Booze v. Lewter

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

)

GORDON EVERETTE BOOZE IV, )

Plaintiff,

) Civil Action No.: 23-cv-2246-LKG

Dated: January 6, 2025

SARGEANT TANISHA LEWTER, et al., )

Defendants. 25 JA om

)

Se

MEMORANDUM

Self-represented Plaintiff Gordon Everette Booze IV, who is currently incarcerated at

Roxbury Correctional Institution (“RCI”) in Hagerstown, Maryland, filed this civil rights action

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants Sergeant Tanisha Lewter and CO Lakeesha

Sanders-Ware, regarding events that took place at the Metropolitan Transition Center. ECF No.

1. Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint, which is the

operative pleading. ECF Nos. 8, 23. Booze opposes the Motion. ECF No. 33. Upon review of

the Motion and applicable law, the Court deems a hearing unnecessary. See Local Rule 105.6.

(D. Md. 2023). For reasons that follow, Defendants’ Motion will be denied.

Background

Booze alleges that on October 8, 2022, he was called to the dorm door of H housing to

speak with Sergeant Lewter about not being able to work that day. ECF No. 8 at 4. While

speaking with Sgt. Lewter, inmate Saiquan Branch began complaining about the telephones not

being turned back on after the dorm was cleaned. Jd. Sergeant Lewter “disregarded” what

Branch was saying and Branch became “more hostile, now cursing and making verbal threats

toward” Booze. Jd. Lewter “clearly heard everything” that Branch was saying through the

cracks in the door and walked away putting Booze in danger. Jd. at 5.

While these events were taking place, Defendant Sanders-Ware was inside the control

booth and witnessed what was taking place, yet also took no action. Jd. Inmate Branch went

upstairs, retrieved a knife, returned with the knife in his open hand and in front of the control

booth, started striking Booze with the knife. Jd. Booze was stabbed above his left eye, and

multiple times in the side of his head, and back. Jd. He seeks monetary damages for his injuries.

Id.

Standard of Review

Defendants move to dismiss raising the affirmative defenses of Eleventh Amendment and

qualified immunity pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). ECF No. 23. This

Court is mindful of its obligation to liberally construe the pleadings of self-represented litigants,

such as the instant Complaint. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). In evaluating

such a Complaint, the factual allegations are assumed to be true. /d. at 93 (citing Bell Atlantic

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007)). “However, conclusory statements or a

‘formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not [suffice].”” E.E.O.C. v.

Performance Food Grp., Inc., 16 F. Supp. 3d 584, 588 (D. Md. 2014) (quoting Twombly, 550

U.S. at 555). “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above a speculative

level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. “‘[N]aked assertions’ of wrongdoing necessitate some

‘factual enhancement’ within the complaint to cross ‘the line between possibility and plausibility

of entitlement to relief.’” Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 193 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).

Although pro se pleadings are construed generously to allow for the development of a

potentially meritorious case, Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980), courts cannot ignore a clear

failure to allege facts setting forth a cognizable claim. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. for City

of Baltimore, 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990) (“The ‘special judicial solicitude’ with which a

district court should view such pro se complaints does not transform the court into an advocate.

Only those questions which are squarely presented to a court may properly be addressed.”’)

(internal citation omitted)). ““A court considering a motion to dismiss can choose to begin by

identifying pleadings that, because they are not more than conclusions, are not entitled to the

assumption of truth.” Ashcroft v. Igbal,556 U.S. 662, 665 (2009).

Discussion

Defendants assert that to the extent Booze brings his claims against them in their official

capacities, they are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity and the Court should dismiss

these claims. ECF No. 23-2 at 3-6. Under the Eleventh Amendment, states as well as their

agencies and departments are immune from suits in federal court brought by their citizens or the

citizens of another state. See Pennhurst State Sch. and Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100

(1984); see also Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70 (1989). While states can

consent to such suits, and while the State of Maryland has waived its sovereign immunity for

certain types of cases brought in state courts, see Md. Code Ann., State Gov't § 12-202(a), the

State has not waived its immunity under the Eleventh Amendment to suit in federal court.

Claims against state officials in their official capacities are claims against the State itself. Will v.

Mich. Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). When defendants are sued in their

individual capacities, however, they are not immune to suit under the Eleventh Amendment.

Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 22 (1991).

To determine whether a defendant has been sued in his individual or official capacity, the

Court must look to the substance of the pleadings. Biggs v. Meadows, 66 F.3d 56, 58 (4th Cir.

1995). In particular, the Court examines the relief requested, whether plaintiff has alleged the

defendants acted pursuant to official customs or policies, and the nature of the defenses. /d. at 61.

Here the pleadings clearly indicate that Booze proceeds against Defendants for acts taken

only in their individual capacity. He expressly states that each Defendant observed that he was

being threatened by inmate Branch, and each failed to act to protect him from harm. ECF No. 8

at 4-5. Further, Booze is solely seeking monetary damages and not injunctive relief. Booze’s

claims may proceed against Defendants in their individual capacity.

Next, Defendants argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity on Booze’s claims

because he fails to allege that there is a violation of a constitutional right. ECF No. 23-2 at 6-8.

“To overcome qualified immunity, a plaintiff must typically show (1) that the government

official violated a statutory or constitutional right and (2) that right was clearly established at the

time of the challenged conduct.” King v. Riley, 76 F.4th 259, 265 (4th Cir. 2023) citing Ashcroft

v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011). Defendants argue that Booze “does not offer any evidence

in the amended complaint that suggests that he or anyone witnessed Sgt. Lewter listening at the

door or was even near the door at the time of the incident.” Jd. at 7. Defendants also assert that

Booze “offers no evidence that he or anyone witnessed her [Sanders- Ware] being in the control

booth on the date of the incident.” /d. at 7-8.

Defendants’ argument is unavailing. Booze is not required to provide “evidence” at this

stage of the proceedings, and has done more than provide “conclusory” allegations. Booze has

provided sufficient factual allegations, that the Court finds plausible, to support his claims that

Defendants failed to protect him from harm at the hands of inmate Branch. Further, the Court

finds unresolved questions of fact that pertain to whether Defendants were in range to hear the

alleged threats made by inmate Branch against Booze, and to have ample time to take action to

prevent the assault. At this juncture, such factual disputes preclude the application of qualified

immunity. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-252 (1986). The Court will

therefore deny the Motion on the issue of qualified immunity, as prematurely raised.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss will be denied. Defendants will

be directed to file an Answer to the Second Amended Complaint.

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