria form was so significant that it could have affected

the outcome of bail proceeding. Similarly, Parfaite has not presented evidence

from which it can reasonably be inferred that the purported misrepresentation

regarding him misrepresenting his identity was so significant that it could have

affected the outcome of bail proceeding.29 Thus, Parfaite’s fabrication-of-evidence

claim based on the bail-criteria form fails.30

29 Further, Parfaite has not pointed to any evidence showing how the form

was used in connection with his state bail hearing. The form itself states: “This

form is to be completed by the affiant on all defendants prior to the preliminary

arraignment and is to be attached to the criminal complaint submitted to the

correctional facility of the Magisterial District Judge.” Doc. 85-1 a 28. Given this,

it may be reasonable to assume that the form was submitted to the Magisterial

District Judge. But to the extent that Parfaite is claiming that the form affected his

federal bail proceedings, there is no basis to assume that the form was presented to

then Chief Magistrate Judge Mehalchick, who conducted the detention hearing,

and Parfaite has not presented any evidence that it was, in fact, presented to Judge

Mehalchick.

30 In his second amended complaint, Parfaite also mentions the Eighth

Amendment in connection with the bail-criteria form. See doc. 22 at 3. Lippincott

does not squarely address the Eighth Amendment. But in support of her argument

that Parfaite cannot maintain a claim for a misrepresentation at a bail hearing, she

does cite a case—Frantz v. Kingston Police Dep't, No. 3:15-CV-0402, 2015 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 56046, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 9, 2015), report and recommendation

adopted, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55521, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 28, 2015)—which, in

the part cited by Lippincott, addresses the Eighth Amendment. “District courts

‘possess the power to enter summary judgments sua sponte, so long as the losing

c. Other Purported Falsifications.

Parfaite also contends that Detective Lippincott failed to fully and properly

fill out a drug-force-activity form, that she failed to date and sign the copy of the

purchase money, and that she failed to have the informant make his mark showing

that he received the money from her or showing where the money was found. Doc.

22 ¶ 2. He also contends that Lippincott falsified physical evidence regarding

money for a controlled buy on February 22, 2021. Id. ¶ 3. Again, to the extent,

Parfaite is contending these purported fabrications lead to the state charges, he has

not shown the significance of these things. Nor given that drugs were found in the

party was on notice that she had to come forward with all of her evidence.’” In re

SemCrude L.P., 864 F.3d 280, 296 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Anderson v. Wachovia

Mortg. Corp., 621 F.3d 261, 280 (3d Cir. 2010)). ‘“Notice’ simply requires that

‘the targeted party ha[ve] reason to believe the court might reach the issue and

receive[ ] a fair opportunity to put its best foot forward.’” Id. (quoting Couden v.

Duffy, 446 F.3d 483, 500 (3d Cir. 2006). Further, even if notice was not

provided,” the grant of summary judgment is only reversible if there is prejudice.”

Id.

Here, although Lippincott does not specifically argue that she is entitled to

summary judgment as to the Eighth Amendment claim, she does argue that she is

entitled to summary judgment as to the claim of misrepresentation at the bail

hearing, which is the basis for Parfaite’s Eighth Amendment claim, and she cites

an Eighth Amendment case. Given this, we conclude that Parfaite had notice and a

full and fair opportunity to present his facts regarding his Eighth Amendment

claim. And for the reasons set forth above, a reasonable factfinder could not

conclude that the purported misrepresentations affected the bail determination.

Accordingly, we will grant summary judgment to defendant Lippincott on the

Eighth Amendment claim.

hotel room where Parfaite was found, can he show how they injured him. Thus,

such claims based on the state charges fail on the merits.

Moreover, like his claim regarding the purported false-identification claim,

to the extent he is claiming that such purported fabrications lead to or involved his

federal charges, such claims are barred by the favorable-termination requirement of

Heck given that his federal conviction has not been invalidated.

4. Exculpatory Evidence Claim.

Parfaite claims that Lippincott failed to provide him with exculpatory

evidence. We construe Parfaite’s claim as a claim based on Brady v. Maryland,

373 U.S. 83 (1963).

In Brady, which involved the prosecution withholding a statement by a

witness admitting to the murder of which Brady was convicted, the Court held

“that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon

request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to

punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” Id. at

87. “The requirements of Brady are not based on any general constitutional right

to discovery in criminal cases, but rather on a defendant’s due process right to a

fair trial.” United States v. Higgs, 713 F.2d 39, 42 (3d Cir. 1983). “Because Brady

rests on the requirements of due process,” in determining when Brady material

must be turned over, the “focus must be on when disclosure is necessary to insure

[the defendant] a fair trial.” Id. at 43. “No denial of due process occurs if Brady

material is disclosed to [the defendant] in time for its effective use at trial.” Id. at

44. ‘“There are three components of a true Brady violation: [(1)] The evidence at

issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or because

it is impeaching; [(2)] that evidence must have been suppressed by the State, either

willfully or inadvertently; and [(3)] prejudice must have ensued.”’ Thompson v.

City of Williamsport, No. 4:22-CV-01159, 2024 WL 1747645, at *6 (M.D. Pa.

Apr. 23, 2024) (quoting Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 282 (1999)).

A police officer has a duty to disclose exculpatory evidence to the

prosecution so that it can be turned over to the defense. See Yarris v. Cnty. of

Delaware, 465 F.3d 129, 141 (3d Cir. 2006) (stating that although ‘“the Brady duty

to disclose exculpatory evidence to the defendant applies only to a prosecutor[,]”

‘“police officers and other state actors may be liable under § 1983 for failing to

disclose exculpatory information to the prosecutor’” (quoting Gibson v.

Superintendent of N.J. Dep’t of Law & Public Safety–Div. of State Police, 411 F.3d

427, 442 (3d Cir. 2005)).

Here, although Parfaite contends that he was not provided with exculpatory

evidence, he has not presented evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could

conclude that Lippincott withheld evidence that would have been exculpatory.

Moreover, if Parfaite is contending that Lippincott should have turned over

exculpatory evidence while the state charges were pending, given that those

charges were pending for only a very short time and given that “[n]o denial of due

process occurs if Brady material is disclosed to [the defendant] in time for its

effective use at trial,” Higgs, 713 F.2d at 44, Parfaite cannot show that he was

prejudiced by the purported failure to disclose while the state charges were

pending. And to the extent that Parfaite is claiming that Lippincott failed to turn

over exculpatory evidence in connection with the federal charges, such a claim is

barred by the favorable-termination rule of Heck. See Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S.

521, 536 (2011) (citing Heck and stating that because a claim under Brady that

exculpatory evidence was withheld, “when successful postconviction, necessarily

yields evidence undermining a conviction[,] . . . Brady claims have ranked within

the traditional core of habeas corpus and outside the province of § 1983”).

5. Search Claim.

Parfaite claims that Lippincott violated his Fourth Amendment rights in

connection with the execution of the search of the hotel room.31 He is seeking to

31 In his second amended complaint, Parfaite also mentions the Fifth

Amendment. See doc. 22 at 4. The Fifth Amendment provides, in part, that “[n]o

person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of

law.” U.S. Const. amend. V. The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment,

however, applies only to the federal government and federal officials. Shoemaker

v. City of Lock Haven, 906 F. Supp. 230, 237 (M.D. Pa. 1995). “It does not apply

hold Lippincott liable because she failed to intervene to prevent the destruction of

his property. See doc. 22 ¶ 6.

Lippincott asserts that she did not destroy Parfaite’s property during the

search, and she did not observe anyone destroy Parfaite’s property during the

search. Doc. 141 ¶ 17. Parfaite responds that he “never claimed the defendant did

anything but fail to intervene to protect [his] rights in this instance.” Doc. 152 ¶ 17.

But he asserts that Lippincott was in the room at the time, and in a video, she can

be seen and heard speaking on a cell phone while his property is being thrown and

smashed. Id.

“To prevail on a failure to intervene claim, a plaintiff must show: (1) that the

defendant failed or refused to intervene when a constitutional violation took place

to the acts or conduct of the states, their agencies, subdivisions, or employees.” Id.

The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment is not applicable in this case

because Lippincott is a state, not a federal, actor. Although Lippincott has not

specifically moved for summary judgment as to the Fifth Amendment claim, the

court has the authority to sua sponte dismiss a claim brought by a party proceeding

in forma pauperis or by a prisoner seeking redress from governmental officers. See

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) (providing that where a plaintiff is proceeding in

forma pauperis, “[n]otwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may

have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines

that . . . the action or appeal . . . fails to state a claim on which relief may be

granted”); 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) (providing that in a case brought by a prisoner

seeking redress from a governmental entity, officer, or employee, the court shall

“dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint . . . fails

to state a claim upon which relief may be granted”). Here, pursuant to that

authority, we will dismiss the Fifth Amendment claim.

in his or her presence or with his or her knowledge; and (2) there was a realistic

and reasonable opportunity to intervene.” Balliet v. Luzerne Cnty., No. 3:22-CV-

02032, 2024 WL 2275252, at *8 (M.D. Pa. May 20, 2024) (citations and internal

quotation marks omitted). The United States Court of Appeals has “recognized a

right to have a government actor intervene when the underlying constitutional

violation involves excessive force or sexual assault of a person in custody or

detention,” but it has held that its “precedent does not establish, let alone clearly

establish, a right to intervention in other contexts.” Thomas v. City of Harrisburg,

88 F.4th 275, 285 (3d Cir. 2023) (medical context), cert. denied, 2024 WL

4426554, at *1 (U.S. Oct. 7, 2024), and 2024 WL 4426555, at *1 (U.S. Oct. 7,

2024).

Given that the Third Circuit has observed that a failure-to-intervene claim is

not clearly established outside the excessive-force and sexual-assault contexts, we

conclude that Lippincott is entitled to qualified immunity from Parfaite’s failure to

intervene claim relating to the execution of the search.

We note that although Lippincott makes a general argument that she is

entitled to qualified immunity, she does not specifically mention the search claim

within that argument. Nevertheless, as set forth above, see supra note 31, in

certain circumstances the court may sua sponte dismiss claims brought by a

prisoner or a plaintiff proceeding in forma pauperis. And the Court may address

qualified immunity sua sponte “where it is clear on the face of the complaint that a

party is immune from suit.” Newland v. Reehorst, 328 F. App’x 788, 791 (3d Cir.

2009) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii), which provides that in a case in which

the plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis “the court shall dismiss the case at

any time if the court determines that . . . the action . . . seeks monetary relief

against a defendant who is immune from such relief.”); see also Doe v. Delie, 257

F.3d 309, 312, 322 n. 13 (3d Cir.2001) (affirming district court’s sua sponte

dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) [failure to state a claim] on the basis

of qualified immunity). Here, because it is clear from the face of Parfaite’s second

amended complaint that he is seeking to hold Lippincott liable on a failure-to-

intervene claim and such is a claim is not clearly established in this context, we

will dismiss the search claim sua sponte based on qualified immunity.

B. State-Law Claim.

In addition to federal claims, it appears that Parfaite is asserting a state-law

claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. See doc. 22 ¶ 7. Such a claim

would fall within the court’s supplemental jurisdiction.

Whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction is within the discretion of the

court. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) provides that district courts may decline to exercise

supplemental jurisdiction over a state-law claim if the district court has dismissed

all claims over which it has original jurisdiction. When deciding whether to

exercise supplemental jurisdiction, “a federal court should consider and weigh in

each case, and at every stage of the litigation, the values of judicial economy,

convenience, fairness, and comity.” City of Chicago v. Int’l Coll. of Surgeons, 522

U.S. 156, 173 (1997) (quoting Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cahill, 484 U.S. 343, 350

(1988)). The Third Circuit has held that “where the claim over which the district

court has original jurisdiction is dismissed before trial, the district court must

decline to decide the pendent state claims unless considerations of judicial

economy, convenience, and fairness to the parties provide an affirmative

justification for doing so.” Hedges v. Musco, 204 F.3d 109, 123 (3d Cir. 2000)

(quoting Borough of West Miflin v. Lancaster, 45 F.3d 780, 788 (3d Cir. 1995)).

There is nothing unique about this case such that considerations of judicial

economy, convenience, and fairness provide an affirmative justification for

exercising supplemental jurisdiction over Parfaite’s state-law claim. Accordingly,

because we conclude that the defendant is entitled to summary judgment or

dismissal as to the federal claims, the court will decline to exercise supplemental

jurisdiction over Parfaite’s state-law claim.

VI. Conclusion.

For the foregoing reasons, we will dismiss Parfaite’s Fifth Amendment due

process claim pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1). And

pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), (iii), we will dismiss Parfaite Fourth Amendment

failure-to-intervene claim based on the search. We will grant summary judgment

to defendant Lippincott as to Parfaite’s fabrication-of-evidence claims based on the

bail-criteria form, all other fabrication-of-evidence claims based on the state

charges, the Brady claims based on the state charges, and the Eighth Amendment

bail claim. Pursuant to the favorable-termination rule of Heck, we will dismiss

without prejudice the other fabrication-of-evidence claims based on the federal

charges and the Brady claims based on the federal charges. Further, we will

decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Parfaite’s state-law claim. An

appropriate order follows.

S/Susan E. Schwab

Susan E. Schwab

United States Magistrate Judge