Sattley v. The City of Beverly Hills CA2/2

Filed 1/22/25 Sattley v. The City of Beverly Hills CA2/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions

not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has

not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

JOSH SATTLEY, B334048

Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No. 21STCV45066)

v.

THE CITY OF BEVERLY

HILLS,

Defendant and

Respondent.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los

Angeles County, Barbara M. Scheper, Judge. Affirmed.

JW Howard/Attorneys, John W. Howard and Scott J. Street

for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Richards, Watson & Gershon, Rebecca T. Green, Jennifer

Petrusis and Garen N. Bostanian for Defendant and Respondent.

Appellant Josh Sattley, formerly employed as a firefighter

for respondent City of Beverly Hills (city), appeals from a final

judgment entered in favor of the city. Sattley sued the city after

he was terminated from employment, asserting causes of action

for violations of his civil rights and violations of the California

Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) (Gov. Code, §§ 12900

et seq.). In this appeal, he challenges two trial court orders: the

order sustaining the city’s demurrer to his cause of action for

failure to accommodate religious beliefs and the order granting

summary judgment on his FEHA retaliation claim. We find no

error and affirm the judgment in full.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Sattley worked for the Beverly Hills Fire Department for

11 years. During that time, he received excellent performance

reviews.

On August 12, 2021, the Health Officer of the County of Los

Angeles issued the Health Care Worker Vaccination Requirement

(health order). The health order required certain healthcare

workers, including emergency medical technicians (EMT’s) and

EMT-paramedics, to be vaccinated against COVID-19 by

September 30, 2021. City firefighters, as certified EMT’s or

EMT-paramedics, were required to comply with the health order

and get vaccinated. The city’s fire chief, Gregory Barton, notified

all city firefighters they had to comply with the health order by

September 30, 2021.

The health order allowed an individual to “be exempt from

the vaccination requirements . . . only upon providing . . . a

declination form, signed by the individual stating either of the

following: (1) the worker is declining vaccination based on

2

Religious Beliefs, or (2) the worker is excused from receiving any

COVID-19 vaccine due to Qualifying Medical Reasons.” An

organization or agency subject to the order could permit an

unvaccinated employee to work under certain conditions,

provided the agency “deem[ed] [the] worker to have met the

requirements of an exemption.”1

Many firefighters, including Sattley, submitted signed

forms declining to get the COVID-19 vaccine for religious

reasons. On September 28, 29, and 30, 2021, the city’s human

resources director, Shelley Ovrom, met individually with each of

the firefighters, including appellant, to determine which of the

firefighters were eligible for a religious accommodation.

Fourteen firefighters were granted an accommodation, four

withdrew their requests, and six firefighters’ requests were

denied. Of the six firefighters whose requests were denied, all

except Sattley later submitted proof of vaccination. Because

Sattley did not have an approved accommodation or exemption,

he was placed on administrative leave on October 1, 2021.

Ovrom and Chief Barton decided to place Sattley on leave

because he was no longer qualified to perform his job under the

health order.

1 The form does not require an employer to grant an

exemption upon the filing of the declination form. The

permissive language of this section of the health order, stating a

worker “may” be exempt upon providing the required form, along

with the language permitting the employer to “deem[] [the]

worker to have met the requirements of an exemption,” allow

some discretion on the part of the employer to review and

approve each individual request for exemption.

3

By e-mail on October 8, 2021, Ovrom inquired whether

appellant intended to get vaccinated so he could return to duty.

She stated, “It is the City’s hope that you will decide to get the

vaccine so you can continue to serve the community as a

firefighter under the County Order.” Ovrom offered to have

another meeting if Sattley needed any further information or

wanted to discuss the city’s decision. Sattley did not respond.

Ovrom and Chief Barton spoke regularly about Sattley’s

employment status between October 1, 2021, and December 14,

2021. They ultimately concluded Sattley could not remain an

employee of the city when the city could not allow him to perform

his job under the health order.

After being placed on administrative leave, Sattley

criticized the city’s COVID policies and its refusal to grant him

an accommodation. Part of this criticism involved Beverly Hills

City Councilmember John Mirisch, who spoke out against any

firefighters disingenuously seeking religious exemptions. Sattley

criticized Mirisch and the city on Instagram.

On December 14, 2021, Chief Barton issued a notice of

intent to discipline, informing appellant that without a COVID-

19 vaccine or exemption, appellant could not serve as an EMT or

EMT-paramedic under the health order, and therefore did not

meet the minimum qualifications for his position.

Sattley received a due process (Skelly) hearing, and the

hearing officer recommended Chief Barton proceed with

termination of Sattley’s employment. On March 9, 2022, Chief

Barton terminated Sattley, effective March 11, 2022. The

termination notice informed appellant: “[b]y failing to comply

with the County’s Order, you are no longer qualified to work as a

Firefighter within L.A. County.” (Underscoring omitted.) Sattley

4

was given his back pay for the time period he was on unpaid

leave.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Sattley and another firefighter filed a lawsuit against the

city, Councilmember Mirisch, the County of Los Angeles, and

County Health Officer Muntu Davis on December 10, 2021.

Sattley was on unpaid leave at the time and had obtained right-

to-sue letters from the California Department of Fair

Employment and Housing (DFEH) and Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission (EEOC) in response to his

discrimination charge.2 The second amended complaint (SAC),

filed August 9, 2022, is the operative complaint. It contained 11

causes of action. In December 2022, the trial court sustained the

city’s demurrer to all causes of action except the 11th cause of

action for retaliation in violation of FEHA.

As to Sattley’s cause of action for failure to accommodate

religious beliefs, the trial court wrote Sattley “failed to allege

requisite facts regarding the belief held by Sattley that conflicted

with the mandatory COVID vaccination.” The court found

Sattley’s allegation he “had a sincerely held religious belief or

practices that conflicted with a stated job requirement” to be

“wholly conclusory.”

The city filed a motion for summary judgment on the

retaliation cause of action on July 6, 2023. The city argued

Sattley’s retaliation claim should be summarily disposed of for

2 In his DFEH charge filed in November 2021, Sattley

asserted: “I believe I was discriminated against due [sic] my

religion (Mormon/Christian), in violation of Title VII Civil Rights

Act of 1964, as amended.”

5

three reasons: first, Sattley did not exhaust his administrative

remedies with the California Department of Civil Rights (CRD).3

Second, Sattley could not identify any specific protected activity

in which he had engaged, and had no evidence of a causal

relationship between any protected activity and his termination.

Finally, the city argued it had a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason

for firing Sattley—he was not in compliance with the health order

and thus did not meet the minimum requirements of his job.

The trial court granted the city’s motion. The court

reasoned, “Given [Sattley’s] undisputed failure to obtain a right-

to-sue letter for his retaliation claim, the claim fails as a matter

of law.” The court further noted, “Even if [Sattley] had exhausted

his administrative remedy, the Court would still grant the

motion.” The court explained Sattley “presented no evidence of

any specific social media post he made, nor of any statement he

made in those posts.” Because he had not identified any specific

posts he made, he “failed to show that any post was sufficiently

close in time to his termination to support a prima facie showing

of causation.” Sattley also offered “no evidence that Chief

Barton, who made the decision to terminate [Sattley], even saw

any particular social media post or considered it in making his

decision.” Finally, Sattley “presented no evidence [the city’s]

purported legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for terminating

[Sattley] was pretextual.”

Prior to filing the motion for summary judgment, the city

filed an application for an order continuing trial due to the

necessity of obtaining additional discovery. Sattley’s attorneys

3 The CRD was known as the DFEH until July 2022. It is

referred to as the DFEH in most current case law.

6

initially opposed the request, but later changed their position,

indicating the case was still in the early stages of discovery and

critical evidence was needed. The motion for summary judgment

proceeded as scheduled. Sattley argued the motion should be

denied pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 437c,

subdivision (h) (section 437c(h)), which permits denial of a

summary judgment motion if it appears “facts essential to justify

opposition may exist but cannot, for reasons stated, be

presented.” The court found Sattley failed to meet the

requirements of section 437c(h) to obtain a continuance.

Final judgment in favor of the city was entered on

October 12, 2023. Sattley filed his notice of appeal on October 19,

2023.

DISCUSSION

I. Demurrer to failure to accommodate cause of action

Sattley first challenges the trial court’s decision sustaining

the city’s demurrer as to his seventh cause of action for failure to

accommodate his religious beliefs.

A. Demurrer standard of review

The order sustaining the city’s demurrer is reviewed de

novo. (SI 59 LLC v. Variel Warner Ventures, LLC (2018) 29

Cal.App.5th 146, 152.) We must exercise our independent

judgment as to whether, as a matter of law, the complaint states

a cause of action under any legal theory. (Ortega v. Contra Costa

Community College Dist. (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 1073, 1080.)

When evaluating the complaint, we construe it liberally and take

all properly pleaded facts as true. (Bank of New York Mellon v.

Citibank, N.A. (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 935, 943.) “[A]ll material

facts pleaded in the complaint and those that arise by reasonable

7

implication, but not conclusions of fact or law, are deemed

admitted by the demurring party.” (Rodas v. Spiegel (2001) 87

Cal.App.4th 513, 517.) We do not consider “opinions, speculation

or allegations which are contrary either to law or to judicially

noticed facts.” (Long Beach Equities, Inc. v. County of Ventura

(1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 1016, 1024–1025.)

An order denying a request for leave to amend is reviewed

for abuse of discretion. (Jo Redland Trust, U.A.D. 4-6-05 v. CIT

Bank, N.A. (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 142, 161.) “To show an abuse

of discretion, the plaintiff has the burden of demonstrating that

‘there is a reasonable possibility the plaintiff could cure the defect

with an amendment.’” (Id. at p. 162.)

B. Applicable law

Government Code section 12940, subdivision (l) establishes

that it is unlawful “[f]or an employer . . . to discharge a person

from employment . . . or to discriminate against a person . . .

because of a conflict between the person’s religious belief or

observance and any employment requirement, unless the

employer . . . demonstrates that it has explored any available

reasonable alternative means of accommodating the religious

belief or observance . . . .”

In establishing a claim for failure to accommodate religious

beliefs, “the employee must establish a prima facie case that he

or she had a bona fide religious belief, of which the employer was

aware, that conflicts with an employment requirement.”

(Soldinger v. Northwest Airlines, Inc. (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 345,

370.) If the employee establishes the existence of such a bona

fide religious belief, “the employer must establish it initiated

good faith efforts to accommodate or no accommodation was

possible without producing undue hardship.” (Ibid.)

8

C. Sattley’s allegations of bona fide religious belief

Sattley’s allegations of his alleged bona fide religious belief

consisted of one sentence: “He had a sincerely held religious belief

or practices that conflicted with a stated job requirement

(mandatory Covid vaccination).”

The city argued on demurrer these allegations were

insufficient to establish a prima facie case of failure to

accommodate, taking the position Sattley could not “plead

entitlement to an accommodation process without pleading facts

about his religious beliefs.” In short, Sattley’s “conclusory

allegation that he had a ‘sincerely held religious belief’” was a

conclusion of law. The trial court agreed.

D. Analysis

The California Supreme Court has held a religious belief

must be more than “a philosophy or a way of life.” (Smith v. Fair

Employment & Housing Comm. (1996) 12 Cal.4th 1143, 1166.)

Employers are not required to “‘accommodate what amounts to a

“purely personal preference.”’” (Friedman v. Southern Cal.

Permanente Medical Group (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 39, 57

(Friedman).) In order to satisfy this element of his claim, Sattley

was required to make a prima facie showing “both that the belief

or practice is religious and that it is sincerely held.” (Ibid.) Thus,

Sattley was required to allege facts allowing the court to

determine “‘whether [his] particular belief-system should be

considered a religion’” (id. at pp. 59–60) and whether “the ‘belief’

for which protection is sought . . . is . . . ‘sincerely held’”

(Redmond v. GAF Corp. (7th Cir. 1978) 574 F.2d 897, 901,

9

fn. 12).4 We do not assume the truth of Sattley’s conclusory

allegation. (Rodas v. Spiegel, supra, 87 Cal.App.4th at p. 517.)

Sattley cites several cases in support of his argument he

sufficiently alleged a sincerely held religious belief. Ludgate Ins.

Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 592 involved

a motion for judgment on the pleadings on a claim for declaratory

relief on an insurance policy. The complainant sought a judicial

determination of the rights and obligations of the parties with

respect to defense and indemnity. (Id. at p. 604.) The insurance

company argued Lockheed was required to plead facts

establishing exhaustion of primary policies before any conflict

arose between the parties. (Id. at p. 608.) Under those

circumstances, the Ludgate court noted “‘a plaintiff is required

only to set forth the essential facts of his case with reasonable

precision and with particularity sufficient to acquaint a

defendant with the nature, source and extent of his cause of

action.’” (Ibid.) Sattley has not done so here. He has failed to set

forth the essential facts of his case, in that he has failed to

explain his religious beliefs and how they interfere with the

vaccination requirement. Sattley points to a statement in

Ludgate asserting “‘less particularity is required where the

defendant may be assumed to have knowledge of the facts equal

to that possessed by the plaintiff.’” (Ibid.) Here, Sattley has

more information about his religious beliefs, and how they

conflict with the vaccine mandate, than the city. This

4 In considering the concept of religion, California courts

consistently look to federal authority. (Friedman, supra, 102

Cal.App.4th at p. 49.) We thus refer to federal case law

throughout this discussion.

10

information is essential to his claim and necessary to acquaint

the city with the nature of his cause of action.

California Fair Employment & Housing Com. v. Gemini

Aluminum Corp. (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1004 involved a

Jehovah’s Witness who provided evidence that he attended

religious conventions nearly every year for over 25 years. (Id. at

p. 1009.) He sought and was denied a request for time off to

attend the convention. (Id. at p. 1010.) When he missed work

and attended the convention despite the denial of his request, he

was suspended, and subsequently fired. (Ibid.) In Gemini, the

former employee provided significantly more detail than Sattley

asserts here. The Gemini plaintiff described his religious

tradition and provided details regarding the way in which this

religious obligation conflicted with his work obligations. In

contrast Sattley has provided no details of his alleged religious

belief nor how such beliefs conflict with the vaccine requirement

in the health order. While the former employee in Gemini was

not required to “explain[] his religious beliefs to his employer and

provide[] enough information about his religious needs for

Gemini to understand the significance of the convention and how

his attendance was tied to his religious beliefs”, he was required

to “cite a religious connection,” which he did. (Id. at p. 1015.)

Sattley made no such connection, except in conclusory form.

Sattley also cites Ohno v. Yasuma (9th Cir. 2013) 723 F.3d

984, which noted “[c]ourts typically give credence to assertions of

sincerely held religious beliefs in absence of any challenge to

their sincerity or religious motives, and so long as they are not ‘so

bizarre, so clearly nonreligious in motivation, as not to be entitled

to protection under the Free Exercise Clause.’” (Id. at p. 1011.)

Here, the city challenges Sattley’s sincerity and religious motives.

11

His request for religious exemption was denied, and his

allegations are conclusory. The court had no way of knowing

whether his religious beliefs were bizarre and nonreligious in

motivation, because he provided insufficient, conclusory

allegations.

Similarly, in Together Employees v. Mass General Brigham

Inc. (D.Mass. 2021) 573 F.Supp.3d 412, 339–440, the court was

“presented with a series of affidavits, each alleging that the

employee holds a sincere religious belief that precludes COVID-

19 vaccination.” The case does not suggest that one sentence,

completely devoid of any description of the asserted religious

beliefs or the connection to the COVID-19 vaccine, is sufficient to

survive demurrer. The Mass General court declined to delve into

the various affidavits, but “assume[d], for the sake of argument,

that plaintiffs can establish a prima facie case that a bona fide

religious belief prevents them from taking the COVID-19

vaccine.” (Id. at p. 441.) Having made this assumption, the Mass

General court concluded Mass General showed a likelihood of

success on the merits of its claim of undue hardship in

accommodating the employees. (Id. at p. 442.)5

5 Sattley cites several cases for the first time in his reply

brief, which he argues show it is inappropriate to dismiss

COVID-related religious accommodation claims at the pleading

stage. All are distinguishable because the pleadings contained

far more detail than Sattley provided as to the appealing parties’

religious beliefs and how those beliefs conflicted with the COVID-

19 vaccine. In Bazinet v. Beth Israel Lahey Health, Inc. (1st Cir.

2024) 113 F.4th 9, the appellant explained, “‘COVID-19 vaccines

currently available developed and confirmed their vaccines using

fetal cell lines, which originated from aborted fetuses.’” (Id. at

12

Sattley argues to survive demurrer he was required to

plead only ultimate facts, not evidentiary facts. He asserts his

religious beliefs are evidentiary facts, thus he was not required to

p. 13.) Based on those specific allegations, the plaintiff indicated

partaking in the vaccine would make her complicit in that action

and was an aberration to her faith. The plaintiffs in Passarella v.

Aspirus, Inc. (7th Cir. 2024) 108 F.4th 1005, 1008, and Bube v.

Aspirus Hospital, Inc. (7th Cir. 2024) 108 F.4th 1017, 1019,

similarly expressed detailed concerns related directly to their

religious beliefs. While there were multiple plaintiffs in

Passarella, their allegations included statements explaining their

beliefs that a “body ‘is [the Lord’s] dwelling place’ and that ‘[a]fter

prayerful consideration, I don’t feel at peace about receiving the

COVID vaccine,’” and “‘I must follow the message that God has

given me not to receive the vaccine.’” (Passarella, supra, at

p. 1007) In Bube, the plaintiffs included statements such as “‘I

trust in God completely and cannot accept this vaccine in my

body’” and receiving the vaccine would be “‘going against what

God has intended for me.’” (Bube, supra, at p. 1019.) The

plaintiff in Lucky v. Landmark Medical of Michigan, P.C. (6th

Cir. 2024) 103 F.4th 1241, 1243, also pled sufficient facts,

including that her beliefs included the belief that “she ‘should not

have any vaccination enter her body such that her body would be

defiled,’” that she sought to make all decisions through prayer,

and specifically that “‘God spoke to [her] in her prayers and

directed her that it would be wrong to receive the COVID-19

vaccine.’” In Ringhofer v. Mayo Clinic, Ambulance (8th Cir. 2024)

102 F.4th 894, 901, the various plaintiffs alleged varying beliefs,

pled with sufficient detail—i.e., that their bodies were temples,

and thus they should not inject them with foreign substances, or

that their anti-abortion beliefs, rooted in their religion, prevented

them from using a product developed with fetal cell lines.

Sattley’s single, conclusory allegation does not suffice under these

authorities.

13

plead them. In support of this argument, Sattley cites Logan v.

Southern Cal. Rapid Transit Dist. (1982) 136 Cal.App.3d 116,

126. In Logan, the court concluded the plaintiff could not state a

cause of action supporting his claim of a taking without due

process. The court stated, “Logan argues the legal conclusion

that he was not accorded due process, but has not presented

ultimate facts as to how his due process rights were violated at

the hearing.” (Ibid.) Logan supports the conclusion that Sattley

has pleaded insufficient, conclusory allegations here.6

Federal district courts grant motions to dismiss when

plaintiffs do not adequately allege their religious beliefs or how

those beliefs conflict with a job requirement. For example, in

Bartholomew v. Washington (W.D.Wash. 2023) 693 F.Supp.3d

1107, 1113, the district court found the plaintiff had failed to

state a bona fide religious belief that conflicted with an

employment policy. The court noted, “[n]owhere in Plaintiff’s

complaint does he specifically state what religious beliefs he

holds or why his religious beliefs conflict with [the defendant’s]

vaccine requirement. At most, Plaintiff alleges that he completed

a religious accommodation request . . . .” Similarly, in Craven v.

Shriners Hospitals for Children (D.Or. 2024) 2024 WL 21557, *3,

the district court determined the plaintiff had not properly

pleaded employment discrimination on the basis of religion where

the plaintiff pleaded he was a “‘devoutly religious individual who

6 Mahan v. Charles W. Chan Ins. Agency, Inc. (2017) 14

Cal.App.5th 841, 848, also cited by Sattley, involved a complaint

that was “not particularly reader-friendly,” but the court found

“the Mahans’ core allegations” to be set forth in a “reasonably

coherent fashion.” Since coherence is not an issue in this case,

the Mahan case is unhelpful to Sattley.

14

adheres to principles of a Christian faith,’” and his “‘sincerely

held religious beliefs conflicted with the Defendant’s COVID-19

vaccine mandate.’” The court held the single conclusory

allegation was insufficient under Federal Rules of Court, rule

12(b)(6). (Craven, at p. *3.) The court noted its conclusion

“comports with those of other courts.” (Ibid.; see Gamon v.

Shriners Hospitals for Children (D.Or. 2023) 2023 WL 7019980,

*3.)

Because Sattley failed to adequately plead a bona fide

religious belief that conflicted with the health order, the trial

court properly sustained the city’s demurrer to this cause of

action. (Soldinger v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., supra, 51

Cal.App.4th at p. 370.)

E. Leave to amend

On appeal, we must determine whether there is a

reasonable possibility the plaintiff could cure the defect with an

amendment. (Schifando v. City of Los Angeles (2003) 31 Cal.4th

1074, 1081.) The party seeking leave to amend carries the

burden of showing “in what manner he can amend his complaint

and how that amendment will change the legal effect of his

pleading.” (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349.)

In support of his argument that he should be granted leave

to amend, Sattley argues he “can allege facts in an amended

complaint that explain, in detail, what his religious beliefs are,

where they come from, and how they affect his objection to

vaccination.” Without providing citation to the record, Sattley

argues he has described these things in discovery responses and

during deposition.

Sattley’s showing is insufficient. Sattley was required to

provide “factual allegations that sufficiently state all required

15

elements” of his cause of action. (Rakestraw v. California

Physicians’ Service (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 39, 43.) Such

allegations must be “factual and specific, not vague or

conclusionary.” (Id. at p. 44.) Sattley has not described with

specificity additional facts that he would plead in an amendment

either in his briefs or at oral argument. He has not offered

specifics about his religious beliefs nor how such beliefs conflict

with the health order.7 Sattley did not provide any such detail in

his opposition to the city’s demurrer, nor does he provide any

7 In his reply brief, Sattley claims his proposed third

amended complaint contained further information about his

religious beliefs. The new allegations stated only “Sattley is a

Christian. He has a sincerely held religious belief that prevents

him from taking the Covid-19 vaccine.” Sattley’s addition of the

denomination of “Christian” does not clarify his religious

objection, as he had already described his religion as

“Mormon/Christian” in his November 2021 DFEH charge.

Sattley argues in his reply brief that he has “similar religious

beliefs to those expressed in the circuit court decisions discussed

above. He can allege those beliefs in detail.” (See fn. 5, above.)

He provides no citation to the record, nor does he provide any

further detail than to assert he will mimic the claims of plaintiffs

in other cases (although he does not specify which case). Sattley’s

suggestion insufficient. The allegations in the federal cases are

specific to each individual plaintiff’s subjective belief. The

individual plaintiffs expressed various reasons their individual

beliefs interfered with a vaccine mandate, depending on the

individual plaintiff’s personal belief. Sattley has failed meet his

burden of adequately stating his own beliefs and how those

beliefs conflict with the health order.

16

such detail on appeal.8 Because a bona fide religious belief and a

conflict between that religious belief and the employment

requirement are essential to his failure to accommodate cause of

action, the trial court did not err in declining to permit Sattley to

amend his complaint.

II. Summary judgment on retaliation cause of action

Sattley’s second challenge is to the trial court’s order

granting the city’s summary judgment motion as to Sattley’s 11th

cause of action for retaliation in violation of FEHA.

8 Sattley argues the city’s own witnesses testified they

listened to Sattley describe his religious beliefs, understood his

religious beliefs, and did not have any reason to doubt his

sincerity. In support of this contention, Sattley cites the

deposition testimony of Ovrom, who conducted an interview with

Sattley concerning his request for accommodation. Sattley

exaggerates Ovrom’s comments. Specifically, Ovrom commented,

“The information shared during the interview we conducted with

Mr. Sattley upon evaluation did not, in our opinion, meet the

standard for what would qualify for a religious exemption.”

Ovrom later specified: “upon reviewing the information he

shared, it did not, in our opinion, qualify as being a sincerely-held

religious belief that would qualify for not being vaccinated. I’m

not saying he doesn’t have sincere religious beliefs, just that it

didn’t necessarily preclude him from being able to receive the

vaccination.” Ovrom could not recall what specific religion

Sattley identified with, but did not believe Sattley was lying

when he expressed his religious beliefs. The cited information

does not support Sattley’s argument that he should be permitted

leave to amend.

17

A. Failure to exhaust administrative remedies

1. Applicable law

“FEHA creates an administrative agency . . . whose task it

is to receive, investigate and conciliate complaints of unlawful

employment discrimination.” (Okoli v. Lockheed Technical

Operations Co. (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 1607, 1613 (Okoli).) “If,

following receipt of a complaint, the [CRD] fails to resolve the

case or to file an accusation against the employer within 150

days, it must notify the employee in writing of his or her right to

file a civil action under the FEHA.” (Ibid.) “This notification is

commonly referred to as a ‘right to sue’ letter.” (Ibid.)

Before filing a FEHA lawsuit, a plaintiff is required to

exhaust administrative remedies with the CRD. (Kim v. Konad

USA Distribution, Inc. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1336, 1345.)

“Exhaustion includes the timely filing of administrative

complaints addressing the claims and parties at issue, as well as

the procurement of right-to-sue letters.” (Ibid.) “Courts have

referred to this requirement as a ‘“jurisdictional prerequisite.”’”

(Ibid.) “To exhaust his or her administrative remedies as to a

particular act made unlawful by the [FEHA], the claimant must

specify that act in the administrative complaint, even if the

complaint does specify other cognizable wrongful acts.” (Martin

v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co. (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1718,

1724.) Sattley bears the burden of proving the exhaustion

requirement was met. (Kim, supra, at p. 1345.)

2. Relevant facts

Sattley filed a charge with the EEOC, which was

automatically dual-filed with the CRD (formerly DFEH), on

November 12, 2021. The charge alleged religious discrimination

only, not retaliation for a protected activity. Sattley’s charge

18

asserted he provided a religious accommodation request that

explained the reasons the COVID-19 vaccine was against his

religious beliefs. Sattley wrote, “To date, I have not been

accommodated to continue working without receiving the COVID-

19 vaccine. I believe I was discriminated against due [sic] my

religion (Mormon/Christian), in violation of Title VII Civil Rights

Act of 1964, as amended.” Sattley filed no further claims with

the EEOC or DFEH prior to filing his first amended complaint or

the SAC.

Sattley’s original complaint, filed in December 2021, did

not contain a FEHA retaliation claim. On March 9, 2022, Chief

Barton terminated Sattley, effective March 11, 2022. Sattley’s

first amended complaint, filed March 25, 2022, added the cause of

action for retaliation in violation of FEHA. The SAC, filed

August 9, 2022, also contained the cause of action for retaliation

in violation of FEHA.

On November 9, 2022, three months after the filing of the

SAC, Sattley filed another charge with the EEOC (dual-filed with

the CRD), alleging the city retaliated against him for engaging in

protected activity. At the time the city’s summary judgment was

heard, Sattley had not received a right-to-sue letter from the

CRD.9

9 Sattley has filed a request for judicial notice, asking we

take judicial notice of his filing of a new charge with the CRD on

April 22, 2024, and the right-to-sue notice he received on the

same date. We granted Sattley’s request. Sattley’s new charge

was filed over four months after his notice of appeal in this

matter. Therefore, it is not relevant to the question of whether

Sattley exhausted his administrative remedies prior to filing his

cause of action for retaliation. As the new charge is not relevant

19

3. Sattley has failed to show he exhausted his

administrative remedies prior to filing the FEHA

retaliation claim

Filing an administrative charge and obtaining a right-to-

sue letter is a jurisdictional prerequisite to filing a civil claim

under FEHA. (Rojo v. Kliger (1990) 52 Cal.3d 65, 83.) “Thus,

instead of abating an action as premature, a trial court must

grant summary judgment and dismiss the suit upon a finding

that a party has not exhausted his or her administrative

remedies.” (Miller v. United Airlines, Inc. (1985) 174 Cal.App.3d

878, 890.)

A trial court has no jurisdiction to hear a retaliation cause

of action if the plaintiff has never filed a charge with the CRD

encompassing the purported retaliation. (Okoli, supra, 36

Cal.App.4th at p. 1612.) This is true even if the plaintiff has filed

a charge with the CRD alleging other illegal acts such as

discrimination. (Id. at p. 1613.) In Okoli, the plaintiff filed a

charge with the CRD (formerly DFEH) of discrimination based on

race and national origin in May 1988. Following its

investigation, in December 1988, the CRD notified the plaintiff of

his right to pursue civil litigation. In June 1989, the plaintiff

filed suit against Lockheed, alleging causes of action for racial

discrimination, racial harassment, and retaliation. (Id. at

p. 1610.) On appeal, the court explained, “it is undisputed that

Okoli filed a charge of discrimination with the DFEH in which he

alleged specific instances of discrimination based on his race and

national origin. It is also undisputed that he did not file a

to our decision on the summary judgment, we decline to consider

it in connection with this appeal.

20

subsequent charge based on acts of retaliation by his employer.

The question on this appeal is whether he can maintain his

retaliation claim in spite of his failure to enumerate that claim in

his charge before the DFEH.” (Id. at p. 1613.) The Okoli court

concluded “the unlawful retaliation, which occurred after the

filing of the DFEH charge, would not reasonably have been

uncovered in an investigation of the charges that were made.”

(Id. at p. 1617.) In sum, “Since Okoli’s complaint added claims

that were neither like nor reasonably related to his DFEH claim

and were not likely to be uncovered in the course of a DFEH

investigation, his retaliation claim is barred by the exhaustion of

remedies doctrine.” (Ibid.)

Similarly, in Wills v. Superior Court (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th

143, 153, the Court of Appeal considered the question of

“‘whether [Wills] can maintain the instant action for alleged

incidents of discrimination [retaliation, harassment, and failure

to accommodate] which were not specifically enumerated in [her]

complaint before the DFEH.’” Wills’s DFEH complaint asserted

she was discriminated against because her employer refused to

reinstate her following her medical leave of absence. It did not

mention disability discrimination, retaliation, harassment, or

failure to accommodate. Nor did it mention her termination. The

court thus concluded she failed to exhaust her administrative

remedies as to her second through sixth causes of action. (Id. at

p. 159.)10

10 Federal decisions interpreting Title VII of the Civil Rights

Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.) are in accord. (See, e.g.,

Fundukian v. United Blood Services (9th Cir. 2001) 18 Fed.Appx.

572, 575 [EEOC charge alleging retaliation for opposing racially

21

Sattley alleged in his November 2021 charge that he was

subjected to religious discrimination by being denied a religious

accommodation. At that time, he was still employed with the

city. After his termination, Sattley added a cause of action for

retaliation to his lawsuit. Sattley’s November 2021 charge

alleging religious discrimination, prior to his termination, was

not sufficient to exhaust administrative remedies as to his

retaliation cause of action based on his termination from

employment four months later. Therefore, the retaliation cause

of action is properly summarily adjudicated in favor of the city.

(Miller v. United Airlines, Inc., supra, 174 Cal.App.3d at p. 890.)11

Sattley cites Corkill v. Preferred Employers Group, LLC

(S.D.Cal. 2011) 2011 WL 5975678, *8, for the proposition that

discriminatory practices was not sufficiently related to plaintiff’s

claims of discrimination based on her race, sex and age]; Ware v.

NBC Nevada Merchants, Inc. (D.Nev. 2016) 219 F.Supp.3d 1040,

1044–1045 [EEOC charge alleging plaintiff was subjected to

harassment through a racially insensitive birthday card and

subject to disparate treatment when her employer hired a

security guard to monitor her not sufficiently related to her

claims of discriminatory practices in hiring and allocating

overtime].)

11 Sattley’s November 2022 charge did not satisfy the

exhaustion requirement because it was filed after the retaliation

claim was added to the complaint and because Sattley never

received a right-to-sue letter stemming from this charge. As set

forth above, the April 2024 charge, filed after Sattley initiated

this appeal, is also insufficient to satisfy exhaustion of

administrative remedies, which must take place before the

plaintiff files a civil suit. (Miller v. United Airlines, Inc., supra,

174 Cal.App.3d at p. 890 [“an individual must exhaust his or her

administrative remedies before filing a civil action”].)

22

“the FEHA administrative exhaustion requirement like the Title

VII requirement is subject to equitable exceptions, such as

waiver, estoppel, and tolling.” However, Sattley fails to make a

factual argument as to how such doctrines are applicable here.

Sattley further argues the claims presentation requirement

is not as narrow as the city argues. Sattley contends he need not

identify every unlawful act, citing Nazir v. United Airlines, Inc.

(2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 243, 266 (Nazir) for the proposition that a

subsequent lawsuit may include “claims that are “‘“like and

reasonably related to” the allegations of the DFEH charge.’” In

making this determination, “what is submitted to the DFEH

must not only be construed liberally in favor of plaintiff, it must

be construed in light of what might be uncovered by a reasonable

investigation.” (Id. at p. 268.)

Nazir is distinguishable. In Nazir, the employee was

subjected to harassment beginning in the early 1990’s and, after

he complained numerous times over the years, was terminated

from employment in May 2005. (Nazir, supra, 178 Cal.App.4th

at pp. 258–262.) The plaintiff’s first precomplaint questionnaire

was submitted to DFEH in July 2005. He checked boxes

indicating he had been discriminated against due to race, color,

age, religion, disability, national origin and ancestry. There was

no box for harassment. However, he wrote that he had been

discriminated against and harassed “‘nonstop since 1991.’” (Id.

at p. 265.) In a second precomplaint questionnaire, the plaintiff

indicated he had endured relentless unfair and prejudicial

treatment by his colleagues and had informed human resources

on numerous occasions. (Ibid.) His first complaint for

discrimination, which was prepared by someone at DFEH, was

filed on October 3, 2005. (Ibid.) In May 2006 the plaintiff filed

23

two more complaints with the DFEH, which indicated he was

“‘harassed and fired in retaliation for taking medical leave and in

retaliation for opposing harassment against me on the basis of

my religion (Muslim), my color (dark), and my national origin

(parents from Pakistan, born in Kuwait).’” (Id. at p. 266.) On

May 23, 2006, the DFEH sent plaintiff a notice of case closure

because “‘an immediate right to sue letter was requested.’” (Ibid.)

The operative complaint, which asserted causes of action for

harassment as well as discrimination, was filed July 7, 2006. (Id.

at p. 250.)

The trial court determined all the alleged acts of

harassment were barred for failure to exhaust administrative

remedies. On appeal, the defendant argued, among other things,

that the factual statement in the October 2005 DFEH charge

made no reference to being harassed, and harassment is not like

or related to discrimination. (Nazir, supra, 178 Cal.App.4th at

p. 266.) The appellate court rejected this argument, stating:

“‘Administrative charges are to be construed liberally because

they are often drafted by claimants without the assistance of

counsel.’” (Id. at pp. 266–267.) Applying those principles, the

court determined the trial court’s summary judgment was in

error. The court concluded, “The materials [plaintiff] submitted

to the DFEH are certainly adequate to specify the nature of his

problems at the workplace. In both of his questionnaires, he

expressly claimed to be the victim of constant harassment.” (Id.

at p. 268.)

In contrast to the present matter, the plaintiff in Nazir

mentioned harassment numerous times. Sattley failed to

mention retaliation at all, failed to mention his criticism of the

city on social media, and failed to supplement his CRD charge

24

following his termination. Even construed liberally, Sattley’s

CRD charge does not satisfy his obligation to exhaust

administrative remedies.12

Because Sattley failed to exhaust his administrative

remedies as to his retaliation cause of action, it was properly

summarily adjudicated in favor of the city.

B. Merits of retaliation claim

The trial court noted in its order that even if Sattley had

exhausted his administrative remedy, the court would still grant

the city’s motion for summary judgment. Both parties address

the trial court’s alternative rationale. Although it is unnecessary,

we briefly address the merits of Sattley’s claim.

12 Sattley cites Sosa v. Hiraoka (9th Cir. 1990) 920 F.2d 1451,

1456–1457, for the proposition that the inquiry into the

jurisdictional scope of any action can include “allegations

occurring not only before, but also after the filing of” an EEOC

charge. Sosa is distinguishable because the Sosa court concluded

“all of Sosa’s allegations are sufficiently ‘like or reasonably

related to’ the allegations contained in Sosa’s EEOC charge.” (Id.

at p. 1457.) In addition to his claims of denial of promotion, Sosa

asserted in his EEOC charge that the department and its

administrators had engaged in a pattern and practice of

retaliating against him because he had previously filed

discrimination charges and complaints against them. (Ibid.) The

Sosa court thus concluded, “Because all of the acts Sosa alleged

in his First Amended Complaint are on their face like or

reasonably related to the allegations in his EEOC charge,

including the allegation of a continuing violation, the district

court should not have dismissed Sosa’s complaint for lack of

jurisdiction.” (Id. at p. 1458.) We reach a different conclusion

based on the facts before us.

25

To prevail on a claim for retaliation under FEHA, a

plaintiff must show (1) the employee engaged in a protected

activity; (2) the employer took adverse employment action

against the employee; and (3) the cause of the adverse

employment action was the employee’s engagement in the

protected activity. (Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc. (2005) 36

Cal.4th 1028, 1042.) If the plaintiff can establish a prima facie

case, the burden shifts to the employer to show a legitimate,

nonretaliatory reason for the adverse employment action.

(Batarse v. Service Employees Internat. Union, Local 1000 (2012)

209 Cal.App.4th 820, 831.) “A defendant moving for summary

judgment, however, may skip to the second step of the analysis

and demonstrate that it had a legitimate business reason . . . for

taking its employment action.” (Ibid.)

1. Protected activity

Sattley argues he engaged in protected activity during the

fall of 2021 when he criticized the city’s COVID personnel policies

on social media and filed this lawsuit. He argues this qualifies as

a protected activity because it involved “‘some degree of

opposition to or protest of the employer’s conduct or practices

based on the employee’s reasonable belief that the employer’s

action or practice is unlawful.’” (Dinslage v. City and County of

San Francisco (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 368, 382 (Dinslage).)

Generally, employees are protected from retaliation for

conduct opposing what the employee reasonably believes to be

unlawful discrimination. (Dinslage, supra, 5 Cal.App.5th at

p. 383.) That an employee perceives his employer’s actions as

“unwise or even improper” is “not enough to make his opposition

a protected activity.” (Id. at p. 382.) Sattley had the burden of

26

showing that his criticisms of the city’s COVID policy qualified as

a protected activity. (Id. at p. 384.)

Sattley fails to point to a specific social media post that he

believed was the basis for his termination. Sattley’s general

objections or disagreement with the city’s policy is insufficient, in

the absence of a showing that Sattley was protesting unlawful

behavior. Sattley argues the court should not focus on any

specific social media post, but instead look to whether Sattley can

“demonstrate some degree of opposition to or protest of the

employer’s conduct or practices based on the employee’s

reasonable belief that the employer’s action or practice is

unlawful.” (Rope v. Auto-Chlor System of Washington, Inc. (2013)

220 Cal.App.4th 635, 652–653, overturned on other grounds by

legislative action.) The Rope case is unhelpful to Sattley, as the

court concluded the plaintiff failed to make a prima facie showing

of a protected activity sufficient to support a claim for retaliation

in violation of FEHA. (Rope, at pp. 652–653.) Similarly, here,

Sattley’s vague allegations that he criticized the city’s COVID

policy do not show a reasonable belief that the city’s actions were

unlawful. Under the circumstances, Sattley failed to set forth a

prima facie case of retaliation.

2. Legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason

Even if Sattley could establish a prima facie case, the city

had a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating his

employment. An employee’s inability to perform the essential

tasks of his or her job is a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason to

terminate the employee. (Serri v. Santa Clara University (2014)

226 Cal.App.4th 830, 861 [examples of legitimate reasons are a

failure to meet performance standards or a loss of confidence in

an employee]; Arteaga v. Brink’s, Inc. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th

27

327, 352 [loss of confidence in an employee to perform his

essential job tasks is a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for

discharge].)

Here, the undisputed facts show the city terminated

Sattley’s employment because Sattley refused to comply with the

health order after his request for accommodation was denied. On

October 1, 2021, he was placed on administrative leave because,

under the terms of the health order, he could no longer perform

his job obligations. This administrative leave occurred prior to

the time Sattley allegedly began criticizing the city on social

media. The health order required that all EMT’s and paramedics

in the county be vaccinated by September 30, 2021. The health

order applied to Sattley. His request for accommodation was

denied, and he failed to submit proof of vaccination. Chief Barton

could not see any way that Sattley could perform his job when he

was not in compliance with the health order, therefore Sattley’s

employment was terminated.

Sattley argues a jury should determine whether his

criticism of the city in the fall of 2021 was the reason for his

termination from employment. He argues the timing of his

termination matches with his social media criticisms in the late

fall of 2021, and that the city notified Sattley of its intent to fire

him just a few days after it learned of this lawsuit. Further,

Sattley argues, he was otherwise in good standing with the

department and was an excellent employee.

Temporal proximity does not support a finding of pretext

here. “[T]emporal proximity alone is not sufficient to raise a

triable issue as to pretext once the employer has offered evidence

of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the termination.”

(Arteaga, supra, 163 Cal.App.4th at p. 353.) “This is especially so

28

where the employer raised questions about the employee’s

performance before [the protected acts], and the subsequent

termination was based on those performance issues.” (Ibid.)

Here, the city placed Sattley on administrative leave before his

alleged protected activity, and his subsequent termination was

for the same reason as his initial leave.

The city’s termination of Sattley for his failure to comply

with the health order was a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for

Sattley’s termination.

III. Motion to continue

Sattley argues the trial court should have denied the

summary judgment motion pursuant to section 437c(h) because

he had not been able to conduct the necessary discovery to find

facts and evidence to oppose the motion.13 In the absence of an

affidavit that requires a continuance, we review a trial court’s

denial of a continuance under section 437c(h) for abuse of

discretion. (Cooksey v. Alexakis (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 246, 253.)

Preliminarily, we note the summary judgment motion

involved only Sattley’s retaliation claim. Additional discovery

would not have changed the outcome of the motion because

Sattley failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as to this

claim. Thus, Sattley cannot show prejudice stemming from any

asserted error in failing to continue the matter, and any such

13 Section 437c(h) provides, in part: “If it appears from the

affidavits submitted in opposition to a motion for summary

judgment or summary adjudication, or both, that facts essential

to justify opposition may exist but cannot, for reasons stated, be

presented, the court shall deny the motion, order a continuance to

permit affidavits to be obtained or discovery to be had, or make

any other order as may be just.”

29

error is not reversible. (Soule v. General Motors Corp. (1994) 8

Cal.4th 548, 574 [error “generally does not warrant reversal

unless there is a reasonable probability that in the absence of the

error, a result more favorable to the appealing party would have

been reached”].) We need not address the parties’ arguments on

this issue further. However, as set forth below, we conclude no

abuse of discretion occurred.

“An opposing party’s declaration in support of a motion to

continue the summary judgment hearing should show the

following: (1) ‘Facts establishing a likelihood that controverting

evidence may exist and why the information sought is essential to

opposing the motion’; (2) ‘The specific reasons why such evidence

cannot be presented at the present time’; (3) ‘An estimate of the

time necessary to obtain such evidence’; and (4) ‘The specific steps

or procedures the opposing party intends to utilize to obtain such

evidence.’” (Johnson v. Alameda County Medical Center (2012)

205 Cal.App.4th 521, 532.) In exercising its discretion as to

whether to grant a continuance under section 437c(h), a trial

court may consider “the extent to which the requesting party’s

failure to secure the contemplated evidence more seasonably

results from a lack of diligence on his part.” (Rodriguez v. Oto

(2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 1020, 1038.)

The trial court found Sattley did not meet the requirements

of section 437c(h). The court explained: “After [Sattley] was

terminated on March 9, 2022, [Sattley] filed a First Amended

Complaint on March 25, 2022. The operative Second Amended

Complaint was filed on August 9, 2022. The trial date of

October 23, 2023 was set on December 5, 2022. [Sattley’s]

counsel . . . states in conclusory fashion that the City and Sattley

did not commence discovery until the Spring of 2023 and

30

describes the action as in the early stages of discovery. This is

utterly insufficient. [Sattley’s] counsel offers no explanation as to

why he failed to initiate any discovery regarding [Sattley’s] claim

for over eighteen months. Moreover, none of the proposed

discovery could rebut [Sattley’s] failure to exhaust his

administrative remedies.” Thus, the trial court denied Sattley’s

motion for continuance under section 437c(h).

Sattley argues he met the standard under section 437c(h).

In support of his request for a continuance, Sattley filed the

declaration of Scott J. Street, his counsel, on August 27, 2023.

Street acknowledged that the case was filed in December 2021,

but claimed that after early motion practice the parties “focused

on litigating the claims against the City and Councilman

Mirisch.” Street then claimed, “Discovery between the City and

Sattley did not start until the spring of 2023. The City did not

produce a witness for deposition until July 28, and the witnesses

it produced that day refused to (or couldn’t) answer many key

questions, including questions about how Sattley violated the

County Health Order and why he had to be terminated when the

City accommodated every other firefighter who insisted on it.”14

As the city points out, the declaration does not explain why such

evidence could not have been sought earlier, nor does it suggest

Sattley sought to depose any witnesses prior to July 28, 2023.

Street stated he was seeking to depose Jennifer Petrusis, a

lawyer listed as counsel of record for the city in this case, who

participated in Sattley’s accommodation process and thus may

have been able to answer questions other city witnesses could not

14 The city challenges this statement, stating the record

shows the city in fact denied accommodations to six firefighters.

31

answer. Street was aware the city intended to seek a protective

order. The city argues it would have prevailed on such an order,

as there are legal hurdles to deposing a party’s counsel, and

Sattley could not have prevailed on these hurdles.

Sattley argues the parties first focused on litigating the

constitutional claims involving the health order, as those claims

would have ended the case early on. Sattley claims this is why

discovery was still in the early stages at the time the summary

judgment deadlines were approaching. However, the trial court

was more involved with the proceedings below, and we defer to

its assessment of the parties’ diligence. Sattley failed to explain

what efforts were made to take the depositions earlier or why,

despite the focus on the constitutional issues, the depositions

could not have commenced at an earlier date. Under the

circumstances, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion

in denying the continuance. (Cooksey v. Alexakis, supra, 123

Cal.App.4th at p. 256; see A & B Painting & Drywall, Inc. v.

Superior Court (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 349, 356–357 [continuance

not warranted where declaration fails to explain what efforts

were made to take necessary depositions or why they could not

have been taken earlier].)

Sattley cites Hamilton v. Orange County Sheriff’s Dept.

(2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 759 as an example of a case where the trial

court abused its discretion in denying a requested continuance

under section 437c(h) solely based on its view of counsel’s alleged

delay in conducting discovery. The facts of Hamilton are

different. In Hamilton, the parties had stipulated to continue the

summary judgment hearing and trial for 60 days. While the

plaintiff had timely noticed the relevant depositions, they could

not go forward because defendant’s counsel was engaged in trial.

32

Under the circumstances, the Hamilton court concluded the trial

court abused its discretion by failing to accommodate counsels’

joint request for the continuance. (Id. at pp. 761–762.) While the

plaintiff had not met the showing required under section 437c(h),

she did make a showing of good cause. (Hamilton, at p. 765.)

The “relatively minor lack of diligence” on the part of plaintiff’s

attorney did not justify “the substantial injustice the court’s order

created.” (Id. at p. 766.)

Sattley complains the trial court failed to consider

additional factors set forth in Chavez v. 24 Hour Fitness USA,

Inc. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 632, 644, including: “(1) how long the

case has been pending; (2) how long the requesting party had to

oppose the motion; (3) whether the continuance motion could

have been made earlier; (4) the proximity of the trial date or the

30-day discovery cutoff before trial; (5) any prior continuances for

the same reason; and (6) the question whether the evidence

sought is truly essential to the motion.” Sattley asserts, without

explanation, that most of these factors favored a continuance. He

fails to make a citation to the record showing he sought a

continuance based on these factors or argued the trial court

should consider them.

The standard of review in this matter is abuse of discretion.

Under this standard, we do not reverse a trial court ruling if it

was based on reasoned judgment and complied with legal

principles and policies relevant to the matter. (City of San Diego

v. Rancho Penasquitos Partnership (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 1013,

1027.) Sattley has failed to show that he could not have obtained

the requested discovery earlier, has failed to explain why

discovery had not commenced earlier, has failed to show the

information he sought from Attorney Petrusis was not available

33

from other witnesses, and has failed to show he was entitled to

depose her. Under the circumstances, he has failed to show an

abuse of discretion.

IV. Evidentiary ruling

Sattley argues the trial court erroneously excluded

evidence of a proposal Sattley claimed he received from the city

about accommodating him if he agreed to stop criticizing the city

on social media. Sattley learned about the proposal from union

Attorney Stuart Adams. On August 18, 2023, the trial court

granted a protective order filed by nonparty Beverly Hills

Firefighters Association (BHFA) to prevent the disclosure of

attorney-client privileged communications between BHFA

counsel Adams and Sattley, a BHFA member. The BHFA argued

the attorney-client privilege exists between the attorney and the

union, not the individual member for whom the union is

providing representation.

Sattley argues the proposal was not confidential, as Adams

never told him it was confidential, and Sattley testified that

“numerous people were aware of the proposal, including the

association’s leadership and the City’s labor negotiator, Peter

Brown.” Sattley argues any privilege was waived by disclosure of

the substance of the communication.

The city argues Sattley forfeited this argument when he

chose not to oppose the BHFA’s motion for protective order or

state his objections during the hearing. Under the forfeiture

doctrine, with few exceptions, “‘an appellate court will not

consider claims of error that could have been—but were not—

raised in the trial court.’” (People v. Stowell (2003) 31 Cal.4th

1107, 1114.) Sattley’s argument fails for this reason.

34

Further, Sattley has failed to show prejudice from the

exclusion of evidence. Sattley argues that while the

consideration of this evidence is not necessary to reverse the

summary judgment on his retaliation claim, it provides

compelling direct evidence of retaliation. Because Sattley’s

retaliation claim was properly summarily adjudicated on the

ground that he failed to exhaust administrative remedies, the

resolution of the evidentiary issue in his favor would be of no

consequence.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Respondent is awarded its costs

of appeal.

________________________

CHAVEZ, J.

We concur:

________________________

LUI, P. J.

________________________

RICHARDSON, J.

35