Ceide v. Trout

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

WESTERN DIVISION

______________________________________________________________________________

JEAN CLAUDE CEIDE, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) No. 2:21-cv-02803-SHM-tmp

)

J. TROUT, ET AL., )

)

Defendants. )

______________________________________________________________________________

ORDER DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT WITH PREJUDICE, DENYING LEAVE TO

AMEND, CERTIFYING AN APPEAL WOULD NOT BE TAKEN IN GOOD FAITH,

NOTIFYING CEIDE OF THE COURT’S STRIKE RECOMMENDATION,

NOTIFYING CEIDE OF THE APPELLATE FILING FEE AND DISMISSING CASE

______________________________________________________________________________

On December 20, 2021, Plaintiff Jean Claude Ceide, Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) register

number 29517-016, filed a pro se complaint (ECF No. 1) and a motion for leave to proceed in

forma pauperis (ECF No. 2). When Ceide filed his complaint, he was incarcerated at the Federal

Correctional Institution (“FCI”) in Jesup, Georgia.1 (ECF Nos. 1 & 1-3 at PageID 2, 19.) The

Court granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis and assessed the $350 civil filing fee pursuant

to the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915, et seq. (the “PLRA”). (ECF No. 4.)

The Court construes the complaint to allege claims under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named

Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Ceide asserts Bivens claims against

1 Ceide is currently not listed in BOP custody. See Federal Bureau of Prisons, Find an

Inmate (Register No. 29517-016) (last accessed Jan. 21, 2025). Ceide has not notified the Court

of a change of address since his June 21, 2022 filing, providing an FCI-Jesup address. Ceide was

advised of his obligation “to notify the Court immediately, in writing, of his change of address.”

(ECF No. 4 at PageID 27.) The Court warned Ceide that failure to notify the Court of his transfer

to a different prison or his release could result in sanctions, “up to and including dismissal of this

action, without any additional notice or hearing by the Court.” (Id.)

Defendants: (1) FCI-Memphis Officer J. Trout, (2) FCI-Memphis Officer S. Alexander, (3) FCI-

Memphis Officer E. Rice, (4) FCI-Memphis Officer J. Hardin, and (5) FCI-Memphis Disciplinary

Hearing Officer (“DHO”) A. Arias. (ECF No. 1 at PageID 1-2.) Ceide seeks the following relief:

(1) seven million dollars ($7,000,000.00) in damages from Trout; (2) two million dollars

($2,000,000.00) in damages from Alexander; (3) three million dollars ($3,000,000.00) in damages

from Hardin; (4) three million dollars ($3,000,000.00) in damages from Arias; and (5) two million

dollars ($2,000,000.00) in damages from Rice. (ECF No. 1 at PageID 3.)

Ceide alleges that on May 4, 2021, at FCI-Memphis, Trout and Hardin assaulted Ceide

while he was handcuffed. (ECF No. 1-1 at PageID 5-6.) At recreation, Ceide asked Alexander

about Ceide’s property, and Alexander told Ceide that Alexander “would check into it.” (Id. at

PageID 4.) Alexander then asked Ceide to “cuff up” so that Alexander could escort Ceide back to

Ceide’s cell in the special housing unit. (Id.) On the way back to Ceide’s cell, Ceide saw Hardin,

the FCI-Memphis property officer, and Trout in Hardin’s office. (Id.) Alexander asked Hardin if

he was “going to do the property today?” (Id.) Hardin responded, “yes why?” (Id. at PageID 5.)

Ceide alleges Alexander then lied and said Ceide said he was not going “back to his cell without

seeing his property.” (Id.) Ceide alleges Trout then approached Ceide “for no [r]eason and struck

me, knocking me to the [g]round, knocking me unconscious for a split second, while I was in

handcuffs and compliance [sic].” (Id.)

Ceide alleges that, “while I was handcuffed and complying[,] [Hardin] let my right arm

lose (sic) and allowed Officer J. [T]rout to assault me by knocking me to the ground.” (Id.) Ceide

alleges Hardin kicked Ceide while he lay on the ground. (Id.)

Ceide alleges that Rice2 “let one of my left arm lose (sic) and allowed the Officer J. [T]rout

to assaulted (sic) me, he was on top of me with his knees on my head; with my face prest (sic)

against the concrete.” (Id.)

Ceide alleges that Arias failed to follow “protocol” because he did not request video

footage of the May 4, 2021 incident for Ceide’s disciplinary hearing. (Id.) Ceide alleges that Arias

violated Ceide’s Eighth Amendment rights by “siding with the others (sic) officers for not

preserving the video footage to show evidence of the actual assault, to my staff rep.” (Id.)

Ceide was found guilty of assault at the disciplinary hearing. (Id. at PageID 7.) Ceide

alleges that “there is no way that I could have assaulted staff with my hands cuffed behind my

back.” (Id.) Ceide alleges FCI-Memphis violated prison policy by failing to give Ceide an incident

report until twelve days after the incident. (Id., see also ECF No. 1-2 at PageID 10.)

Ceide attaches the May 4, 2021 incident report filed by Trout to Ceide’s complaint, but

does not refer to the report in his narrative. (ECF No. 1-2 at PageID 10.) The report says that

Trout took over the escort from Alexander because Ceide stopped walking and would not allow

Alexander to escort Ceide properly and that Ceide resisted and dropped down “thrusting his right

shoulder into [Trout’s] chest.” (Id.)

Ceide attaches his Regional Appeal form for the May 4, 2021 incident and a Rejection

Notice rejecting the appeal for Ceide’s failure to follow appeal procedures. Ceide does not mention

the forms in his complaint. (See ECF Nos. 1-1 & 1-2 at PageID 6, 8.)

For the reasons explained below, the complaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

2 Ceide does not allege how or when Rice became involved in the altercation. (See ECF

No. 1-1 at PageID 5.)

I. SCREENING THE COMPLAINT

The Court must screen prisoner complaints and dismiss any complaint, or any portion of

it, if the complaint —

(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief

may be granted; or

(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from

such relief.

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

In assessing whether the complaint states a claim on which relief may be granted, the Court

applies the standards under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), as stated in Ashcroft v.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-79 (2009), and in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-57

(2007). Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010). Applying those standards, the

Court accepts the complaint’s “well-pleaded” factual allegations as true and then determines

whether the allegations “plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief.” Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d

380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681). The Court does not assume that

conclusory allegations are true, because they are not “factual,” and all legal conclusions in a

complaint “must be supported by factual allegations.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. A complaint must

contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” it

also requires factual allegations to make a “‘showing,’ rather than a blanket assertion, of

entitlement to relief.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 n.3 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)).

“Pro se complaints are to be held ‘to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted

by lawyers,’ and should therefore be liberally construed.” Williams, 631 F.3d at 383 (quoting

Martin v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 712 (6th Cir. 2004)). Pro se litigants are not exempt from the

requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir.

1989); see Brown v. Matauszak, 415 F. App’x 608, 612, 613 (6th Cir. 2011) (affirming dismissal

of pro se complaint for failure to comply with “unique pleading requirements” and stating “a court

cannot ‘create a claim which [a plaintiff] has not spelled out in his pleading’” (quoting Clark v.

Nat’l Travelers Life Ins. Co., 518 F.2d 1167, 1169 (6th Cir. 1975))).

II. ANALYSIS

Bivens provides a right of action against federal employees who, acting under color of

federal law, violate an individual’s rights under the Constitution. 403 U.S. at 389. “Under the

Bivens line of cases, the Supreme Court has recognized a cause of action against federal officials

for certain constitutional violations when there are no alternative processes to protect the interests

of the plaintiff and no special factors counseling against recognizing the cause of action.” Koubriti

v. Convertino, 593 F.3d 459, 466 (6th Cir. 2010).

Ceide’s claims are construed as Bivens claims because: (1) Ceide was a federal inmate

confined at FCI Memphis when the events alleged in the complaint occurred (ECF No. 1-1 at

PageID 4); (2) Ceide has named Bureau of Prisons employees as defendants; and (3) Ceide alleges

violations of his rights under the Eighth and Fifth Amendments3 of the United States Constitution

(see id. at PageID 5).

Ceide does not clearly specify whether he is suing the Defendants in their official or

individual capacities. (See ECF No. 1 at PageID 2-3.) In the relief portion of the complaint, he

says “I would like to suing in own personal compacity individual.” (Id. at PageID 3.) Absent a

specification of capacity, it is presumed that an official is sued in his official capacity. See

Northcott v. Plunkett, 42 F. App’x 795, 796 (6th Cir. 2002); see Brown v. Holdener, 67 F. App'x

288, 290 (6th Cir. 2003) (construing Bivens claims against defendants in their official capacity

where plaintiff did not specify the capacity). If the Court were to presume that Defendants are

3 The Court construes Ceide’s claims about the failure to follow protocols and the unfairness of his

disciplinary hearing as due process claims. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563-66 (1974).

being sued in their official capacity, Ceide’s Bivens claims would be barred by the doctrine of

sovereign immunity. Brown, 67 F. App’x at 290. The Court will liberally construe Ceide’s

statement in the relief section of his complaint to allege claims against Defendants in their

individual capacity.

A. BIVENS STANDARD

“[T]o plausibly state a Bivens claim, ‘a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official

defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution’ in a manner

that can be vindicated under Bivens.” Himmelreich v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, No. 11-3474, 2012

WL 13226685, at *2 (6th Cir. May 7, 2012) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676). A plaintiff asserting

a Bivens claim must, as part of his prima facie case, allege facts showing “that the individual

defendant acted under color of federal authority and was personal[l]y involved in the deprivation

of the plaintiff’s constitutional rights.” Mueller v. Gallina, 137 F. App’x 847, 850 (6th Cir. 2005)

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

To date, the Supreme Court has recognized three contexts in which a Bivens claim is

appropriate: (a) a Fourth Amendment claim in the search and seizure context; (b) a Fifth

Amendment claim under the Due Process Clause for gender discrimination by a federal employer;

and (c) an Eighth Amendment claim for a prison official’s deliberate indifference to a federal

inmate’s medical needs. Ziglar v. Abbasi, 582 U.S. 120, 131 (2017); see Egbert v. Boule, 596 U.S.

482, 490-91 (2022). Expanding Bivens "is now a 'disfavored' judicial activity[.]" Ziglar, 582 U.S.

at 135 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 675); see also Egbert, 596 U.S. at 491. When deciding

whether Bivens can provide relief, a court must first ask "whether the case presents 'a

new Bivens context[.]'" Egbert, 596 U.S. at 492 (quoting Ziglar, 582 U.S. at 139-40). A

new Bivens context is "'meaningful[ly]' different from the three cases in which the Court has

implied a damages action." Egbert, 596 U.S. at 491 (alteration in original) (quoting Ziglar, 582

U.S. at 139). If there is a new Bivens context, a court must determine "if there are 'special factors'

indicating that the Judiciary is at least arguably less equipped than Congress to 'weigh the costs

and benefits of allowing a damages action to proceed.'" Id. (quoting Ziglar, 582 U.S. at 136). "If

there is even a single 'reason to pause before applying Bivens in a new context,' a court may not

recognize a Bivens remedy." Id. (quoting Hernandez v. Mesa, 589 U.S. 93 (2020)); see also

Anderson v. Fuson, No. 23-5342, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 2299, 2024 WL 1697766, at *5-6 (6th

Cir. Feb. 1, 2024).

B. EXCESSIVE FORCE CLAIMS

Ceide’s allegations against Trout, Alexander, Rice and Hardin arise from the May 4, 2021

incident at FCI Memphis when Ceide alleges the officers assaulted him. (See ECF Nos. 1 & 1-2.)

Ceide’s allegations are liberally construed to be excessive force claims. (Id.) An excessive force

claim does not fall within the three recognized appropriate Bivens claims. An inmate’s excessive

force claim is not a ground on which he can bring a Bivens claim. Hindman v. Doe, No. 24-5311,

2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 23752, at *4 (6th Cir. Sep. 18, 2024) (denying a motion to proceed in

forma pauperis on appeal and declining to extend a Bivens right of action to an Eighth Amendment,

U.S. Const. amend. VIII, excessive-force claim); see also Anderson, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 2299,

at *3. Ceide’s excessive force claims arise in a new Bivins context. See Anderson, 2024 U.S. App.

LEXIS 2299, at *6. Special factors disfavor recognizing a Bivens claim in this new

context. There are alternative processes for protecting Ceide’s rights. Callahan v. Fed. Bureau

of Prisons, 965 F.3d 520, 524 (6th Cir. 2020). Ceide has access to the BOP’s Administrative

Remedy Program and to suits in federal court for injunctive relief. Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko,

534 U.S. 61, 74 (2001); Anderson, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 2299, at *6. The Sixth Circuit has ruled

that “there are ‘separation of powers concerns’ here, because excessive-force claims against

federal prison employees ‘present a risk of interference with prison administration,’ which is a task

‘peculiarly within the province of the legislative and executive branches.’” Anderson, 2024 U.S.

App. LEXIS 2299, at *7 (quoting Callahan, 965 F.3d at 524).

Ceide’s excessive force claims against Trout, Alexander, Rice, and Hardin are

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE for failure to state a claim to relief.

C. DISCIPLINARY HEARING CLAIMS

Ceide’s allegation that Arias violated protocol when Arias failed to request the production

of video footage is liberally construed as a due process challenge to disciplinary proceedings and

fails to state a Bivens claim. See Morrison v. Williams, No. 4:19-CV-2676, 2020 WL 6389993, at

*3 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 2, 2020) (holding that federal employee’s failure to adhere to a BOP Program

Statement did not constitute a violation of federal law and failed to state a Bivens claim).4

Ceide’s claim for violation of prison disciplinary hearing policy does not fall within the

three claims recognized as appropriate under Bivens and presents a new Bivens context. The Sixth

Circuit has “recognized that the BOP's inmate grievance process ‘is substantial’ in that ‘it contains

its own statutes of limitations, filing procedures, and appeals process’ and allows for prisoners to

retain counsel to assist with the process[.]” Anderson, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 2299, at *6-7

(quoting Callahan, 965 F.3d at 524). “The presence of one of these alternative processes ‘alone

may limit the power of the Judiciary to infer a new Bivens cause of action.’” Anderson, 2024 U.S.

App. LEXIS 2299, at *7 (quoting Ziglar, 582 U.S. at 137).

4 See also Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 482 (1995) (In the context of Section 1983, the

Court observed that “a prison regulation primarily designed to guide correctional officials in the

administration of a prison” does not “confer rights on inmates”).

To the extent Ceide challenges the validity of his disciplinary proceeding, his claim is Heck

barred because Ceide has not alleged his disciplinary proceeding has been overturned. See Heck

v. Humphrey, 512 U.S.477, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994). The Supreme Court applied

the Heck rule to prison disciplinary proceedings in Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 117 S.Ct.

1584, 137 L.Ed.2d 906 (1997), when it held that, in the context of prison disciplinary hearings that

result in the loss of good-time credits, challenges to prison hearing procedures that necessarily

imply the invalidity of the judgment must be pursued in habeas corpus, not in a Section 1983

action. Lewis v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, No. CV 1:20-00062, 2021 WL 6884741, at *3 (S.D.W.

Va. Jan. 11, 2021), report and recommendation adopted, No. CV 1:20-00062, 2022 WL 452413

(S.D.W. Va. Feb. 14, 2022).

Ceide’s due process claim against Arias is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE for failure to

state a claim to relief.

III. AMENDMENT UNDER THE PLRA

The Sixth Circuit has held that a district court may allow a prisoner to amend his complaint

to avoid a sua sponte dismissal under the PLRA. Lucas v. Chalk, 785 F. App’x 288, 291 (6th Cir.

2019) (citing LaFountain v. Harry, 716 F.3d 944, 951 (6th Cir. 2013)). Leave to amend should

not be granted where a plaintiff cannot cure the deficiency in his complaint. See Gonzalez-

Gonzalez v. United States, 257 F.3d 31, 37 (1st Cir. 2001) (“If it is crystal clear that . . . amending

the complaint would be futile, then a sua sponte dismissal may stand.”); see also Curley v. Perry,

246 F.3d 1278, 1284 (10th Cir. 2001) (“We agree with the majority view that sua sponte dismissal

of a meritless complaint that cannot be salvaged by amendment comports with due process and

does not infringe the right of access to the courts”).

The Court will not allow Ceide to amend his complaint because amendment would be

futile.

IV. APPELLATE ISSUES

Under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), the Court

considers whether an appeal by Ceide would be taken in good faith. See Callihan v. Schneider,

178 F.3d 800, 803–04 (6th Cir. 1999). Under Rule 24(a), if the District Court permits a party to

proceed in forma pauperis, that party may also proceed on appeal in forma pauperis without

further authorization. There is an exception when the District Court “certifies that the appeal is not

taken in good faith or finds that the party is not otherwise entitled to proceed in forma

pauperis.” Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(3)(A). If the District Court denies pauper status, the party may

move to proceed in forma pauperis in the Court of Appeals. Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(4)–(5).

The good faith standard is an objective one. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445

(1962). The test for whether a party appeals in good faith is whether the litigant seeks appellate

review of any issue that is not frivolous. Id. “It would be inconsistent for a court to determine that

a complaint should be dismissed prior to service on Defendants but has sufficient merit to support

an appeal in forma pauperis.” DePriest v. Prestress Servs., Inc., No. 13-2768-JDT-cgc, 2014 WL

1269933, at *1 (W.D. Tenn. Mar. 27, 2014) (citing Williams v. Kullman, 722 F.2d 1048, 1050 (2d

Cir. 1983)). For the reasons the Court dismisses Ceide’s complaint against the Defendants for

failure to state a claim, the Court finds that an appeal would not be taken in good faith. The Court

therefore CERTIFIES, under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a), that any appeal by Ceide

would not be taken in good faith. The Court DENIES leave to proceed on appeal in forma

pauperis. If Ceide appeals, he must pay the full appellate filing fee or move for leave to appeal in

forma pauperis with a supporting affidavit in the Sixth Circuit. See Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(5).

V. NOTICE OF STRIKE RECOMMENDATION

The “three strikes” provision of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) prevents a court from granting in

forma pauperis status to a prisoner who “has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated ...

brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that

it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. §

1915(g). For § 1915(g) analysis of Ceide’s future filings, if any, the Court recommends that the

dismissal of this case be treated as a strike pursuant to § 1915(g). See Simons v. Washington, 996

F.3d 350, 353 (6th Cir. 2021).

VI. CONCLUSION

For the reasons explained above:

A. Ceide’s individual capacity claims against Trout, Alexander, Hardin, Rice, and

Arias are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE for failure to state a claim to relief. See §

1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1);

B. Leave to amend is DENIED;

C. The Court CERTIFIES that an appeal would not be taken in good faith;

D. The Court DENIES leave to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal; and

E. This case is DISMISSED in its entirety.

IT IS SO ORDERED, this 22nd day of January, 2025.

/s/ Samuel H. Mays, Jr.

SAMUEL H. MAYS, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE