Opinion

Tian v. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services

Court
District Court, D. Massachusetts
Filed
Jan 3, 2025
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 33.5%

The opinion

Case 1:24-cv-12514-ADB Document4 Filed 12/18/24 Pagelof7

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

)

YONGHONG TIAN, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

Vv. )

) No. 24-cv-12514-PGL

U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION )

SERVICES, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

a)

ORDER ON MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS,

ORDER OF REASSIGNMENT, AND RECOMMENDATION TO DISMISS

LEVENSON, U.S.M.J.

Pro se plaintiff Youghong Tian (“Plaintiff”), who is not a citizen of the United States,

brings this action against the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) concerning

the agency’s alleged failure to timely process his petition to remove conditions on his residency

in the United States. Plaintiff also names Attorney General Merrick Garland and the U.S.

Attorney for the District of Massachusetts. Instead of paying the $405 filing fee, Plaintiff has

filed a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Docket No. 2. For the reasons stated

below, I will GRANT the in forma pauperis motion, order that this action be reassigned to a

District Judge, and recommend to the District Judge that this action be dismissed for failure to

state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

Case 1:24-cv-12514-ADB Document4 Filed 12/18/24 Page 2 of7

IL Motion for Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis

Upon review of Plaintiff's motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, I conclude that

Plaintiff has adequately shown that he is unable to pay the $405 filing fee. Accordingly, I

GRANT the motion.

I. Order of Reassignment

Pursuant to General Orders (10-1) and (09-3), a case may be randomly assigned, at the

time of filing, to a Magistrate Judge. The parties are required to inform the Court within 30 days

of service of the last party whether they consent or refuse to consent to the final jurisdiction of a

Magistrate Judge. Absent the parties’ consent to the final assignment of this case to a Magistrate

Judge, a Magistrate Judge is without jurisdiction to dismiss a complaint for lack of jurisdiction or

otherwise involuntarily dismiss an action. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1 (A).

This action was drawn to me under the above-described protocol. The parties have not

consented to my jurisdiction in this case. As set forth below, I have reviewed the complaint and

conclude that it is subject to dismissal. Accordingly, I will treat this as a dispositive matter that is

subject to the Report and Recommendation provisions of the Rules for United States Magistrate

Judges in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts. See R. 3(a)(15). For

that reason, I will order the Clerk of Court reassign this case to a District Judge.

IH. Review of the Complaint

Because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, his pleading is subject to screening

under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(¢)(2). This statute authorizes federal courts to dismiss an action in which

a plaintiff seeks to proceed without prepayment of fees if the complaint is malicious, frivolous,

fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a

defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

Case 1:24-cv-12514-ADB Document4 Filed 12/18/24 Page3of7

To state a claim upon which relief may be granted, a complaint must, among other things,

contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). In determining whether a complaint meets this pleading standard, a court

accepts well-pled factual matter as true, but the Court “is not bound to accept as true a legal

conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting

Twombly v. Bell Atlantic Corp., US. 544 (2007)). Instead, the complaint must “contain

sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its

face.’” Jd. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff

pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is

liable for the misconduct alleged.” Jd.

In conducting this review, I construe Plaintiff's complaint liberally because he is

proceeding pro se. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam).

A, Plaintiff's Complaint

Plaintiff's complaint concerns one of the last steps of the process by which a noncitizen

married to a citizen may receive unconditional “permanent residency” in the United States. This

process may be summarized as follows:

The process begins when the citizen spouse files a Form I-130 Petition for Alien

Relative (J-130), which acts as a request for immigration authorities to formally

recognize the validity of the marriage. 8 C.F.R. § 204.1(a)(1). USCIS then conducts

“an investigation of the facts” and adjudicates the petition. 1154(b).

Once the I-130 petition is approved, the noncitizen spouse may apply for permanent

residency, which—if successful—she receives only “on a conditional basis,” and

which can be revoked if the marriage is later found to be a fraud. See id. §§ 1255(a),

1186a(a)(1). The conditional permanent residency automatically expires after two

years, and if the noncitizen wishes the status to become truly permanent, she must

file a Form I-751 Petition to Remove Conditions on Residence (I-751). Id.

§ 1186a(c)(1)(A). In addition to filing the I-751 petition, the couple must also

appear together for an interview with USCIS. /d. § 1186a(c)(1)(B).

Case 1:24-cv-12514-ADB Document4 Filed 12/18/24 Page 4of7

The noncitizen spouse’s permanent residency becomes unconditional (truly

permanent) at the end of two years if the I-751 petition is approved. See id.

§ 1186a(c)(3)(B).

Zerezghi v. United States Citizenship & and Immigr. Servs., 955 F.3d 802. 804 (9th Cir. 2020).

Plaintiff's statement of his claim consists of two sentences: “I sincerely submitted the I-

751 Application to the USCIS at the ending of the March 2024, the USCIS accepted my case on

April 10, 2024. Since then, there is no further notification be sent from the USCIS.” Docket No.

Lat 4. In his request for relief, Plaintiff asks that the Court “provide the mandamus of [his] I-751

case to the USCIS.” /d. On the civil cover sheet, Plaintiff represents that he is bringing this

action under 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (a), and he identifies his action as one for “unreasonable delay of

the final determination of the I-751 case from the USCIS.” Docket No. 1-1 at 1.

Attached to Plaintiff's complaint is a document from the USCIS! in which the agency

informs Plaintiff that it received his 1-751 application on March 28, 2024, and that the agency

“ha[d] extended the validity period on [his] Form 1-551, Permanent Resident Card, (also known

as a Green Card) for 48 months from the date of expiration,” during which Plaintiffis

“authorized to work and travel.” Docket No. | at 6.

B. Discussion

Plaintiff seeks relief under 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (a), which provides: “The Supreme Court

and all courts established by Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid

of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 1651 (a). This statute does not provide any basis for relief by this Court. Requiring USCIS to

make a determination on Plaintiffs I-751 petition is not “necessary or appropriate in aid of [the

Court’s] jurisdiction[].”

' Specifically, the document is a Form I-797 Notice of Action.

Case 1:24-cv-12514-ADB Document4 Filed 12/18/24 Page5of7

Further, relief is not available under 28 U.S.C. 1361, albeit for a different reason. Section

1361 gives district courts “original jurisdiction of any action in the nature of mandamus to

compel an officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof to perform a duty

owed to the plaintiff.” 28 U.S.C. § 1361. However, “[m]andamus is regarded as an extraordinary

writ reserved for special situations. Among its ordinary preconditions are that the agency or

official have acted (or failed to act) in disregard of a clear legal duty and that there be no

adequate conventional means for review.” In re Dolours Price, 685 F.3d 1. 13 n.16 (1st Cin

2012) (quoting /n re City of Fall River, Mass., 470 F.3d 30, 32 (1st Cir_2006)). “Such clear legal

duty must be ‘nondiscretionary.’” /d. (quoting Eveland v. Dir. of Cent. Intel. Agency, 843 F.2d

46, 51 (1st Cir. 1988) (per curiam)).

Here, Plaintiff has not alleged any facts suggesting that mandamus relief is appropriate.

Plaintiff filed this action approximately six months after USCIS received his I-751 petition. The

fact that USCIS did not make a determination on the petition during the six-month period does

not suggest that the agency acted in disregard of a clear, nondiscretionary duty. See Tang v.

United States, No. 23-CV-13187-RGS, 2024 WL 1836624, at *2 (D. Mass. Apr_26, 2024)

(“Congress has not mandated any timetable for a decision on an I-751 petition.”); Morgovsky v.

Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 517 F. Supp. 2d 581, 584 (D. Mass. 2007) (Here, in the absence of a

clearly established duty to act on a naturalization petition within a prescribed period of time, the

court agrees with those of its sister courts that have held that [section 1361] attaches only in the

most egregious of cases. A delay of some sixteen months in reaching a decision on an appeal of a

denial of a naturalization application, while perhaps unusual, is not so extreme or outrageous as

to warrant [a writ of mandamus].”) Moreover, after receiving Plaintiff's I-751 petition, USCIS

Case 1:24-cv-12514-ADB Document4 Filed 12/18/24 Page 6of7

acted promptly to notify Plaintiff that the validity of his conditional permanent residency had

been extended.

In addition, mandamus relief is not available because an “adequate conventional means

for review” exists. Under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), “[a] person suffering legal

wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the

meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof.” 5 U.S.C. § 702. The APA

mandates that “within a reasonable time, each agency shall proceed to conclude a matter

presented to it,” and that a reviewing court shall “compel agency action unlawfully withheld or

unreasonably delayed.” 5 ULS.C. §§ 555(b), 706(1). That said, as noted above, Plaintiff has not

alleged any facts that would show that a determination on his I-751 petition has been

unreasonably delayed.

In short, Plaintiff has not alleged any facts showing that he is entitled to relief. I therefore

recommend that this action be dismissed on that ground.

Case 1:24-cv-12514-ADB Document4 Filed 12/18/24 Page 7 of7

IV. Conclusion

For the reasons stated above:

1. Plaintiff's motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED.

2. The Clerk shall reassign this case to a District Judge.

3. I recommend that the District Judge dismiss this action for failure to state a claim

upon which relief may be granted.”

/s/ Paul G. Levenson

Paul G. Levenson

Dated: December 18, 2024 U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE

> The parties are advised that under the provisions of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b), any

party who objects to this recommendation must file specific written objections thereto with the

Clerk of this Court within 14 days of service of this Report and Recommendation. The written

objections must specifically identify the portion of the proposed findings, recommendations, or

report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The parties are further

advised that the United States Court of Appeals for this Circuit has repeatedly indicated that

failure to comply with Rule 72(b) will preclude further appellate review of the District Court’s

order based on this Report and Recommendation. See Keating v. Secretary of Health & Human

Servs., 848 F.2d 27] (Ist Cir. 1988); United States v. Valencia-Copete, 792 F.2d 4 (1st Cir. 1986);

Scott v. Schweiker, 702 F.2d 13,14 (1st Cir. 1983); United States v. Vega, 678 F.2d 376, 378-79

(1st Cir. 1982); Park Motor Mart, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 616 F.2d 603 (Ist Cir. 1980); see also

Thomas y. Arn, 4J4.ULS, 140 (1985).

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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