Hall v. Harris

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

FORT MYERS DIVISION

WENDALL HALL, TONNIE

NEALY and CURTIS DALE, JR,

Petitioners,

v. Case No.: 2:24-cv-1069-SPC-KCD

SHEVAUN HARRIS, RAVEN

REID and MELANIE MERCADO,

Respondents.

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OPINION AND ORDER

Before the Court is Plaintiffs Wendall Hall, Tonnie Nealy, and Curtis

Dale, Jr.’s Civil Rights Complaint (Doc. 1). The plaintiffs are involuntarily

committed residents of the Florida Civil Commitment Center (FCCC), and they

are litigating this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action pro se and in forma pauperis. United

States Magistrate Judge Kyle Dudek granted the plaintiffs leave to proceed in

forma pauperis, to the Court must review the complaint to determine whether

it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks monetary damages

from anyone immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides the standard for

screening complaints under § 1915. Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1485

(11th Cir. 1997). A district court should dismiss a claim when a party does not

plead facts that make the claim facially plausible. See Bell Atl. Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible when a court

can draw a reasonable inference, based on facts pled, that the opposing party

is liable for the alleged misconduct. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678

(2009). This plausibility standard requires “more than a sheer possibility that

a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557

(internal quotation marks omitted)). And a plaintiff must allege more than

labels and conclusions amounting to a formulaic recitation of the elements of a

cause of action. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

The plaintiffs are representing themselves in this action. Courts hold

the pleadings of pro se litigants to a less stringent standard than pleadings

drafted by attorneys. Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th

Cir. 1998). But courts do not have a duty to “re-write” a pro se litigant’s

complaint to find a claim. See Washington v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 256

F. App’x 326, 327 (11th Cir. 2007). Nor must a court ignore a plaintiff’s

litigation history.

Defendant Shevaun Harris is the secretary of Florida’s Department of

Children and Families (DCF), and Raven Reid is the director of the DCF’s

sexually violent predator program. Melanie Mercado is a psychology post-

doctoral resident at the FCCC. The plaintiffs assert three counts against the

defendants: (1) Harris and Reid violated the plaintiff’s due process rights by

allowing the FCCC to punish them with excessive periods of seclusion and

confinement; (2) Harris and Reid violated the plaintiff’s due process rights by

allowing the FCCC to employ unqualified experts—like Mercado—who provide

the state commitment courts written reports in annual reviews to determine

whether they should be released; and (3) Harris and Reid discriminate against

Black men—including the plaintiffs—when deciding whether to pursue civil

commitment proceedings. The Court finds the second and third counts fail to

state plausible claims.

A. Count 2

In this count, the plaintiffs allege Harris and Reid allow the FCCC to

employ unqualified psychologists—like Mercado—to provide state

commitment courts written reports in annual reviews to determine whether

FCCC residents should be released. While framed as a due process claim under

the Fourteenth Amendment, this count is really an attack on the admissibility

of evidence used in certain state judicial proceedings.

Florida law requires an annual review of the mental condition of each

person committed as a sexually violent predator. See Fla. Stat. § 394.918. The

review begins with an examination of the committee by a qualified

professional, who writes a report to the commitment court. It is the DCF’s duty

to provide the initial examination. White v. Fla. Dept. of Children and

Families, 981 So. 2d 1233, 1235 (1st Dist. Ct. App. Fla. 2008). If the court finds

probable cause to believe it would be safe to release the detainee, the court

conducts a trial. The detainee has a right to present evidence at the probable

cause hearing and the trial.

Given the plaintiffs’ continued commitment, the Court can safely infer

they have not prevailed on any annual review trials. If the plaintiffs believe

the DCF has not discharged its statutory duty to provide an annual

examination by a qualified professional, “such a claim is properly addressed by

motion filed with the committing court, which is in a superior position to

determine whether the requirement for an annual examination and report has

been discharged, and if not, to order compliance.” Id.

The plaintiffs fail to state a federal substantive due process claim

because the right they allege was violated is not a federal right. Grady v.

Baker, 404 F. App’x 450, 454 (11th Cir. 2010). The plaintiffs challenge their

right to examination by a qualified professional under a Florida statute, and

Florida law provides them with a remedy to enforce that right. Id. In addition

to filing a motion with the commitment court to enforce the right, the plaintiffs

can challenge the credibility of the expert report and offer competing evidence.

What is more, the plaintiffs’ second count is barred by the Heck doctrine,

which prohibits plaintiffs from using § 1983 to challenge “the unlawfulness of

his conviction or confinement”. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87

(1994); see also Fetzer v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Children and Families, No. 20-

11139-E, 2020 WL 5625172, at *1 (11th Cir. Aug. 13, 2020) (applying the Heck

doctrine to civilly committed sexually violent predators). That is true whether

the claim is construed as a challenge to the results of the plaintiffs’ state

commitment proceedings or the procedure of the proceedings because either

way, a judgment in the plaintiffs’ favor would imply the illegality of their

confinement. See Price v. McNeil, 340 F. App’x 581, 584 (11th Cir. 2009).

B. Count 3

The plaintiff’s third count accuses Harris and Reid of violating the Equal

Protection Clause by discriminating against Black men—including the

plaintiffs—when deciding whether to pursue civil commitment proceedings.

As a factual basis for their claim, the plaintiffs allege the FCCC population is

60% black, 38% white, and 2% other races.

“The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment commands

that no State shall ‘deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal

protection of the laws,’ which is essentially a direction that all persons

similarly situated should be treated alike.” City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne

Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985) (quoting Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202,

216 (1982)). While prosecutorial discretion is broad, it is not subject to

constitutional constraints. “In particular, the decision to prosecute may not be

‘deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or

other arbitrary classification[.]’” Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608

(1985) (quoting Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978)). Courts

“judge selective prosecution claims according to ordinary equal protection

standards.” Id.

To plead a selective enforcement claim, a plaintiff must allege facts

suggesting the enforcement policy at issue was motivated by a discriminatory

purpose and had a discriminatory effect. See United States v. Armstrong, 517

U.S. 456, 465 (1996). “To establish discriminatory effect in a race case, the

claimant must show that similarly situated individuals of a different race were

not prosecuted.” Id. A “similarly situated” individual is a person who engaged

in the same type of conduct as the claimant and against whom the evidence

was as strong or stronger than the evidence against the claimant. United

States v. Cannon, 987 F. 3d 924, 937 (11th Cir. 2021). Here, the complaint does

not identify a comparator who is similarly situated to any of the three

plaintiffs. Thus, they fail to state an equal protection claim.

Accordingly, it is now

ORDERED:

Counts 2 and 3 of the Complaint are DISMISSED without prejudice

for failure to state a claim. This action will proceed on Count 1 only. Because

the plaintiffs do not assert Count 1 against Melanie Mercado, the Clerk is

DIRECTED to terminate her as a party to this case.

DONE and ORDERED in Fort Myers, Florida on January 22, 2025.

tite POLSTER otal

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

SA: FTMP-1

Copies: All Parties of Record