The opinion
Southern District of Texas
ENTERED
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT January 03, 2025
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS Nathan Ochsner, Clerk
HOUSTON DIVISION
TRENTON CHARLES GARRETT, §
Plaintiff,
VS. § CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:24-cv-957
STATE OF TEXAS, HARRIS COUNTY :
Defendant. :
ORDER
Pending before this Court is Harris County’s (“Defendant”) Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to
Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint. (Doc. No. 5). Trenton Charles Garrett (“Plaintiff”) did not file a
response, but instead, filed a “Certification of Non-Response/Non-Performance.” (Doc. No. 6).
Having considered the motion and the relevant pleadings, the Court GRANTS the motion. (Doc.
No. 5).
I. Background
Proceeding pro se, Plaintiff describes himself as an American Indian of the “Holy Citi-state
[sic] L’nu’k Tslagai Yavapai Spiritual Private Society.” (Doc. No. 1 at 2). He claims that
“TRENTON CHARLES GARRETT” is an “artificial person/ens legis,” and the “Absolute
Supreme Ambassador Chief Black Bear” is the “live flesh and blood natural person.” (Doc. No. 1
at 2, 7). From what this Court can gather, it seems Plaintiff was pulled over, searched, and detained
by a deputy from the Harris County Sheriff’s Department. (/d. at 3). According to Defendant, he
was subsequently charged with possession of a controlled substance and indicted. (Doc. No. 5
at 2).
While the state case remains pending, Plaintiff has filed this suit, claiming that the “339th
District Court [of] Harris County does not possess jurisdiction to prosecute or enforce any orders
against Absolute Supreme Ambassador Chief Black Bear in this matter pursuant to Natural,
Ecclesiastical, International, Treaty, and Constitutional Law of the Land.”! (Doc. No. 1 at 4).
Defendant filed its motion to dismiss in lieu of an answer, arguing that (1) the complaint does not
satisfy Rule 8(a)(2), (2) Plaintiff’s claims are barred by absolute prosecutorial immunity, (3) they
are premature under Heck v. Humphrey, and (4) the Younger abstention applies.
Il. Legal Standard
This Court’s Local Rules state that “[flailure to respond to a motion will be taken as a
representation of no opposition.” S.D. Tex. L.R. 7.4; see also Hanen L.R. 7(D). As stated above,
Plaintiff failed to respond to Defendant’s motion, instead filing a “Certification of Non-
Response/Non-Performance.” Therefore, the local rules would allow the Court to grant
Defendant’s motion as it should be considered unopposed.
Nevertheless, the Fifth Circuit has explained that “although we have endorsed the adoption
of local rules that require parties to file responses to opposed motions, we have not approved the
automatic grant, upon failure to comply with such rules, of motions that are dispositive of the
litigation. See Johnson v. Pettiford, 442 F.3d 917, 918 (Sth Cir. 2006) (citing Johnson v. Louisiana,
757 F.2d 698, 707-09 (Sth Cir. 1985); Ramsey v. Signal Delivery Serv., 631 F.2d 1210, 1213-14
(5th Cir. 1980). In other words, where a party does not respond to a motion to dismiss, such □□□□□□□
does not permit the Court to enter a “default” dismissal. Therefore, the Court will consider the
merits of the motion.
+ While the caption may make it seem like there are two defendants in this case, it seems Harris County is the sole
defendant. The Complaint names “STATE OF TEXAS/HARRIS COUNTY”—with a slash—as “Respondent(s)” and
complains of a prosecution conducted by the Harris County District Attorney’s Office. (Doc. No. 1). Moreover, only
one summons was requested, issued, and returned. The return of service states that the “[nJumber of parties to be
served in this case” is “1,” and Defendant is to be served at “STATE OF TEXAS HARRIS COUNTY C/O District
Attorney et al.” (Doc. No. 4 at 1). These facts all indicate that Harris County is the sole, intended defendant.
A defendant may file a motion to dismiss a complaint for “failure to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted.” FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). To defeat a motion to dismiss under Rule
12(b)(6), a plaintiff must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 663 (2009) (citing
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’
but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Jd. (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “Where a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a
defendant's liability, it ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement
to relief.’” Jd. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
In reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court must accept all well-pleaded facts in the
complaint as true and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Sonnier v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 509 F.3d 673, 675 (Sth Cir. 2007). The court is not bound to accept factual
assumptions or legal conclusions as true, and only a complaint that states a plausible claim for
relief survives a motion to dismiss. Jgbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79. When there are well-pleaded factual
allegations, the court assumes their veracity and then determines whether they plausibly give rise
to an entitlement to relief. Jd. “Although pro se litigants are entitled to liberal construction of their
pleadings, they must still ‘state a plausible claim to relief.’”” Dunbar v. Pena, 827 F. App’x 419,
420 (Sth Cir. 2020).
III. Analysis
Plaintiff has not made clear the basis for this Court’s jurisdiction over his suit. Nevertheless,
reading his Complaint liberally, the Court assumes that he brings constitutional and federal-law
challenges to the jurisdiction of the state court, given his reference to “International, Treaty, and
Constitutional Law of the Land.” (Doc. No. 1 at 4). Thus, presumably, he is bringing this suit under
28 U.S.C, § 1331.
Assuming, arguendo, this Court has jurisdiction under § 1331, it still cannot exercise it in
this case. As the Supreme Court has expressed, “national policy forbid[s] federal courts to stay or
enjoin pending state court proceedings except under special circumstances.” Younger v. Harris,
401 U.S. 37, 41 (1971). Thus, under the Younger abstention, a federal court must decline to exercise
jurisdiction when “(1) the federal proceeding would interfere with an ‘ongoing state judicial
proceeding,’; (2) the state has an important interest in regulating the subject matter of the claim,
and (3) the plaintiff has ‘an adequate opportunity in the state proceedings to raise constitutional
challenges.’” Bice v. La. Public Defender Bd., 677 F.3d 712, 716 (Sth Cir. 2012).
In this case, all three elements of Younger abstention are met, and thus, this Court must
decline to exercise its jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims. First, Plaintiff’s suit would interfere with
an ongoing state proceeding because he seeks “immediate notice of estoppel pertinent to” his
criminal case. (Doc. No. 1 at 12). Second, Texas “has a strong interest in enforcing its criminal
laws.” DeSpain v. Johnston, 731 F.2d 1171, 1176 (Sth Cir. 1984). Third, Plaintiff can litigate the
jurisdictional issues in state court, and he can appeal any adverse decisions or verdicts.
Moreover, exceptions to the Younger abstention do not apply. Courts may disregard the
Younger doctrine only when: “(1) the state court proceeding was brought in bad faith or with the
purpose of harassing the federal plaintiff, (2) the state statute is ‘flagrantly and patently violative
of express constitutional prohibitions in every clause, sentence, and paragraph, and in whatever
manner and against whomever an effort might be made to apply it, or (3) application of the doctrine
was waived.” Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Earle, 388 F.3d 515, 519 (Sth Cir. 2004) (citing Younger, 401
U.S. at 49)). Here, not only does Plaintiff not argue or even mention these exceptions, but the
pleadings also do not establish the first or second exceptions, and Defendant clearly has not waived
this doctrine because it invokes it in its motion to dismiss. Thus, the Younger doctrine applies, and
the Court must decline to exercise its jurisdiction here.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. (Doc. No. 5).
This case is dismissed.
Signed on this ss day of January 2025.
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United States District Judge