affirming dismissal of complaint where “one cannot 17 determine from the complaint who is being sued, for what relief, and on what theory, with 18 enough detail to guide discovery”
How later courts described this case
- affirming dismissal of complaint where “one cannot 17 determine from the complaint who is being sued, for what relief, and on what theory, with 18 enough detail to guide discovery”
- liberal construction appropriate even post–Ashcroft 11 v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
10
11 JESSE F. SWARTZ, Case No. 2:24-cv-02112-DC-CSK PS
12 Plaintiff,
13 v. ORDER AND FINDINGS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS
14 WILLIAM ALSUP, et al.,
(ECF Nos. 1, 2, 8, 15, 16)
15 Defendants.
16
17 Plaintiff Jesse F. Swartz is representing himself in this action against Defendants
18 William Alsup, James Thomson, and Marissa Harris.1 Plaintiff seeks leave to proceed in
19 forma pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Plaintiff’s application in support of
20 the IFP request makes the required financial showing. Accordingly, the Court grants
21 Plaintiff’s IFP request.
22 I. SCREENING REQUIREMENT
23 A determination that a plaintiff qualifies financially for IFP status does not
24 complete the inquiry required by the statute. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), the court
25 must screen every IFP proceeding, and must order dismissal of the case if it is “frivolous
26 or malicious,” “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” or “seeks monetary
27
1 This matter proceeds before the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636, Fed. R.
28 Civ. P. 72, and Local Rule 302(c)(21).
1 relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B);
2 Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). A claim is legally
3 frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490
4 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court accepts as
5 true the factual allegations contained in the complaint, unless they are clearly baseless
6 or fanciful, and construes those allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See
7 id. at 326-27; Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, 592 F.3d 954,
8 960 (9th Cir. 2010).
9 Pleadings by self-represented litigants are liberally construed. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627
10 F.3d 338, 342 & n.7 (9th Cir. 2010) (liberal construction appropriate even post–Ashcroft
11 v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). However, the court need not accept as true
12 conclusory allegations, unreasonable inferences, or unwarranted deductions of fact. See
13 Western Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981); Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
14 678-79. A formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action does not suffice to
15 state a claim. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-57 (2007); Iqbal, 556
16 U.S. at 678.
17 To state a claim on which relief may be granted, the plaintiff must allege enough
18 facts “to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A
19 claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court
20 to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
21 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A pro se litigant is entitled to notice of the deficiencies in the
22 complaint and an opportunity to amend unless the complaint’s deficiencies could not be
23 cured by amendment. See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130-31; Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80
24 F.3d 336, 339 (9th Cir. 1996).
25 II. THE COMPLAINT
26 Plaintiff initiated this action by filing a Complaint entitled “Petition for Declaratory
27 Remedy.” Compl. (ECF No. 1). Plaintiff’s Complaint seeks declaratory relief to concur
28 with his conclusion that “errors and omissions” that occurred when he was “arrested,
1 charged, indicted and found guilty of violating 18 U.S.C. § 111” constitute corruption. Id.
2 at 2-3. Plaintiff states he filed his Complaint in the Eastern District of California because
3 the Northern District of California found him to be a vexatious litigant. Id. at 2. Plaintiff
4 lists some “high probability conclusions,” including: “via hi speech patterns and
5 decisions, William Alsup and his sycophants are members of ‘the mob’ and/or are
6 felons”; “William Alsup and other named parties are part of the catholic church and,
7 pursuant to their errant actions and inactions, are part of ‘the mob’”; “William Alsup and
8 parties involved in the matter within are foreign agents (i.e., Russian FSB)”; and “William
9 Alsup and parties named within are Democratic Party members and, via their errant acts,
10 have effectuated an unlawful mob.” Id. at 3. Plaintiff’s Complaint is three pages long, but
11 he includes over 60 pages of exhibits, which include documents he filed in other cases in
12 the Northern District of California, the San Francisco County Superior Court, and the
13 Ninth Circuit. Plaintiff seeks “a finding that the events partially outlined in [his Complaint],
14 including exhibits, constitute corruption.” Id.
15 These exhibits include: charts Plaintiff created that include events supporting
16 corruption (id. at 7-8); a document filed in the Northern District of California titled
17 “Objections to Pre-Trial Services Report (Doc 13) & Defendant’s Request To Strike
18 Same” (id. at 10-13); a document filed in the Northern District titled in part “Notice of
19 Motion & Defendant’s 2nd Motion for Judicial Qualification” (id. at 15-21); a document
20 filed in the San Francisco County Superior Court titled “Supplemental Brief in Support of
21 Complaint: Evidence of Attorney Misconduct in Support of Bar Disciplinary Action &
22 Injunctive Remedy Request” (id. at 23-37); a document filed in the Northern District titled
23 “Notice of and Defendant’s Brief on Proposed Sentencing” (id. at 39-46); and a
24 document filed in the Ninth Circuit titled “Defendant’s Assessment: Probation
25 Department Sentencing Report Errors & Speculative Conclusions as to Reasons
26 Therefore” (id. at 48-64).
27 III. DISCUSSION
28 Plaintiff’s initial pleading is entitled “Petition for Declaratory Remedy.” Compl.
1 Plaintiff’s pleading makes clear that he is only seeking declaratory relief “concurring with
2 the conclusion he has drawn.” Id. at 2. He seeks “a finding that the events partially
3 outlined in this filling, including exhibits, constitute corruption.” Id. at 3. The Declaratory
4 Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 et seq, “create[s] additional remedies in the form of
5 declaratory judgment relief for federal litigants, but do[es] not in and of [itself] confer
6 subject matter jurisdiction on the courts.” Luttrell v. United States, 644 F.2d 1274, 1275
7 (9th Cir. 1980). “Therefore, a district court presented with a request for declaratory relief
8 must ‘inquire whether there is an actual case or controversy within its jurisdiction.’” Lucas
9 v. Director of Dept. of Corrections, 2015 WL 1014037, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2015)
10 (quoting Principal Life Ins. Co. v. Robinson, 394 F.3d 665, 669 (9th Cir. 2005)). For the
11 reasons outlined below, Plaintiff’s Complaint fails for lack of subject matter jurisdiction,
12 failure to comply with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8, and because of various
13 immunities.
14 A. Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction
15 Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and may hear only those cases
16 authorized by federal law. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377
17 (1994). Jurisdiction is a threshold inquiry, and “[f]ederal courts are presumed to lack
18 jurisdiction, ‘unless the contrary appears affirmatively from the record.’” Casey v. Lewis,
19 4 F.3d 1516, 1519 (9th Cir. 1993) (quoting Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475
20 U.S. 534, 546 (1986)); see Morongo Band of Mission Indians v. Cal. State Bd. of
21 Equalization, 858 F.2d 1376, 1380 (9th Cir. 1988). Without jurisdiction, the district court
22 cannot decide the merits of a case or order any relief and must dismiss the case. See
23 Morongo, 858 F.2d at 1380. A federal court’s jurisdiction may be established in one of
24 two ways: actions arising under federal law or those between citizens of different states
25 in which the alleged damages exceed $75,000. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332. “Subject-
26 matter jurisdiction can never be waived or forfeited,” and “courts are obligated to
27 consider sua sponte” subject matter jurisdiction even when not raised by the parties.
28 Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 U.S. 134, 141 (2012).
1 Here, there is no cause of action alleged. Plaintiff states that the “subject matter
2 [in his pleading] is federally pertinent” (Compl. at 2) and requests a finding that events
3 outlined in the pleading constitute corruption. However, he does not state a claim under
4 any particular federal law.2 He lists multiple conclusory allegations about Defendants
5 that are clearly fanciful, and does not support them with coherent facts. Id. at 3. Plaintiff
6 also states that from February 2023 through July 2024, he was “arrested, charged,
7 indicted and found guilty of violating 18 U.S.C. § 111,” and during that time “an incredible
8 number of errors and omissions occurred” and that those events were conducted by
9 “approximately 25 government employees.” Id. at 2. However, Plaintiff does not describe
10 those errors and only lists three defendants in his pleading. While Plaintiff states that he
11 seeks declaratory relief that Defendants’ actions in a prior case allegedly amounted to
12 corruption, Plaintiff does not describe those actions or explain how they amount to
13 corruption. Plaintiff does include over 60 pages of exhibits attached to his Complaint
14 which he states show that corruption occurred. However, these exhibits include two
15 pages of documents that merely state Plaintiff’s opinion about certain actions or
16 statements made by various named and unnamed individuals. Compl. at 7-8. The
17 additional exhibits are his own documents he filed in other cases in the Northern District
18 of California, the San Francisco County Superior Court, and the Ninth Circuit.
19 Additionally, Plaintiff alleges that all Defendants are from California and does not
20 demand any amount of money. Based on the Complaint, it does not “appear[]
21 affirmatively from the record” that the Court has subject matter jurisdiction stemming
22 from a federal question or diversity. See Casey, 4 F.3d at 1519 (citation omitted).
23 Therefore, the Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction and the Complaint
24 should be dismissed on that ground.
25
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2 In a “notice of correction” to Plaintiff’s Complaint filed a few days after the Complaint,
Plaintiff states that this is a “corruption case and the laws usually related to the same can
27 be found at or about 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1957 et seq.” (ECF No. 4.) This is the only time
Plaintiff states a federal law in connection with his case. However, Plaintiff does not
28 explain or support how his claims relate to corruption under this statute.
1 B. Failure to Comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8
2 The Complaint also does not contain a short and plain statement of a claim as
3 required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8. In order to give fair notice of the claims
4 and the grounds on which they rest, a plaintiff must allege with at least some degree of
5 particularity overt acts by specific defendants which support the claims. See Kimes v.
6 Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1129 (9th Cir. 1996). From the Complaint, Plaintiff requests a
7 finding that certain events related to a prior conviction amount to corruption. However,
8 Plaintiff does not describe in detail what actions Defendants took that would constitute
9 corruption. Vague statements that “an incredible number or errors and omissions
10 occurred” is not enough to put Defendants on notice of the claims against them. The
11 Complaint also does not clearly state the elements of any claim. See Compl. Although
12 the Federal Rules adopt a flexible pleading policy, even a pro se litigant’s complaint must
13 give fair notice and state the elements of a claim plainly and succinctly. Jones v.
14 Community Redev. Agency, 733 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1984).
15 The Complaint is therefore subject to dismissal. See McHenry v. Renne, 84 F.3d
16 1172, 1178-80 (9th Cir. 1996) (affirming dismissal of complaint where “one cannot
17 determine from the complaint who is being sued, for what relief, and on what theory, with
18 enough detail to guide discovery”).
19 C. Judicial Immunity
20 One of the defendants in this case is District Judge William Alsup of the Northern
21 District of California. Under the doctrine of judicial immunity, judges have absolute
22 immunity for their acts related to the judicial process. See In re Castillo, 297 F.3d 940,
23 947 (9th Cir. 2002); Demoran v. Witt, 781 F.2d 155, 158 (9th Cir. 1985). Moreover,
24 judicial immunity exists for suits such as this one, seeking only declaratory relief. See
25 Mullis v. U.S. Bankruptcy Court for Dist. of Nevada, 828 F.2d 1385, 1394 (9th Cir. 1987).
26 Here, Plaintiff seeks “a finding that the events partially outlined in this filing,
27 including exhibits, constitute corruption.” Compl. at 3. In the exhibits Plaintiff attached to
28 his Complaint, he includes court documents from the Northern District of California, the
1 San Francisco County Superior Court, and the Ninth Circuit. See Compl. at 15, 23, 48.
2 One of these documents is a motion for recusal of Defendant Judge Alsup related to a
3 case in the Northern District. Compl. at 23. The conduct Plaintiff challenges relates to
4 Judge Alsup’s acts related to his judicial duties, see id. at 16-21 and 23, and Judge
5 Alsup has absolute immunity for these acts. Therefore, Plaintiff’s claim against
6 Defendant Judge Alsup should be dismissed. See In re Castillo, 297 F.3d at 947.
7 D. Prosecutorial Immunity
8 One of the Defendants in this case is Marissa Harris, who Plaintiff identifies as a
9 federal prosecutor. Compl. at 32 (Page 20, line 9). “Attorneys who prosecute cases on
10 behalf of the Government are absolutely immune from claims based on their participation
11 in the judicial process.” Joelson v. United States, 2020 WL 6449196, at *3 (S.D. Cal.
12 Nov. 3, 2020) (citations omitted); see Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 422-23, 429-30.
13 Plaintiff attaches to the Complaint a document he filed in San Francisco County
14 Superior Court that is titled “Evidence of Attorney Misconduct.” Compl. at 23. In this
15 document, Plaintiff contests Defendant Harris’s conduct and statements in two hearings
16 and a motion she allegedly filed. Compl. at 32-33. The conduct Plaintiff challenges
17 relates to Harris’s acts related to her prosecutorial role in the judicial process, see id. at
18 23 and 32-33, and Harris has absolute immunity for these acts. Therefore, Defendant
19 Harris is immune from this suit, and Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Harris should be
20 dismissed. See Joelson, 2020 WL 6449196, at *3.
21 E. Leave to Amend
22 Plaintiff’s current Complaint does not present a cogent, non-frivolous claim. In
23 light of the Court’s lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the Complaint’s deficiencies, and
24 the absolute immunity of Defendants Judge Alsup and Harris, granting leave to amend
25 would be futile. See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130-31; Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103,
26 1105-06 (9th Cir. 1995). The Complaint should therefore be dismissed without leave to
27 amend.
28 / / /
1 IV. PLAINTIFF’S OTHER REQUESTS
2 On October 8, 2024, Plaintiff filed a request for information regarding alleged
3 appellate counsel in a different case. (ECF No. 8.) On November 12, 2024, Plaintiff filed
4 a request for written comments from a correctional facility. (ECF No. 16.) Plaintiff asks
5 for the “clerks to obtain from the Taft Correctional Facility, [Plaintiff’s] written comms. to
6 their staff [and] docket those items.” Id. These requests are not properly brought in this
7 federal court and are denied. In addition, in light of the Court’s recommendation to
8 dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint without leave to amend, these requests are also moot.
9 On October 28, 2024, Plaintiff filed a request for appointment of counsel pursuant
10 to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). (ECF No. 15.) In certain exceptional circumstances, the court
11 may request the voluntary assistance of counsel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1).
12 Terrell v. Brewer, 935 F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991) (discussing former § 1915(d));
13 Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1335-36 (9th Cir. 1990) (same). In the present
14 case, the Court does not find the required exceptional circumstances are present.
15 Plaintiff's request for the appointment of counsel will therefore be denied.
16 V. CONCLUSION
17 In accordance with the above, IT IS ORDERED that:
18 1. Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2) is granted;
19 2. Plaintiff’s request for information (ECF No. 8) is denied;
20 3. Plaintiff’s request for comments (ECF No. 16) is denied; and
21 4. Plaintiff’s request for appointment of counsel (ECF No. 15) is denied.
22 In addition, IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Complaint (ECF No. 1) be dismissed
23 without leave to amend.
24 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District
25 Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within
26 14 days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file
27 written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. This document should
28 be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any
1 || reply to the objections shall be served on all parties and filed with the Court within 14
2 | days after service of the objections. Failure to file objections within the specified time
3 || may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449,
4 | 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Yist, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156-57 (9th Cir. 1991).
5
6 | Dated: January 13, 2025 C iy S \U
CHI SOO KIM
8 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Q || 5, swar.2112.24
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