The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
JANE DOE CIVIL ACTION
VERSUS
BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF THE NO. 22-00338-BAJ-SDJ
UNIVERSITY OF LOUISIANA SYSTEM,
ET AL.
RULING AND ORDER
Now before the Court is Defendant Board of Supervisors of the University of
Louisiana System’s Motion In Limine To Exclude Reports And Other Materials
Produced By Louisiana State University Regarding Victor Daniel Silva
(Doc. 154, the “Motion”). The Motion is opposed. (Doc. 168). For the reasons below,
Defendant’s Motion is denied.
I. BACKGROUND
The alleged facts of this case have been provided by the Court at length in its
previous rulings. (Doc. 52). Defendant Board of Supervisors of the University of
Louisiana System (“ULS”) have brought this Motion to preclude Plaintiff from
introducing evidence of acts that occurred after her alleged assault.
II. LEGAL STANDARDS
“It is well settled that motions in limine are disfavored.” Auenson v. Lewis,
1996 WL 457258, at *1 (E.D. La. Aug. 12, 1996) (citing Hawthorne Partners v. AT&T
Technologies, Inc., 831 F. Supp. 1398, 1400 (N.D. Ill. 1993)). “Motions in limine are
frequently made in the abstract and in anticipation of some hypothetical
circumstance that may not develop at trial.” Collins v. Wayne Corp., 621 F.2d 777,
784 (5th Cir. 1980) (superseded on other grounds). “An order in limine excludes only
clearly inadmissible evidence; therefore, evidence should not be excluded before trial
unless it is clearly inadmissible on all potential grounds.” Rivera v. Robinson, 464 F.
Supp. 3d 847, 853 (E.D. La. 2020) (quoting Auenson, 1996 WL 457258, at *1)
(emphasis added). Instead, courts should reserve evidentiary rulings until trial so
that questions as to the evidence “may be resolved in the proper context.” Auenson,
1996 WL 457258, at *1.
However, “[d]enial of a motion in limine does not mean all evidence
contemplated by the motion will be automatically admitted. Rather, denial means
that the court cannot determine in advance whether the evidence should be
excluded.” Id.
Federal Rule of Evidence 401 instructs that evidence is relevant if “it has any
tendency to make a fact more or less probably than it would be without the evidence”
and “the fact is of consequence in determining the action,” while Federal Rule of
Evidence 402 states that, as a general matter, relevant evidence is admissible.
Meanwhile Federal Rule of Evidence 403 provides courts with the ability to “exclude
relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one
or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury,
undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.”
III. DISCUSSION
ULS asks the Court to prevent Plaintiff from introducing materials produced
by the Louisiana State University, previously a defendant in this matter, because, in
ULS’s view, the introduction of these events at trial would be irrelevant to Plaintiff’s
claims and prejudicial to ULS’s defense. (Doc. 154 at 2). These materials chiefly
amount to the disciplinary record of Silva, Plaintiff’s alleged assailant, while he was
a student at LSU. (Doc. 154-1 at 3). The Parties agree that these materials were
neither requested by nor disclosed to ULS prior to this litigation, and so ULS argues
that they cannot be used to satisfy the “actual knowledge” component of a Title IX
claim. (Id. at 5 (citing Roe v. Cypress-Fairbanks Indep. Sch. Dist., 53 F.4th 334, 341
(5th Cir. 2022), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 1002, 218 L. Ed. 2d 21 (2024))).
Plaintiff is opposed to ULS’s Motion, and argues that the identified evidence is
relevant to ULS’s alleged deliberate indifference. (Doc. 168 at 10). The Court does not
find this argument persuasive, but nonetheless concludes that ULS’s Motion should
be denied at this time.
Silva’s disciplinary history does not directly impact ULS’s deliberate
indifference to the notice it received as to his 2015 arrest for rape, because the
disciplinary history is, for this limited inquiry, irrelevant to whether ULS’s “response
to the harassment or lack thereof [was] clearly unreasonable in light of the known
circumstances.” I.F. v. Lewisville Indep. Sch. Dist., 915 F.3d 360, 369 (5th Cir. 2019)
(quoting Davis ex rel. LaShonda D. v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 648
(1999)). Put differently, the important fact for Title IX deliberate indifference is what
the responding entity did, which, in this case, included ULS’s dubious decision to not
request any additional details from LSU on Silva, as opposed to what the responding
entity would have found had it done so. Nevertheless, ULS’s Motion should only be
granted if ULS, as the movant, shows that the identified evidence would be
inadmissible on all possible grounds. Rivera, 464 F. Supp. 3d at 853; Joan Cravens,
Inc. v. Deas Constr., Inc., No. 1-15-CV-385-KS-MTP, 2017 WL 217650, at *2 (S.D.
Miss. Jan. 18, 2017). Neither Party has addressed whether this evidence has
relevance and would be admissible to support Plaintiff’s state-law negligence claim.
Given that ULS has failed to argue the issue of the identified evidence’s relevance as
pertaining to Plaintiff’s negligence claim, (see Docs. 154-1, 183), and since it is ULS
who carries the burden on this Motion, the Court will not exclude Silva’s disciplinary
records from LSU at this time.
As noted above, ULS is free to raise its evidentiary argument at trial, where
the Court will be able to assess the potential relevance of the offered evidence with
the added benefit of context. In reaching this conclusion, the Court does not render
an opinion on Plaintiff’s argument that the identified evidence is admissible by virtue
of ULS’s “willfull[] blindness” to Silva’s disciplinary history while at LSU. (Doc. 168
at 10).
IV. CONCLUSION
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that ULS’s Motion (Doc. 154) be and is hereby DENIED.
Baton Rouge, Louisiana, this 22nd day of January, 2025
_____________________________________
JUDGE BRIAN A. JACKSON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA