The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
CORDELL CHATMAN CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS NO. 23-1688
PLAQUEMINES PARISH, ET AL. SECTION “O”
ORDER
Before the Court is the motion1 for summary judgment of Defendant
Plaquemine Parish Sheriff’s Office Deputy Vincenzo Sainato. Deputy Sainato’s
motion was noticed for submission on December 11, 2024;2 Plaintiff Cordell
Chatman’s response was due on December 3. See LOCAL CIVIL RULE 7.5. Chatman
failed to file a timely response. So the Court considers the motion unopposed.
The unopposed motion has merit. This 42 U.S.C. § 1983 case arises from
Chatman’s claim that Deputy Sainato unlawfully arrested him after a traffic stop and
then falsified details of the police report.3 Chatman in turn brought a Section 1983
unreasonable-arrest claim against Deputy Sainato in his individual capacity.4
Chatman also sued Deputy Sainato under Louisiana law for false imprisonment,
intentional infliction of emotional distress, and violations of the Louisiana
Constitution.5 Deputy Sainato now moves for summary judgment, contending that he
enjoys qualified immunity under federal and Louisiana law, and that Chatman
cannot carry his burden to prove his Louisiana-law tort claims.6 The Court agrees.
1 ECF No. 29.
2 ECF No. 29-9 at 1.
3 See generally ECF No. 1.
4 Id. at ¶¶ 6–7 (count I).
5 Id at ¶¶ 24–26 (count VI); id. at ¶¶ 27–28 (count VII).
6 See generally ECF No. 29-1.
“The [C]ourt shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is
no genuine dispute of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). “A dispute is genuine if ‘the evidence is such
that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.’” Perry v. VHS
San Antonio Partners, L.L.C., 990 F.3d 918, 926 (5th Cir. 2021) (quoting Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). “A fact is material if it ‘might affect the
outcome of the suit.’” Id. (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248). “[W]here the
nonmovant bears the burden of proof at trial,” as Chatman does on his Section 1983
and state-law claims here, “the movant may merely point to an absence of evidence,
thus shifting to the non-movant the burden of demonstrating by competent summary
judgment proof that there is an issue of material fact warranting trial.” Lindsey v.
Sears Roebuck & Co., 16 F.3d 616, 618 (5th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted).
First, Deputy Sainato is entitled to summary judgment dismissing Chatman’s
individual-capacity Section 1983 claim. Because Deputy Sainato invokes qualified
immunity, the burden shifts to Chatman to “show that the defense is not available”
by “adduc[ing] summary judgment evidence indicating that [Deputy Sainato’s]
actions violated clearly established constitutional rights of which a reasonable person
would have known.” Ratliff v. Aransas Cnty., Tex., 948 F.3d 281, 287 (5th Cir. 2020)
(internal quotation marks, citation, and alterations omitted). Chatman fails to carry
that burden: He does not direct the Court to summary-judgment evidence from which
a reasonable jury could find that Deputy Sainato violated his clearly established
constitutional rights. So Deputy Sainato enjoys qualified immunity from this claim.
Second, and similarly, Deputy Sainato is entitled to summary judgment
dismissing Chatman’s claim under the Louisiana Constitution based on Louisiana-
law immunity principles. “Louisiana applies qualified immunity principles to state
constitutional law claims based on ‘[t]he same factors that compelled the United
States Supreme Court to recognize a qualified good faith immunity for state officers
under § 1983.’” Roberts v. City of Shreveport, 397 F.3d 287, 296 (5th Cir. 2005)
(quoting Moresi v. Dep’t of Wildlife & Fisheries, 567 So. 2d 1081, 1093 (La. 1990)).
Chatman’s claim against Deputy Sainato under the Louisiana Constitution rests on
the same alleged conduct that forms the foundation of Chatman’s claim against
Deputy Sainato under Section 1983.7 Accordingly, because the alleged facts
underlying those claims are the same, and because the qualified-immunity defenses
under state and federal law are materially identical for all relevant purposes here,
Deputy Sainato enjoys qualified immunity from the claim under the Louisiana
Constitution for the same reasons he enjoys qualified immunity from the Section 1983
claim. See, e.g., id. (holding that police chief enjoyed qualified immunity from claims
asserted against him under the Louisiana Constitution “inasmuch as the plaintiffs’
claims under state constitutional law parallel entirely the § 1983 allegations”).
Third, Deputy Sainato is entitled to summary judgment dismissing Chatman’s
false-imprisonment claim under Louisiana law. That claim has two elements: “(1)
detention of the person; and (2) the unlawfulness of the detention.” Waganfeald v.
Gusman, 674 F.3d 475, 480 (5th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks and citation
7 Compare ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 6–7 with id. at ¶¶ 27–28.
omitted). Among other arguments, Deputy Sainato “point[s] to an absence of
evidence” that Chatman’s arrest was unlawful. Lindsey, 16 F.3d at 618 (citations
omitted). So the burden shifts to Chatman to “demonstrat[e] by competent summary
judgment proof that there is an issue of material fact warranting trial.” Id. (citations
omitted). Chatman fails to do so. He does not point to evidence from which a
reasonable jury could find that his arrest was unlawful. Thus, there is no genuine
dispute as to the absence of evidence supporting his false-imprisonment claim.
Deputy Sainato is entitled to summary judgment dismissing the claim with prejudice.
Finally, Deputy Sainato is entitled to summary judgment dismissing
Chatman’s claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. That claim requires
Chatman to prove (1) that Deputy Sainato’s conduct was “extreme and outrageous”;
(2) that he suffered “severe” emotional distress; and (3) that Deputy Sainato “desired
to inflict severe emotional distress or knew that such distress would be substantially
certain to result from the conduct.” Morris v. Dillard Dep’t Stores, Inc., 277 F.3d 743,
756 (5th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). Deputy Sainato “point[s] to an absence of
evidence” of those elements. Lindsey, 16 F.3d at 618 (citations omitted). So the burden
shifts to Chatman to “demonstrat[e] by competent summary judgment proof that
there is an issue of material fact warranting trial.” Id. (citations omitted). He fails to
do so. He does not point to evidence from which a reasonable jury could find any
element is met. So there is no genuine dispute as to the absence of evidence
supporting Chatman’s intentional-infliction-of-emotional-distress claim. Deputy
Sainato is thus entitled to summary judgment dismissing this claim with prejudice.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that Deputy Sainato’s unopposed motion’ for summary
judgment is GRANTED. Chatman’s claims against Deputy Sainato are
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. Deputy Sainato’s unopposed motion? to stay
discovery pending a determination of qualified immunity is DENIED as moot.
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 22nd day of January, 2025.
BRANDON S. LONG □□□
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
8 ECF No. 29.
9 ECF No. 28.