Williams v. The Bank of Fayette County

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE

WESTERN DIVISION

)

TERRY WILLIAMS, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) No. 2:24-cv-02216-SHM-cgc

)

THE BANK OF FAYETTE COUNTY, )

)

Defendant. )

)

)

ORDER DENYING LEAVE TO FILE AMENDED COMPLAINT; DENYING MOTION

FOR REHEARING; DENYING MOTION TO AMEND COMPLAINT; DENYING

MOTION TO INITIATE DISCOVERY; AND DENYING AS MOOT MOTION TO

STRIKE REPLY

This is a pro se action by Plaintiff Terry Williams against

Defendant Bank of Fayette County, alleging a violation of the

Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1641(g), and related

state law claims. (ECF No. 1). On October 18, 2024, the Court

ordered the dismissal of Plaintiff’s action with prejudice (ECF

No. 19) and entered a judgment closing the case. (ECF No. 20).

Before the Court are several post-judgment motions:

Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint, filed on

November 12, 2024 (ECF No 21); Plaintiff’s Motion for Rehearing,

filed on the same day (ECF No. 22); Plaintiff’s Second Motion to

Amend Pro Se Complaint, filed on December 3, 2024 (ECF No. 24);

Defendant’s Motion to Strike Plaintiff’s Reply, filed on December

17, 2024 (ECF No. 27); and Plaintiff’s Motions to Initiate

Discovery (ECF No. 28), filed on the same day (collectively, the

“Motions”). For the reasons below, the Motions are DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND

On April 4, 2024, Plaintiff filed suit against Defendant,

alleging violations of TILA and fraudulent concealment and

seeking declaratory relief and to quiet title, based on a real

property transaction that originated on November 21, 2008. (ECF

No. 1). On May 10, 2024, Defendant moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s

complaint for failure to state a claim. (ECF No. 10). On October

18, 2024, the Court granted Defendant’s motion, dismissing

Plaintiff’s complaint with prejudice (ECF No. 19) and entered

judgment closing the case. (ECF No. 20).

In its October 18, 2024 order, the Court explained that

Plaintiff’s claims were dismissed because, even if Plaintiff’s

factual allegations were accepted as true, they failed to state

a plausible claim for relief. (ECF No. 19). Plaintiff’s claims

were based on his argument that the securitization of the

mortgage rendered the note and mortgage unenforceable. (ECF No.

1). The Court found this argument inconsistent with established

Sixth Circuit case law. See Williams v. Bank of Fayette County,

No. 2:24-cv-02216, 2024 WL 4529584, at *3 (W.D. Tenn. Oct. 18,

2024) (citing Dauenhauer v. Bank of New York Mellon, 562

Fed.Appx. 473, 480 (6th Cir. 2014); Thompson v. Bank of America,

N.A., 773 F.3d 741, 749 (6th Cir. 2014)).

After judgment, Plaintiff filed multiple post-judgment

motions. On November 12, 2024, Plaintiff filed a motion for leave

to amend his complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

15(a). (ECF No. 21). Plaintiff attached an amended complaint

that raises three new claims: breach of contract, fraud in the

inducement, and declaratory relief challenging Defendant’s

standing to enforce the mortgage. (ECF No. 21). On the same day,

Plaintiff filed a motion for rehearing, which the Court construes

as a motion for reconsideration given that no hearing was held.

(ECF No. 22).

On November 26, 2024, Defendant filed a response arguing

that Plaintiff’s post-judgment motions were procedurally

defective. (ECF No. 23). On December 3, 2024, Plaintiff filed a

second motion to amend the complaint (ECF No. 24) and a reply to

Defendant’s response. (ECF No. 25). On December 17, 2024,

Defendant opposed Plaintiff’s second motion to amend as frivolous

(ECF No. 26) and filed a motion to strike Plaintiff’s December

3, 2024 reply for failure to seek leave under the Court’s Local

Rule. (ECF No. 27). In response, Plaintiff filed a motion to

initiate discovery. (ECF No. 28).

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Under Rule 15(a), courts shall “freely grant leave to amend

when justice so requires.” Oleson v. United States, 27 Fed.Appx.

566, 569 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)). However,

“the right granted by Rule 15(a) […] to amend the complaint […]

end[s] with the entry of the judgment dismissing the action.”

Feddersen Motors v. Ward, 180 F.2d 519, 523 (10th Cir. 1950).

After a final judgment has been entered, “a party may not seek

to amend their complaint without first moving to alter, set

aside, or vacate judgment pursuant to either Rule 59 or Rule

60[.]” Morse v. McWhorter, 290 F.3d 795, 799 (6th Cir. 2002)

(citing Lindauer v. Rogers, 91 F.3d 1355, 1356 (9th Cir. 1996)).

“[U]nless post-judgment relief is granted, the district court

lacks the power to grant a motion to amend the complaint under

Rule 15(a).” In re Ferro Corp. Derivative Litigation, 511 F.3d

611, 624 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing Acevedo-Villalobos v. Hernandez,

22 F.3d 384, 389 (1st Cir. 1994)).

A plaintiff who fails to “amend his complaint prior to the

entry of judgment, but instead waits until after the judgment of

dismissal […] must make the more difficult showing that the case

should be reopened under Rule 59 or Rule 60.” Washington v. Ohio,

No. 5:21-cv-2003, 2024 WL 4664709, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 4,2024)

(citing Pond v. Haas, 674 Fed.Appx. 466, 472 (6th Cir. 2016))

see also Leisure Caviar, LLC v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 616

F.3d 612 (6th Cir. 2010)). In addition to the standard Rule 15(a)

factors – such as “undue delay, bad faith, dilatory motive, undue

prejudice, and futility” – courts consider “the competing

interests of protecting the finality of judgments and the

expeditious termination of litigation.” Washington, 2024 WL

4664709, at *2 (citing Pond, 674 Fed.Appx. at 473) (internal

quotation marks omitted). That “includes asking whether the

claimant has made a ‘compelling explanation’ for failing to seek

leave to amend prior to the entry of judgment.” Id. (citations

omitted).

Whether to grant or deny a post-judgment motion for leave

to amend complaint “is committed to the district court’s sound

discretion.” Ruschel v. Nestle Holdings, Inc., 89 Fed.Appx. 518,

521 (6th Cir. 2004); see also Russel v. GTE Government Systems

Corp., 141 Fed.Appx. 429, 437 (6th Cir. 2005); Northwestern Nat.

Ins. Co. v. Joslyn, Nos. 93-4266, 93-4295, 93-4332, 1995 WL

270995, at *5 (6th Cir. May 8, 1995) (noting that the standard

of review for a district court’s denial of motions under Rule

15(a) and Rule 59(e) is abuse of discretion).

III. ANALYSIS

Because Plaintiff filed his post-judgment motions within 28

days of the Court’s dismissal, the Court applies the Rule 59(e)

standard.1 Under Rule 59(e), a court may alter or vacate judgment

for: “(1) a clear error of law; (2) newly discovered evidence;

(3) an intervening change in controlling law; or (4) a need to

prevent manifest injustice.” Hearing v. Perry, No. 2:18-cv-94,

2022 WL 22738217, at *2 (E.D. Tenn. Dec. 8, 2022) (citing GM,

LLC v. FCA US, LLC, 44 F.4th 548, 563 (6th Cir. 2022)); see also

Betts v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 558 F.3d 461, 474 (6th Cir.

2009) (citing Henderson v. Walled Lake Consol. Sch., 469 F.3d

479, 496 (6th Cir. 2006)). Rule 59(e) motions “are generally

disfavored because they consume scarce judicial resources on

matters already decided.” Oden v. Warden, North Central

Correctional Complex, No. 1:18-cv-420, 2020 WL 419749, at *1

(S.D. Ohio Jan. 27, 2020). Courts grant them sparingly in the

interest of finality. See Am. Textile Mfrs. Institute, Inc. v.

Limited, Inc., 179 F.R.D. 541, 547 (S.D. Ohio 1998).

1 If a motion is filed within 28 days after the entry of a

final judgment, it is treated as a motion to alter or amend

judgment under Rule 59. See Banister v. Davis, 590 U.S. 504, 520

n. 9 (2020); accord Dayton Veterans Residences Limited

Partnership v. Dayton Metropolitan Housing Authority, No. 3:16-

cv-466, 2019 WL 5956543, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 13, 2019). If

filed after 28 days, the motion is treated as a motion for relief

from a judgment or order under Rule 60. See Goyer v. United

States, No. 1:15-cv-01185, 2020 WL 5995505, at *2 (W.D. Tenn.

Oct. 9, 2020).

A. Plaintiff Fails to Satisfy the Requirements for

Reopening the Case Under Rule 59(e)

Plaintiff has not met his burden under Rule 59(e). Nowhere

in his post-judgment motions does Plaintiff demonstrate any clear

error of law, newly discovered evidence, or an intervening change

in controlling law. To the extent Plaintiff seeks to prevent

manifest injustice, his only relevant assertion is that “denying

leave to amend […] for a pro se litigant [ ] conflicts with

established procedural principles favoring amendments[.]” (ECF

No. 22). Plaintiff relies on Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178 (1962),

and Brown v. Matauszak, 415 Fed.Appx. 608 (6th Cir. 2011), for

the proposition that courts should be lenient in allowing pro se

litigants to amend their complaints. (ECF No. 22). However, those

cases are inapplicable. Although courts often grant pro se

litigants some latitude to amend their pleadings, neither Foman

nor Brown supports the granting of post-judgment amendments. The

right to amend under Rule 15(a) ends once a final judgment has

been entered. See Ward, 180 F.2d at 523; see also Morse, 290

F.3d at 799.

No legal authority supports Plaintiff’s argument that

courts should liberally grant leave to amend pro se complaints

after judgment. Plaintiff cites only one case, Doe v. Oberlin

College, 963 F.3d 580 (6th Cir. 2020), for his proposition that

“post-judgment amendments are permissible where they address

deficiencies or prevent procedural injustice.” (ECF Nos. 24,

25). That sentence does not appear in Doe. In fact, Doe addresses

a different issue altogether: whether the district court erred

in dismissing a Title IX sex discrimination claim for lack of

factual support. See Doe, 963 F.3d at 586-87. The Sixth Circuit

reversed the district court’s decision based on the factual

sufficiency of the pleading, not the permissibility of post-

judgment amendments. Plaintiff’s reliance on Doe is misplaced.

B. The Court’s Interest in Protecting the Finality of the

October 18, 2024 Judgment Outweighs Plaintiff’s

Interest in Reopening the Case

The Court’s interest in finality weighs against granting

the post-judgment motions. “A motion under Rule 59(e) is not an

opportunity to re-argue a case.” Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of

Chippewa Indians v. Engler, 146 F.3d 367, 374 (6th Cir. 1998).

It may not be used to “revisit arguments already made and

rejected.” Meekison v. Ohio Dep’t of Rehabilitation & Correction,

181 F.R.D. 571, 572 (S.D. Ohio 1998). All of Plaintiff’s claims,

whether old or new, recycle the argument the Court considered

and rejected in its October 18, 2024 order: that the

securitization of the mortgage voids Defendant’s rights to

enforce it. (ECF Nos. 19, 21, 22). As the Court explained,

securitization does not alter the parties’ rights under the

mortgage because it “creates a separate contract, distinct from

the original note.” Williams, 2024 WL 4529584, at *3. Plaintiff

could not state a plausible claim for relief because his rights

under the mortgage were unaffected by securitization. See id.

(citing Thompson, 773 F.3d at 749). Plaintiff offers no basis

for the Court to revisit Plaintiff’s securitization argument.

Plaintiff also fails to meet his burden to justify reopening

the case under Rule 59(e). See Washington, 2024 WL 4664709, at

*2; see also Pond, 674 Fed.Appx. at 473 (holding that courts

must balance the petitioner’s interest against “the competing

interests of protecting the finality of judgments and the

expeditious termination of litigation.”). Plaintiff offers no

reason, let alone a compelling reason, for failing to seek leave

to amend before the Court entered judgment on October 18, 2024.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons above, Plaintiff’s post-judgment motions

fail. Plaintiff has not met the requirements to reopen the case

under Rule 59(e). He has not provided a compelling reason for

failing to seek leave to amend his complaint before the Court

entered its judgment.

The Court DENIES Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Amend

Complaint (ECF No. 21), Motion for Rehearing (ECF No. 22), Second

Motion to Amend Complaint (ECF No. 24), and Motion to Initiate

Discovery (ECF No. 28).

The Court also DENIES AS MOOT Defendant’s Motion to Strike

Plaintiff’s Reply. (ECF No. 27).

SO ORDERED this 6th day of January, 2025.

/s/ Samuel H. Mays, Jr.

SAMUEL H. MAYS, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE