Opinion

Brown v. Raymond

Court
District Court, S.D. Illinois
Filed
Jan 16, 2025
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 33.7%

The opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

ROBERT BROWN, #N62623, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Case No. 23-cv-1554-RJD

)

)

SHAUN REIMAN, )

)

Defendant. )

ORDER

DALY, Magistrate Judge:1

Plaintiff Robert Brown, an inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections (“IDOC”)

who is currently incarcerated at Menard Correctional Center (“Menard”), brought this civil action

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the alleged violation of his constitutional rights. Plaintiff

specifically alleged in the Complaint that on July 19, 2022, between 5:00 pm and 7:30 pm, while

in Cell No. 104 of the East Cellhouse at Menard, Defendant Reiman,2 the acting cellhouse sergeant

at the time, maced Plaintiff for no reason as he stood at the back of the cell trying to get away from

Defendant. (Doc. 1, pp. 8-9). Plaintiff seeks monetary damages. After threshold review of the

Complaint, Plaintiff was allowed to proceed on an Eighth Amendment excessive force claim

against Defendant Reiman for spraying Plaintiff with mace for no reason on July 19, 2022.

1 This matter has been assigned to the undersigned to conduct all proceedings, including the trial

and final entry of judgment, through the parties’ consent pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 636(c) and Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 73. (Doc. 46).

2 The Complaint was originally addressed against Sgt. Raymond, who was later identified as

Defendant Shaun Reiman. (Docs. 33 & 39).

Page 1 of 9

This matter is now before the Court on the parties’ various motions. For the reasons set

forth below, the following motions are GRANTED: Plaintiff’s Motions to Clarify (Docs. 64, 65,

66, 67, 70, 72). The following motions are DENIED: Plaintiff’s Motion to Clarify (Doc. 63);

Plaintiff’s Motion for Discovery (Doc. 74), and Plaintiff’s Motion to Deny Summary Judgment

(Doc. 75). Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment on the Issue of Exhaustion of

Administrative Remedies (Doc. 54) will be set for a hearing in a separate order.

Plaintiff’s Motion to Clarify (Doc. 63) & Motion for Discovery (Doc. 74)

In his Motion to Clarify (Doc. 63), Plaintiff states that on April 10, 2024, a male security

staff picked up a breakfast tray from outside Plaintiff’s door and threw it at him so hard that it hit

Plaintiff in his face, left eye, left shoulder, arm, and chest. (Doc. 63, p. 1). The force caused

Plaintiff to land on the back of the cell, toilet, mirror, TV, and floor. (Id.). The security staff then

picked the tray up again and threw it at Plaintiff for a second time through the “chuck hole.” (Id.).

Plaintiff asks for the camera footage of the incident as evidence of the treatment he received at

Menard. (Id.). Defendants did not file a response. While titled as a motion to clarify, this is, in

essence, a discovery request as to the merits of the case.

Plaintiff also filed a Motion for Discovery (Doc. 74), in which he asks Defendant to

produce the following: (a) the duty roster of the date of the incident, including the verified names

of staff assigned and pictures of each staff member so that Plaintiff can confirm the identity of the

individual who maced him; (b) video footage of the July 19, 2022, incident from a camera close

to his cell; (c) a legal document that the clinical service worker, Mr. Malbrey, allegedly coerced

Plaintiff to sign on September 12, 2023; and (d) video footage of Plaintiff’s alleged assault by

Menard security staff on April 10, 2024. (Doc. 74, p. 1).

Page 2 of 9

Pursuant to the Initial Scheduling Order (Doc. 52), discovery on the merits of Plaintiff’s

claims has been stayed until the Court resolves the issue of exhaustion of administrative remedies.

In its Order, the Court explicitly warned that “[a]ny motions filed regarding discovery on the merits

will be summarily denied, with leave to refile after the stay has been lifted.” (Doc. 52, p. 5).

Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on the issue of exhaustion of administrative remedies

is still pending, and the stay on the merits discovery remains in place. Because Plaintiff’s Motion

to Clarify (Doc. 63) and Motion for Discovery (Doc. 74) pertain to the merits of the case,

Plaintiff’s motions are DENIED. The Court further clarifies that after the stay is lifted, Plaintiff’s

requests for production of those items should be mailed to Defendant’s counsel and not filed with

the Court. See SDIL-LR 26.1(b)(providing that written discovery requests and responses must “be

served upon other counsel or parties but shall not be filed with the Clerk of Court”).

Plaintiff’s Motion to Clarify (Doc. 64)

This motion to clarify is split into two sections. In the first section, Plaintiff addresses the

issue of exhaustion of administrative remedies (Doc. 64, p. 1), while in the second section, he asks

for clarification regarding the Court’s Notice found at docket entry 38. (Doc. 64, p. 2). The Court

considers the first section as Plaintiff’s response to Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on

the issue of exhaustion of administrative remedies (Doc. 75).3 In the second section, Plaintiff

specifically asks for clarification of the Court’s Notice found at docket entry 38. Plaintiff’s Motion

to Clarify (Doc. 64) is GRANTED. The Notice states:

The Court has received from Plaintiff Request for Production of Documents. These

documents will not be filed as it would violate this Court's Local Rule 26.1(b). No

discovery materials shall be filed. Your documents were received electronically,

therefore, will not be returned to you.

3 This issue is discussed later on in more detail.

Page 3 of 9

(Doc. 38). Plaintiff first asks if those documents are being held by the Court and will be returned

to him at a later time. The Court clarifies that it has not maintained Plaintiff’s requests for

production of documents. Because those documents were received electronically, they will not be

returned to Plaintiff. Plaintiff next asks if he should refile the request for production once the stay

on the merits discovery is lifted. The Court clarifies that Plaintiff should not refile his requests for

production of documents with the Court. See SDIL-LR 26.1(b)(providing that written discovery

requests and responses must “be served upon other counsel or parties but shall not be filed with

the Clerk of Court”). When the issue of exhaustion of administrative remedies is resolved, and

the stay on the merits discovery is lifted, the Court will enter a new scheduling order regarding

discovery on the merits. Then, Plaintiff will have the opportunity to send his requests to

Defendant’s counsel through mail. Again, Plaintiff shall not file his discovery request with the

Court unless a discovery dispute arises (e.g., if Defendant fails to respond to Plaintiff’s discovery

requests within the timeframe that will be set in the Court’s scheduling order for discovery on the

merits, Plaintiff will be entitled to file a motion to compel and attach the relevant discovery

requests as exhibits).

Motions to Clarify (Docs. 65 & 66)

In these motions, which are identical, Plaintiff states that he mailed a letter to the Court on

April 10, 2024, regarding his alleged assault by security staff on that same day, but Menard

correctional officers did not process the mail under May 3, 2024. (Doc. 65, p. 1). Plaintiff states

that the delay resulted in the Court ruling in favor of the Defendant. Plaintiff does not identify the

specific ruling, but the Court assumes it refers to Order (Doc. 61), entered on May 2, 2024. There,

the Court addressed Plaintiff’s various motions that were pending at that time, including a motion

Page 4 of 9

to subpoena the video footage of Plaintiff’s alleged assault on April 10, 2024. Plaintiff’s Motions

to Clarify (Docs. 65 & 66) are GRANTED. The Court first clarifies that all but one of Plaintiff’s

motions addressed in Order (Doc. 61) were granted. The Court denied without prejudice only

Plaintiff’s Motion for Subpoena (Doc. 56), asking for video footage of the April 10, 2024, incident.

The Court explained that this was a request for discovery on the merits filed in violation of the

Court’s Initial Scheduling Order. Once more, the Court clarifies that Plaintiff may refile his

motion for a subpoena after the issue of exhaustion of administrative remedies has been resolved

and the stay in merits discovery has been lifted. The Court expresses no opinion on the merits of

Plaintiff’s request for subpoena. It merely holds that Plaintiff’s request at this time is barred

pursuant to the Initial Scheduling Order.

Motion to Clarify (Doc. 67)

In this motion, Plaintiff asks for clarifications as to the correct name of Defendant and the

correct number of this case. Plaintiff’s Motion to Clarify (Doc. 67) is GRANTED. Plaintiff

states he is confused because, in the Certificate of Service of Defendants’ Rule 56 Notice (Doc.

62, p. 4), Defendant’s name is stated as C/O RAYMOND (Sergeant). He accuses the Defendant’s

counsel of collusion. However, Defendant’s correct name was used throughout the Notice, and it

appears that the misidentification in the accompanying Certificate of Service was an inadvertent

mistake that does not prejudice Plaintiff in any way. The Court again clarifies that Defendant’s

correct name is Shaun Reiman. (See Docs. 33, 39 & 58).

As to the correct case number, the Plaintiff complained about the case being referenced in

the Court’s filings interchangeably as 23-cv-01554-RJD and 23-1554-RJD. The Court clarifies

Page 5 of 9

that these are both valid forms of this case’s number. The omission or addition of the number “0”

is not a misidentification of this case’s number.

Plaintiff’s Motion to Clarify (Doc. 70)

This motion is also titled “Motion to Clarify,” but Plaintiff’s requested relief is unclear.

Plaintiff states that on July 30, 2024, he was placed in segregation, and since then, he has been

unable to “notify or respond” to the Court. (Doc. 70, p. 1). He then states that he was “set up to

fight an ex-cellie” and has been prevented from initiating new actions against other Menard

correction staff, but he does not indicate who set him up or prevented him from initiating those

actions (Id.). He closes his motion, stating that he feels his life is in danger and that as of October

20, 2024, he has not received his legal documents. (Id.). Defendant filed a response, arguing that

the motion should be denied because the allegations therein are unrelated to Defendant and this

pending claim. (Doc. 70). Defendant further suggests that the alleged interference with Plaintiff’s

ability to file documents after being sent to segregation on July 30, 2024, cannot be an excuse for

Plaintiff’s alleged failure to respond to Defendant’s motion for summary judgment, which was due

on June 3, 2024. (Id.).

To the extent Plaintiff seeks an extension of time to respond to Defendant’s motion for

summary Judgment (Doc. 54), Plaintiff’s Motion to Clarify (Doc. 70) is GRANTED. As set forth

above, on May 14, 2024, Plaintiff filed a document titled “Motion to Clarify” (Doc. 64, p. 1),

which contains a section addressing the issue of exhaustion of administrative remedies. Plaintiff

has more recently filed another Motion to Clarify (Doc. 72), in which he explains that he included

his response to Defendant’s motion for summary judgment in documents he mailed to the Court

on April 30, 2024. Defendant filed a response opposing Plaintiff’s Motion to Clarify (Doc. 72)

Page 6 of 9

and denied receiving any response to the summary judgment motion. (Doc. 73). The Court

assumes the document Plaintiff refers to is the Motion to Clarify (Doc. 64). The Court will

consider that document as Plaintiff’s timely response to Defendant’s motion for summary

judgment.

Given the seriousness of Plaintiff’s statement that he believes his life is in danger, and even

though Plaintiff is not asking for a preliminary injunction, the Court will also address this matter.

The main purpose of a preliminary injunction is “to preserve the relative positions of the parties

until a trial on the merits can be held.” University of Texas v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395

(1981). Accordingly, the preliminary injunctive relief sought must relate to the claims pending in

the underlying lawsuit. See Devose v. Herrington, 42 F.3d 470, 471 (8th Cir. 1994) (per curiam)

(holding that “a party moving for a preliminary injunction must necessarily establish a relationship

between the injury claimed in the party’s motion and the conduct asserted in the complaint”). See

also Pacific Radiation Oncology, LLC v. Queen’s Medical Center, 810 F.3d 631, 636 (9th Cir.

2015) (there must be “a sufficient nexus between the claims raised in a motion for injunctive relief

and the claims set forth in the underlying complaint itself. The relationship between the

preliminary injunction and the underlying complaint is sufficiently strong where the preliminary

injunction would grant relief of the same character as that which may be granted finally.”). A

motion for preliminary injunction is not a proper avenue to pursue additional claims or name

additional defendants. The allegations set forth in Plaintiff’s motion do not appear to relate to the

claim he pursues in this case. Plaintiff states that he was “set up to fight an ex-cellie” and was

prevented from initiating new actions against other Menard correction staff. There is no indication

in Plaintiff’s motion that Defendant has been involved in those actions. The plaintiff further states

Page 7 of 9

that he feels his life is in danger, but he does not state who poses a threat to his life. He further

does not set forth any facts indicating Defendant’s involvement with the threat to his life. This

action relates to a single incident that occurred on July 19, 2022, when Defendant Reiman allegedly

maced Plaintiff for no reason as he stood at the back of the cell trying to get away from Defendant.

There is nothing in Plaintiff’s motion connecting his transfer to segregation, the interference with

his legal mail, and his fear for his life to Defendant or the claim Plaintiff pursues in this action.

Accordingly, to the extent Plaintiff seeks a preliminary injunction with his motion, his request is

DENIED.

Plaintiff’s Motion to Deny Summary Judgment (Doc. 75)

In this motion, Plaintiff lists all his filings following Defendant’s Motion for Summary

Judgment (Doc. 54) but does not make any specific request. The Court assumes the purpose of

this motion is to respond to Defendant’s recent filing denying that he ever received a response to

the Motion for Summary Judgment. As set forth above, the Court agrees with Plaintiff that his

Motion to Clarify (Doc. 64) is a timely response to the motion for summary judgment. In his

response, Plaintiff states that he filed a grievance relating to this action on July 24, 2022, but never

received a response from his counselor. (Doc. 64, p. 1). Because Plaintiff’s response raises a

factual dispute on the issue of exhaustion of administrative remedies, the Court cannot determine

the issue without an evidentiary hearing. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion to Deny Summary

Judgment (Doc. 75) is DENIED. The Court will enter a separate order setting Defendant’s Motion

for Summary Judgment on the Issue of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies (Doc. 54) for a

hearing.

Page 8 of 9

Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, the following motions are GRANTED: Plaintiff’s Motions

to Clarify (Docs. 64, 65, 66, 67, 70, 72). The following motions are DENIED: Plaintiff’s Motion

to Clarify (Doc. 63); Plaintiff’s Motion for Discovery (Doc. 74), and Plaintiff’s Motion to Deny

Summary Judgment (Doc. 75). The Court will enter a separate order setting Defendant’s Motion

for Summary Judgment on the Issue of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies (Doc. 54) for a

hearing.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: January 16, 2025

s/ Reona J. Daly

Hon. Reona J. Daly

United States Magistrate Judge

Page 9 of 9

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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