Opinion

Divine Son Irvis v. Israel Jacquez

Court
District Court, C.D. California
Filed
Jan 10, 2025
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 33.6%

“[W]e hold that federal courts lack jurisdiction to review the BOP’s individualized RDAP determinations made pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3621, such as Reeb’s claim herein.”

How later courts described this case

  • “[W]e hold that federal courts lack jurisdiction to review the BOP’s individualized RDAP determinations made pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3621, such as Reeb’s claim herein.”
  • challenging the content of an inaccurate pre-sentence report used to deny parole
  • applying Reeb in the context of individualized determination concerning eligibility for residential reentry center under § 3621
  • contending that time spent in state custody should be credited toward federal custody

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL

Case No. 5:24-cv-02527-PA-AJR Date: January 10, 2025

Page 1 of 4

Title: Divine Son Irvis v. Israel Jacquez, Warden

DOCKET ENTRY: ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE WHY THIS ACTION SHOULD

NOT BE DISMISSED FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION

PRESENT:

HONORABLE A. JOEL RICHLIN, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

_ Claudia Garcia-Marquez _______None_______ __None__

Deputy Clerk Court Reporter/Recorder Tape No.

ATTORNEYS PRESENT FOR PETITIONER: ATTORNEYS PRESENT FOR RESPONDENT:

None Present None Present

PROCEEDINGS: (IN CHAMBERS)

On September 13, 2024, Petitioner Divine Son Irvis (“Petitioner”), a federal

prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in

Federal Custody pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (the “Petition”) in the U.S. District Court

for the District of Oregon. (Dkt. 1.) Petitioner named as Respondent the then-Warden of

FCI Sheridan located in Sheridan, Oregon, Israel Jacquez. (Id.) At the time the Petition

was filed, Petitioner was incarcerated (and still is) at FCI Victorville Medium II, located in

Adelanto, California. (Id. at 1.)

On November 21, 2024, the U.S. District Court for the District of Orgon issued an

Order transferring the action to the U.S. District Court for the Central District of

California because Petitioner was (and still is) incarcerated in the Central District of

California. (Dkt. 4.) Indeed, the Ninth Circuit has held that a habeas petition filed

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 generally must be filed in the judicial district where the

petitioner is incarcerated. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Campbell, 204 F.3d 861, 864 (9th Cir.

2000). A Section 2241 habeas petition must also name as respondent the warden of the

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL

Case No. 5:24-cv-02527-PA-AJR Date: January 10, 2025

Page 2 of 4

Title: Divine Son Irvis v. J. Doerer, Warden

facility where the petitioner is incarcerated. See, e.g., Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426,

435 (2004). Here, because Petitioner failed to name the warden of FCI Victorville

Medium II as respondent, the Court lacks jurisdiction over the Petition. See, e.g., Doe v.

Garland, 109 F.4th 1188, 1193 (9th Cir. 2024) (“Doe’s failure to name his immediate

custodian, the warden of GSA, as respondent to his habes petition, as well as his failure to

file his petition in the district of confinement, renders the district court’s exercise of

jurisdiction improper.”).

Thus, it appears that this action is subject to dismissal without prejudice for lack of

jurisdiction. Of course, Petitioner can file an amended petition naming the warden of FCI

Victorville Medium II as respondent and the Court will grant Petitioner the opportunity to

do so. Petitioner is expressly warned that if he does not file an amended petition

naming as respondent the warden of the facility where he is incarcerated, then the

Court will recommend that the action be dismissed without prejudice for lack of

jurisdiction.

Turning to the merits of the Petition, it also appears that the Court lacks jurisdiction

over Petitioner’s claims. “Section 2241 embodies the traditional writ of habeas corpus,

permitting an individual to challenge the legality of his custody . . . .” Woods v. Carey,

525 F.3d 886, 889 n.2 (9th Cir. 2008). Section 2241 permits a prisoner to challenge the

manner in which the BOP is executing their sentence. See, e.g., Brown v. United States,

610 F.2d 672, 677 (9th Cir. 1990). To receive relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, a prisoner in

federal custody must show that his sentence is being executed in an illegal, but not

necessarily unconstitutional, manner. See, e.g., Clark v. Floyd, 80 F.3d 371, 372, 374 (9th

Cir. 1995) (contending that time spent in state custody should be credited toward federal

custody); Brown, 610 F.2d at 677 (challenging the content of an inaccurate pre-sentence

report used to deny parole).

Here, Petitioner contends that his release to a halfway house is being delayed by a

fictitious “FBI Referral.” (Dkt. 1 at 6.) Petitioner seeks an order compelling Respondent

to provide proof that the “FBI Referral” exists and to provide the legal basis to deny

release to a halfway house. (Id. at 8.) However, the determination of whether an inmate is

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL

Case No. 5:24-cv-02527-PA-AJR Date: January 10, 2025

Page 3 of 4

Title: Divine Son Irvis v. J. Doerer, Warden

eligible for placement in a halfway house is within the sole discretion of the Bureau of

Prisons (“BOP”). See, e.g., Reeb v. Thomas, 636 F.3d 1224, 1228 (9th Cir. 2011) (“[W]e

hold that federal courts lack jurisdiction to review the BOP’s individualized RDAP

determinations made pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3621, such as Reeb’s claim herein.”);

Mohsen v. Graber, 583 F. App’x 841, 842 (9th Cir. 2014) (applying Reeb in the context of

individualized determination concerning eligibility for residential reentry center under §

3621). Thus, the Court lacks jurisdiction to review the BOP’s discretionary housing

determinations.

However, the Ninth Circuit has also recognized that the statute governing BOP

determinations related to residential reentry programs such as halfway houses, 18 U.S.C. §

3621, mandates that the BOP consider five statutory factors when making a housing

determination. See Rodriguez v. Smith, 541 F.3d 1180, 1187 (9th Cir. 2008). Thus, the

Ninth Circuit held that Courts have limited jurisdiction to consider whether the BOP at

least considered the five statutory factors when making an individualized housing

determination. See id. at 1187 (“This failure to consider the five statutory factors when

considering eligibility for placement in or transfer to a [halfway house] violates

Congress’s clear intent that each of these factors be applied in making inmate transfer or

placement determinations to ‘any available penal or correctional facility.’ 18 U.S.C. §

3621(b).”).

The Court notes that Petitioner already has a separate habeas action pending in this

district, EDCV 24-1708-PA-AJR, that challenges whether the BOP considered the five

statutory factors and seeks an order compelling the BOP to release Petitioner to a halfway

house. In that separate action, this Court has issued a Report and Recommendation

concluding that the BOP actually did consider the five statutory factors and recommended

release to a halfway house. (Case No. EDCV 24-1708-PA-AJR, Dkt. 18 at 11-12.) In the

Report and Recommendation, the Court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to grant the

relief requested and that the Petition was unexhausted so also subject to dismissal without

prejudice on that basis as well. (See id. at 8, 13.) For all the same reasons in this action,

the Court appears to lack jurisdiction to grant the relief Petitioner is seeking. Ultimately,

Petitioner wants to compel the BOP to release him to a halfway house. (Dkt. 1 at 8.) The

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL

Case No. 5:24-cv-02527-PA-AJR Date: January 10, 2025

Page 4 of 4

Title: Divine Son Irvis v. J. Doerer, Warden

Court simply does not have jurisdiction to grant that form of relief. Accordingly, this

action appears subject to dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.

Petitioner is therefore ORDERED TO SHOW CAUSE, by February 7, 2025,

why this action should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner may satisfy

this Order by filing a declaration, signed under penalty of perjury, setting forth any

reason why this Court has jurisdiction to consider Petitioner’s claims in the Petition.

Petitioner must also file an amended petition by February 7, 2025, that names as

respondent the warden of the facility where he is incarcerated. A form habeas

petition is attached for Petitioner’s convenience.

Petitioner is expressly warned that failure to timely file a response and

amended petition in compliance with this Order may result in a recommendation

that this action be dismissed without prejudice for his failure to comply with Court

orders and failure to prosecute. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b). Petitioner is further advised

that if he no longer wishes to pursue this action, he may voluntarily dismiss it by filing a

Notice of Dismissal in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1). A form

Notice of Dismissal is attached for Petitioner’s convenience.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Attachment:

CV-09, Notice of Dismissal Pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 41(a) or (c).

CV-27, Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in Federal Custody (28 U.S.C. §

2241).

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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