MACK v. CITY OF MARIANNA

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

PANAMA CITY DIVISION

LADARIUS NAJUAN MACK,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 5:23-cv-269-TKW/MJF

CITY OF MARIANNA, et al.,

Defendants.

/

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Ladarius NaJuan Mack, a prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma

pauperis, has filed a third amended complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

against the City of Marianna and Police Captain Tyler Scarborough. Doc.

15. The District Court should dismiss Mack’s federal claims for failure to

state a claim upon which relief can be granted and should decline to

exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Mack’s state-law claims.

I. THE ALLEGATIONS OF MACK’S THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT

Mack is a pretrial detainee of the Bay County Sheriff’s Office. Doc.

15 at 2, 4. Mack’s claims arise from his warrantless arrest and criminal

prosecution in Jackson County Circuit Court Case No. 2022-CF-000127.

Id. at 5-11. The charges ultimately were nolle prossed. Id. at 6.

Mack alleges that on March 15, 2022, Marianna Police Captain

Tyler Scarborough and “several other City officials” arrested Mack

without a warrant and seized Mack’s vehicle. Id. at 5. The same day,

Scarborough filed an affidavit and criminal complaint charging Mack

with aggravated battery with a firearm and possession of a firearm by a

felon. Id. at 5-6. According to Mack, Scarborough’s affidavit stated that

“Police were told by crime scene witnesses at the Three Rivers Apartment

that I [Mack] possessed a gun and was the shooter in the incident.” Id. at

6.

At Mack’s initial appearance on March 16, 2022, the Florida judge

“stated that the city officials involved in [Mack’s] arrest need to amend

their Arrest Affidavit to state probable cause for lack thereof.” Id. at 7.

In response, Scarborough filed an amended probable cause affidavit that,

according to Mack, stated: “Crime Scene Witnesses told Police ‘Ladarius

Mack’ was the shooter at the Three Rivers Apartment Complex.” Id.

During the discovery process in the criminal case, the State

produced “truly obtained witness statements that did not say [Mack] shot

anyone nor had a gun.” Id. at 6, 7. The charges against Mack were

dismissed on November 28, 2022. Id. at 6.

Mack asserts that Scarborough’s statement in the original and

amended probable cause affidavits was “fabricated and erroneous” in

light of the “obtained documented witness statements” produced during

discovery. Id. at 6, 7. Mack maintains that as a result of Scarborough’s

affidavit and criminal complaint, Mack was detained, charged, and

imprisoned illegally “without reasonable probable cause.” Id. at 5–6.

Mack is suing the City of Marianna (“the City”) and Captain

Scarborough in his individual capacity. Doc. 15 at 2–3. Mack asserts

seven claims:

Count One – § 1983 claim for unlawful search and seizure under

the Fourth Amendment;

Count Two – § 1983 claim for malicious prosecution under the

Fourth Amendment;

Count Three – state tort claim for negligence;

Count Four – § 1983 claim for denial of equal protection under the

Fourteenth Amendment;

Count Five – § 1983 claim for deliberate indifference and failure to

train or supervise (against the City only);

Count Six – state tort claim for defamation; and

Count Seven – state tort claim for intentional infliction of emotional

distress.

Doc. 15 at 12. Mack seeks compensatory and punitive damages.

II. SCREENING STANDARD UNDER 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A

Because Mack is a prisoner and is proceeding in forma pauperis, this

court is required to review his complaint, identify cognizable claims and

dismiss the complaint, or any portion thereof, if the complaint “(1) is

frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune

from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a)–(b); see also 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2)(B).

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that a complaint

contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Rule 8’s standard

“does not require detailed factual allegations, but it demands more than

an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quotation marks omitted).

To prevent dismissal for failure to state a claim, “a complaint must

contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to

relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Bell

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see also Fed. R. Civ.

P. 12(b)(6). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads

factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference

that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S.

at 678. In applying the foregoing standard, the court accepts all well-

pleaded factual allegations in the complaint as true and evaluates all

reasonable inferences derived from those facts in the light most favorable

to the plaintiff. See Hunnings v. Texaco, Inc., 29 F.3d 1480, 1483 (11th

Cir. 1994).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Section 1983 Standard

“A section 1983 claim is conditioned on two essential elements: first,

the conduct complained of must have been committed by a person acting

under color of state law; second, this conduct must have deprived the

plaintiff of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution

or the laws of the United States.” Whitehorn v. Harrelson, 758 F.2d 1416,

1419 (11th Cir. 1985) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983).

B. Mack Fails to State a Federal Claim Against the City

Each of Mack’s claims against the City is based on respondeat

superior liability for Scarborough’s (and other officers’) warrantless

search and seizure and Scarborough’s initiation of the prosecution of

Mack. Municipalities, however, may not be held liable in a section 1983

action under a respondeat superior theory. Board of Comm’rs of Bryan

Cnty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997); Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs.,

436 U.S. 658, 691–94 (1978). Rather, “it is when execution of a

government’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by

those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy,

inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsible under

[section] 1983.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 694.

To state a claim against a municipality under section 1983, a

plaintiff must allege “(1) that his constitutional rights were violated; (2)

that the municipality had a custom or policy that constituted deliberate

indifference to that constitutional right; and (3) that the policy or custom

caused the violation.” McDowell v. Brown, 392 F.3d 1283, 1289 (11th Cir.

2004) (citing City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989)). “A

policy is a decision that is officially adopted by [the City], or created by

an official of such rank that he or she could be said to be acting on behalf

of” the City. Cooper v. Dillon, 403 F.3d 1208, 1221 (11th Cir. 2005)

(quotation marks and citation omitted). “A custom is a practice that is so

settled and permanent that it takes on the force of law.” Id.; Sewell v.

Town of Lake Hamilton, 117 F.3d 488, 489 (11th Cir. 1997). Thus, for a

municipality to be liable under Monell, “[a] pattern of similar

constitutional violations . . . is ordinarily necessary” because a “single

incident would not be so pervasive as to be a custom.” Craig v. Floyd

County, Georgia, 643 F.3d 1306, 1310 (11th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation

marks omitted).

In his third amended complaint, Mack acknowledges that the City

had a “probable cause policy of ‘officers needing probable cause before

making an arrest.’” Doc. 15 at 8. Beyond that, Mack makes only a vague

and unintelligible allegation that he was charged and imprisoned “to

deprive me of my rights in which the Policy being the main fact that

violated my Fourth Amendment Right against Unlawful Search and

Seizure . . . .” Id. at 9. However, Mack does not identify or describe a

municipal policy that caused a deprivation of his constitutional rights.

Instead, each of Mack’s claims is based on a single incident—the search,

seizures, and criminal prosecution on March 15, 2022. See Doc. 15 at 5-

11. “Proof of a single incident of unconstitutional activity is not sufficient

to impose liability” against a municipality. Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471

U.S. 808, 823–24 (1985) (plurality opinion); Watkins v. Pinnock, 802 F.

App’x 450, 455 (11th Cir. 2020) (per curiam).

Additionally, Mack does not allege that Scarborough was vested

with the City’s policymaking authority. See Cooper, 403 F.3d at 1221

(quoting Hill v. Clifton, 74 F.3d 1150, 1152 (11th Cir. 1996) (“Only those

officials who have final policymaking authority may render the

municipality liable under § 1983.”)). Because Mack has not alleged that

violations of his constitutional rights resulted from a municipal policy,

liability for the actions of City police during a single search, seizure and

criminal prosecution cannot be imputed to the City. Accordingly, each of

the federal claims against the City must be dismissed.

C. Mack Fails to State a Federal Claim Against Scarborough

Mack’s claims against Scarborough arise from Scarborough’s acts

of arresting Mack, searching and seizing Mack’s vehicle, and initiating

the criminal prosecution against Mack.

1. Fourth Amendment Search and Seizure

a. Warrantless Arrest

The Fourth Amendment provides, in relevant part, that people

have the right “to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,

against unreasonable searches and seizures . . . , and no Warrants shall

issue, but upon probable cause.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. The arrest of a

person is ‘quintessentially a seizure’” of the person that triggers the

Fourth Amendment’s protections. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585,

(1980) (quoting United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 428 (1976) (Powell,

J., concurring)); Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989). Because

arrests are “seizures” of “persons,” they must be reasonable under the

circumstances. District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 56 (2018)

(quoting Payton, 445 U.S. at 585). A warrantless arrest is reasonable if

the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect committed a

crime. Id. at 56-57 (citing Atwater v. Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354

(2001)).

Probable cause to arrest exists when “law enforcement officials

have facts and circumstances within their knowledge sufficient to

warrant a reasonable belief that the suspect had committed or was

committing a crime.” United States v. Gonzalez, 969 F.2d 999, 1002 (11th

Cir. 1992). This does not require an actual showing of criminal activity,

but “only a probability or substantial chance of criminal activity.” Illinois

v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 243 n.13 (1983); United States v. Babcock, 924

F.3d 1180, 1192 (11th Cir. 2019). “Whether probable cause exists depends

upon the reasonable conclusion to be drawn from the facts known to the

arresting officer at the time of the arrest.” Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S.

146, 152 (2004).

“Probable cause ‘is not a high bar.’” Wesby, 583 U.S. at 57 (quoting

Kaley v. United States, 571 U.S. 320, 338 (2014)). Probable cause “does

not require overwhelmingly convincing evidence, but only reasonably

trustworthy information.” Ortega v. Christian, 85 F.3d 1521, 1525 (11th

Cir. 1996) (internal citations and quotations omitted). Probable cause

does not entail the same “standard of conclusiveness and probability as

the facts necessary to support a conviction.” United States v. Dunn, 345

F.3d 1285, 1290 (11th Cir. 2003) (internal quotations omitted). Probable

cause requires even less evidence than “preponderance of the evidence.”

Gates, 462 U.S. at 235; United States v. Gourde, 440 F.3d 1065, 1069 (9th

Cir. 2006).

Here, Mack alleges that Scarborough conducted “an unlawful search and

seizure” of Mack and his Mercedes AMG. Doc. 15 at 5. Officers told Mack

at the time of his arrest that: “Witnesses at the Three River Apartments

said [Mack] had a gun and shot someone.” Id. Statements of witnesses

are sufficient to create probable cause for an arrest or a search. Bright v.

Thomas, 754 F. App’x 783, 787 (11th Cir. 2018); L.S.T., Inc. v. Crow, 49

F.3d 679, 684-85 (11th Cir. 1995). Indeed, the statement of a single

witness is sufficient to create probable cause. Martin v. Wood, 648 F.

App’x 911, 916 (11th Cir. 2016); Knight v. Jacobson, 300 F.3d 1272, 1275

(11th Cir. 2002).

Mack contends that the information conveyed by the witnesses

were lies. That itself does not negate probable cause, but Mack further

alleges that officers used “fabricated evidence” and “fake probable cause”

to justify the warrantless arrest and criminal charges. Doc. 15 at 5–8, 10.

To support this assertion, Mack relies on “documented witness

statements” he obtained during the discovery process of his criminal case

that “in fact did not state that I possessed a gun nor shot anyone.” Id. at

5. Mack faults Scarborough for omitting these “truly obtained witness

statements” in his amended probable cause affidavit the day after Mack’s

arrest. Id. at 7.

Mack’s allegations blur verbal statements witnesses made to police

on the night of Mack’s arrest with “documented” witness statements later

produced during discovery. Id. at 6, 7. Mack provides no details about

who spoke to police at the scene before Mack’s arrest; who provided the

information in the “documented” witness statements; when the witnesses

provided the “documented” statements; when Scarborough became aware

of the information in the “documented” witness statements; or other

details necessary to establish that Scarborough knew at the time he

arrested Mack and executed his affidavits that he was providing (or

omitting) information in reckless disregard for the accuracy of the

affidavit. Mack also provides no details about what other information was

contained in Scarborough’s affidavits.

An affidavit supporting an arrest must “be truthful in the sense

that the information put forth is believed or appropriately accepted by

the affiant as true.” Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 165 (1978)

(internal quotation marks omitted). An affidavit “violates the Fourth

Amendment when it contains omissions ‘made intentionally or with a

reckless disregard for the accuracy of the affidavit.’“ Madiwal v. Savaiko,

117 F.3d 1321, 1326-27 (11th Cir. 1997) (quoting United States v. Martin,

615 F.2d 318, 329 (5th Cir. 1980)).

Mack’s conclusory and vague allegations that Scarborough “lied,”

provided “false” information, and “deliberately omitted” important

information from the probable cause affidavits fall short of stating a

facially plausible Fourth-Amendment violation. See Doe v. Emory Univ.,

110 F.4th 1254, 1258 (11th Cir. 2024) (“[A]llegations that are merely

consistent with liability stop short of the line between possibility and

plausibility that a plaintiff must cross in order to survive . . . dismiss[al.].”

(internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); Doe v. Samford Univ.,

29 F.4th 675, 685 (11th Cir. 2022) (“[W]hen determining whether the

complaint crosses the line between possibility and plausibility of

entitlement to relief, courts may infer from the factual allegations in the

complaint obvious alternative explanations, which suggest lawful

conduct rather than the unlawful conduct the plaintiff would ask the

court to infer.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); see also

Wright v. Dodd, 438 F. App’x 805, 806 (11th Cir. 2011) (affirming sua

sponte dismissal of the plaintiff’s section 1983 complaint because the

plaintiff alleged only “in conclusory fashion that the police arrested [him]

without a warrant,” and he did not “allege any facts showing that the

police lacked probable cause to arrest him”).

Thus, Mack fails to state a Fourth Amendment claim for false arrest

or “unreasonable seizure.”

b. Warrantless Search and Seizure of Mack’s Vehicle

The Supreme Court has interpreted the Fourth Amendment

generally to require government agencies to obtain a search warrant

prior to seizing or searching items and places in which a person has a

reasonable expectation of privacy, such as a vehicle. Kentucky v. King,

563 U.S. 452, 459 (2011). There are a number of exceptions to this general

rule, however. Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 338 (2009). A

warrantless search of a vehicle is permissible when the driver who

recently occupied the vehicle is arrested and it “is reasonable to believe

the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest.” Id. at 351; United

States v. Clark, 32 F.4th 1080, 1089 n.3 (11th Cir. 2022).

Mack alleges that officers violated his Fourth Amendment rights by

“executing an unlawful search and seizure on me and my Mercedes AMG

at my residence.” Doc. 15 at 5. However, he provides no further details

about the automobile, even whether officers searched the car or seized it

at the time of Mack’s arrest. Without more, Mack has failed to state a

claim based on a search and seizure of his vehicle.

2. Fourth-Amendment Clam of Malicious Prosecution

Mack next asserts a claim of malicious prosecution against

Scarborough. Doc. 15 at 5.

Malicious prosecution is a violation of the Fourth Amendment

and is a viable constitutional tort cognizable under § 1983. . .

. A § 1983 claim for malicious prosecution requires the

plaintiff to show both the elements of the common law tort of

malicious prosecution and an unreasonable seizure in

violation of the Fourth Amendment.

Smith v. Mitchell, 856 F. App’x 248, 249 (11th Cir. 2021) (internal

citations omitted). “As to the first prong, the constituent elements of the

common law tort of malicious prosecution are: (1) a criminal prosecution

instituted or continued by the present defendant; (2) with malice and

without probable cause; (3) that terminated in the plaintiff accused’s

favor; and (4) caused damage to the plaintiff accused.” Carter v. Gore, 557

F. App’x 904, 906 (11th Cir. 2014).

As discussed, Mack’s allegations do not indicate that Scarborough

and other officers lacked probable cause or conducted an unreasonable

seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Therefore, Mack’s

malicious prosecution claim also must be dismissed for failure to state a

claim upon which relief can be granted.

3. Equal-Protection Claim

Mack also asserts that Scarborough and other officers denied Mack

equal protection by falsifying evidence for his arrest on March 15, 2022,

and amending their affidavits the following day.

Under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,

“‘[n]o State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal

protection of the laws,’ which is essentially a direction that all persons

similarly situated should be treated alike.” Chabad Chayil, Inc. v. Sch.

Bd. of Miami-Dade Cnty., 48 F.4th 1222, 1233 (11th Cir. 2022) (quoting

City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985));

Campbell v. Rainbow City, Ala., 434 F.3d 1306, 1313 (11th Cir. 2006).

Generally, equal protection violations arise when the State classifies and

treats “some discrete and identifiable group of citizens differently from

other groups.” Corey Airport Servs., Inc. v. Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc.,

682 F.3d 1293, 1296 (11th Cir. 2012).

Likewise, a State violates the Equal Protection Clause when it

intentionally treats a plaintiff differently from others similarly situated

without a rational reason for doing so. See Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech,

528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (per curiam). A plaintiff, therefore, must at least

demonstrate that the State treated him differently than another

similarly-situated person, based on his membership in an identifiable

group or class or without a rational reason for the disparate treatment.

Corey, 682 F.3d at 1296; Leib v. Hillsborough Cnty. Pub. Transp.

Comm’n, 558 F.3d 1301, 1305 (11th Cir. 2009).

Mack alleges only that the “dismissal [of] all charges on November

28, 2022, proving officers intentionally discriminated against [him] and

treated [him] differently than others would’ve been in a similar situation

which violated my 14th Amendment right to Equal Protection of Law . .

. because anyone else would have been released.” Doc. 15 at 8. Mack has

not alleged that he belongs to an identifiable group or class, or that he

was treated differently than others similarly situated who do not belong

to that group or class. Mack merely repackages his Fourth-Amendment

claim as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.

Because Macks has failed to state the elements of an equal

protection claim, the District Court should dismiss this claim.

C. The District Court Should Decline to Exercise Supplemental

Jurisdiction Over Mack’s State-Law Claims

Mack also attempts to assert claims of negligence, defamation, and

intentional infliction of emotional distress under Florida law.

“The decision to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over pendant

state claims rests within the discretion of the district court.” Raney v.

Allstate Ins. Co., 370 F.3d 1086, 1088–89 (11th Cir. 2004). Generally,

however, district courts should “dismiss any remaining state claims

when, as here, the federal claims have been dismissed prior to trial.” Lobo

v. Celebrity Cruises, Inc., 704 F.3d 882, 891 n.13 (11th Cir. 2013) (quoting

Raney, 370 F.3d at 1089). Accordingly, the District Court should decline

to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Mack’s state law claims.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the undersigned respectfully

RECOMMENDS that the District Court:

1. DISMISS Plaintiff’s section 1983 claims against Defendants;

2. DECLINE to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over

Plaintiff’s state law claims and dismiss those claims without prejudice;

and

3. DIRECT the clerk of the court to close the case file.

At Panama City, Florida, this 13th day of December 2024.

/s/ Michael J. Frank

Michael J. Frank

United States Magistrate Judge

NOTICE TO THE PARTIES

The District Court referred this case to the undersigned

to address preliminary matters and to make

recommendations regarding dispositive matters. See

N.D. Fla. Loc. R. 72.2; 28 U.S.C. § 636(b); Fed. R. Civ. P.

72(b). Objections to these proposed findings and

recommendations must be filed within fourteen (14)

days of the date of the report and recommendation. Any

different deadline that may appear on the electronic

docket is for the court’s internal use only and does not

control. An objecting party must serve a copy of the

objections on all other parties. A party who fails to

object to the magistrate judge’s findings or

recommendations contained in a report and

recommendation waives the right to challenge on

appeal the district court’s order based on unobjected-to

factual and legal conclusions. See 11th Cir. R. 3-1; 28

U.S.C. § 636.