King v. Chronister

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA

MARTINSBURG

CATHY KING,

Plaintiff,

v. CIVIL ACTION NO.: 3:24-CV-19

(GROH)

N. CHRONISTER, a deputy sheriff of

Berkeley County; BERKELEY COUNTY

SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT, a division of

the Berkeley County Commission; and

BERKELEY COUNTY COMMISSION, a

political subdivision of Berkeley County,

West Virginia; CITY OF CHARLES TOWN,

a municipal corporation; RONALD

KERNS, a police officer for the city of

Charles Town; JOHN DOE #1, a law

enforcement officer; JOHN DOE #2, a

deputy sheriff or sheriff of Berkeley

County; JOHN DOE #3, a deputy sheriff or

sheriff of Berkeley County; JOHN DOE #4,

a police officer for the City of

Martinsburg; JOHN DOE #5, a police

officer for the City of Martinsburg; JOHN

DOE #6, a police officer for the City of

Charles Town; JOHN DOE #7, a police

officer for the City of Charles Town; JOHN

DOE #8, a police officer for the City of

Ranson; and JOHN DOE #9, a police officer

for the City of Ranson,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM ORDER AND OPINION

REGARDING MOTIONS TO DISMISS

Cathy King alleges Defendants violated her constitutional rights when they

arrested her at work and kept her handcuffed in the back of a police cruiser for

approximately forty-five minutes. Officers were attempting to execute an arrest warrant

for Catherine Marie Starliper, a White woman in her thirties. Instead, they arrested the

Plaintiff, Cathy King, who is a 59-year-old African American woman.

I. BERKELEY COUNTY’S MOTION TO DISMISS

As an initial matter, the Plaintiff filed a Response to Berkeley County Commission

and Berkeley County Sheriff’s Department’s Motion to Dismiss noting she does not

oppose it. Accordingly, Berkeley County’s Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. ECF No. 4.

II. CITY OF CHARLES TOWN’S MOTION TO DISMISS

The City of Charles Town, Ronald Kerns, and John Does 6 & 7 filed a joint

Motion to Dismiss. ECF No. 3. Therein, the Defendants argued that the Plaintiff failed to

plead any claim against the City of Charles Town. Id. at 6. In her Response, the Plaintiff

“does not oppose the dismissal of Defendant City of Charles Town as a defendant from

Plaintiff’s fourth and seventh causes of action.” ECF No. 14 at 9n.1. The Plaintiff concedes

these are the only counts that contain allegations against Charles Town. Accordingly, the

Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED as to the City of Charles Town. ECF No. 3.

III. BACKGROUND

The facts of this case are straightforward. On February 15, 2022, the Plaintiff was

working at a 7-11 when Defendant Chronister arrested her and took her to the Berkeley

County Judicial Center. Once there, Defendant Chronister located a copy of the arrest

warrant, which was for Catherine Marie Starliper, and attempted to confirm that Plaintiff

was the same individual named in the warrant. After sending a picture of the Plaintiff to

another officer—who confirmed the Plaintiff was not Catherine Starliper—Defendant

Chronister allegedly said, “we fucked up.” ECF No. 1 at 9.

Having been arrested pursuant to a warrant issued for a different person, the

Plaintiff alleges unlawful detainment, unlawful search and seizure, and excessive force

under 42 U.S.C. §1983; Bivens violations; and battery, assault, and negligence. In their

Motions to Dismiss, the Defendants argue they enjoy qualified and statutory immunity;

the Bivens claims fail because the Complaint does not allege they were federal agents;

Plaintiff failed to state a claim as to the assault and battery claims; the Complaint fails to

state a claim because it lacks specific facts as to each defendant, and they cannot

vicariously be held liable for another’s constitutional violation.

IV. LEGAL STANDARD

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that

the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure allows a defendant to challenge the complaint’s sufficiency in this

regard by moving to dismiss a complaint for failing “to state a claim upon which relief can

be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the complaint

must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl.

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). Although the pleading standard under

Rule 8 “does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ . . . it demands more than an

unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.

662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Thus, “[a] pleading that offers ‘labels

and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’

Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertions’ devoid of ‘further factual

enhancements.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557).

When reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court assumes that the complaint’s

well-pleaded allegations are true, resolves all doubts and inferences in favor of the plaintiff

and views the allegations in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. Edwards v. City of

Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243-44 (4th Cir. 1999). Only factual allegations receive the

presumption of truth. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79. A court may also consider facts derived

from sources beyond the four corners of the complaint, including documents attached to

the complaint, documents attached to the motion to dismiss “so long as they are integral

to the complaint and authentic” and facts subject to judicial notice under Federal Rule of

Evidence 201. Philips v. Pitt Cnty. Mem’l Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009).

V. RONALD KERNS AND JOHN DOES’ MOTION TO DISMISS

In her Response, Plaintiff notes that these Defendants are only named in the

fourth and seventh causes of actions within the Complaint. The fourth cause of action is

for Bivens violations and the seventh is for negligence.

The Court first addresses Plaintiff’s Bivens claim. The only allegation in support

of a Bivens action is that the Defendants “while acting under the color of federal law,

deprived the plaintiff of her constitutional rights under the United States Constitution.”

ECF No. 1 at 17. The Plaintiff, for the first time, suggests in response to the Motion to

Dismiss that these Defendants were part of a federal task force. The Court has searched

Plaintiff’s complaint, and the term “task force” does not appear there. Similarly, “federal”

only appears one time—in the above-quoted sentence.

The Defendants aptly point out that “[t]he purpose of Bivens is to deter federal

officers from committing constitutional violations, and thus pursuant to Bivens, only an

individual federal agent may be held liable for actions in excess of the authority delegated

to him.” Ross v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, No. 3:20-CV-43, 2022 WL 2398525, at *5

(N.D.W. Va. Mar. 10, 2022), report and recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 2400041

(N.D.W. Va. July 1, 2022).

The Plaintiff argues in her Response, for the first time, “Defendants, while

technically state actors, were working as part of a Federal task force . . . .” ECF No. 14 at

9. That factual allegation is noticeably absent from the Complaint. Thus, the Court finds

it appropriate to dismiss the Bivens claim against these Defendants. Further, had the

Plaintiff alleged the Defendants were federal actors, the Court finds dismissal warranted

under Annappareddy v. Pascale, 996 F.3d 120 (4th Cir. 2021). See also Egbert v. Boule,

596 U.S. 482 (2022); Ziglar v. Abbasi, 582 U.S. 120 (2017).

Turning to the negligence claim, Plaintiff avers the Defendants owed her a duty to

provide an accurate description of the suspect, Catherine Marie Starliper, who was

named in the arrest warrant. The Court is not convinced Plaintiff states a plausible claim

for negligence against Kerns and the Doe Defendants, but it need not reach that question

because these Defendants enjoy statutory immunity.

The Plaintiff argues immunity should not apply to Defendant Kerns or the John

Does because they acted in a wanton or reckless manner. However, the Complaint fails

to allege with any detail what actions were taken in a wanton or reckless manner. At best,

the Complaint leads the reader to find Kerns failed to provide a description of Catherine

Marie Starliper to the arresting officer.

The Complaint does not allege any wanton or reckless behavior by these

Defendants. The threadbare recital of a legal conclusion is insufficient to survive a motion

to dismiss. Defendants point out both the Federal and West Virginia Rules of Criminal

Procedure do not require an arrest warrant to provide a defendant’s description when a

name is provided.

This case is like Horton v. Vinson, where the plaintiff alleged officer Vinson

negligently caused a BOLO alert to be issued for his vehicle. The Court held, “based on

the absence of any supporting facts that Vinson acted maliciously, in bad faith, or in a

wanton or reckless manner, . . . Vinson is immune from Horton's negligence claim.” No.

1:14CV192, 2015 WL 4774276, at *25 (N.D.W. Va. Aug. 12, 2015). “Simply identifying

conduct as willful, wanton, intentional, or reckless, with little factual enhancement or

support is insufficient.” Tomashek v. Raleigh Cnty. Emergency Operating Ctr., No. 2:17-

CV-01904, 2017 WL 5473926, at *2 (S.D.W. Va. Nov. 14, 2017) (quoting Earle v.

Huntington, No. 3:14-29536, 2015 WL 5611650, at *5 (S.D. W. Va. Sept. 23, 2015)).

These Defendants are entitled to immunity under W. Va. Code § 29-12A-5 for

Plaintiff’s negligence claim. Therefore, Defendants Kerns and Does 6 & 7’s Motion to

Dismiss shall be GRANTED, and they are hereby DISMISSED from this Civil Action

WITH PREJUDICE. ECF No. 3.

VI. CHRONISTER’S MOTION TO DISMISS

The Complaint’s first three causes of action allege Defendant Chronister

unlawfully detained, searched, and seized the Plaintiff while using excessive force—all in

violation of 42 U.S.C. §1983. The Defendant argues he is entitled to qualified immunity.

The parties agree that the test for immunity in this context turns on a standard of objective

reasonableness. “What this means in practice is that whether an official protected by

qualified immunity may be held personally liable for an allegedly unlawful official action

generally turns on the objective legal reasonableness of the action, assessed in light of

the legal rules that were clearly established at the time it was taken.” Wilson v. Layne,

526 U.S. 603, 614 (1999) (cleaned up).

Defendant Chronister contends this case is like others where officers arrested the

wrong individual pursuant to a valid arrest warrant. For example, Chronister cites Miller v.

Hall, where the Plaintiff, Jeremy Miller, was arrested based upon a warrant for “Jeremy

Miller.” No. 2:19-CV-00901, 2020 WL 4612394, at *4 (S.D.W. Va. Aug. 11, 2020). Miller

alleged he was held for a couple hours and treated rudely by the sheriff before being

released. Id. There are critical distinctions in the case before this Court.

First, Defendant Chronister arrested Cathy King pursuant to a warrant for

Catherine Marie Starliper. Catherine and Cathy may be similar, but that is where the

similarities end. Further, the Complaint alleges Defendant Chronister was told shortly

before arresting Plaintiff that the warrant was for a White female; the Plaintiff is African

American. The Complaint further alleges that over a half hour after the Plaintiff was

handcuffed, removed from her place of employment, and placed in the back of a cruiser,

Defendant Chronister sent a picture of the Plaintiff to another officer who confirmed he

had arrested the wrong person.

This case is not like the cases Defendant suggests mirror these facts. Several of

those cases were decided at the summary judgment stage, and the ones that were not,

like Miller, presented a much easier question. Indeed, arresting “Jeremy Miller” pursuant

to a warrant for “Jeremy Miller” is categorically different than arresting an African

American named Cathy King in lieu of a White Catherine Marie Starliper. Perhaps

Defendant Chronister can avail himself of immunity during the summary judgment stage,

but it is not presently available to him. Plaintiffs first three causes of action will proceed.

Defendant Chronister’s Motion seeks to dismiss Plaintiff’s Bivens claim for the

same reasons articulated in the other Defendants’ Motion. The Court finds that analysis

applies here and incorporates it by reference. Accordingly, for those reasons and the ones

provided in Defendant Chronister’s Motion, the Bivens claim against him is dismissed.

The Court finds dismissal of the remaining causes of action for assault, battery,

and negligence, is currently not appropriate. Like the §1983 claims, the allegations within

Plaintiff's Complaint, taken as true, offer cognizable claims for which relief could be

granted. The claims are adequately pled. Accordingly, Defendant Chronister’s Motion to

dismiss the fifth, sixth, and seventh causes of action is denied. Thus, Defendant

Chronister’s Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED in PART and DENIED in PART.

Vil. CONCLUSION

The Motions to dismiss as to Berkeley County Commission and Berkeley County

Sheriffs Department [ECF No. 4], and the City of Charles Town [ECF No. 3] were

unopposed by the Plaintiff and are therefore GRANTED; those parties are hereby

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE from this Civil Action.

The Motion to Dismiss Ronald Kerns and John Does 6 & 7 [ECF No. 3] is

GRANTED for those reasons stated above, and they are also DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE. The Motion to Dismiss N. Chronister is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED

IN PART. ECF No. 12. Specifically, the Bivens claim in the fourth cause of action is

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. However, all remaining causes of action against

Defendant Chronister shall proceed in the normal course.

The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to transmit copies of this Order to all counsel of

record herein.

DATED: January 10, 2025 F) ey

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE