The opinion
J-A02030-25
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
TIMOTHY C. SAUNDERS :
:
Appellant : No. 931 WDA 2024
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered July 2, 2024
In the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County Criminal Division at No(s):
CP-25-CR-0002794-2016
BEFORE: KUNSELMAN, J., MURRAY, J., and BECK, J.
MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.: FILED: January 17, 2025
Timothy C. Saunders (Appellant), pro se, appeals from the order
dismissing his two petitions for writ of habeas corpus, which the court below
consolidated and construed as a petition filed under the Post Conviction Relief
Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.
On December 20, 2016, following a non-jury trial, the trial court
convicted Appellant of two counts of arson.1 A prior panel of this Court
summarized the subsequent procedure:
[On February 1,] 2017, the trial court imposed an aggregate
sentence of four to eight years’ imprisonment. On direct appeal,
this Court affirmed [Appellant’s] judgment of sentence, in part,
but vacated the restitution portion of his sentence. See
Commonwealth v. Saunders, 185 A.3d 1101 (unpublished
memorandum) (Pa. Super. 2018), appeal denied, 190 A.3d 1134
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1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3301(a)(1)(i), (d)(2)
J-A02030-25
(Pa. 2018). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied [Appellant’s]
petition for allowance of appeal.
[Appellant] then filed a timely [PCRA] petition, which the
PCRA court denied. … [O]n appeal to this Court, [Appellant]
challenged, inter alia, the calculation of his prior record score.
This Court affirmed the denial of PCRA relief. See
Commonwealth v. Saunders, 226 A.3d 647 (unpublished
memorandum) (Pa. Super. 2020), appeal denied, 237 A.3d 386
(Pa. 2020).
In June 2020, [Appellant] filed a pro se “Motion for
Extraordinary Relief,” which challenged the discretionary aspects
of his sentence. The trial court denied relief, and [Appellant]
appealed. This Court reasoned that the type of relief sought in
the motion was not cognizable under the PCRA. See
Commonwealth v. Saunders, 299 A.3d 929 (unpublished
memorandum) (Pa. Super. 2023). Instead, we held that the
motion was tantamount to a post-sentence motion, the motion
was untimely filed and did not toll the time to file a direct appeal,
and thus[, Appellant’s] notice of appeal was similarly untimely.
See id.; see also Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(A)(1) (requiring any post-
sentence motion to be filed within ten days of the imposition of
sentence), (3) (providing that if a defendant does not file a timely
post-sentence motion, the notice of appeal shall be filed within
thirty days of the imposition of sentence). This Court thus
quashed the appeal. See Saunders, 299 A.3d 929 (unpublished
memorandum).
Meanwhile, in 2022, [Appellant] filed a pro se second PCRA
petition, which the PCRA court dismissed as untimely filed.
[Appellant] filed an appeal, and this Court affirmed the dismissal
in May 2023. See Commonwealth v. Saunders, 303 A.3d 790
(unpublished memorandum) (Pa. Super. 2023).
On June 9, 2023, [Appellant] filed [a pro se “Application for
Leave to File Post-Sentence Motion Nunc Pro Tunc.”] Referring to
his prior Motion for Extraordinary Relief, [Appellant] averred it was
“a newly discovered fact to” him that his discretionary aspects of
sentencing issue must have been raised in a post-sentence
motion. Application for Leave, 6/9/23, at 2. [Appellant] further
claimed he was unaware of errors involving his prior record score,
and sought leave to file a post-sentence motion nunc pro tunc.
The trial court denied relief on June 15, 2023, and [Appellant] filed
a notice of appeal.
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Commonwealth v. Saunders, 836 WDA 2023 (Pa. Super. 2024)
(unpublished memorandum at 1-3) (footnotes omitted). This Court quashed
the appeal, determining Appellant’s Application for Leave suffered from “the
same procedural impediment as his previously filed Motion for Extraordinary
Relief[.]” Id. (unpublished memorandum at 6-7).
The PCRA court summarized what next transpired:
On July 20, 2023, [Appellant] filed with the Erie County
Prothonotary a pro se “Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Ad
Subjiciendum.” At the [c]ourt’s direction, on August 3, 2023, the
petition was transferred to the Erie County Clerk of Courts[,] on
the [grounds] that [Appellant] challenged the legality or basis of
his confinement at this docket. On August 14, 2023, [Appellant]
filed a [second] pro se “Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Ad
Subjiciendum” at this docket. As the [PCRA] is the sole means of
obtaining collateral relief and encompasses all other common law
and statutory remedies, including habeas corpus, the [PCRA
c]ourt consolidated the petitions and treated them as one PCRA
[petition] … filed as of July 20, 2023.
PCRA Court Opinion, 8/22/24, at 1.
On June 10, 2024, the PCRA court issued Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice of its
intent to dismiss Appellant’s petition without a hearing. The PCRA court
determined the petition was untimely filed and failed to establish any of the
PCRA’s time-bar exceptions. Rule 907 Notice, 6/10/24, at 4. On June 28,
2024, Appellant filed a response to the Rule 907 Notice. On July 2, 2024, the
PCRA court entered a final order dismissing Appellant’s petition.
Appellant timely filed the instant appeal. Appellant and the PCRA court
have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. Appellant raises a single issue for our
review:
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Whether the [PCRA c]ourt erred and abused [its] discretion when
the [c]ourt deemed Appellant’s Habeas Corpus Petitions an
untimely PCRA petition[,] when the issues raised are not
cognizable under the PCRA?
Appellant’s Brief at 5.
We review the dismissal of a PCRA petition to determine “whether the
PCRA court’s findings of fact are supported by the record, and whether its
conclusions of law are free from legal error.” Commonwealth v. Busanet,
54 A.3d 35, 45 (Pa. 2012). “Our scope of review is limited to the findings of
the PCRA court and the evidence of record, viewed in the light most favorable
to the party who prevailed in the PCRA court proceeding.” Id. Whether the
PCRA court properly construed Appellant’s habeas petitions as a PCRA petition
“presents a question of law,” for which “our standard of review is de novo,
and our scope of review is plenary.” Commonwealth v. Descardes, 136
A.3d 493, 496-97 (Pa. 2016).
Preliminarily, we observe that “[a]lthough this Court is willing to
construe liberally materials filed by a pro se litigant, a pro se appellant enjoys
no special benefit.” Commonwealth v. Westlake, 295 A.3d 1281, 1286 n.8
(Pa. Super. 2023) (citation omitted). “To the contrary, any person choosing
to represent himself in a legal proceeding must, to a reasonable extent,
assume that his lack of expertise and legal training will be his undoing.”
Commonwealth v. Vurimindi, 200 A.3d 1031, 1037 (Pa. Super. 2018)
(citation omitted). Pro se litigants “must comply with the procedural rules set
forth in the Pennsylvania Rules of Court; if there are considerable defects [in
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an appellant’s brief], we will be unable to perform appellate review.” Id. at
1038 (citation omitted).
“Of particular importance is the provision of [Pa.R.A.P.] 2119(a) that a
brief must contain a developed argument augmented by citation to pertinent
authorities. Arguments not appropriately developed are waived.”
Commonwealth v. Love, 896 A.2d 1276, 1287 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citation
omitted). “This Court will not act as counsel and will not develop arguments
on behalf of an appellant.” Commonwealth v. Tchirkow, 160 A.3d 798,
804 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation omitted).
Here, Appellant asserts he “has challenged the legality of his
detention/confinement, [and] such challenges are not cognizable under the
PCRA.” Appellant’s Brief at 8. Appellant maintains he “properly raised his
claims of illegal detention/confinement” in habeas petitions. Id. at 8-9 (citing
Brown v. Pennsylvania Dep’t of Corr., 81 A.3d 814 (Pa. 2013); Joseph v.
Glunt, 96 A.3d 365 (Pa. Super. 2014)).
However, Appellant’s brief fails to discuss the substance of the claims
raised in his habeas petitions. See id. at 6-10. His assertion that his claims
challenge “the legality of his detention/confinement” is wholly conclusory, and
Appellant makes no attempt to analogize his claims to those involved in the
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authorities he cites.2 As Appellant’s issue is not appropriately developed, we
deem it waived and affirm the PCRA court’s order. See Love, 896 A.2d at
1287.
Order affirmed.
Judge Beck joins the memorandum.
Judge Kunselman concurs in the result.
DATE: 01/17/2025
____________________________________________
2 In Brown and Joseph, prison inmates challenged the legality of their
detention on the grounds that the Department of Corrections was not in
possession of a copy of the sentencing order, as allegedly required under 42
Pa.C.S.A. § 9764(a)(8). The Brown Court determined such a claim “sounded
in habeas corpus.” Brown, 81 A.3d at 815. Following Brown, the Joseph
Court treated the inmate’s “submission as a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus instead of a petition under the PCRA, which typically governs collateral
claims implicating the legality of sentence.” Joseph, 96 A.3d at 369.
Instantly, our review discloses Appellant’s habeas petitions do not raise claims
analogous to Brown and Joseph, but rather repeat substantially the same
claims we rejected in Appellant’s five prior appeals. See Petition for Habeas
Corpus, 7/20/23, at 3-6; Second Petition for Habeas Corpus, 8/14/23, at 3-
11.
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