Opinion

Poore v. Brown Harris Stevens Residential Sales, LLC

  • 2025 NY Slip Op 30161(U)
Court
New York Supreme Court, New York County
Filed
Jan 15, 2025
Status
Unpublished
Author
Lyle E. Frank
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 33.7%

The opinion

Poore v Brown Harris Stevens Residential Sales, LLC

2025 NY Slip Op 30161(U)

January 15, 2025

Supreme Court, New York County

Docket Number: Index No. 652218/2023

Judge: Lyle E. Frank

Cases posted with a "30000" identifier, i.e., 2013 NY Slip

Op 30001(U), are republished from various New York

State and local government sources, including the New

York State Unified Court System's eCourts Service.

This opinion is uncorrected and not selected for official

publication.

INDEX NO. 652218/2023

NYSCEF DOC. NO. 91 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 01/15/2025

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

NEW YORK COUNTY

PRESENT: HON. LYLE E. FRANK PART 11M

Justice

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------X INDEX NO. 652218/2023

CHRIS POORE

MOTION DATE 09/13/2024

Plaintiff,

MOTION SEQ. NO. 005

-v-

BROWN HARRIS STEVENS RESIDENTIAL SALES, LLC, DECISION + ORDER ON

MOTION

Defendant.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------X

The following e-filed documents, listed by NYSCEF document number (Motion 005) 79, 80, 82, 84, 88

were read on this motion to/for SUMMARY JUDGMENT(AFTER JOINDER .

Upon the foregoing documents, plaintiff’s motion is denied.

Background

Factual History

Chris Poore (“Plaintiff”) is a licensed real estate broker who was working for Sotheby’s

when he was approached by the CEO of Brown Harris Stevens Residential Sales, LLC

(“Defendant”) with a job offer. In August of 2020 Plaintiff was given an offer letter (the “Offer

Letter”) that matched Plaintiff’s current compensation and benefits and also guaranteed referrals,

including for new developments. The day after the parties signed the Offer Letter, they also

signed an Independent Agent Agreement (the “IAA”). The IAA purported to incorporate the

Offer Letter, and in a relevant provision stated that “[Plaintiff] confirms that [Plaintiff] has been

given the opportunity to review [Defendant’s] Policies in detail and will keep abreast of all

updates provided by [Defendant], which shall be binding on [Plaintiff].”

Roughly two years after joining, Plaintiff left his employment relationship with

Defendant citing the lack of guaranteed referrals. A sale that Plaintiff was involved with ended

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Motion No. 005

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[* 1]

INDEX NO. 652218/2023

NYSCEF DOC. NO. 91 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 01/15/2025

up closing after Plaintiff’s departure, and in response Defendant reduced Plaintiff’s commission

according to terms found in their Policy Manual. In response, Plaintiff commenced this

underlying suit in May of 2023, with two claims against Defendant: one for payment of sales

commissions and attorneys’ fees pursuant to New York Labor Law, and one for breach of

contract for failing to honor the terms of the Offer Letter and IAA. Defendant filed a verified

answer with counterclaims in July of 2023.

Procedural History

In September of 2023, Plaintiff made a motion for summary judgment on his two claims.

This motion was denied as to the first claim but granted as to the second. Plaintiff then moved

for reargument, which was granted. On reargument, the Court granted summary judgment for

Plaintiff on the first cause of action, holding that “the Court does not see how the defendant will

be able to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that policy manual was incorporated by reference

into the original agreement that was signed prior to the plaintiff even knowing about the

existence of the policy manual.” Plaintiff now brings the present motion, seeking summary

judgment on the counterclaims and to sever their first cause of action from the second, allowing

for a judgment in sum certain on the first while discovery proceeds on the second.

Standard of Review

Under CPLR § 3212, a party may move for summary judgment and the motion “shall be

granted if, upon all the papers and proof submitted, the cause of action or defense shall be

established sufficiently to warrant the court as a matter of law in directing judgment in favor of

any party.” CPLR § 3212(b). Once the movant makes a showing of a prima facie entitlement to

judgment as a matter of law, the burden then shifts to the opponent to “produce evidentiary proof

in admissible form sufficient to establish the existence of material issues of fact which require a

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Motion No. 005

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NYSCEF DOC. NO. 91 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 01/15/2025

trial of the action.” Stonehill Capital Mgt. LLC v. Bank of the W., 28 N.Y.3d 439, 448 (2016).

The facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, but conclusory

statements are insufficient to defeat summary judgment. Id.

Discussion

Plaintiff argues that the Court’s prior holding when granting summary judgment on the

first cause of action necessarily implies that the Policy Manual is not binding at any time on

Plaintiff, and therefore there is no basis for the counterclaims. Plaintiff faces two problems with

this motion. The first is that Plaintiff could have easily moved for summary judgment in their

favor on the counterclaims at the same time that they moved for summary judgment on their own

claims. The line of reasoning is similar, in that both motions rely on Plaintiff’s argument that the

Policy Manual is not binding on him and that the terms of his Offer Letter and IAA control. In

New York, “it is axiomatic that successive summary judgment motions are disfavored.” Priester

v. Phanor, 228 A.D.3d 593, 594 (1st Dept. 2024).

The second problem that Plaintiff faces is that there are issues of fact remaining on the

counterclaims. While this Court held that, at the time of signing the IAA, the Policy Manual

could not have been incorporated by reference and binding on Plaintiff, given the fact that he did

not have the opportunity to review it before signing, that does not mean that the Policy Manual

could never have been binding on Plaintiff. The IAA states that Plaintiff would “keep abreast of

all updates provided by [Defendant], which shall be binding on [Plaintiff].” It is not settled when

Plaintiff became aware of the changes to the Policy Manual during his employment, or when the

policies that underpin the counterclaims would have become binding on Plaintiff. For the reasons

given above, Plaintiff here has failed to meet their burden on a summary judgment motion.

Because of the outstanding counterclaims, the Court does not find that judicial economy would

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Motion No. 005

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[* 3]

INDEX NO. 652218/2023

NYSCEF DOC. NO. 91 RECEIVED NYSCEF: 01/15/2025

favor severing the first cause of action and awarding a judgment on that claim. Accordingly, it is

hereby

ADJUDGED that plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and to sever is denied.

1/15/2025

DATE LYLE E. FRANK, J.S.C.

CHECK ONE: CASE DISPOSED X NON-FINAL DISPOSITION

□ □

GRANTED X DENIED GRANTED IN PART OTHER

APPLICATION: SETTLE ORDER SUBMIT ORDER

□

CHECK IF APPROPRIATE: INCLUDES TRANSFER/REASSIGN FIDUCIARY APPOINTMENT REFERENCE

652218/2023 POORE, CHRIS vs. BROWN HARRIS STEVENS RESIDENTIAL SALES, LLC Page 4 of 4

Motion No. 005

4 of 4

[* 4]

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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