“[T]he provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) are not limited to prisoners.”
How later courts described this case
- “[T]he provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) are not limited to prisoners.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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11 BYRON O. WOODS, SR., Case No.: 3:24-cv-02437-CAB-DDL
12 Plaintiff,
ORDER DISMISSING COMPLAINT
13 v.
[ECF Nos. 1–2]
14 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.,
15 Defendants.
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17 On Dec. 23, 2024, Plaintiff Byron O. Woods, Sr., filed a complaint against the
18 United States and Renaye Murphy, Executive Director of the San Diego Regional Office
19 of the Department of Veterans Affairs. [ECF No. 1.] Plaintiff did not prepay the civil
20 filing fees required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) at the time of filing; instead, he filed a motion
21 to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). [ECF No. 2.] For
22 the reasons outlined below, Plaintiffs’ complaint is dismissed with leave to amend. The
23 IFP motion is denied as moot.
24 I. Motion to Proceed IFP
25 Generally, all parties instituting a civil action in this court must pay a filing fee. See
26 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a); CivLR 4.5(a). However, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), the court may
27 authorize the commencement, prosecution, or defense of any suit without payment of fees
28 if the plaintiff submits an affidavit, including a statement of all his or her assets, showing
1 that he or she is unable to pay filing fees or costs. “An affidavit in support of an IFP
2 application is sufficient where it alleges that the affiant cannot pay the court costs and still
3 afford the necessities of life.” Escobedo v. Applebees, 787 F.3d 1226, 1234 (9th Cir. 2015).
4 “[A] plaintiff seeking IFP status must allege poverty with some particularity, definiteness
5 and certainty.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The granting or denial of leave to
6 proceed IFP in civil cases is within the sound discretion of the district court. Venerable v.
7 Meyers, 500 F.2d 1215, 1216 (9th Cir. 1974) (citations omitted).
8 In support of his application, Plaintiff lists several assets, including his savings
9 account, a home, and two vehicles. [ECF No. 2 at 1–2.] He reports receiving $2,241.91 a
10 month from the VA. [Id.] Plaintiff mentions that the last time he filed a tax return was in
11 2008. [Id.] He lists average monthly expenses totaling $4,401.16. [Id.] He provides
12 significant detail to support this amount. [Id.] Plaintiff’s expenses are greater than his
13 source of income, which appears to be solely his VA benefits (the focus of his dispute).
14 [Id.] Based on the “particularity, definiteness and certainty” in the information provided,
15 the Court is persuaded that Plaintiff lacks the funds to pay the filing fee and “still afford
16 the necessities of life.” Escobedo, 787 F.3d at 1234.
17 II. Screening of the Complaint Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
18 The Court must additionally analyze a complaint’s sufficiency under 28 U.S.C
19 § 1915. A plaintiff seeking to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) is subject to
20 sua sponte dismissal if the complaint is “frivolous or malicious; fails to state a claim upon
21 which relief may be granted; or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune
22 from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845, 845 (9th
23 Cir. 2001) (“[T]he provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) are not limited to prisoners.”).
24 Congress enacted this safeguard because “a litigant whose filing fees and court costs are
25 assumed by the public . . . lacks an economic incentive to refrain from filing frivolous,
26 malicious, or repetitive lawsuits.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992) (quoting
27 Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989)).
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1 The Court construes Plaintiff’s complaint liberally. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338,
2 342 (9th Cir. 2010). Plaintiff appears to be making a due process claim related to the
3 reduction of his VA benefits. [See Compl. at 3.] Of course, courts have recognized a
4 constitutionally protected liberty interest in veteran’s disability benefits. See Guillory v.
5 Shinseki, 603 F.3d 981, 987 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
6 But this Court lacks jurisdiction over this case. “A district court does not have
7 jurisdiction over claims that would require it to review a question of fact or law relating to
8 or affecting veterans’ benefits decisions.” Recinto v. U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Affs., 706 F.3d
9 1171, 1175 (9th Cir. 2013). In other words: “[i]f reviewing” Plaintiff’s “claim would
10 require review of the circumstances of individual benefits requests, jurisdiction is lacking.”
11 Recinto, 706 F.3d at 1175.
12 Plaintiff’s complaint requires exactly that: Plaintiff asks this Court to review, and
13 overturn, a decision affecting his individual benefits. [See Compl. at 8.] He seeks an order
14 restoring his disability rating based on alleged errant factual determinations related to that
15 rating. [Id.]
16 “To adjudicate veterans’ claims, the VA uses a two-step process, beginning with a
17 regional office that processes claims and makes an initial decision.” Recinto, 706 F.3d at
18 1174 (citing Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428 (2011)). “If a veteran
19 is not satisfied with the decision made by the regional office, he or she may appeal it to the
20 VA’s Board of Veterans’ Appeals, which makes the agency’s final decision.” Id.; see also
21 38 U.S.C. §§ 7101, 7104(a). “From there, benefits determinations may be appealed in the
22 manner established by the Veterans’ Judicial Review Act of 1988 (“the VJRA”)[.]” Id.
23 “The VJRA established an Article I court called the United States Court of Appeals for
24 Veterans Claims, which has exclusive jurisdiction to review decisions of the Board of
25 Veterans’ Appeals.” Id.; see 38 U.S.C. §§ 7251, 7252(a), 7261. “On further appeal,
26 decisions from the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims are reviewed by the Federal
27 Circuit.” Id.; see 38 U.S.C. § 7292(c)-(d).
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1 The Court is sympathetic to Plaintiffs claimed harms. But Congress, and the Ninth
2 || Circuit, has made clear that this Court is “expressly disqualified from hearing cases related
3 ||to VA benefits” pursuant to 38 U.S.C. § 511. See Veterans for Common Sense v. Shinseki,
4 F.3d 1013, 1023 (9th Cir. 2012). Should Plaintiff amend his complaint to state a
5 || constitutional claim that does not look at the specifics of any individual veteran’s case, the
6 ||Court may have jurisdiction over it. See Recinto, 706 F.3d at 1175. Until then, the Court
7 || dismisses this complaint for want of subject matter jurisdiction.
8 iI. Conclusion
9 The Court dismisses Plaintiff's complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). Plaintiff’s
10 || application to proceed IFP [ECF No. 2] is denied as moot. Plaintiff shall have until
11 |/Jan. 31, 2025 to amend his complaint. Should this Court have jurisdiction over any
12 ||amended complaint, Plaintiff may renew his motion to proceed JFP. Plaintiff is reminded
13 federal courts are required to examine jurisdiction sua sponte (meaning, on their own
14 |/initiative). See Bernhardt v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 279 F.3d 862, 868 (9th Cir. 2002).
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16 Dated: January 14, 2025 (6
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Hon. Cathy Ann Bencivengo
18 United States District Judge
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