holding that, when abstaining under Younger, “a 28 district court must dismiss the federal action . . . [and] there is no discretion to grant injunctive 1 relief”
How later courts described this case
- holding that, when abstaining under Younger, “a 28 district court must dismiss the federal action . . . [and] there is no discretion to grant injunctive 1 relief”
- holding that 19 pro se complaints should continue to be liberally construed after Iqbal
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
1
2
3
4
5
6
7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
8 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
9
10 DAMEAD HOLMES, Case No. 1:24-cv-01573-JLT-EPG
11 Plaintiff, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS,
RECOMMENDING THAT THIS CASE BE
12 v. DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE BASED
ON (1) LACK OF SUBJECT-MATTER
13 JAMES HORG, et al., JURISDICTION; AND (2) THE YOUNGER
ABSTENTION AND ROOKER-FELDMAN
14 Defendants. DOCTRINES
15 (ECF No. 1).
16 OBJECTIONS, IF ANY, DUE WITHIN
THIRTY (30) DAYS
17
18
Plaintiff Damead Holmes proceeds pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil action. (ECF
19
Nos. 1, 3). Generally, Plaintiff seeks a temporary restraining order under a federal criminal statute
20
in connection with a dispute involving board members of his church. However, because (1) the
21
criminal statute that Plaintiff relies on to establish the Court’s jurisdiction fails to support any
22
private right of action and (2) there are ongoing state court proceedings relating to the events
23
mentioned in the complaint, the Court will recommend that this case be dismissed without
24
prejudice and without leave to amend based on lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and the
25 Younger abstention and Rooker-Feldman doctrines.1
26
27
1 See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); Rooker v. Fid. Tr. Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); D.C. Ct. of
28 Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983).
1 I. SCREENING REQUIREMENT
2 Because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis (ECF No. 3), the Court screens the
3 complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i-iii), which directs the Court to dismiss a case at any
4 time if the Court determines that it is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks relief
against an immune defendant. Likewise, “[i]f the court determines at any time that it lacks
5
subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).
6
A complaint is required to contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that
7
the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not
8
required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
9
conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell
10
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual
11
matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting
12
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). The mere possibility of misconduct falls short of meeting this
13
plausibility standard. Id. at 679. While a plaintiff’s allegations are taken as true, courts “are not
14
required to indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681
15
(9th Cir. 2009) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Additionally, a plaintiff’s legal
16 conclusions are not accepted as true. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
17 Pleadings of pro se plaintiffs “must be held to less stringent standards than formal
18 pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that
19 pro se complaints should continue to be liberally construed after Iqbal).
20 II. SUMMARY OF THE COMPLAINT
21 Plaintiff lists four Defendants: (1) former Board Member Patrick McKendrick; (2) former
22 Board Member James Horg; (3) Church Clerk Sarah Mejia; and (4) former Treasurer David
23 Ferry.
As for the basis of federal question jurisdiction, Plaintiff lists 18 U.S.C. § 1514, which
24
permits a district court, in limited circumstances discussed below, to “issue a temporary
25
restraining order prohibiting harassment of a victim or witness in a Federal criminal case.” 18
26
U.S.C. § 1514(a)(1). For his factual allegations, Plaintiff refers to an email attached to his
27
complaint, which states as follows:
28
1 On October 27, 2023, while fulfilling my duties as a pastor at United Christian
Church, I was physically assaulted by former board member James Horg. Horg,
2
dissatisfied with his removal from the board, and another individual, Patrick
McKendrick, resisted the peaceful transition of the church’s governance. During
3
the encounter, Horg threatened and harassed me and our congregation. In an effort
4 to defend myself from Horg’s aggression, I reacted in self-defense.
Simultaneously, McKendrick threatened me with a firearm.
5
In the aftermath, Horg alleged that I had deliberately assaulted him, using his
6 injuries to manipulate a restraining order against me. This has hindered my ability
to fulfill my responsibilities to the church. Both Horg and McKendrick engage in
7 business under the name of United Christian Church, despite not representing the
church itself; they are effectively “squatting” on the church’s identity. They
8
continue to use the Secretary of State illegally to change the board of directors,
undermining the legitimate governance of the church.
9
Their actions have involved harassment and intimidation, weaponizing the
10 situation against me. I previously sought help from OSHA and consulted with
legal counsel, but the circumstances have been used as a means of harassment,
11
damaging my career and ministry.
12 The restraining orders currently in place Horgs against me. And mines against
Mckendricks does not keep them from the church property. They are growing in
13
violence and irrational thinking.
14 (ECF No. 1, p. 7).
15 As for relief, Plaintiff states that he wants a temporary restraining order “until hearing to
16 regain the Church Board’s access to our sanctuary.” (Id. at 6) (minor alterations for readability).
17 III. LACK OF SUBJECT-MATTER JURISDICTION
18 “Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of
19 Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). “Article III, § 2, of the Constitution delineates [t]he character of
20 the controversies over which federal judicial authority may extend. And lower federal-court
21 jurisdiction is further limited to those subjects encompassed within a statutory grant of
jurisdiction. Accordingly, the district courts may not exercise jurisdiction absent a statutory
22
basis.” Home Depot U. S. A., Inc. v. Jackson, 139 S. Ct. 1743, 1746 (2019) (alteration in original)
23
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
24
In 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1332(a), Congress granted federal courts jurisdiction
25 over two general types of cases: cases that aris[e] under federal law and cases in
which the amount in controversy exceeds $ 75,000 and there is diversity of
26
citizenship among the parties. These jurisdictional grants are known as federal-
27 question jurisdiction and diversity jurisdiction, respectively. Each serves a distinct
purpose: Federal-question jurisdiction affords parties a federal forum in which to
28 vindicate federal rights, whereas diversity jurisdiction provides a neutral forum for
1 parties from different States.
2 Id. (alteration in original) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). A plaintiff “properly
3 invokes” subject-matter jurisdiction under § 1331 when he “pleads a colorable claim arising
4 under the Constitution or laws of the United States.” Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 513
(2006) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
5
Here, Plaintiff’s principal allegations are that he was harassed and threatened by
6
Defendants Horg and McKendrick in connection with board proceedings involving his church
7
and Horg improperly obtained a restraining order against him that apparently prevents Plaintiff
8
from accessing the church.
9
As for the basis for federal question jurisdiction, Plaintiff cites 18 U.S.C. § 1514.
10
Presumably, Plaintiff intends to rely on the following provision of the statute:
11
A United States district court, upon application of the attorney for the
12 Government, shall issue a temporary restraining order prohibiting harassment of a
victim or witness in a Federal criminal case if the court finds, from specific facts
13 shown by affidavit or by verified complaint, that there are reasonable grounds to
believe that harassment of an identified victim or witness in a Federal criminal
14
case exists or that such order is necessary to prevent and restrain an offense under
15 section 1512 of this title, other than an offense consisting of misleading conduct,
or under section 1513 of this title.
16
18 U.S.C. § 1514(a)(1).
17
However, Plaintiff’s reliance on this statute is not proper because it does not confer a
18 private right of action necessary to establish subject-matter jurisdiction over this case. As a
19 general matter, “unless a specific statute provides for a private right of action, courts have found
20 that violations of Title 18 are properly brought by the United States government through criminal
21 proceedings and not by individuals in a civil action.” Banuelos v. Gabler, No. 1:18-CV-00675-
22 LJO-SAB, 2018 WL 2328221, at *3 (E.D. Cal. May 22, 2018).
23 Here, the statute provides that an “attorney for the Government” may apply for a
24 temporary restraining order prohibiting harassment of a victim or witness in a federal criminal
25 case. The statute does not confer a right on a private individual, like Plaintiff, to apply for a
temporary restraining order. Accordingly, courts that have addressed this provision have
26
concluded that it does not confer a private right of action. See Ronet v. Reeder, No. CV-24-
27
01843-PHX-DWL, 2024 WL 3848430, at *3 (D. Ariz. Aug. 16, 2024) (finding no basis for civil
28
1 claim at screening stage based on 18 U.S.C. § 1514); Smith v. Emps., No. 3:17-CV-04421, 2018
2 WL 4381277, at *3 (S.D.W. Va. Feb. 14, 2018), report and recommendation adopted, 2018 WL
3 3493082 (S.D.W. Va. July 20, 2018) (“Although 18 U.S.C. § 1514 addresses harassment, it is
4 essentially a criminal statute with no associated private cause of action.”); McClure v. Menard
Corr. Ctr., No. 11-CV-984-JPG, 2012 WL 3062235, at *4 (S.D. Ill. July 26, 2012) (“First, 18
5
U.S.C. § 1514 provides a mechanism for protecting a victim or witness in a Federal criminal case,
6
not a civil rights action.”).
7
In short, because 18 U.S.C. § 1514 provides no private right of action, the complaint fails
8
to identify a sufficient basis for the Court to exercise jurisdiction based on any federal question.
9
There being no other basis for jurisdiction over a cognizable legal claim implicated by the
10
complaint, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has failed to establish subject-matter jurisdiction
11
over this case.
12
IV. YOUNGER ABSTENTION AND ROOKER-FELDMAN
13
A. Legal Standards
14
Two doctrines prevent a federal court from interfering with state court proceedings. The
15
first is a doctrine called Younger abstention, which is rooted in the “desire to permit state courts
16 to try state cases free from interference by federal courts.” Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43
17 (1971). Thus, “[a]bsent extraordinary circumstances, interests of comity and federalism instruct
18 federal courts to abstain from exercising our jurisdiction in certain circumstances when asked to
19 enjoin ongoing state enforcement proceedings.” Page v. King, 932 F.3d 898, 901 (9th Cir. 2019)
20 (alterations, citation, and internal quotation marks omitted).
21 Younger abstention is appropriate when: (1) there is an ongoing state judicial
proceeding; (2) the proceeding implicates important state interests; (3) there is an
22 adequate opportunity in the state proceedings to raise constitutional challenges;
and (4) the requested relief seeks to enjoin or has the practical effect of enjoining
23 the ongoing state judicial proceeding.
24 Arevalo v. Hennessy, 882 F.3d 763, 765 (9th Cir. 2018) (alterations, citation, and internal
25 quotation marks omitted).
26 Typically, dismissal is required for Younger abstention. Aiona v. Judiciary of State of
27 Hawaii, 17 F.3d 1244, 1248 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that, when abstaining under Younger, “a
28 district court must dismiss the federal action . . . [and] there is no discretion to grant injunctive
1 relief”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). But “federal courts should not dismiss
2 actions where damages are at issue; rather, damages actions should be stayed until the state
3 proceedings are completed.” Gilbertson v. Albright, 381 F.3d 965, 968 (9th Cir. 2004). Lastly,
4 “Federal courts will not abstain under Younger in extraordinary circumstances where irreparable
injury can be shown.” Page, 932 F.3d at 902 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
5
“[B]ad faith and harassment” are “the usual prerequisites” to show “the necessary irreparable
6
injury.” Younger, 401 U.S. at 53.
7
The next doctrine is known as the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which “takes its name from
8
two Supreme Court cases: Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 44 S.Ct. 149, 68 L.Ed. 362
9
(1923), and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 75
10
L.Ed.2d 206 (1983).” Carmona v. Carmona, 603 F.3d 1041, 1050 (9th Cir. 2010). Under this
11
doctrine, lower federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction in “cases brought by state-court
12
losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the [federal]
13
district court proceedings commenced and inviting [federal] district court review and rejection of
14
those judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005).
15
“The purpose of the doctrine is to protect state judgments from collateral federal attack. Because
16 district courts lack power to hear direct appeals from state court decisions, they must decline
17 jurisdiction whenever they are ‘in essence being called upon to review the state court decision.”’
18 Doe & Associates Law Offices v. Napolitano, 252 F.3d 1026, 1030 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing
19 Feldman, 460 U.S. at 482 n.16).
20 B. Analysis
21 It appears from the face of the complaint that Plaintiff desires to challenge actions related
22 to either ongoing or past California state court matters. Specifically, Plaintiff states that Horg has
23 “a restraining order against” him, which the Court presumes is based on California law as that is
the only apparent authority that would permit a restraining order under these circumstances.
24
Likewise, Plaintiff states that he has a restraining order against McKendrick.
25
Plaintiff appears to ask the Court to become involved in one or both of the restraining
26
orders, as he requests a temporary restraining order “until hearing to regain the Church Board’s
27
access to our sanctuary,” which indicates that Plaintiff is unable to access his church because of a
28
1 California restraining order issued against him.
2 Notably, in analogous circumstances, courts have concluded that plaintiffs were
3 improperly trying to obtain federal court intervention in state court matters. See Malberg v.
4 McCracken, No. 5:22-CV-01713-EJD, 2023 WL 2769095, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2023) (“For
the purposes of the second Rooker-Feldman element, it is difficult to envision a clearer example
5
of a plaintiff attempting to blatantly end run an adverse state court judgment. Several federal
6
courts in California have also used the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to dismiss complaints with
7
remarkably similar allegations challenging California domestic violence restraining orders.”);
8
Ervin v. California, No. 3:18-CV-00442-GPC-RBB, 2018 WL 3375058, at *4 (S.D. Cal. July 11,
9
2018) (“Essentially, plaintiff is asking this court to overturn the state court’s order issuing the
10
protective order and the gun prohibition, making this a de facto appeal of the state court order that
11
is prohibited under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.”); Steinmetz v. Steinmetz, No. CIV 08-0629
12
JB/WDS, 2008 WL 5991009, at *10 (D.N.M. Aug. 27, 2008) (dismissing complaint under
13
Younger abstention due to ongoing state-court domestic violence, divorce, and custody
14
proceedings).
15
Accordingly, to the extent that Plaintiff seeks federal intervention in any state court
16 proceedings, the Younger abstention and Rooker-Feldman doctrines prohibit such relief under
17 these circumstances.
18 V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
19 “Although leave to amend a deficient complaint shall be freely given when justice so
20 requires, Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a), leave may be denied if amendment of the complaint would be
21 futile.” Gordon v. City of Oakland, 627 F.3d 1092, 1094 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). Here,
22 the only basis asserted in the complaint for jurisdiction, 18 U.S.C. § 1514, fails. Likewise,
23 Plaintiff’s claims involve intervention in state court matters in violation of the Younger abstention
and Rooker-Feldman doctrines. Under such circumstances, granting leave to amend would be
24
futile.
25
Based on the above discussion, IT IS RECOMMENDED as follows:
26
1. This case be dismissed without prejudice and without leave to amend based on lack of
27
subject-matter jurisdiction and the Younger abstention and Rooker-Feldman doctrines.
28
1 2. The Clerk of Court be directed to close this case.
2 These findings and recommendations will be submitted to the United States district judge
3 || assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within thirty (30)
4 | days after being served with these findings and recommendations, Plaintiff may file written
5 | objections with the Court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s
6 Findings and Recommendations.” Plaintiff is advised that failure to file objections within the
7 specified time may result in the waiver of rights on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834,
8 838-39 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)).
? | IT IS SO ORDERED.
10
1, | Dated: _January 8, 2025 [see ey
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28