Stapleton v. Lozano

Case: 24-40155 Document: 64-1 Page: 1 Date Filed: 01/14/2025

United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

____________ FILED

January 14, 2025

No. 24-40155 Lyle W. Cayce

____________ Clerk

Jacqueline Louise Stapleton; Dawn Stapleton, as Personal

Representative of the Estate of Joshua Stapleton,

Plaintiffs—Appellees,

versus

Ernesto Lozano; Justin Lee Becerra; Cesar Solis,

Defendants—Appellants.

______________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 7:23-CV-69

______________________________

Before Richman, Graves, and Ramirez, Circuit Judges.

Irma Carrillo Ramirez, Circuit Judge:

While he was being booked into jail for public intoxication, Joshua Sta-

pleton told police officers that he did not feel well. A few hours later, he died

from “combined drug toxicity.” Stapleton’s family sued the officers and the

police chief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging deliberate indifference to Sta-

pleton’s serious medical needs while he was in jail. The officers and the po-

lice chief moved to dismiss the lawsuit based on qualified immunity, and the

district court denied their motion. We REVERSE.

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No. 24-40155

I

A

Around 5:40 p.m. on February 26, 2021, Progreso Police Officer

Ernesto Lozano stopped a car he observed swerving in and out of the center

lane. He approached the vehicle and asked the driver, Joshua Stapleton, for

his driver’s license. Noting Stapleton’s bloodshot eyes and slurred speech,

Officer Lozano asked him to exit the car for a field sobriety test. Stapleton

complied and failed the test.

Officer Lozano arrested Stapleton and Michael Guerrero, the car’s

sole passenger, for public intoxication. Chief of Police Cesar Solis arrived to

assist with the arrest. Officer Lozano then searched Stapleton’s car and

found four hydrocodone bitartrate pills, two diazepam pills, one

acetaminophen and hydrocodone pill, and two gabapentin capsules. He also

found a clear package labeled “hemp” and two burnt pipes.

Around 6:30 p.m., Officer Lozano booked Stapleton and Guerrero

into jail. During booking, Stapleton told Officer Lozano that he “was not

feeling well.” He was “visibly swaying and slightly unsteady on his feet,” and

he had a dark substance on the fingertips of both of his hands. Stapleton did

not request or receive medical attention. Officer Lozano placed both men in

a holding cell monitored by closed-circuit television cameras (“CCTVs”).

Video from the cameras shows that Officer Lozano came to the holding cell

several times to speak to both men and give them hand sanitizer.

Video also shows that Officer Justin Lee Becerra came to the holding

cell and took Stapleton’s temperature around 8:20 p.m. Stapleton was still

“swaying and generally unsteady on his feet.” After his temperature was

taken, Stapleton knelt on the floor, leaned forward slowly over his folded legs,

and began rocking back and forth. About ten minutes later, Guerrero took off

his shirt and draped it around Stapleton’s shoulders. Guerrero then walked

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back and forth along the perimeter of the holding cell, leaning outside of the

bars to speak to the women in the adjacent cell. Stapleton remained in the

same position for the next hour. Both officers walked past him several times,

but neither spoke to him.

Around 9:30 p.m., Guerrero attempted to rouse Stapleton. He tried to

pick Stapleton up by his arms, but Stapleton could not stand. The women in

the adjacent holding cell began screaming for help, and about two minutes

later, Officer Lozano ran to the holding cell and called for help on his

shoulder-mounted radio. Around 9:55 p.m., Officer Lozano and a first

responder entered the holding cell. Officer Becerra and several other first

responders followed and began attempting chest compressions. Officer

Becerra administered Narcan while Chief Solis appeared to be talking on his

cell phone.

Doctors at Knapp Medical Center in Weslaco, Texas, where

Stapleton was taken, determined that he had experienced cardiac failure,

circulatory failure, and central nervous system failure. Stapleton died

between 10:44 p.m. and 10:53 p.m. from what was later determined to be

“combined drug toxicity.” According to a toxicology report, he had alcohol,

fentanyl, Narcan, clonazepam, alprazolam, dihydrocodeine, hydrocodol,

norfentanyl, and mitragynine in his system at the time of his death.

Within a half hour of Stapleton’s death, the Hidalgo County Sheriff’s

Office opened an investigation. During his interview, Officer Lozano

explained that “once a subject is booked in, he – and presumably other

Progreso PD officers – then go to a room outside of the area of the cells to

draft their reports.” An officer had to leave the station to respond to calls that

came in. No one in the police department supervised the inmates if the officer

left, but “[m]aybe the fire department’s looking at ‘em” on CCTV. “[The

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fire department is] usually there. They have a TV in their kitchen with

cameras.”

Officer Lozano stated that, after he placed Stapleton in the holding

cell, he left the police station to assist Chief Solis with another traffic stop.

Officer Lozano returned to the department to work on his report in a room

where he could “kinda” monitor the inmates. He realized that Stapleton was

in medical distress when he heard the three women in the adjoining holding

cell screaming for help.

B

Stapleton’s mother and sister sued Officer Lozano, Officer Becerra,

Chief Solis, and the City of Progreso under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging

deliberate indifference to Stapleton’s serious medical needs while he was in

custody.

The officers and chief moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that

the Stapletons had not pleaded sufficient facts to overcome their qualified

immunity. They argued that the Stapletons had not sufficiently alleged that

the officers and chief were deliberately indifferent to a substantial risk of

serious harm or that their conduct violated clearly established law. The

district court denied their motion. This appeal followed.

II

The denial of a motion to dismiss asserting qualified immunity is an

immediately appealable decision under the collateral order doctrine. See

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 672 (2009).

We review this denial de novo. Ramirez v. Escajeda, 921 F.3d 497, 500

(5th Cir. 2019) (citing Brown v. Miller, 519 F.3d 231, 236 (5th Cir. 2008)). At

this early stage, review is “restricted to determining whether the facts

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pleaded establish a violation of clearly-established law.” Stevenson v. Tocé, 113

F.4th 494, 501 (5th Cir. 2024) (internal quotations marks omitted) (quoting

Ramirez, 921 F.3d at 501). We must assume the “veracity of well-pleaded

factual allegations and determine whether they plausibly give rise to an

entitlement to relief.” Ramirez, 921 F.3d at 501 (internal quotations marks

omitted) (quoting Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 679). All well-pleaded facts are viewed

in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Fisher v. Moore, 73 F.4th 367, 371

(5th Cir. 2023), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 569 (2024).

III

The defense of qualified immunity protects state officials from civil

suit when they could have reasonably believed that their actions were legal.

McKay v. LaCroix, 117 F.4th 741, 746 (5th Cir. 2024) (citing Pearson v.

Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009)). “When a defendant invokes qualified

immunity, the burden is on the plaintiff to demonstrate the inapplicability of

the defense.” Kelson v. Clark, 1 F.4th 411, 416 (5th Cir. 2021) (internal

quotation marks omitted) (quoting McClendon v. City of Columbia, 305 F.3d

314, 323 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc)).

A state official is entitled to qualified immunity unless (1) the plaintiff

alleged a violation of a constitutional right; and (2) that right was “clearly

established” at the time of the alleged violation. Cope v. Cogdill, 3 F.4th 198,

204 (5th Cir. 2021) (citing Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232). While a court has sound

discretion to address either of these prongs first, “the development of the law

is best served by undertaking, wherever possible, the threshold constitutional

analysis.” Mayfield v. Currie, 976 F.3d 482, 493 (5th Cir. 2020) (Willett, J.,

concurring); Cope, 3 F.4th at 204 (“Still, often ‘the better approach to

resolving cases in which the defense of qualified immunity is raised is to

determine first whether the plaintiff has alleged a deprivation of a

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constitutional right at all.’”) (quoting Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S.

833, 841 n.5 (1998)).

A

Under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,

pretrial detainees have a constitutional right “not to have their serious

medical needs met with deliberate indifference.” Kelson, 1 F.4th at 417 (5th

Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Thompson v. Upshur

Cnty., 245 F.3d 447, 457 (5th Cir. 2001)). “[A] serious medical need is one

for which treatment has been recommended or for which the need is so

apparent that even laymen would recognize that care is required.” Sims v.

Griffin, 35 F.4th 945, 949 (5th Cir. 2022) (quoting Gobert v. Caldwell, 463

F.3d 339, 345 n.12 (5th Cir. 2006)). To succeed on a deliberate-indifference

claim, the plaintiff must show that the officer: “(1) subjectively knew of a

substantial risk of serious harm to the detainee; and (2) responded to that risk

with ‘deliberate indifference.’” Ford v. Anderson Cnty., 102 F.4th 292, 307

(5th Cir. 2024) (quoting Cope, 3 F.4th at 206–07). The plaintiff must also

demonstrate that “substantial harm” resulted from that conduct. Baldwin v.

Dorsey, 964 F.3d 320, 326 (5th Cir. 2020).

Deliberate indifference is an extremely high standard to meet. Kelson,

1 F.4th at 417 (quoting Dyer v. Houston, 964 F.3d 374, 380 (5th Cir. 2020)).

It “cannot be inferred merely from a negligent or even a grossly negligent

response to a substantial risk of serious harm.” Thompson, 245 F.3d at 459

(citing Hare v. City of Corinth, 74 F.3d 633, 645, 649 (5th Cir. 1996)).

“Rather, the plaintiff must show that the officials ‘refused to treat him,

ignored his complaints, intentionally treated him incorrectly, or engaged in

any similar conduct that would clearly evince a wanton disregard for any

serious medical needs.’” Domino v. Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Just., 239 F.3d 752,

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756 (5th Cir. 2001) (quoting Johnson v. Treen, 759 F.2d 1236, 1238 (5th Cir.

1985)). When multiple officials are named as defendants, each officer’s

knowledge and response is evaluated individually, to the extent possible.

Williams v. City of Yazoo, 41 F.4th 416, 423 (5th Cir. 2022); Cope, 3 F.4th at

207 (5th Cir. 2021) (quoting Poole v. City of Shreveport, 691 F.3d 624, 628 (5th

Cir. 2012)).

1

Regarding Officer Lozano, the Stapletons allege that he conducted the

traffic stop. At the time he booked Stapleton into jail, Stapleton was “clearly

and visibly swaying and slightly unsteady on his feet” and “not feeling well,”

but Officer Lozano left him unsupervised for some time. The Stapletons

argue that these allegations are enough to defeat qualified immunity: “Officer

Lozano possessed additional knowledge about the risk of overdose because

he inventoried the drugs found in Stapleton’s car.”

An officer’s failure to immediately recognize ambiguous symptoms as

a medical emergency does not amount to deliberate indifference, although it

might constitute negligence. For example, in Tamez v. Manthey, 589 F.3d 764,

771 (5th Cir. 2009), we found that the facts pleaded did not suggest a “need

for immediate attention” “[b]ecause pupil dilation can mean ‘a lot of things,’

. . . and because the undisputed evidence is that medical clearances were

requested for even the most minor medical issues.” See Trevino v. Hinz, 751

Fed. App’x. 551, 555 (5th Cir. 2018) (the plaintiffs’ “allegations may depict

negligence on the officers’ part in not initially realizing the gravity of

Trevino’s condition and in not calling an ambulance sooner. But negligent or

even grossly negligent conduct does not rise to the level of deliberate

indifference.”); Estate of Allison v. Wansley, 524 F. App’x 963, 972 (5th Cir.

2013) (holding that the appellees did not plead facts showing deliberate

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indifference because “Appellees have presented no evidence to indicate that

Decedent Allison’s physical condition exceeded anything beyond perhaps

significant intoxication.”); Dyer v. Houston, 964 F.3d 374, 381 (5th Cir. 2020)

(finding that the plaintiffs’ allegations that paramedics should have provided

additional care after treating Graham were “[a]t most, . . . allegations that the

Paramedics acted with negligence”).

Here, Stapleton’s symptoms were initially ambiguous. His eyes were

bloodshot, his speech was slurred, and he was “visibly swaying and slightly

unsteady on his feet” when he arrived at the jail. Stapleton later knelt on the

floor, leaned over his folded legs, and began rocking back and forth. This

behavior did not suggest a “need for immediate medical attention.” Tamez,

589 F.3d at 771. Even Guerrero, who was in the same holding cell, remained

unaware of Stapleton’s condition for about an hour until he tried to pick

Stapleton up by his arms and realized that he could not stand.

Moreover, although Stapleton told Officer Lozano that he “did not

feel well,” the video does not reflect any request for medical assistance. The

Stapletons made no allegation that Officer Lozano refused to treat Stapleton,

ignored his complaints, intentionally treated him incorrectly, or engaged in

any similar conduct that would clearly evince a wanton disregard for his

serious medical needs. Domino, 239 F.3d at 756. The complaint alleges that

Officer Lozano came to the holding cell multiple times to speak to Stapleton

and Guerrero. He also responded quickly after the women in the adjacent

holding cell began screaming for help.

Even taking all facts in the light most favorable to the Stapletons, the

facts alleged do not rise to level of “wanton disregard” and deliberate

indifference to Stapleton’s serious medical needs. The Stapletons did not

sufficiently allege a deliberate-indifference claim against Officer Lozano.

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2

Officer Becerra is mentioned just three times in the complaint. The

Stapletons allege that he: (1) took Stapleton’s temperature; (2) escorted

other detainees to an adjacent holding cell; and (3) entered Stapleton’s cell

and administered Narcan. They claim these allegations are sufficient to

defeat qualified immunity because it was reasonable to infer that Officer

Lozano told him about the drugs found in Stapleton’s car; “[b]oth Officer

Becerra and Officer Lozano were on-site and apparently responsible for

inmate well-being,” and “[b]oth Officer Becerra and Officer Lozano could

have seen that Stapleton was in medical distress and deteriorating.” Relying

on Huff v. Refugio Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, No. 6:13-CV-00032, 2013 WL

5574901 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 9, 2013), the Stapletons argue that they do not need

to specifically allege in their complaint what Officer Becerra did—or did not

do—that amounted to deliberate indifference.

In Huff, the plaintiff alleged that two corrections officers repeatedly

slammed him into the holding cell’s cement floor and walls. 2013 WL

5574901, at *1. The officers moved to dismiss the claim against them because

he “ha[d] not specified which of the two jailers violently and repeatedly

slammed Plaintiff into the cement wall and which one jerked his arm behind

his back.” Id. at *2 (internal quotation marks omitted). The district court

denied the motion to dismiss because the plaintiff alleged that both officers

used excessive force and that “both [officers] were present in the cell when

the force was applied.” Id. at *3.

The plaintiff in Huff sufficiently pleaded an excessive force claim

against the officers because he alleged an injury resulting from both officers’

“direct involvement in applying excessive force.” Id. (emphasis added).

Here, the Stapletons have only alleged that Officer Becerra was on site and

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could have seen that Stapleton was in medical distress. They have not alleged

facts showing that Officer Becerra knew of a substantial risk of serious harm

to Stapleton, or that he acted with deliberate indifference, an essential

element of their claim against him.1 Deliberate indifference is, as discussed,

an extremely high standard to meet. Kelson, 1 F.4th at 417. The Stapletons

must allege facts indicating a “wanton disregard” for serious medical needs

because deliberate indifference cannot be inferred from a negligent—or even

a grossly negligent—response to a substantial risk of serious harm. Domino,

239 F.3d at 756.

Even taking all facts in the light most favorable to them, the Stapletons

did not sufficiently allege a deliberate-indifference claim against Officer

Becerra.

3

As for Chief Solis, the Stapletons allege that he (1) assisted Officer

Lozano in conducting Stapleton’s traffic stop; (2) called Officer Lozano for

assistance in a subsequent traffic stop; and (3) approached Stapleton’s

holding cell and used his cell phone while Stapleton was in medical distress.

They argue that these allegations are sufficient to defeat qualified immunity

because it is reasonable to infer that Chief Solis knew about the opioids in

Stapleton’s car; he was present during part of the traffic stop and knew there

was a risk that Stapleton was suffering from drug intoxication. The

Stapletons argue that, based on these alleged facts, “[a]ny reasonable officer

would have known that further monitoring was required under the

_____________________

1

In fact, the complaint alleges that Officer Becerra responded quickly to

Stapleton’s medical distress, administering Narcan as firefighters and paramedics

attempted chest compressions.

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circumstances.” They also point to Nagle v. Gusman, 61 F. Supp. 3d 609

(E.D. La. 2014).

In Nagle, the plaintiff was held under suicide watch, but the officer

assigned to maintain direct and constant observation of him abandoned his

post three times, and the plaintiff committed suicide. 61 F. Supp. 3d at 617.

His siblings sued the police officer under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the district

court determined that the officer had actual knowledge of a serious risk

because he was assigned to monitor the plaintiff on suicide watch. Id. at 629.

Here, the Stapletons allege no facts showing that Chief Solis knew that there

was a substantial risk of serious harm. They only alleged that Chief Solis knew

that Stapleton had been arrested, drugs were found in his vehicle, and

Stapleton was “clearly and visibly swaying and slightly unsteady on his feet.”

But these symptoms can “mean a lot of things,” and they are typical

symptoms of alcohol intoxication. Tamez, 589 F.3d at 771 (internal quotation

marks omitted). The Stapletons must allege facts indicating a “wanton

disregard” for serious medical needs, but nothing about the facts in this case

suggested a need for immediate attention or further monitoring. Domino, 239

F.3d at 756. The facts alleged do not meet the “extremely high standard” of

deliberate indifference. Kelson, 1 F.4th at 417.

Even taking all facts in the light most favorable to the Stapletons, the

facts they allege do not reflect that Chief Solis acted with deliberate

indifference to Stapleton’s serious medical needs.

B

The Stapletons’ failure to allege a constitutional violation—the first

prong of the qualified immunity analysis—forecloses their ability to succeed

on their deliberate-indifference claims against the officers. Even though this

alone is enough to reverse the district court’s holding, we also assess whether

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the constitutional right at issue was “clearly established” at the time of the

alleged violation.

To demonstrate that the constitutional right at issue was “clearly

established,” the plaintiff “must show that the law was ‘sufficiently clear’ at

that time ‘that every reasonable official would have understood that what he

[was] doing violate[d] that right.’” Batyukova v. Doege, 994 F.3d 717, 726 (5th

Cir. 2021) (quoting Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 11 (2015)). This

“demanding” standard “requires that the legal principle clearly prohibit the

officer’s conduct in the particular circumstances before him.” D.C. v. Wesby,

583 U.S. 48, 63 (2018). “The relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining

whether a right is clearly established is whether it would be clear to a

reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he

confronted.” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001). A rule is too general

if the unlawfulness of the officer’s conduct “does not follow immediately

from the conclusion that [the rule] was firmly established.” Wesby, 583 U.S.

at 63 (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641 (1987)).2

The Stapletons attempted to meet this burden in pointing to cases

establishing that pretrial detainees have a Fourteenth Amendment right to

_____________________

2

The plaintiff can also meet this requirement by arguing that analogous case law is

not needed because the unlawfulness of the challenged conduct is clear. Tyson v. Sabine, 42

F.4th 508, 520 (5th Cir. 2022) (“[Qualified immunity] does not immunize those officials

who commit novel, but patently ‘obvious,’ violations of the Constitution.”). This standard

requires “particularly egregious” facts and “extreme circumstances.” Id. (“We have little

trouble finding that the constitutional offense was obvious because the physical sexual

abuse alleged here is … by a state official.”). See, e.g., Taylor v. Riojas, 592 U.S. 7, 9 (2020)

(per curiam) (holding that qualified immunity should not be granted where petitioner was

confined in a cell “covered, nearly floor to ceiling, in massive amounts of feces: all over the

floor, the ceiling, the window, the walls, and even packed inside the water faucet”) (internal

quotation marks omitted). The Stapletons have not alleged that their case meets this level

of obviousness, and they pleaded no similarly egregious facts.

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not have their serious medical needs met with deliberate indifference. See,

e.g., Hare, 74 F.3d at 645; Thompson, 245 F.3d at 457; Dyer v. Houston, 964

F.3d 374, 380 (5th Cir. 2020); see also Jacobs v. W. Feliciana Sheriff’s Dep’t,

228 F.3d 388, 393–94 (5th Cir. 2000). They also refer to cases holding that a

plaintiff can demonstrate a violation of his constitutional rights by showing

that the officials refused to treat him, ignored his complaints, intentionally

treated him incorrectly, or engaged in any similar conduct that would clearly

evince a wanton disregard for any serious medical needs. Domino, 239 F.3d

at 758.

Broad general propositions, however, are not enough to show that the

constitutional right at issue was “clearly established.” Cope, 3 F.4th at 205

(citing Baldwin, 964 F.3d at 326). The Stapletons were required to identify a

case in which an officer who did not obtain medical treatment for a detainee

exhibiting symptoms consistent with significant intoxication was held to have

violated the Constitution. Their failure to provide a factually comparable case

forecloses the Stapleton’s ability to overcome the officers’ qualified

immunity.

IV

The parties disagree about whether the Stapletons pleaded an

individual failure-to-train claim against Chief Solis in addition to their Monell

claim against the City of Progreso. The Stapletons contend the complaint

alleges that Chief Solis created a policy requiring officers to leave inmates

unmonitored if they received other calls and failed to train his officers on how

to spot medical issues.

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A

To establish Monell liability, a plaintiff must show that an official

policy promulgated by a municipal policymaker was the moving force behind

the violation of a constitutional right. Henderson v. Harris Cnty., 51 F.4th 125,

130 (5th Cir. 2022). A “failure-to-train action is a type of Monell claim.” Id.

(quoting Hutcheson v. Dallas Cnty., 994 F.3d 477, 482 (5th Cir. 2021)). To

establish Monell liability on a failure-to-train theory, a plaintiff must prove

that: “(1) the city failed to train or supervise the officers involved; (2) there

is a causal connection between the alleged failure to supervise or train and

the alleged violation of the plaintiff's rights; and (3) the failure to train or

supervise constituted deliberate indifference to the plaintiff's constitutional

rights.” Id.

The Stapletons’ complaint alleges that the City “had a policy,

custom, or practice of allowing its officers to leave inmates unattended when

responding in locations other than the police station.” It also alleges that the

City had a policy, custom, or practice of “not checking on inmates at least

once each hour and ensuring their health and safety.” Chief Solis is not

mentioned in the section of the complaint describing the policies, customs,

or practices that allegedly caused Stapleton’s death.

The section of the complaint describing the “failure to train or

inadequate training” alleges that the City is “tasked with the training of

peace officers acting as jail and medical staff in ensuring inmate safety and

medical treatment.” It further alleges that the training provided to Officers

Lozano and Becerra was “woefully inadequate,” and that Chief Solis’s

“promulgation and perpetuation” of the problematic policies demonstrates

deliberate indifference. This is the only reference to Chief Solis in the

section. As conceded at oral argument, Chief Solis is the official responsible

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for promulgating and perpetuating these policies on behalf of the City. This

sole mention of him is consistent with a Monell claim. The complaint cannot

be fairly read as providing fair notice of an individual failure-to-train claim

against Chief Solis.

B

Even if the Stapletons did plead a failure-to-train claim against Chief

Solis individually, they failed to sufficiently plead deliberate indifference.

To succeed on a claim of failure to train or supervise, a plaintiff must

demonstrate that: (1) the defendant failed to train or supervise the officers

involved; (2) there is a causal connection between the alleged failure to

supervise or train and the alleged violation of the plaintiff’s rights; and (3)

the failure to train or supervise constituted deliberate indifference to the

plaintiff's constitutional rights. Cousin v. Small, 325 F.3d 627, 637 (5th Cir.

2003) (quoting Thompson, 245 F.3d at 459).

The plaintiff must establish that the supervisor acted, or failed to act,

with deliberate indifference to violations committed by their subordinates.

Wernecke v. Garcia, 591 F.3d 386, 401 (5th Cir. 2009). The test cannot be met

absent an underlying constitutional violation. Rios v. City of Del Rio, 444 F.3d

417, 425 (5th Cir. 2006) (citing Breaux v. City of Garland, 205 F.3d 150, 161

(5th Cir.2000)). Indeed, “[a] pattern of similar constitutional violations by

untrained employees is ‘ordinarily necessary’ to demonstrate deliberate

indifference for purposes of failure to train.” Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S.

51, 62 (2011) (quoting Bd. of Cnty. Com’rs of Bryan Cnty. v. Brown, 520 U.S.

397, 409 (1997)). “Without notice that a course of training is deficient in a

particular respect, decisionmakers can hardly be said to have deliberately

chosen a training program that will cause violations of constitutional rights.”

Id.

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The Stapletons’ complaint does not establish the third prong of the

failure-to-train claim for two reasons. First, “[this] test cannot be met if there

is no underlying constitutional violation.” Rios, 444 F.3d at 425. See also

Breaux, 205 F.3d at 161 (“[T]he fact that Plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights

were not actually infringed exonerates [the supervisor] from supervisory

liability.”). As discussed, the officers did not demonstrate a “wanton

disregard for any serious medical needs.” Domino, 239 F.3d at 756 (5th Cir.

2001) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Johnson, 759 F.2d at

1238). They did not violate Stapleton’s constitutional rights.

Second, the Stapletons alleged no “pattern of similar constitutional

violations by untrained employees.” Connick, 563 U.S. at 62. The Stapletons

allege that “Chief Solis had a policy of failing to adequately monitor inmates

and ignoring their needs,” and “all inmates held at the Progreso jail would

be left unsupervised for periods of time under the policy if the officers

received other calls.” Their allegation that a problematic policy exists—and

that this policy could violate a detainee’s constitutional rights—is not enough

to overcome qualified immunity. The Stapletons do not allege or point to a

pattern of similar constitutional violations within the Progreso Police

Department, including officers’ failure to monitor detainees, which

amounted to deliberate indifference to detainees’ serious medical needs, and

resulting substantial harm. “Without notice that a course of training is

deficient in a particular respect, decisionmakers can hardly be said to have

deliberately chosen a training program that will cause violations of

constitutional rights.” Id. at 62.

V

The district court’s denial of the motion to dismiss based on qualified

immunity is REVERSED.

16