White v. Deere & Company

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

ROCK ISLAND DIVISION

DANIEL J. WHITE, )

)

Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant, )

)

v. ) Case No. 4:23-cv-04022-SLD

)

DEERE & COMPANY, )

)

Defendant/Counter-Claimant. )

ORDER

Plaintiff Daniel J. White asserts that Defendant Deere & Company (“Deere”) violated

Illinois common law because it discharged him in retaliation for raising safety concerns related

to electric batteries. See Compl. 1–9, Not. Removal Ex. A, ECF No. 1-1. Before the Court is

Deere’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, ECF No. 32. For the reasons that follow, the

motion is DENIED.

BACKGROUND1

By 2022, Deere had an ambitious goal: Design an autonomous battery-powered

agricultural tractor. One iteration of this proposed tractor was the Carver project. Aaron

Wetzel—a vice president at Deere—wanted to bring in external talent to lead the Carver project,

1 At summary judgment, a court must “constru[e] the record in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.” Payne v.

Pauley, 337 F.3d 767, 770 (7th Cir. 2003). Unless otherwise noted, this factual background is drawn from Deere’s

statement of undisputed material facts, Mem. L. Supp. Mot. Partial Summ. J. 1–23, ECF No. 33, White’s response

thereto and his statement of additional material facts, Resp. Mot. Partial Summ. J. 3–72, ECF No. 35, and Deere’s

reply thereto, Reply Mem. L. Supp. Mot. Partial Summ. J. 3–18, ECF No. 36. Deere argues that White’s responses

to its statement of undisputed material facts “blatantly violate” the Court’s Civil Local Rules, pointing in part to the

length of White’s responses and his tendency to “present[] arguments unrelated to whether the fact is admitted.”

Reply Mem. L. Supp. Mot. Partial Summ. J. 1 n.1; see also Resp. Mot. Partial Summ. J. 27–47 (devoting twenty

pages to dispute one fact and “apologiz[ing] for the lengthy marshalling of evidence to dispute this fact”). To the

extent they do not relate to disputation of the at-issue fact, White’s responses are an improper attempt to circumvent

the page limits imposed upon the argument section of summary-judgment briefing, such that the Court does not

consider them. See Civil LR 7.1(D)(5).

which would have a distinct funding structure, a different approach to internal collaboration, and

a goal of “engaging a targeted customer segment in learning what their needs were” as part of the

design process. Pl.’s Excerpt Wetzel Dep. 9:23–12:7, Resp. Mot. Partial Summ. J. Ex. 4, ECF

No. 35-1 at 25–36. Wetzel hired White—he began work on or around February 16, 2022 in the

role of Chief Electrification Officer/Chief of Electrification. That role required White to report

to Wetzel, lead the Carver team, and reach a targeted rollout date of 2025. White’s offer letter

specified that his employment was “at-will.” Jan. 6, 2022 Letter from Wetzel & Junkins to

White DEERE00003, Foong Decl. Ex. D, Mem. L. Supp. Mot. Partial Summ. J., ECF No. 33-4

at 15–18.

In or around February 2022, Deere finalized its acquisition of a majority stake of Kreisel

Electric (“Kreisel”), a company that develops and manufactures batteries, including batteries

which utilize immersion cooling technology. Deere intended to use Kreisel batteries across

many different products, including the Carver tractor. Deere conducted extensive diligence into

Kreisel’s practices and assets prior to finalizing its acquisition. This diligence included

reviewing safety test reports for specific battery models—like the Kreisel Battery Pack 63

(“KBP63”)—which indicated that Kreisel batteries were compliant with certain international

safety standards. Although the diligence did not reveal safety concerns associated with Kreisel’s

existing products or its immersion cooling technology, Kreisel batteries had previously caused

two fires outside of Kreisel’s facilities. Jennifer Preston—Vice President of John Deere Electric

Power Train, a group within Deere related to John Deere Power Systems (“JDPS”)—testified

that Carver team members, including White, “didn’t need to be informed” of these incidents.

Pl.’s Excerpt Preston Dep. 52:14–22, Resp. Mot. Partial Summ. J. Ex. 5, ECF No. 35-2 at 1–10.

From the beginning, White made clear that he had doubts about using Kreisel batteries

for the Carver project. He initially sought to leverage his connections from prior employment to

set up meetings with companies like Panasonic. He was informed that conversations between

Deere and Panasonic were already ongoing, and he was asked to clarify what he would request

from Panasonic. He responded that he was aware that Preston’s team was working to scale up

production of Kreisel batteries and that he was hoping “to understand contingency plans or

parallel plans should their [sic] be parallel paths [that Deere would be] interested in.” June 6,

2022 Email from White to Handa et al., Mem. L. Supp. Mot. Partial Summ. J. Ex. 11, ECF No.

33-1 at 129–30. Preston forwarded this email to Pierre Guyot—Senior Vice President of

JDPS—and Guyot sent an email to White wherein he stated: “To go direct to the point, Carver

will have a Kreisel battery.” June 8, 2022 Email from Guyot to White, Mem. L. Supp. Mot.

Partial Summ. J. Ex. 11, ECF No. 33-1 at 129.

The next month, Guyot noted that he was still “hearing a lot of swirl on the battery for

Carver,” and stated that it “ha[d] to stop”—he reiterated: “[T]he battery in Carver will be a

Kreisel battery.” July 22, 2022 Email from Guyot to White & Scheff, Mem. L. Supp. Mot.

Partial Summ. J. Ex. 13, ECF No. 33-1 at 134–35 (emphasis omitted). White remained

unconvinced that Kreisel batteries were the proper solution and continued to explore other

options for the Carver project—he felt that he could “[d]isregard” Guyot’s views, at least in part

because he thought that the relationship between JDPS and the Carver project was

“undetermined at the time.” Def.’s Excerpt White Dep. 84:13–24, 86:1–24, Yee Decl. Ex. A,

Mem. L. Supp. Mot. Partial Summ. J., ECF No. 33-1 at 4–127. White sent to Wetzel a proposed

response to Guyot’s July 2022 email wherein White wrote that he was “not bought in” on using

Kreisel batteries and that he believed that “the existing Kreisel solution and the Carver proposal

do not yield a successful market execution.” July 22, 2022 Email from White to Wetzel, Mem.

L. Supp. Mot. Partial Summ. J. Ex. 13, ECF No. 33-1 at 134.

According to Wetzel, White’s concerns with the Kreisel batteries focused on certain

performance metrics, such as “cost and density and the economics.” Pl.’s Excerpt Wetzel Dep.

45:1–4. However, White was also concerned about safety. See, e.g., July 22, 2022 Email from

White to Wetzel (“The big [questions] are energy density and cost but safety and reliability are

still a question as we had discussed.”). White met with Preston in March 2022 to discuss a safety

strategy for Deere. Later in June 2022, at Preston’s suggestion, White traveled as part of a group

to visit Kreisel’s facilities in Austria. He returned from that trip with certain safety concerns.

For example, he thought that the large quantity of O-rings—a common engineering component

often utilized for sealing—in the batteries could cause leaking issues. He raised his concerns

about Kreisel batteries, including safety issues, in separate meetings with, among others, Wetzel,

Guyot, and Preston. White informed Guyot of his concerns about “fires and contamination of

the dielectric fluid,” providing Guyot with documentation of those concerns. Guyot Dep. 13:16–

24, Resp. Mot. Partial Summ. J. Ex. 6, ECF No. 35-2 at 11–15. Wetzel assured him that Deere

would not put an unsafe product on the market. Guyot and Preston listened to his concerns and

directed him to meet with more technical employees who could more fully understand and

address his concerns. White reached out to Mike Duffield—Battery Engineering Manager—via

another engineer to ask about the “shock and vibe specifications” of the KBP63. June 24, 2022

Email from Duffield to Heimbuch, Mem. L. Supp. Mot. Partial Summ. J. Ex. 12, ECF No. 33-1

at 133. In an email to that other engineer cc’ing White, Duffield stated that the KBP63 was

designed and tested according to an international standard and provided him with that battery’s

“specific profiles,” noting that other options for the Kreisel battery’s design were available

should the still undesigned Carver tractor require something different. Id.

White was unsatisfied—he wanted to design and control a testing regimen for the KBP63

which would tell him more about Kreisel’s technology generally and inform the design choices

his team could make for the Carver tractor. Preston and Guyot repeatedly informed him that

normally JDPS, rather than a product team like the Carver team, was responsible for testing the

batteries. Preston thought that the battery could not be designed and tested without first

designing the product, thereby defining the product’s energy needs. The record establishes that

Wetzel shared the view that JDPS was responsible for battery testing but does not show whether

Wetzel instructed White that he had to run testing through JDPS. By July 2022, White knew that

JDPS believed that they were responsible for testing, not his team. Yet he and Preston remained

at odds—Preston thought that the battery needed to be designed and tested based upon the

Carver tractor’s design, whereas White thought that his team could not design the Carver tractor

without knowing more about the Kreisel batteries’ capabilities and safety risks. Essentially,

White and Preston disagreed as to whether the Carver tractor was the chicken or the egg.

White began to pursue testing the KBP63 with FEV, a third-party company in Germany

that did battery testing. In August 2022, White informed Preston and Guyot that “the first pass

KB[P]63 test plan ha[d] been developed,” and would be refined by his team in collaboration with

Duffield. Aug. 11, 2022 Email from White to Preston, Mem. L. Supp. Mot. Partial Summ. J. Ex.

15, ECF No. 33-1 at 137. Preston responded: “As you know we are responsible for testing, so let

us know what the application requirements are and we’ll build a test plan around it[.]” Aug. 11,

2022 Email from Preston to White, Mem. L. Supp. Mot. Partial Summ. J. Ex. 16, ECF No. 33-1

at 138. Guyot responded in similar fashion, noting that if the Carver team defined the test on

their own, that was “not the right approach.” Aug. 11, 2022 Email from Guyot to White, Mem.

L. Supp. Mot. Partial Summ. J. Ex. 17, ECF No. 33-1 at 139. White testified that he thought that

because he was “running the project” that he could “do the testing where [he] need[ed] to do it.”

Def.’s Excerpt White Dep. 113:4–14. On August 19, 2022, White informed Lauren Foong—

Human Resources (“HR”) Business Partner—that a prototype battery was being shipped to the

Carver team.

On August 31, 2022, Joachim Sobotzik—a “support person in Germany that [White] had

put in like an innovation role,” id. at 114:19–21—sent to Duffield notes that he had prepared

from their “Carver Pre-Engineering Meeting” which articulated a series of proposed tests for the

KBP63 based on data from FEV, Aug. 31, 2022 Email from Sobotzik to Duffield, Resp. Mot.

Partial Summ. J. Ex. 15, ECF No. 35-4 at 1–3. A few days later, Duffield informed Preston that

he believed Sobotzik’s test plan “came from [White],” that he was “not aligned and disagree[d]

with the request to test batteries at FEV especially the abusive tests,” and that he did not support

White pushing Sobotzik “to start testing immediately.” Sept. 2, 2022 Email from Duffield to

Preston, Resp. Mot. Partial Summ. J. Ex. 15, ECF No. 35-4 at 1. That same day, Preston emailed

White and Sobotzik, cc’ing Guyot and Udo Scheff, Director of Engineering, Mid & Utility,

reiterating “that JDPS is responsible for battery design and testing, based on vehicle

requirements.” Sept. 2, 2022 Email from Preston to Sobotzik & White, Resp. Mot. Partial

Summ. J. Ex. 8, ECF No. 35-2 at 19–20. She stated that JDPS did “not want to do 3rd party

testing unless absolutely necessary (which is common with battery companies, to protect their

own IP)” and that “[a]ny battery testing will be initiated by the JDPS team.” Id.

White was “floored.” Def.’s Excerpt White Dep. 126:8–14. He thought that Preston had

agreed in principle to third-party testing via FEV, yet “[s]he all of a sudden just said no after she

. . . saw” the specific tests White wanted to conduct Id. at 126:10–14, 127:3–4. White and

Preston met to discuss this testing issue, and Preston sent herself an email recording her notes

and thoughts from that meeting. Preston noted that White felt that they “had an agreement that

he and FEV would test KBP63,” that she had given noncommittal responses to his statements

about the proposed third-party testing which “he took . . . as agreement,” and that was a

“miscommunication on [her] part.” Sept. 8, 2022 Email from Preston to Preston, Resp. Mot.

Partial Summ. J. Ex. 7, ECF No. 35-2 at 16–17. Preston wrote that she liked White “as a person”

and thought that he was working on maintaining his relationships with other stakeholders within

Deere. Id. Otherwise, Preston was critical of White: (1) She thought that he believed that

“[e]veryone (all functions) [we]re incompetent so [he] need[ed] to make all decisions related to

Carver”; (2) He stated that the Carver team was “so weak”; and (3) He stated that “this Deere

process of ‘give requirements, design, test’ [wa]s ridiculous and no one else in the world d[id]

that,” and that “he was brought in to fix that.” Id. Her conclusion was that she thought that

White had not “heard anything [she] said,” and that “if someone asked [White] how the

discussion with [her] went, he would [have said] something like ‘I set [her] straight and let her

know how things are going to work.’” Id.

A few weeks later, White forwarded Preston’s September 2, 2022 email—the one

“shutting . . . down” the third-party testing—to Wetzel, and White described the prior

discussions regarding testing, his desired test plan, why he thought testing was important, and his

belief that Carver would not “succeed with the current trajectory of guarded information,

emotion, and lack of collaboration.” Sept. 19, 2022 Email from White to Wetzel, Resp. Mot.

Partial Summ. J. Ex. 8, ECF No. 35-2 at 18–19. He also stated: “There is something going on

that is driving this behavior and I don’t think [Preston] is the type that would let ego get in front

of a great product.” Id.

On October 19, 2022, Deere’s competitor DeWalt demonstrated a new product involving

an electric battery—the product caught fire. A Deere employee present at the event took a

picture of the fire and sent it to colleagues within Deere, one of whom forwarded it to White and

Wetzel. Wetzel subsequently received the following text from White:

Subject-->Kreisel battery testing. After seeing the dewalt go up in flames it stresses

the need to do testing on the kreisel battery. There are rumors swirling that JDPS

has started testing and getting poor results and thus not wanting us to test. Are we

walking into a situation like DEWALT?

Oct. 19, 2022 Text from White to Wetzel, Resp. Mot. Partial Summ. J. Ex. 12, ECF No. 35-3 at

29. White also sent an email about the DeWalt fire to his team, warning them that the relevant

battery technology was “no joke” and urging them to “Be Safe.” Oct. 19, 2022 Email from

White to Muller et al., Resp. Mot. Partial Summ. J. Ex. 11, ECF No. 35-3 at 25.

Wetzel contacted Foong and informed her that White had sent him that text about the

DeWalt fire, relaying the text from White verbatim. They then exchanged the following

messages:

Wetzel: One of our competitors [sic] machines caught on fire today at their launch

event…

Foong: Is this in [White’s] scope?

Wetzel: No.

Foong: Isn’t it [Preston]’s team that does the testing?

Wetzel: No. This is turf. Dave knight.2

Foong: Liked “No. This is turf. Dave knight.”

Foong: [White] needs to stay in his lane and stick to facts. Not always assume the

worst! We at [Deere], we are also smart… [emoji]

Foong: We will always do what’s right!

Wetzel: Exactly!

2 Wetzel testified that he stated that the DeWalt issue was not within White’s scope because White was not

“responsible for the design or the development of the battery system—of the battery packs.” Pl.’s Excerpt Wetzel

Dep. 35:11–21. Low-voltage batteries like the at-issue DeWalt battery were handled by a different division within

Deere, namely, Turf Systems, of which Dave Knight was a part. Id. at 36:22–37:8.

Oct. 19, 2022 Texts Between Wetzel & Foong, Resp. Mot. Partial Summ. J. Ex. 10, ECF No. 35-

3 at 13. Foong later testified that she was unaware that: (1) White had communicated with his

superiors about the DeWalt fire, (2) there was tension between White and Preston regarding who

would be responsible for testing the Carver tractor’s batteries, and (3) White had texted Wetzel

about the Kreisel battery and his desire to get it tested for safety reasons. She also testified that

she was unaware that White was alleging that rumors were swirling about JDPS’s poor test

results and that those results were why JDPS did not want White to conduct testing on the

Kreisel batteries. In the following days and on Wetzel’s instruction, Foong met with White’s

supervisees to document their negative feedback about White and his performance as a leader.

On October 31, 2022, White was informed that he had been terminated.

Deere emphasizes a distinct yet overlapping set of events. First, White frequently

clashed with other senior Deere employees. In addition to the disputes with Preston and Guyot

regarding battery testing, he got into a heated conversation with Scheff which was so disruptive

that witnesses called Deere’s Compliance Hotline to report it. One of White’s supervisees

described the relationship with Scheff as “non[-]functioning” and another stated that he had

“burnt th[e] bridge” with Scheff’s team of engineers. Oct. 28, 2022 Email from Foong to Eley,

Foong Decl. Ex. A, Mem. L. Supp. Mot. Partial Summ. J., ECF No. 33-4 at 5–8. His

relationship with Preston was described as “questionable,” and his relationship with Guyot as

“tolerable,” id., although Guyot himself described their relationship as “low to average” by the

time White was terminated, Guyot Dep. 54:2–5. White criticized Wetzel to outside

consultants—for example, he requested that one consultant keep confidential his opinion that

Wetzel was not “going to be there on the hard stuff.” Sept. 20, 2022 Text from White to

Brahmandam, Mem. L. Supp. Mot. Partial Summ. J. Ex. 18, ECF No. 33-1 at 140–41. Earlier,

he had asked that consultant to “do some recon” on Duffield because he had “not been

impressed” by Duffield’s work in such a “critically important” role. May 24, 2022 Text from

White to Brahmandam, Mem. L. Supp. Mot. Partial Summ. J. Ex. 9, ECF No. 33-1 at 128. He

refused to accept the decision of Deere’s relocation consultants and senior HR personnel

regarding reimbursement of certain moving expenses. And as described above, his emails to

Wetzel about Preston “shutting [the third-party testing] down” demonstrate that he thought that

his working relationships with his supervisory peers were at risk of deteriorating, thereby risking

the success of the Carver project. Sept. 19, 2022 Email from White to Wetzel.

Second, many of White’s supervisees did not think that he was a good leader or that he

was leading the Carver team to success. Wetzel testified that White had relationship problems

with “[n]early all” of the people he worked with on a regular basis, Def.’s Excerpt Wetzel Dep.

74:24–75:3, Yee Decl. Ex. C, Mem. L. Supp. Mot. Partial Summ. J., ECF No. 33-1 at 164–85,

and that Wetzel regularly “receiv[ed] feedback from various folks across the organization”

regarding White’s “performance, or his behavior in meetings,” id. at 28:13–15. Foong similarly

averred that “[t]hroughout Mr. White’s tenure, various individuals on his team reached out to

[her] to report issues that they had with his leadership and ability to work with others.” Foong

Decl. ¶ 5, ECF No. 33-4 at 1–4. On September 19, 2022, Foong texted Wetzel to coordinate a

time to discuss feedback regarding the Carver team dynamic that Foong had just received from

White’s administrative assistant which made Foong “a little concerned.” Sept. 19, 2022 Text

from Foong to Wetzel, Resp. Mot. Partial Summ. J. Ex. 10, ECF No. 35-3 at 4.

Following a contentious meeting between White and his team on October 20, 2022,

Foong texted Wetzel that multiple people had reached out to her “asking for guidance on how to

handle the chaos and work with [White].” Oct. 20, 2022 Text from Foong to Wetzel, Resp. Mot.

Partial Summ. J. Ex. 10, ECF No. 35-3 at 15. On October 21, one of White’s supervisees sent

Foong an email describing the “lack of trust, transparency, and overall, a lack of an environment

of collaboration” engendered by White’s hostility to pushback and his preference to work with

outside consultants instead of his team within Deere. Oct. 21, 2022 Email from Cobie to Foong,

Resp. Mot. Partial Summ. J. Ex. 14, ECF No. 35-3 at 37–38. The extensive complaints which

Foong compiled from White’s supervisees are best summarized by one of White’s supervisees

stating: “[H]is issue is his [l]eadership skills, that is clearly tearing this team apart.” Oct. 28,

2022 Email from Foong to Eley.

Finally, White was recorded drinking a beer during a work meeting. See Video

Recording: Received by Foong from Muller on Oct. 14, 2022, Foong Decl. Ex. E, ECF No. 33-4

at 19. On September 27, 2022, Foong informed her supervisor that one of White’s supervisees

reported that White was seen “drinking beers when he works from home” and that she intended

to ask White “to refrain, especially when on work calls during the workday.” Sept. 27, 2022

Text from Foong to Butler, Resp. Mot. Partial Summ. J. Ex. 10, ECF No. 35-3 at 22. Foong and

White subsequently met to discuss his drinking, and Foong informed her supervisor that White

“denie[d] ‘crushing beers’ during work hours” but “he said that he might have had one late in the

day, on a late call.” Sept. 28, 2022 Text from Foong to Butler, Resp. Mot. Partial Summ. J. Ex.

10, ECF No. 35-3 at 24. Wetzel also spoke with White about drinking on the job and he testified

that White told him that it “[w]on’t happen again.” Pl.’s Excerpt Wetzel Dep. 91:18–92:4

(quotation marks omitted). However, it did happen again. During a virtual meeting on October

14, 2022, White was recorded by one of his supervisees drinking a Miller Lite while conducting

business for Deere. That supervisee sent the recording to Foong, who in turn sent it to Wetzel.

According to Wetzel, this was the “straw that broke the camel’s back” and he decided after

viewing that recording that White needed to be terminated. Id. at 18:14–21:3.

White sued Deere in state court on December 27, 2022, alleging in part that Deere

retaliatorily discharged him for raising safety concerns about the Kreisel batteries. Compl. 1–9.

Deere removed this case to federal court on February 3, 2023, Not. Removal, ECF No. 1, and has

asserted alternative counterclaims against White for either breach of contract or unjust

enrichment, Am. Answer & Countercls. 24–30, ECF No. 21. The Court denied Deere’s motion

to dismiss White’s claim of retaliatory discharge, finding that White plausibly alleged that his

discharge violated a clear mandate of Illinois’s public policy. See generally Aug. 23, 2023

Order, ECF No. 19. Deere now moves for summary judgment on White’s claim of retaliatory

discharge and White opposes that motion.3

DISCUSSION

I. Legal Standard

Summary judgment is proper when “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as

to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(a). The movant in a summary judgment motion bears the initial burden of production; it must

point the court to the materials in the record that “demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of

material fact” for trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Where the

nonmovant bears the ultimate burden of persuasion on a particular issue, however, the movant

can meet its initial burden by showing “that there is an absence of evidence to support the

3 White moved for summary judgment on Count II of his Complaint, which asserted that a retention agreement

between himself and Deere was unenforceable. See generally Mot. Summ. J. Count II, ECF No. 31. Upon realizing

that satisfaction clauses in employment contracts are generally enforceable under Illinois law due to an implied

covenant of good faith, he conceded that his motion should be denied. Reply Mot. Summ. J. Count II 1, ECF No.

37. The Court denied that motion. Dec. 3, 2024 Text Order.

nonmov[ant]’s case.” Modrowski v. Pigatto, 712 F.3d 1166, 1168 (7th Cir. 2013) (quotation

marks omitted). Once the movant discharges its initial burden, the burden shifts to the

nonmovant to “make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to

that party’s case.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322.

The court must construe the record in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, Payne v.

Pauley, 337 F.3d 767, 770 (7th Cir. 2003), “resolving all factual disputes and drawing all

reasonable inferences in favor of [the nonmovant],” Grant v. Trs. of Ind. Univ., 870 F.3d 562,

568 (7th Cir. 2017). The nonmovant “is not entitled to the benefit of inferences that are

supported by only speculation or conjecture.” Nichols v. Mich. City Plant Plan. Dep’t, 755 F.3d

594, 599 (7th Cir. 2014) (quotation marks omitted). “[T]he mere existence of some alleged

factual dispute is insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment,” Dawson v. Brown, 803

F.3d 829, 833 (7th Cir. 2015) (quotation marks omitted), as “there must be evidence on which

the jury could reasonably find for the [nonmovant],” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.

242, 252 (1986).

II. Analysis

The parties agree that Illinois law applies to White’s claim of retaliatory discharge. See

Mem. L. Supp. Mot. Partial Summ. J. 24–25, ECF No. 33; Resp. Mot. Partial Summ. J. 72–73,

ECF No. 35. “It has long been the general rule in Illinois that a noncontractual or at-will

employee may be discharged by his or her employer at any time and for any reason.” Michael v.

Precision All. Grp., LLC, 21 N.E.3d 1183, 1188 (Ill. 2014). The Illinois Supreme Court

established a “narrow exception” to this general rule by recognizing a common law cause of

action for retaliatory discharge. Id. (citing Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 384 N.E.2d 353 (Ill. 1978)).

The cause of action has been expanded beyond its original scope of workers’ compensation

issues to cover discharges implicating a “clear mandate of public policy,” Palmateer v. Int’l

Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876, 878 (Ill. 1981) (quotation marks omitted), such as

whistleblowing, Jacobson v. Knepper & Moga, P.C., 706 N.E.2d 491, 493 (Ill. 1998).

Retaliatory discharge requires an employee to prove that “(1) the employer discharged

the employee, (2) in retaliation for the employee’s activities, and (3) that the discharge violates a

clear mandate of public policy.” Turner v. Mem’l Med. Ctr., 911 N.E.2d 369, 374 (Ill. 2009);

Perez v. Staples Cont. & Com. LLC, 31 F.4th 560, 571 (7th Cir. 2022) (quoting Turner, 911

N.E.2d at 374). White was informed by Deere on October 31, 2022 that he had been terminated,

see Def.’s Excerpt White Dep. 314:20–22, and Deere does not contest whether White’s discharge

violated a clear mandate of public policy, see, e.g., Resp. Mot. Partial Summ. J. 73. In other

words, resolution of Deere’s motion for partial summary judgment turns solely upon the second

element—whether White was discharged in retaliation for his activities.

“The requirement that the discharge be in retaliation for plaintiff’s activities requires that

a plaintiff establish a causal relationship between the employee’s activities and the discharge.”

Michael, 21 N.E.3d at 1188. “[T]he plaintiff has the burden of affirmatively show[ing] that the

discharge was primarily in retaliation for his exercise of a protected right.” Walker v. Ingersoll

Cutting Tool Co., 915 F.3d 1154, 1157 (7th Cir. 2019) (second alteration in original) (quotation

marks omitted); see also Michael, 21 N.E.3d at 1189 (“[T]he burden rests on plaintiff to prove

each of the elements of the cause of action.”). “[C]ausation may be demonstrated by

circumstantial evidence.” Hubert v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Chi., 169 N.E.3d 831, 838 (Ill. App.

Ct. 2020); see also Reid v. Neighborhood Assistance Corp. of Am., 749 F.3d 581, 587 (7th Cir.

2014) (noting that “the evidence will typically be circumstantial” for claims of retaliatory

discharge). Merely showing a “sequential connection” is insufficient. Walker, 915 F.3d at 1157

(quotation marks omitted). Similarly, “but-for causation is necessary but not sufficient to prove

the causation element of a retaliatory-discharge claim.” Hillmann v. City of Chicago, 834 F.3d

787, 794 (7th Cir. 2016). “[T]he ultimate issue to be decided is the employer’s motive in

discharging the employee.” Hartlein v. Ill. Power Co., 601 N.E.2d 720, 730 (Ill. 1992). A court

“looks to the record as a whole to determine whether a jury could reasonably infer retaliation.”

Monroe v. Capstone Logistics, LLC, No. 4:20-cv-04107-SLD-JEH, 2021 WL 3711171, at *10

(C.D. Ill. Aug. 20, 2021) (citing Reid, 749 F.3d at 587).

Illinois has explicitly rejected the burden-shifting framework often used for retaliation

claims asserted under federal law. See Clemons v. Mech. Devices Co., 704 N.E.2d 403, 407–08

(Ill. 1998) (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–04 (1973)). Instead,

“[t]he allocation of proof in a retaliatory discharge claim is reviewed using traditional tort

analysis.” Holland v. Schwan’s Home Serv., Inc., 992 N.E.2d 43, 76 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013).

Illinois’s determination that a plaintiff must satisfy traditional tort principles to maintain a cause

of action for retaliatory discharge is a “substantive judgment” such that “when a retaliatory

discharge case governed by Illinois law is litigated in a federal court, the federal court must

apply the standard of the state law to a motion for summary judgment, and not the federal

standard, because the standards are materially different and the difference is rooted in a

substantive policy of the state.” Gacek v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 614 F.3d 298, 303 (7th Cir. 2010).

A federal court may not reflexively import generalized federal standards for analyzing whether

an adverse employment action was retaliatory—Illinois’s substantive law controls. See Staples

Cont. & Com. LLC, 31 F.4th at 571.

Under Illinois law, “an employer is not required to come forward with an explanation for

the employee’s discharge, although an employer may choose to offer a reason if it desires.”

Michael, 21 N.E.3d at 1189. “The element of causation is not met if the employer has a valid

basis, which is not pretextual, for discharging the employee.” Hartlein, 601 N.E.2d at 728.

However, “[i]f an employer provides a reason for the employee’s dismissal, that does not

automatically defeat a retaliatory discharge claim.” Michael, 21 N.E.3d at 1189. The trier of

fact’s role is crucial—“if an employer chooses to come forward with a valid, nonpretextual basis

for discharging its employees and the trier of fact believes it, the causation element required to

be proven is not met.” Id. (emphasis added) (quotation marks omitted). “[T]he issue of an

employer’s true motive in terminating an employee is a question of material fact, not normally

suitable for resolution on summary judgment.” Hubert, 169 N.E.3d at 837; see also Turner, 911

N.E.2d at 375 n.1; Zuccolo v. Hannah Marine Corp., 900 N.E.2d 353, 359 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008).

“If, at the summary judgment stage, a genuine dispute as to whether the employee’s or the

employer’s explanation was the true reason for the termination exists, it is for the trier of fact to

decide between the competing explanations.” Monroe, 2021 WL 3711171, at *10.

Hubert is particularly instructive on this point. There, the employee’s “colleagues that

submitted evidence in th[e] case resoundingly stated that he was difficult to work with and that

he made their jobs stressful” because he continued to condescend to his colleagues and clash

with them despite explicit instructions to the contrary. Hubert, 169 N.E.3d at 838. The

employer argued that it was entitled to summary judgment because it had mustered a convincing

case that the employee was “terminated for legitimate, nonretaliatory reasons—insubordination

and inappropriate behavior toward coworkers.” Id. at 836–37. The employee maintained that he

was retaliated against for reporting to outside entities that his employer was being defrauded by

vendors—he was fired three weeks after he went outside his department to report the fraud. Id.

at 837. The Hubert court found that there was a genuine dispute of material fact regarding

pretext because the employee averred that his boss “stated his displeasure” with the employee

going outside his department and that “might have created the impression that [the employee’s

boss] could not manage his department and, thus, [the boss] was threatened.” Id. at 838–39. It

further found that summary judgment for the employer was improper, describing the issue as “a

classic case of both sides presenting evidence to support their positions and advancing a narrative

that could be true.” Id. at 837. A trier of fact had to decide “the issue of an employer’s true

motive in terminating an employee,” because “[a] jury could believe the narrative advanced by

[the employee], and that narrative [wa]s supported by at least some evidentiary facts and the

inferences that could be drawn therefrom.” Id. at 837–38. At bottom, even if an employer

amply supports their legitimate reasons for terminating an employee, summary judgment is

inappropriate if a reasonable finder of fact could believe that the employer’s true motive was

retaliatory.

At trial, White would need to convince the trier of fact that each of Deere’s reasons for

his termination is unworthy of belief and that a retaliatory motive was the proximate cause for

his discharge. See Matros v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 136 N.E.3d 83, 107–08 (Ill. App. Ct.

2019); Wallace v. Cont’l Tire the Americas LLC, No. 21-cv-00562-SPM, 2022 WL 672467, at

*2 (S.D. Ill. Mar. 7, 2022); Baptist v. Ford Motor Co., No. 13 C 8974, 2018 WL 1519153, at *2–

3 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 28, 2018). But at this stage, solely demonstrating the existence of a legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reason for termination does not automatically entitle an employer to summary

judgment. See Michael, 21 N.E.3d at 1189. Instead, the inquiry is two-fold: (1) whether White

has mustered evidence sufficient to allow a trier of fact to reasonably infer that Deere’s decision

to terminate White was improperly motivated, i.e., motivated by White continuing to raise his

concerns about the Kreisel batteries’ safety; and (2) whether there are genuine issues of material

fact which, if resolved in White’s favor, would allow a reasonable trier of fact to infer that

Deere’s proffered reasons for White’s termination were pretextual, i.e., to disbelieve Deere’s

narrative that White was fired because of his clashes with his supervisory peers, his inability to

lead his supervisees, or his drinking on the job.

Returning to the facts of this case, the Court first addresses the parties’ dispute regarding

when the decision to terminate White was made. Pinning down the date that the decision to

terminate an employee was made is often crucial in retaliation cases—an employer’s decision

could not have been motivated by an employee’s activities or intent to engage in those activities

if the decisionmaker was unaware of those facts when it decided to terminate the employee. See

Gordon v. FedEx Freight, Inc., 674 F.3d 769, 773 (7th Cir. 2012) (“Factual support that the

employer was informed or in some way found out about the plaintiff’s intent to [engage in

protected activity] is essential to a retaliatory discharge action.” (quotation marks omitted)).

Deere asserts that Wetzel made the decision to terminate White on October 14, 2022, the day on

which White was recorded drinking beer during a work meeting. See Mem. L. Supp. Mot.

Partial Summ. J. 18. Deere argues that certain events which occurred after October 14 are

therefore irrelevant because they could not have influenced Wetzel’s earlier decision. See, e.g.,

Reply Mem. L. Supp. Mot. Partial Summ. J. 22. However, the only evidence to which Deere

points to support October 14 as the date when Wetzel decided to terminate White is Wetzel’s

testimony that he decided to fire White after viewing the recording of White drinking beer. See

Mem. L. Supp. Mot. Partial Summ. J. 18 (citing Def.’s Excerpt Wetzel Dep. 18:14–20:17). And

Wetzel testified that he did not “remember specifically the date” when he decided to terminate

White, Def.’s Excerpt Wetzel Dep. 18:14–16, nor did he “recall exactly” when he saw that

recording, id. at 19:17–21. This testimony does not conclusively establish that Wetzel decided to

terminate White on October 14.

Wetzel came closest to articulating a specific date for his decision when discussing text

messages that he and Foong exchanged on October 18, asserting that he “had already decided

that [White] was done” by that point. Pl.’s Excerpt Wetzel Dep. 32:6–7. But in those same

texts, Foong indicates that the decision was not yet final by using the phrase “if we walk away,”

and states that Wetzel’s boss did not want him to “rush the process” of firing White. Oct. 18,

2022 Texts Between Wetzel & Foong, Resp. Mot. Partial Summ. J. Ex. 10, ECF No. 35-3 at 10–

11. Viewing the evidence in White’s favor, a reasonable trier of fact could infer that the decision

to fire White had not yet been finalized by October 18. Therefore, the undisputed record shows

only that the decision to terminate White was made at some point between October 14 and

October 31 of 2022—a finder of fact would need to decide what to believe regarding the exact

date of White’s termination decision.

Turning to White’s evidence of Deere’s improper motivation, it is undisputed that White

raised his concerns about the Kreisel batteries’ safety and potential to cause fires to, among

others, Wetzel, Preston, and Guyot. Pl.’s Excerpt White Dep. 91:18–92:23, Resp. Mot. Partial

Summ. J. Ex. 1, ECF No. 35-1 at 1–19; Pl.’s Excerpt Preston Dep. 32:4–8; Guyot Dep. 13:4–24,

15:20–16:6. White believed that Preston had agreed to allowing a third party to run tests upon

the KBP63, Pl.’s Excerpt White Dep. 158:4–11, and Preston contemporaneously recorded that

she initially had not explicitly told White that third-party testing was off the table, Sept. 8, 2022

Email from Preston to Preston. Preston rejected the idea of testing with a third party after seeing

a detailed proposal of the tests that White wanted to run, and White informed Wetzel of

Preston’s rejection of his proposal. Sept. 19, 2022 Email from White to Wetzel. Around this

time, White’s team was working in physical proximity to a prototype Kreisel battery. See Aug.

19, 2022 Email from White to Foong & Panjwani , Resp. Mot. Partial Summ. J. Ex. 3, ECF No.

35-1 at 24; Pl.’s Excerpt White Dep. 160:11–161:8. After DeWalt’s product caught fire in

October, White again raised the need to conduct testing on the Kreisel batteries and asserted that

there were rumors that JDPS was getting poor results from its tests. Oct. 19, 2022 Text from

White to Wetzel. He tied the rumored test results to Preston’s earlier refusal to allow third-party

testing under his control. Id. He concluded by asking if his team was at risk of being exposed to

a similar fire. See id. (“Are walking into a situation like DEWALT?”). Wetzel forwarded that

text to Foong, who stated that White “need[ed] to stay in his lane and stick to facts.” Oct. 19,

2022 Texts Between Wetzel & Foong. Wetzel responded: “Exactly!” Id.

A trier of fact must decide what is the proper inference to draw from Wetzel’s statement

of “Exactly!” as the record as a whole could support both parties’ narratives. Wetzel testified

that his statement of “Exactly!” was in response to Foong’s statement that “[Deere] will always

do what’s right!” and that he meant to express his view that Deere “would never bring a product

to market that would catch fire like that.” Id. at 38:10–19. A reasonable trier of fact could

believe this explanation, recalling that Wetzel informed White of his belief that Deere would not

put an unsafe product on the market when White raised safety concerns regarding the Kreisel

batteries. Wetzel Decl. ¶ 9, Mem. L. Supp. Mot. Partial Summ. J., ECF No. 33-2.

On the other hand, a reasonable finder of fact could also infer that Wetzel was agreeing

with Foong’s statement that White “need[ed] to stay in his lane and stick to facts.” Oct. 19, 2022

Texts Between Wetzel & Foong. Wetzel knew that Preston had rejected White’s desired tests,

see Sept. 19, 2022 Email from White to Wetzel, and when White raised the issue of testing

again, Wetzel forwarded White’s text to the only other person who, aside from legal counsel,

Deere stated was consulted in the termination decision—Foong. Pl.’s Excerpt Wetzel Dep.

17:15–18:11. In the days immediately following those texts, Foong acted upon Wetzel’s

instruction to “gather[] all of the information . . . into one location” to support White’s

termination. Pl.’s Excerpt Wetzel Dep. 21:4–13; see also Oct. 28, 2022 Email from Foong to

Eley (showing that Foong held meetings with White’s supervisees to discuss his performance as

a leader on October 20, 21, and 24). As will be further explored below, Foong denied any

knowledge of White’s activities related to the Kreisel batteries’ safety, despite the contrary

contemporaneous evidence demonstrating that White informed her of his concerns about

prototype batteries generally, see Aug. 19, 2022 Email from White to Foong & Panjwani, and

that she knew about the DeWalt fire specifically, see Oct. 19, 2022 Texts Between Wetzel &

Foong. Taking this circumstantial evidence as a whole, a reasonable trier of fact could infer that

Wetzel’s response of “Exactly!” was actually expressing agreement with Foong’s statement that

White “need[ed] to stay in his lane,” and that Wetzel therefore harbored an improper motive to

silence White’s incessant complaints about the Kreisel batteries’ risks. Oct. 19, 2022 Texts

Between Wetzel & Foong. A trier of fact could reasonably conclude that White mustered

sufficient evidence that the decision to terminate him was improperly motivated. See Hubert,

169 N.E.3d at 838 (finding that summary judgment was improper where “[a] jury could believe

the narrative advanced by [the employee], and that narrative [wa]s supported by at least some

evidentiary facts and the inferences that could be drawn therefrom”).4

4 White asserts that a retaliatory motive could also be inferred because Preston was aware of the previous fires and

rejected the third-party testing to conceal safety flaws in the Kreisel batteries. See Resp. Mot. Partial Summ. J. 80–

84. That inference is unreasonable for two reasons. First, Preston stated at the time that she was shutting down the

testing to protect Deere’s intellectual property. See Sept. 2, 2022 Email from Preston to Sobotzik & White. White

asserted that Preston shut down the testing to conceal safety issues instead, see Pl.’s Excerpt White Dep. 158:7–15,

but that assertion is simply speculation on his part, see, e.g., Fox v. Adams & Assocs., Inc., 166 N.E.3d 772, 789 (Ill.

App. Ct. 2020) (“Where a plaintiff offers merely her own speculation to substantiate her claim that an employer

sought to retaliate against her, summary judgment may be appropriate.”); cf. Argyropoulos v. City of Alton, 539 F.3d

724, 737 (7th Cir. 2008) (noting in a Title VII retaliation case that “speculation will not withstand summary

Deere advances many arguments for why it is still entitled to summary judgment, none of

which are persuasive. First, Deere advances three related points regarding the October 19 texts

between Foong and Wetzel about the DeWalt fire and Foong’s role generally: (i) Foong was an

HR employee, not a technical employee, so she would not have any reason to retaliate against

White; (ii) Foong was not dishonest in her deposition; and (iii) even if Foong was dishonest, she

was not the decisionmaker, so her testimony is ultimately immaterial. While a trier of fact could

be convinced by these points, none are sufficient to conclude as a matter of law that it would be

unreasonable to consider evidence related to Foong to be probative of an improper motive on

Wetzel’s part. Deere’s other arguments relate to: (2) direct evidence of a retaliatory motive; (3)

Deere employees’ reactions to White’s safety concerns; (4) Deere’s assertedly valid and non-

pretextual reasons for terminating White; and (5) whether White’s intervening misconduct

severed any causal connection between his activities and termination. The Court first addresses

the arguments related to Foong and takes up the other arguments in turn.

Beginning with Deere’s initial point about Foong, Deere questions why Foong—“an HR

representative with no knowledge of battery safety”—would be motivated to retaliate against

White. Reply Mem. L. Supp. Mot. Partial Summ. J. 21–23. Foong testified that she was not

involved in “meetings where they got into technical details.” Pl.’s Excerpt Foong Dep. 64:5–19,

Resp. Mot. Partial Summ. J. Ex. 9, ECF No. 35-2 at 21–25. She also had no opinion as to

whether White was raising safety concerns when he asked, “Are we walking to a situation like

DEWALT?” Oct. 19, 2022 Text from White to Wetzel, testifying that “there’s a lot to that

judgment” where the plaintiff-employee’s “argument rest[ed] on speculation that the [defendant]’s employees lied to

conceal their true motives”). Second, there is no evidence connecting Preston’s speculatively improper motive to

the decisionmaker, Wetzel. White does not dispute Wetzel’s testimony that he was unaware of the two occasions

when Kreisel batteries caused fires, see Pl.’s Excerpt Wetzel Dep. 38:20–39:11, nor Preston’s testimony that she

was not involved in discussions related to White’s termination, see Pl.’s Excerpt of Preston Dep. 173:7–175:11.

White has failed to muster evidence that Preston’s rejection of third-party testing is itself probative of an improper

retaliatory motive on Wetzel’s part.

question,” Def.’s Excerpt Foong Dep. 67:16–68:5, Reply Mem. L. Supp. Mot. Partial Summ. J.

Ex. D, ECF No. 36-1 at 40–47. However, Foong’s lack of technical knowledge is not

dispositive. For example, in Hubert, the supervisor’s potentially improper motive was not tied to

the merits of the employee’s concerns about vendor fraud. Instead, the believably improper

motive came from the impression created by the employee’s decision to complain outside of his

department about the fraud, namely that the supervisor could not manage his department.

Hubert, 169 N.E.2d at 838–39. In other words, the supervisor’s motive was based upon process,

not substance. One need not understand why the wheel is squeaking to grow resentful of its

incessant din, and here Foong would not need to know anything about battery safety to develop

an improper motive regarding White’s repeated invocation of battery safety.

Next, Deere asserts that Foong was not dishonest in her deposition testimony. Reply

Mem. L. Supp. Mot. Partial Summ. J. 12–14, 16–17. Foong denied knowing whether White had

communicated about the DeWalt fire with his superiors, Pl.’s Excerpt Foong Dep. 62:14–18, but

she had been forwarded the text about the DeWalt fire that White had sent to Wetzel, see Oct.

19, 2022 Texts Between Wetzel & Foong. She denied being aware that “White was engaged in

numerous conversations with Jenny Preston and others, including Aaron Wetzel and Pierre

Guyot, about testing the batteries that his Carver Project was supposed to use in their project,”

Pl.’s Excerpt Foong Dep. 63:16–64:2, yet her response to Wetzel when he informed her that

White wanted to test the batteries following the DeWalt battery fire was to ask whether this issue

was within White’s scope and—without prompting—raise the idea that Preston’s team was

responsible for testing, not White’s, see Oct. 19, 2022 Texts Between Wetzel & Foong. Finally,

when asked directly whether she was “aware that on October 19, 2022, Dan White texted Aaron

Wetzel’s mobile about the Kreisel battery and his desire to get it tested for safety reasons,” she

denied being aware of this fact. Pl.’s Excerpt Foong Dep. 66:15–20. Deere asserts that this

testimony was not dishonest because White’s text “did not explicitly say that he wanted to test

the Kreisel battery for safety reasons.” Reply Mem. L. Supp. Mot. Partial Summ. J. 13–14

(quotation marks omitted). This distinction is hard to draw when viewed in light of White’s

email to Foong describing prototype batteries as “dangerous goods by their nature,” and the fact

that White’s team was working in physical proximity to a prototype Kreisel battery. Aug. 19,

2022 Email from White to Foong & Panjwani; Pl.’s Excerpt White Dep. 160:11–161:8. The

Court cannot conclude as a matter of law that it would be unreasonable for a trier of fact to find

Foong’s denials that she was aware of White’s activities to be dishonest.

Turning to its last point about Foong, Deere posits that evidence related to Foong is

immaterial, characterizing her as a bystander who had “no role in Mr. Wetzel’s decision” to

terminate White. See Reply Mem. L. Supp. Mot. Partial Summ. J. 21–23. However, viewing the

record in White’s favor, Foong was much more than just an HR functionary. In its interrogatory

responses, Deere stated that she was consulted in the decision to terminate White. Pl.’s Excerpt

Wetzel Dep. 17:15–18:11. When Wetzel made his decision that White needed to be terminated,

Foong was the person Wetzel told of that decision. Id. at 18:23–19:6. After they exchanged

texts about White’s renewed call for testing following the DeWalt fire, Wetzel tasked her with

assembling a documentary record to support White’s termination. Id. at 21:4–13. She was a

conduit by which negative feedback about White was passed to Wetzel, and she was the one who

met with White’s supervisees in the following days to document their negative feedback about

him. See, e.g., Oct. 28, 2022 Email from Foong to Eley. She and Wetzel were the people who

informed White that he was terminated. Def.’s Excerpt White Dep. 303:22–304:6. She may not

have been the one to decide that White should be terminated, but she was involved for every step

in that process.

Deere points out that in the Title VII context, the animus of a non-decisionmaker is

“usually ineffective to show pretext where . . . there is a non-retaliatory reason for the

employer’s decision.” Reply Mem. L. Supp. Mot. Partial Summ. J. 22 (quoting Metzger v. Ill.

State Police, 519 F.3d 677, 682 (7th Cir. 2008)). But unlike Metzger, here there is evidence

from which a reasonable trier of fact could infer that the decisionmaker agreed with the non-

decisionmaker’s disapproval of the employee’s protected activity, namely Wetzel’s response of

“Exactly!” to Foong’s statement that White “need[ed] to stay in his lane and stick to facts.” See

Oct. 19, 2022 Texts Between Wetzel & Foong. In sum, Foong’s texts and testimony are properly

considered as pieces of circumstantial evidence that could support a reasonable inference that

Wetzel’s decision to terminate White was improperly motivated.

Moving from Deere’s related points about Foong’s role to its second argument for why it

is entitled to summary judgment, Deere asserts that there is no direct evidence of a retaliatory

motive. Mem. L. Supp. Mot. Partial Summ. J. 25–26. White testified that no one at Deere told

him that he was terminated because he was “voicing safety concerns.” Def.’s Excerpt White

Dep. 168:23–169:2. But such direct evidence is rare because “an employer will generally know

better than to explicitly reveal that a discharge is motivated by the employee’s protected

complaints,” Reid, 749 F.3d at 587, and ultimately unnecessary because “causation may be

demonstrated by circumstantial evidence,” Hubert, 169 N.E.3d at 838. The absence of a

smoking gun is neither unusual nor dispositive.

Relatedly, Deere argues that the absence of direct evidence means that White is relying

solely upon suspicious timing, noting that “temporal proximity, without more, does not create a

genuine issue of material fact.” Mem. L. Supp. Mot. Partial Summ. J. 26 (citing Perez v.

Transformer Mfrs., Inc., 35 F. Supp. 3d 941, 955 (N.D. Ill. 2014)). In Transformer

Manufacturers, the court described the plaintiff’s evidence of an improper motive as follows:

“[The employer] was aware that [the employee] filed a [worker’s compensation] claim, that the

claim was denied, and that [the employee] was unable to perform the duties of a ‘hand winder’”

prior to terminating the employee. Transformer Mfrs., 35 F. Supp. 3d at 955. The court

concluded that the plaintiff’s evidence of improper motivation relied solely on timing, and

therefore was insufficient as a matter of law. Id. Here, White has more than just timing or a

mere sequential connection. See Walker, 915 F.3d at 1157. He has evidence which reasonably

suggests that the decisionmaker was improperly motivated, namely the October 19 texts about

the DeWalt fire between Wetzel and Foong. A trier of fact could reasonably consider those texts

and conclude that Wetzel expressed disapproval of White’s protected activity, during the time

period when the decision to fire White was being considered and ultimately made. Those texts,

coupled with Foong’s after-the-fact denials of even knowing of the texts, elevate White’s case

from one consisting solely of a simple series of events or suspicious timing.

Third, Deere argues that “the record belies any reasonable inference that Deere reacted

adversely to or sought to minimize any safety concerns that [White] did raise.” Mem. L. Supp.

Mot. Partial Summ. J. 26–27. Deere points out that people like Wetzel, Preston, and Guyot

listened to White’s concerns and connected him with more technical employees to discuss those

concerns. See, e.g., Def.’s Excerpt White Dep. 55:1–56:13 (describing how Preston connected

White with Matt Kenitzer, an engineer tasked with battery manufacturing, to discuss White’s

safety concerns in March 2022). When White brought his safety concerns to Wetzel, Wetzel

assured him that “Deere would not put an unsafe product on the market.” Wetzel Decl. ¶ 9.

When White asked for technical information about an existing Kreisel battery, he received at

least some of that information. See June 24, 2022 Email from Duffield to Heimbuch (providing

information about the “shock and vibe specifications” of the KBP63 to an engineer, cc’ing

White). Deere asserts that the disagreement over testing was not about whether the Kreisel

battery that would go into the Carver tractor would eventually be tested for safety issues—

Preston continuously maintained that once White’s team gave her team the tractor’s

requirements, they would design and test a battery that could meet those requirements. See Aug.

11, 2022 Email from Preston to White. Instead, the dispute was about who would perform that

testing and at what stage of the design process. Id. Deere concludes that nothing in the record

suggests that it had any reason to fear testing of the existing KBP63 batteries because the Carver

tractor’s battery was not designed yet and the tractor itself was years away from a public release.

It likens the situation to a laboratory which had no reason to fear scrutiny from the Occupational

Safety and Health Administration because it was already subject to unannounced inspections.

Mem. L. Supp. Mot. Partial Summ. J. 26–27 (citing Ramon v. Ill. Gastroenterology Grp., LLC,

No. 19 C 1522, 2021 WL 1088316, at *10 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 22, 2021)).

Ramon is distinguishable because Deere was not required to submit the Kreisel batteries

to outside scrutiny at this early stage of the Carver tractor’s design—when White proposed that

an external entity test the batteries, Preston was free to, and did in fact, reject that proposal. See

Sept. 2, 2022 Email from Preston to Sobotzik & White. Moreover, the record does allow for a

reasonable inference that Deere did have reason to be concerned about safety testing by non-

JDPS employees. Deere invested in Kreisel batteries by acquiring a majority stake in Kreisel

and intended to use the batteries in many products. See Def.’s Excerpt Preston Dep. 35:18–21,

Yee Decl. Ex. B, Mem. L. Supp. Mot. Partial Summ. J., ECF No. 33-1 at 154–63; Preston Decl.

¶¶ 3, 6, Mem. L. Supp. Mot. Partial Summ. J., ECF No. 33-3 at 1–3; Pl.’s Excerpt Wetzel Dep.

36:3–9. Kreisel batteries had previously caused two fires. Pl.’s Excerpt Preston Dep. 49:18–

50:2. If a vocal opponent of Kreisel batteries, such as White, received access to testing data that

was not controlled by JDPS and suggested an expensive-to-fix and risky safety flaw, that could

lend support to White’s campaign that Deere abandon Kreisel in favor of another battery

supplier. See Oct. 19, 2022 Text from White to Wetzel (“There are rumors swirling that JDPS

has started testing and getting poor results and thus not wanting us to test.”). Viewing the

evidence in White’s favor, Deere, and JDPS in particular, did have reason to fear “abusive”

testing, see Sept. 2, 2022 Email from Duffield to Preston, and its potential to undermine the

company-wide buy-in for a crucial component that it hoped to use across many products in the

future.

Ultimately, whether Deere was sufficiently incentivized to address the potential safety

risks posed by Kreisel batteries is not amenable to resolution as a matter of law on this record.

Consider the analogous context of retaliation claims brought under section 15(b) of Illinois’s

Whistleblower Act, 740 ILCS 174/15(b).5 In Brame v. City of North Chicago, the employer

argued that it was entitled to summary judgment because “reasonable minds could not differ” as

to the conclusion that the employee “had no reasonable belief that a crime had been committed.”

955 N.E.2d 1269, 1273 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011). The Illinois Appellate Court, relying upon the

requirement to construe the evidence in the nonmovant’s favor and the general rule that

“reasonableness is a question of fact rather than a question of law,” rejected this argument and

declined to conclude that the employee’s belief that a crime had been committed was

5 “An employer may not retaliate against an employee for disclosing information to a government or law

enforcement agency, where the employee has reasonable cause to believe that the information discloses a violation

of a State or federal law, rule, or regulation.” 740 ILCS 174/15(b).

unreasonable as a matter of law. Id. Here, the evidence related to prior battery fires and

Preston’s rejection of White’s detailed testing proposal supports a contrary reasonable inference

that there were potential issues to be worked out with the Kreisel batteries and that Deere did not

want White—a vocal and persistent opponent of Kreisel batteries generally—to design and

oversee their testing. The Court declines to decide as a matter of law that the only reasonable

conclusion to draw from this record is that Deere had nothing to fear with respect to allowing

White to control testing of the Kreisel batteries.

Fourth, Deere argues that it is entitled to summary judgment because it has provided

valid reasons for White’s termination “supported by undisputed record evidence.” Mem. L.

Supp. Mot. Partial Summ. J. 27–29. Deere has amply shown that: (1) White clashed with his

supervisory colleagues; (2) His supervisees thought that he was doing a poor job of leading the

Carver team; and (3) He drank a beer during a work meeting despite being asked to refrain from

that behavior. Yet a legitimate reason for termination is not sufficient if a trier of fact could

reasonably conclude that the employer did not honestly believe that those legitimate reasons

were the true motivation for the termination. The employer in Hubert had also mustered

evidence from “several of [the employee]’s colleagues and subordinates” demonstrating the

employee’s inappropriate and unprofessional behavior. Hubert, 169 N.E.3d at 837. Summary

judgment was unwarranted because the employee’s supervisor had “stated his displeasure” with

the employee’s protected activity, such that there was an issue of material fact regarding pretext.

Id. at 838–39. In another case, an employer showed that its employee refused to obey a direct

order, which was “a valid ground for termination.” Kirchhoff v. Chem Processing, Inc., No. 20

C 50242, 2023 WL 157922, at *9 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 11, 2023). However, because a trier of fact

could believe that the employee “was fired because he complained about the unsafe condition” of

the workplace, summary judgment was unwarranted. Id. at *10.

Here, Deere’s ample evidence of terminable misconduct is, by itself, similarly

insufficient to warrant summary judgment in Deere’s favor. Deere attempts to distinguish

Hubert and Kirchhoff by asserting that there is no evidence that Wetzel expressed any

displeasure with White’s protected activity. See Reply Mem. L. Supp. Mot. Partial Summ. J. 22–

23. But this argument ignores the reasonable inference which can be drawn from evidence like

the October 19 texts between Foong and Wetzel about the DeWalt fire. Again, viewing the

record as a whole, it would be reasonable to interpret Wetzel’s statement of “Exactly!” as

agreeing with Foong’s statement that White needed to “stay in his lane and stick to facts,” and

that Wetzel therefore expressed his displeasure with White’s activities. Oct. 19, 2022 Texts

Between Wetzel & Foong.6

Finally, Deere argues that White’s misconduct occurred between his protected activity

and his termination, such that “any causal connection [wa]s broken by that intervening event.”

Mem. L. Supp. Mot. Partial Summ. J. 29–30. It points to Reid, where the employee’s

termination was immediately preceded by the discovery of pervasive violations of the

6 Deere’s other citations are also distinguishable or inapposite. See Mem. L. Supp. Mot. Partial Summ. J. 27–29.

Deere points to Kupperman v. Tanu, Inc., No. 1-13-3347, 2014 WL 5798351, at *7 (Ill. App. Ct. Nov. 6, 2014), for

the proposition that summary judgment is appropriate if the employee’s performance was indisputably deficient.

Mem. L. Supp. Mot. Partial Summ. J. 28. However, the Illinois Appellate Court found that summary judgment was

appropriate in Kupperman because the employee’s affirmative evidence of causation was simply that the employer

gave one reason for his termination at the time he was informed of that decision yet gave different reasons during

discovery. Kupperman, 2014 WL 5798351, at *7–8. Here, White has done more than simply point to a shifting

litigation strategy—he has mustered facts, such as the October 19 texts between Foong and Wetzel about the

DeWalt fire and Foong’s deposition testimony concerning those texts, which create a genuine dispute of material

fact regarding what motivated Wetzel to terminate him. Deere also points to Rhodes v. Professional Transportation,

Inc., 3 F. App’x 515, 519 (7th Cir. 2001), an unpublished Title VII case which notes that an employee’s subjective

assessments of her actions and the seriousness thereof is irrelevant to the issue of pretext. White does advance many

arguments which sound in subjective disagreement with whether his performance was deficient. See, e.g., Resp.

Mot. Partial Summ. J. 87–88 (disputing whether White’s relationship with Preston was actually “beyond repair”).

However, as just explained, other evidence allows for a reasonable inference that Wetzel did not honestly believe the

reasons that Deere asserts were the basis for White’s termination.

employer’s policies. See Reid, 749 F.3d at 589. This argument is premised upon Deere’s

assertion that the decision to terminate White was indisputably made before Foong and Wetzel

exchanged texts on October 19 about the DeWalt fire. Yet, as explained above, the date on

which Wetzel made the decision to terminate White is genuinely disputed. The Court cannot

conclude as a matter of law that White’s misconduct, such as drinking a beer on October 14,

severed a potential causal relationship between his termination and protected activity.

The Court is not deciding what is the best or most believable inference to draw from the

record as a whole. Instead, the Court must decide whether a reasonable trier of fact could draw

the inference that Wetzel disapproved of White’s protected activity, such that the decision to

terminate him was improperly motivated by his protected activity. See Hubert, 169 N.E.3d at

837. Because White has mustered evidence sufficient to persuade a reasonable trier of fact to

infer that Wetzel harbored an improper motive and did not honestly believe the reasons which

Deere provided for White’s termination, summary judgment is unwarranted.

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, Defendant Deere & Company’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment,

ECF No. 32, is DENIED.

Entered this 15th day of January, 2025.

s/ Sara Darrow

SARA DARROW

CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE