The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
AT NASHVILLE
MARSHALL EDWARDS and )
ALICE EDWARDS )
)
v. ) Case No. 3:24-cv-00831
)
WILSON COUNTY GOVERNMENT et al. )
TO: Honorable Aleta Trauger, United States District Judge
R E P O R T A N D R E C O M M E N D A T I O N
By Order entered January 3, 2025 (Docket Entry No. 44), this pro se and in forma
pauperis civil case was referred to the Magistrate Judge for pretrial proceedings.
For the reasons set out below, the undersigned respectfully recommends that Plaintiffs’
motion for class certification (Docket Entry No. 3) and petition for a writ of mandamus (Docket
Entry No. 4) be DENIED.
I. BACKGROUND
Marshall and Alice Edwards (“Plaintiffs”) are residents of Atlanta, Georgia. They filed
this pro se and in forma pauperis lawsuit on July 9, 2024, against the Wilson County
Government, the Wilson County Court, the City of Lebanon Police Department, the Wilson
County Board of Commissioners, the Wilson County Judicial District, the Wilson County
Human Resources Department, Wilson County Judge Michael Collins, Brown & Brown
Insurance Brokers, William Brown, and Fresh Co. Foods, LLC. (Docket Entry No. 1.)
Plaintiffs were injured by auto accident that occurred in Wilson County, Tennessee, on
August 25, 2022, when their car was hit by a semi-truck driven by Defendant Brown. (Id. at 5.)
Plaintiffs allege that the police officer who was dispatched to the scene of the accident from the
City of Lebanon Police Department, Officer Andy Byrnes, allowed Brown to leave the scene of
the accident without issuing him a citation for outdated insurance despite “clear evidence that
Brown lacked proper insurance coverage for the commercial vehicle.” (Id. at 6.) Plaintiffs further
allege that Brown’s employer, Defendant Fresh Foods, LLC, and its insurance brokers provided
Plaintiffs with three fraudulent and misleading insurance certificates related to insurance
coverage on the semi-truck. (Id. at 7.) Plaintiffs thereafter filed a lawsuit in the Wilson County
Court for claims arising out of the accident. They allege that their lawsuit was dismissed by
Wilson County Judge Michael Collins despite “compelling evidence of negligence, fraud, and
misconduct by Defendants.” (Id. at 8.)1 Plaintiffs assert that they were mistreated by Collins
and that the dismissal was “a miscarriage of justice fueled by racial animus and a failure to
uphold the principles of due process and equal protection under the law.” (Id. at 9.)
In the instant lawsuit, Plaintiffs contend that their federal constitutional rights were
violated by Officer Byrnes’ conduct at the scene of the accident and by Judge Collins during the
proceedings in their state court lawsuit. They further contend that the Wilson County
governmental entities named as defendants have engaged in systemic discrimination, nepotism,
favoritism, and misconduct that caused or contributed to the violations of their rights and their
mistreatment and that permitted Officer Byrnes and Judge Collins to be hired and employed in
1 In their complaint, Plaintiffs offer few specifics about the state court proceeding.
However, it appears from filings related to their request for mandamus relief that: (1) they
initiated the state lawsuit on January 18, 2024, in Williamson County, Tennessee and that the
lawsuit was thereafter transferred to Wilson County, Tennessee; (2) the lawsuit was dismissed
after a hearing before Judge Collins on May 13, 2024; and, (3) a hearing for reconsideration of
the dismissal was set for July 8, 2024. (Docket Entry No. 4-1 at 9-12.) It unknown whether a
final judgment has been entered in the state lawsuit and, if so, whether Plaintiffs have pursued an
appeal from the dismissal of the lawsuit.
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their respective jobs. Plaintiffs finally allege that Defendants Brown and Fresh Foods engaged in
negligence, fraud, conspiracy to defraud, and violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations (“RICO”) Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1962 et seq.
Seeking various forms of relief in the instant lawsuit, Plaintiffs state:
This action seeks to remedy egregious violations of Plaintiffs’ constitutional and
civil rights, as well as address systemic discrimination, elder abuse, fraud, and
negligence perpetrated by Defendants. As senior Black American citizens,
Plaintiffs have been denied due process, equal protection under the law, and their
fundamental human dignity through a coordinated series of unlawful acts by
government entities and private actors in Wilson County Tennessee.
(Id. at 2.) Plaintiffs assert that federal jurisdiction exists under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343, as
well as supplemental jurisdiction over their state law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367.2 The two
pending motions at issue were filed in conjunction with Plaintiffs’ complaint.
Because of deficiencies with Plaintiffs’ applications to proceed in forma pauperis, they
were not granted in forma pauperis status until the January 3, 2025 order of referral. Despite
the absence of a summons issued by the Clerk, Plaintiffs apparently served Defendants with a
copy of their complaint, and motions to dismiss have been filed by Defendant City of Lebanon
Police Department (Docket Entry No. 13) and Defendants Wilson County Government, Wilson
County Court, Wilson County Board of Commissioners, Wilson County Judicial District, and
Wilson County Human Resource Department (Docket Entry No. 20). Defendant Brown &
2 The instant lawsuit is the third federal lawsuit filed by the Edwards based on the August
25, 2022, accident. On November 17, 2022, Mr. Edwards filed a lawsuit in the Eastern District
of Tennessee against Fresh Foods, claiming negligence. Edwards v. Fresh Food, LLC, Case
No.1:22-cv-00285-TRM-CHS (McDonough, J.). That lawsuit was dismissed without prejudice
on December 14, 2022, for improper venue. Mr. and Mrs. Edwards then brought a negligence
lawsuit in this Court against Fresh Foods, LLC, Johnny Harris, Penske Truck Leasing Co., L.P.,
and Roger S. Penske. Edwards v. Fresh foods, LLC, et al., Case No. 3:23-cv-00049 (Richardson,
J.). That lawsuit was dismissed without prejudice on April 12, 2023, for failure to show that
diversity subject matter jurisdiction existed and for want of prosecution.
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Brown Insurance Brokers was dismissed from the case with prejudice upon agreed order entered
November 4, 2024. (Docket Entry No. 34.) The remaining three Defendants – Judge Michael
Collins, William Brown, and Fresh Co. Foods, LLC – have not appeared in the case.
II. LEGAL STANDARDS AND ANALYSIS
Although not all Defendants are yet in the case, the Court finds it appropriate to address
Plaintiffs’ early filed and pending motions for class certification and for a writ of mandamus
without further delay.
A. Motion for Class Certification (Docket Entry No. 3)
By their motion for class certification (Docket Entry No. 3), Plaintiffs seek an order that
certifies their lawsuit as a class action under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and
appoints them as the class representatives for a class of plaintiffs consisting of:
All individuals who, within the applicable statute of limitations period, were:
a) Provided with fraudulent or misleading insurance documentation by
Defendants Brown & Brown Insurance Brokers, Fresh Co. Foods, LLC, or their
agents;
b) Subjected to discriminatory practices or denial of due process by Defendants
Wilson County Court, Judge Michael Collins, City of Lebanon Police
Department, Wilson County Government, Wilson County Board of
Commissioners, Wilson County Judicial District, or Wilson County Human
Resources Department; or
c) Harmed as a result of negligent hiring, retention, or supervision practices by
any of the Defendants.
(Docket No. 3 at 2-3.)
This motion must be denied for the significant and conclusive reason that Plaintiffs are
proceeding pro se without representation by counsel. Under Rule 23(a), one of the four
prerequisites that must be satisfied for any class to be certified is that the representative party
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must be able to fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. Stout v. J.D. Byrider,
228 F.3d 709, 716-17 (6th Cir. 2000). The established law within this Circuit is that a pro se
party is not a proper representatives of a class. See e.g. Ziegler v. Michigan, 90 F.App’x. 810 (6th
Cir. January 23, 2004); Palasty v. Hawk, 15 F.App’x. 197 (6th Cir. June 20, 2001); Howard v.
Dougan, 221 F.3d 1334 (Table), 2000 WL 876770 (6th Cir. June 23, 2000); Hammond v. O’Dea,
932 F.2d 968 (Table), 1991 WL 78161 (6th Cir. May 14, 1991); Hobson v. Esper, No.
3:20-cv-00076, 2020 WL 4035399 at *2 (M.D. Tenn. July 17, 2020) (Campbell, J.); Dundee v.
Univ. Hosps. Corp, Case No. 1:19-cv-01141, 2020 WL 511520 at *1 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 31, 2020);
Mustric v. Huntington Nat'l Bank, Case No. 2:18-cv-1279, 2019 WL 1472095 at *2 (S.D. Ohio
Apr. 3, 2019); Myers v. Transcor Am., LLC, No. 3:08-cv-0295, 2009 WL 793752 at *1 (M.D.
Tenn. Mar. 23, 2009) (Trauger, J.); Powers v. NWA, Inc., No. 05-2468-B/P, 2006 WL 984738 at
*2 (W.D. Tenn. Apr. 13, 2006); Collins v. Kentucky, No. 04-CV-66-JMH, 2004 WL 3623342 at
*1 (E.D. Ky. Oct. 22, 2004). Additionally, Plaintiffs, as pro se parties, may proceed without
counsel in this lawsuit but as an unlicensed lay persons cannot represent anyone other than
themselves, including as class representatives. See 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (“In all courts of the
United States the parties may plead and conduct their own cases personally or by counsel as, by
the rules of such court, respectively, are permitted and conduct causes therein.”). See also
Freeman v. Southern Health Partners, No. 3:12-cv-990, 2012 WL 4903376 at *2 (M.D. Tenn.
Oct. 16, 2012) (Sharp, J.) (pro se plaintiff has no standing to bring a class action on behalf of
others, because “28 U.S.C. § 1654 does not allow for an unlicensed layman to represent anyone
other than himself”) (internal citations omitted); Powers, supra (same).
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B. Petition for a Writ of Mandamus (Docket Entry No. 4)
Plaintiffs’ petition for a writ of mandamus (Docket Entry No. 4) should be denied as both
procedurally flawed and substantively meritless. As a procedural matter, Plaintiffs present
contradictory and confusing filings. The docketed petition is directed at the “United States
District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee, Wilson County Division.” (Id. at 5.)
However, there is not a “Wilson County Division” within the United States District Court for the
Middle District of Tennessee. See 28 U.S.C. § 123(b). Additionally, the attachment to the
petition appears to be a different petition and is directed at the “Wilson County Court.” (Docket
Entry No. 4-1.) Further confusing matters is the “declaration” filed in support of Plaintiffs’
request for mandamus relief. (Docket Entry No. 5). In this declaration, Plaintiffs refer to “the
Petition for Writ of Mandate” (id. at. 2), which suggests that only a single petition for mandamus
relief is at issue, but also state that they request that the mandamus order be directed at
“Defendants” (id. at 5), which suggests that they seek an order against the nine Defendants
collectively.
For this reason alone, denial of the petition for mandamus relief is warranted. While the
Court recognizes Plaintiffs’ filings must be viewed with a certain measure of leniency because
they are proceeding pro se, this leniency has limits. Pilgrim v. Littlefield, 92 F.3d 413, 416 (6th
Cir. 1996). A party, even a pro se party, who comes to court seeking the extraordinary remedy
of the issuance of an order of mandamus is expected to make a request that is clear and precise
and does not require the Court to guess or speculate about to whom the requested order is
intended to be directed.
More importantly, the request for mandamus relief is also substantively meritless.
Before addressing the shortcomings in Plaintiffs’ request for a writ of mandamus, the Court
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clarifies that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 81(b) formally abolished the writ of mandamus.
Haggard v. State of Tenn., 421 F.2d 1384, 1386 (6th Cir. 1970). However, district courts can
issue such writs pursuant to the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651, which provides that “[t]he
Supreme Court and all other courts established by Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary
or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of
law.” 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a). Although Plaintiffs make no reference to the basis for their request
for a writ of mandamus, the Court liberally construes their request as seeking relief under Section
1651.
Nonetheless, liberally construing Plaintiffs’ filing as linked to the proper statutory
authority does not save their petition from dismissal. First, to the extent that the actual petition is
directed at the “United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee, Wilson County
Division,” there is no such entity. If the petition is meant to be directed to this Court, it is
nonsensical to request that a federal court issue a mandamus order against itself. Second, to the
extent that the petition is intended to be directed at the “Wilson County Court,” a federal court
has no authority to issues writs of mandamus to direct state courts or their judicial officers in the
performance of their duties. Haggard, 421 F.2d at 1386; Hughes v. Martin, No. 3:22-cv-00332,
2022 WL 1598254, at *2 (M.D. Tenn. May 19, 2022) (Richardson, J.) (federal court lacks
subject matter jurisdiction to issue a mandamus writ under Section 1651 based on a challenge to
the actions taken by a state court and its judicial officer); Bordages v. Thorne, No.
19-cv-02353-JTF-dkv, 2019 WL 8440508, at *3 (W.D. Tenn. Aug. 1, 2019) (quoting Haggard
for the same proposition and finding the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over a petition
for writ of mandamus asking the court to direct Arkansas authorities to perform their job duties).
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RECOMENDATION
For the reasons set out above, it is respectfully RECOMMENDED that Plaintiffs’
motion for class certification (Docket Entry No. 3) be DENIED and that Plaintiffs’ petition for a
writ of mandamus (Docket Entry No. 4) be DENIED.
ANY OBJECTIONS to this Report and Recommendation must be filed within fourteen
(14) days of service of this Report and Recommendation and must state with particularity the
specific portions of this Report and Recommendation to which objection is made. See Rule
72(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Local Rule 72.02(a). Failure to file written
objections within the specified time can be deemed a waiver of the right to appeal the District
Court's Order regarding the Report and Recommendation. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140
(1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981). Any response to the objections
must be filed within fourteen (14) days after service of objections. See Federal Rule 72(b)(2) and
Local Rule 72.02(b).
Respectfully submitted,
United States Magistrate Judge