“Whether qualified immunity can be invoked turns on the objective legal reasonableness of the official’s acts. And reasonableness of official action, in turn, must be assessed in light of the legal rules that were clearly established at the time the action was taken.”
How later courts described this case
- “Whether qualified immunity can be invoked turns on the objective legal reasonableness of the official’s acts. And reasonableness of official action, in turn, must be assessed in light of the legal rules that were clearly established at the time the action was taken.”
- court found that a forensic chemist would have had fair warning that fabricating evidence was a constitutional violation
- judicial function of parole board members warranted absolute immunity
- “A social worker who lacks any legitimate justification for seizing a child, but nonetheless seizes the child and demands, in direct contravention of a court order, that she enter the custody of her abusive father, would clearly know that his conduct is unconstitutional.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF UTAH
AMANDA WOOD, in her personal capacity and as MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
personal representative of LINDA NEMELKA and ORDER GRANTING IN PART [ECF
the ESTATE OF LINDA NEMELKA, MARJORIE NOS. 55, 56, AND 80] DEFENDANTS’
CHARLES-SCOTT, in her personal capacity and as
MOTIONS TO DISMISS
representative of SHANDON NICOLE SCOTT and
ESTATE OF SHANDON NICOLE SCOTT, CHRIS
MILLER and CINDY MILLER on behalf of M.M., Case No. 2:23-cv-00334-DBB
WILFRED ROBLES AND SANDRA CECILIA
MOGUEL, co-personal representatives of SANDRA District Judge David Barlow
FIORELLA ROBLES and ESTATE OF SANDRA
FIORELLA ROBLES, KIMBERLE DIXON as heir
of the ESTATE OF FARRELL BARTSCHI,
BETHANY SCHMUCKER, CLARENCE
NEWMAN, ESTATE OF HERMAN
SCHMUCKER, LAURICE WILLIAMSON,
personal representative of MORGAN KAY HARRIS
and the ESTATE OF MORGAN KAY HARRIS,
SUSAN ZAWALSKI, CHRISTINE MCNICOL,
JAMIE HINOJOSA,
Plaintiffs,
v.
STATE OF UTAH, UTAH DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS, UTAH BOARD OF PARDONS
AND PAROLE, UTAH ADULT PROBATION &
PAROLE, ALL STATE AGENCIES, GOVERNOR
SPENCER COX, LT. GOVENOR DEIDRE
HENDERSON, BRIAN NIELSON, BRIAN REDD,
MIKE HADDON, DAN BLANCHARD, SCOTT
STEPHENSON, DOE UTAH DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS OFFICERS AND AGENTS 1–25,
DOE BOARD MEMBERS 1–10 OF UTAH
BOARD OF PARDONS AND PAROLE, DOE
UTAH BOARD OF PARDONS AND PAROLE
OFFICERS AND AGENTS 1–25, DOE ADULT
PROBATION AND PAROLE OFFICERS AND
AGENTS 1–25,
Defendants.
Before the court are the Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss. Plaintiffs Amanda Wood,1
Marjorie Charles-Scott,2 Chris Miller and Cindy Miller on behalf of M.M., Wilfred Robles and
Sandra Cecilia Moguel,3 Kimberlie Dixon,4 Bethany Schmucker, Clarence Newman, Estate of
Herman Schmucker, Laurice Williamson,5 Susan Zawalski, Christie McNicol, and Jamie
Hinojosa (collectively “Plaintiffs”) filed their Amended Complaint on February 15, 2024.6
Defendants State of Utah; Utah Department of Corrections (“UDC”); Utah Adult Probation and
Parole (“AP&P”); Spencer Cox, Governor of the State of Utah (“Gov. Cox”); Deidre Henderson,
Lieutenant Governor of the State of Utah (“Lt. Gov. Henderson”); Brian Nielson, former
Executive Director of UDC (“Mr. Nielson”); Brian Redd, Executive Director of UDC (“Mr.
Redd”); Dan Blanchard, Former Division Director of AP&P (“Mr. Blanchard”) (together “State
Defendants”); Utah Board of Pardons and Parole (“UBPP”); Mike Haddon, Director of UBPP
(“Mr. Haddon”); and Scott Stephenson, Chair of UBPP (“Mr. Stephenson”) 7 (together “Board
Defendants”); (collectively “Defendants”) move to dismiss the Amended Complaint under Rule
12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.8 For the reasons stated below, Defendants’
motions are granted on Plaintiffs’ federal claims.
1 Amanda Wood is personal representative of Linda Nemelka and the Estate of Linda Nemelka.
2 Marjorie Charles-Scott is personal representative of Shandon Nicole Scott and the Estate of Shandon Nicole Scott.
3 Wilfred Robles and Sandra Cecilia Moguel are co-personal representatives of Sandra Fiorella Robles and the
Estate of Sandra Fiorella Robles.
4 Kimberlie Dixon is heir of the Estate of Farrell Bartschi.
5 Laurice Williamson is personal representative of Morgan Kay Harris and the Estate of Morgan Kay Harris.
6 Amended Complaint (“Am. Compl.”), ECF No. 40, filed Feb. 15, 2024.
7 The Amended Complaint erroneously refers to Mr. Stephenson as “Scott Stephensen” and states he is the Division
Director of AP&P. The court refers to Mr. Stephenson under his correct name and title.
8 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim (“State MTD”), ECF No. 55, filed April 29, 2024; Motion to
Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim (“Board MTD”), ECF No. 56, filed April 29, 2024; Scott Stephenson’s Motion
to Dismiss (“Stephenson MTD”), ECF No. 80, filed Aug. 30, 2024. The Board Defendants have incorporated State
Defendant’s motion. See Board MTD 37; Stephenson MTD 4. Therefore, the court refers to Defendants’ collective
arguments where appropriate.
BACKGROUND
This case arises from the undeniably tragic injuries inflicted upon Plaintiffs by formerly
incarcerated individuals (the “Offenders”). Plaintiffs or their family members have all been
harmed by Offenders who they allege were on parole, under state supervision, or improperly
released from state custody, resulting in physical injuries and, in some instances, death.9
Plaintiffs allege these harms were caused by the failure of various agencies and
individuals in the Utah state government to keep the Offenders in custody or monitor them after
their release.10 Utah Department of Corrections is a department of the State of Utah that oversees
state corrections activities.11 Defendant Brian Redd is the current executive director of UDC, and
Brian Nielson is the former executive director.12 The Utah Board of Pardons and Parole oversees
pardon and parole decision making in Utah, and Mike Haddon serves as its director.13 Plaintiffs
allege that in 2016, UBPP was audited and given recommendations for improvement.14 When
UBPP was audited again in 2022, it was determined that UBPP had not implemented the
previous recommendations, resulting in unqualified individuals being released on parole.15
The results of these audits were allegedly provided to Governor Cox, Lieutenant
Governor Henderson, Mr. Nielson, Mr. Blanchard, and Mr. Haddon.16 Plaintiffs allege that UBPP
knew it was releasing violent individuals on parole, which put the public at risk.17 Plaintiffs
9 Am. Compl. ¶¶ 152–153; ¶¶ 171–173; ¶¶ 199–207; ¶¶ 219–220; ¶¶ 233–235; ¶¶ 249–260; ¶¶ 270–273; ¶¶ 280–
283; ¶¶ 291–294; ¶¶ 302–305.
10 Id. at ¶¶ 78–82.
11 Id. at ¶ 23.
12 Id. at ¶¶ 24–25.
13 Id. at ¶¶ 27–28.
14 Id. at ¶¶ 64–65.
15 Id. at ¶¶ 66–70.
16 Id. at ¶ 73.
17 Id. at ¶¶ 70–72.
further allege that Governor Cox and Lieutenant Governor Henderson knew or should have
known that UBPP had serious deficiencies and was releasing violent offenders from prison and
allowed this improper release and monitoring to continue.18
Plaintiffs next allege that state agencies and officials failed to adequately monitor
individuals on probation and parole. Utah Adult Probation and Parole is the division of UDC
tasked with supervising parolees who are under the custody and control of UDC.19 Dan
Blanchard is the former Division Director of AP&P, and Scott Stephenson is the current
director.20 Plaintiffs allege AP&P, Mr. Blanchard, and Mr. Stephenson failed to properly train
their officers and agents, which created an environment where officers and agents believed they
did not have to properly supervise the Offenders and other individuals on parole.21 Plaintiffs
allege the AP&P officers and agents they supervised made minimal or no contact with the
Offenders and falsified information in their reports so AP&P administration would believe the
Offenders were being properly supervised despite ongoing parole violations.22 Plaintiffs also
summarily allege that Defendants UDC, AP&P, UBPP, Cox, Henderson, Nielson, Blanchard,
Haddon, and the Doe UDC Board Members falsified, concealed, and destroyed records to cover
up their failures in monitoring the Offenders and other individuals.23
Plaintiffs allege that, as a result of Defendants’ conduct, they were harmed by Offenders
between January 2020 and February 2023.24 Plaintiffs originally filed their complaint in Utah
18 Id. at ¶¶ 74–77.
19 Id. at ¶ 31.
20 Id. at ¶¶ 32–33.
21 Id. at ¶¶ 120–125.
22 Id. at ¶¶ 116–117.
23 Id. at ¶ 199; ¶ 270.
24 Id. at ¶¶ 144–146.
state court, but Defendants removed the action based on Plaintiffs’ federal claims on May 24,
2023.25 Defendants State of Utah, AP&P, UDC, UBPP, Mr. Blanchard, Mr. Nielson, and Mr.
Haddon filed motions to dismiss on August 22, 2023.26 On February 8, 2024, the parties filed a
stipulated motion for leave to amend the complaint, which was granted.27 Plaintiffs filed their
Amended Complaint on February 15, 2024, and the court denied as moot the outstanding
motions to dismiss.28
State Defendants and Board Defendants filed their new Motions to Dismiss on April 29,
2024.29 Plaintiffs filed their Opposition to the Board Defendants’ Motion on July 26, 2024,30 and
their Opposition to State Defendants’ Motion on July 29, 2024.31 Defendants filed their replies
on August 30, 2024.32
25 Notice of Removal, ECF No. 2, filed May 24, 2023.
26 Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 22, filed August 22, 2023 (“State MTD”); Board of Pardons and Parole and Mike
Haddon’s Motion to Dismiss (“Board MTD”), ECF No. 23, filed August 23, 2023.
27 Stipulated Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint, ECF No. 38, filed Feb. 8, 2024; Order Granting Stipulated
Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint, ECF No. 39, filed Feb. 13, 2024.
28 Amended Complaint; Docket Text Order denying without prejudice Motions to Dismiss, ECF No. 41, filed Feb.
16, 2024.
29 State MTD; Board MTD.
30 Memorandum in Opposition to Board Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (“Opp. to Board MTD”), ECF No. 62, filed
July 26, 2024.
31 Memorandum in Opposition to State of Utah Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (“Opp. to State MTD”), ECF No. 66,
filed July 29, 2024. On August 2, 2024, Magistrate Judge Bennett issued an order for Plaintiffs to show cause why
their case against Mr. Stephenson should not be dismissed for lack of prosecution. See Order to Show Cause, ECF
No. 67, filed Aug. 2, 2024. Plaintiffs responded by requesting that Defendants’ attorneys be allowed to clarify
whether they represent Mr. Stephenson. See Plaintiffs’ Response to Order to Show Cause, ECF No. 70, filed Aug.
16, 2024. Counsel for Mr. Stephenson filed a notice of appearance on August 22, 2024, and filed a stipulated motion
for extension of time to file an answer the next day. See Notice of Appearance of Counsel, ECF No. 71, filed Aug.
23, 2024; Joint Stipulated Motion for Extension of Time to Answer Complaint, ECF No. 72, filed Aug. 23, 2024.
Mr. Stephenson is represented by the same counsel as UBPP and serves as its chair, therefore he is included as a
Board Defendant.
32 Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss and Memorandum in Support (“State Reply”), ECF No. 78,
filed Aug. 30, 2024; Board of Pardons and Parole and Mike Haddon’s Reply Memorandum in Support of their
Motion to Dismiss (“Board Reply”), ECF No. 79, filed Aug. 30, 2024.
STANDARD
“Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate only if the complaint, viewed in the light
most favorable to plaintiff, lacks enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.”33 “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”34
“In evaluating a motion to dismiss, the court must take as true all well-pleaded facts, as
distinguished from conclusory allegations, view all reasonable inferences in favor of the
nonmoving party, and liberally construe the pleadings.”35 However, conclusory statements and
legal conclusions are “not entitled to the assumption of truth.”36
DISCUSSION
Plaintiffs assert eight causes of action, including two federal and six Utah state law
claims. The court first addresses the federal claims.
I. Federal Claims
Plaintiffs assert two federal claims, both arising under § 1983. First, they allege a group
of individual Defendants created the danger that harmed them and their loved ones.37 Second,
they allege that all Defendants failed to train and supervise AP&P officers.38 Defendants raise
immunity doctrines in response, claiming they are shielded from litigation by absolute and
33 Abdi v. Wray, 942 F.3d 1019, 1025 (10th Cir. 2019) (citing United States ex rel. Reed v. KeyPoint Gov’t Sols., 923
F.3d 729, 764 (10th Cir. 2019)).
34 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citation omitted).
35 McNellis v. Douglas Cnty. Sch. Dist., 116 F.4th 1122, 1130–31 (10th Cir. 2024) (quoting Reznik v. inContact, Inc.,
18 F.4th 1257, 1260 (10th Cir. 2021)) (also quoting Ruiz v. McDonnell, 299 F.3d 1173, 1181 (10th Cir. 2002))
(cleaned up).
36 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 1951 (emphasis omitted).
37 Am. Compl. 43. Plaintiffs assert this claim “against Governor Spencer Cox, Lt. Governor Deidre Henderson,
Brian Nielson, Mike Haddon, Dan Blanchard, & all Doe defendants (in their individual capacities).”
38 Id. at 55–58. Plaintiffs assert this claim “against all defendants in their official and individual capacities.”
qualified immunity. Before considering Defendants’ immunity claims, the court addresses which
parties Plaintiffs have properly included in their federal claims. 39
Section 1983 provides a civil action against every “person” who deprives another person
of their federal rights.40 “It is well established that arms of the state, or state officials acting in
their official capacities, are not ‘persons’ within the meaning of § 1983 and therefore are immune
from § 1983 damages suits.”41
Plaintiffs bring their fifth cause of action for failure to supervise under § 1983 against all
Defendants, including the State of Utah, UDC, UBPP, AP&P, and all state agencies (“Entity
Defendants”).42 However, their Amended Complaint does not plausibly allege that any of these
Entity Defendants are suable persons under § 1983.43 Moreover, the individual Defendants may
only be sued under § 1983 in their individual capacity.44 Therefore, the Amended Complaint fails
39 Plaintiffs’ briefs refer only to “Doe Officers and Agents 1–50.” See Opp. to State MTD i; Opp. to Board MTD i.
However, the Amended Complaint lists four groups of Does for a total of 85 Doe Defendants. See Am. Compl. 2
(listing Doe Utah Department of Corrections Officers and Agents 1–25, Doe Board Members 1–10 of Utah Board of
Pardons and Parole, Doe Utah Board of Pardons and Parole Officers and Agents 1–25, and Doe Adult Probation and
Parole Officers and Agents 1–25). Regardless, no Doe has been identified by Plaintiffs or served. Therefore, the
court does not address the Doe Defendants further.
40 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Nelson v. Geringer, 295 F.3d 1082, 1097 (10th Cir. 2002) (quoting Seminole Tribe of Fla. v.
Fla., 517 U.S. 44, 74 (1996) (Section 1983 did not create any substantive rights, but merely enforces existing
constitutional and federal statutory rights).
41 Hull v. State of New Mexico Tax’n & Revenue Department’s Motor Vehicle Div., 179 F. App’x 445, 446 (10th Cir.
2006) (citing Howlett By & Through Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 365 (1990)) (also citing Will v. Michigan Dep’t
of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989)) (“an entity with Eleventh Amendment immunity is not a ‘person’ within the
meaning of § 1983”).
42 Amended Complaint 55.
43 Opp. to State MTD 5 (“Plaintiffs agree that Governor Cox, Lt. Governor Henderson, UDC, AP&P, and UBP are
not ‘persons’ for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in their official capacity for Claim 5 Failure to Train and/or
Supervise. . . However, Defendants Cox, Henderson, Blanchard, Redd, Haddon, and Nielson in their individual
capacities are ‘persons’ under § 1983 and are subject to liability.”); Opp. to Board MTD 10 (“Plaintiffs agree that
UBP, Mike Haddon, and unnamed Board Members and Officers and Agents are not ‘persons’ for purposes of 42
U.S.C. §1983 in their official capacities for Claim 5 Failure to Train and/or Supervise. . . However, Mike Haddon
and unnamed Board Members and Officers and Agents in their individual capacities are ‘persons’ under § 1983 and
are subject to liability.”) (emphasis in original).
44 See Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991) (citing Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985)) (“Suits against
state officials in their official capacity therefore should be treated as suits against the State.”)
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted against the State of Utah, UDC, UBPP, AP&P,
all state agencies, and all individual Defendants in their official capacity.
Plaintiffs’ federal claims are therefore only evaluated against the named individual
Defendants in their individual capacity. The remaining federal claims are (1) for state created
danger against Gov. Cox, Lt. Gov. Henderson, Mr. Nielson, Mr. Haddon, and Mr. Blanchard in
their individual capacities and (2) for failure to train and/or supervise against Gov. Cox, Lt. Gov.
Henderson, Mr. Nielson, Mr. Redd, Mr. Blanchard, and Mr. Stephenson in their individual
capacities (hereinafter “Defendants”).
a. Absolute Immunity
Board Defendants argue they are absolutely immune from lawsuits based on their release
decisions.45 Plaintiffs respond that UBPP is not a judicial body, so its members should not be
given absolute immunity.46 They allege that UBPP is part of the executive branch, so its
members do not qualify for the absolute immunity given to judicial and quasi-judicial roles.
“Absolute immunity flows not from rank or title or ‘location within the Government,’ but
from the nature of the responsibilities of the individual official.”47 The Supreme Court has
identified several factors applicable to determining “absolute as contrasted with qualified
immunity.”48 The parties do not meaningfully analyze these factors. However, the Tenth Circuit
has found that parole board members are “absolutely immune from damages liability for actions
taken in performance of the Board’s official duties regarding the granting or denying parole.”49
45 Board MTD 28.
46 Opp. to Board MTD 16.
47 Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 201–2 (1985).
48 Id. at 202.
49 Knoll v. Webster, 838 F.2d 450, 451 (10th Cir. 1988) (per curiam).
“Damages simply are not available against parole board members under these circumstances.”50
This immunity derives from the absolute immunity given to “judges and others performing
judicial or ‘quasi-judicial’ functions” regardless of whether they are organized under the
executive or judicial branch.51 Accordingly, the Board Defendants have absolute immunity from
Plaintiffs’ claims based on their decisions to grant or deny parole. Because the parties do not
analyze any other claims against the Board Defendants against all the applicable factors,52 the
court turns to the question of qualified immunity.
b. Qualified Immunity
Qualified immunity shields state officers from civil liability if their conduct “does not
violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would
have known.”53 “When a defendant raises the qualified-immunity defense, ‘the onus is on the
plaintiff to demonstrate (1) that the official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2)
that the right was clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct.’”54 “Courts have
discretion to decide ‘which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be
addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand.’”55 Here, the court will
first examine whether Defendants’ conduct violated clearly established rights under federal law.
50 Knoll, 838 F.2d at 451.
51 Russ v. Uppah, 972 F.2d 300, 303 (10th Cir. 1992) (citation omitted); see also Mee v. Ortega, 967 F.2d 423, 428
(10th Cir. 1992) (judicial function of parole board members warranted absolute immunity).
52 See Cleavinger, 474 U.S. at 202.
53 Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)).
54 Cummings v. Dean, 913 F.3d 1227, 1239 (10th Cir. 2019) (quoting Quinn v. Young, 780 F.3d 998, 1004 (10th Cir.
2015) (emphasis and internal quotations removed)).
55 Stewart v. Beach, 701 F.3d 1322, 1330 (10th Cir. 2012) (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009)).
“A clearly established right is one that is ‘sufficiently clear that every reasonable official
would have understood that what he is doing violates that right.’”56 “The relevant, dispositive
inquiry in determining whether a right is clearly established is whether it would be clear to a
reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.”57 Generally,
“[i]n order for the law to be clearly established, there must be a Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit
decision on point, or the clearly established weight of authority from other courts must have
found the law to be as the plaintiff maintains.”58 “[C]learly established law must be
‘particularized’ to the facts of the case.”59
Plaintiffs do not point to a case that would have informed Defendants that their conduct
violated federal law. Indeed, while Plaintiffs provide brief quotes from a number of cases about
the legal standard, they do not discuss the facts of those cases or how they would have made
Defendants aware that their conduct violated federal law.60 Instead, Plaintiffs argue that they do
not need to find a case with the exact same facts they have alleged to overcome qualified
immunity.61 But the Supreme Court has emphasized that still “existing precedent must have
placed the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.”62 Plaintiffs do not explain how
that standard has been met here. While Plaintiffs do not discuss the cases they cite, none of them
are about state officials violating federal rights through failures involving the probation or parole
56 Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 11 (2015) (quoting Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664 (2012)).
57 Stearns v. Clarkson, 615 F.3d 1278, 1282 (10th Cir. 2010) (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001)).
58 Id. (quoting Murrell v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, Denver, 186 F.3d 1238, 1251 (10th Cir. 1999)).
59 White v. Pauly, 580 U.S. 73, 79 (2017) (per curiam) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)).
60 Opp. to State MTD 22–24.
61 Opp. to State MTD 23–25.
62 Rivas-Villegas v. Cortesluna, 595 U.S. 1, 5 (2021) (cleaned up).
of offenders who then go on to injure others.63 This is insufficient for Plaintiffs to carry their
burden on qualified immunity.
Next, Plaintiffs argue that Defendants’ activity was so obviously unlawful that a similar
case has not yet arisen.64 “Qualified immunity does not protect an officer where the
constitutional violation was so obvious under general well-established constitutional principles
that any reasonable officer would have known the conduct was unconstitutional.”65 “Cases
featuring obvious constitutional violations typically involve unlawful conduct that is ‘obviously
egregious.’”66 “The more obviously egregious the conduct in light of prevailing constitutional
principles, the less specificity is required from prior case law to clearly establish the violation.”67
The Supreme Court has found that such cases are “rare.”68 Ultimately, the question is “whether
our precedents render the legality of the conduct undebatable.”69
Plaintiffs argue that Defendants’ conduct was obviously unconstitutional because
Defendants should have known their improper offender release decisions, failure to fulfill their
offender monitoring obligations, and related misdeeds “would lead to offenders having
unfettered ability to cause harm.”70 But Plaintiffs must demonstrate obvious unlawfulness under
63 Plaintiffs cite Uhlrig v. Harder, 64 F.3d 567 (10th Cir. 1995). Uhlrig involved the killing of a therapist at a mental
hospital by a custodial patient. It affirmed judgment in favor of the defendants on the grounds of qualified immunity
and does not support Plaintiffs’ attempt to overcome qualified immunity here.
64 Opp. to State MTD 23–25.
65 Rosales v. Bradshaw, 72 F.4th 1145, 1157 (10th Cir. 2023); (citing Taylor v. Riojas, 592 U.S. 7, 8 (2020)); see also
Browder v. City of Albuquerque, 787 F.3d 1076, 1082 (10th Cir. 2015) .
66 Id. (quoting Truman v. Orem City, 1 F.4th 1227, 1240 (10th Cir. 2021)).
67 Pierce v. Gilchrist, 359 F.3d 1279, 1298 (10th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted).
68 D.C. v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 64 (2018).
69 Lowe v. Raemisch, 864 F.3d 1205, 1211 (10th Cir. 2017) (citing Aldaba v. Pickens, 844 F.3d 870, 877 (10th Cir.
2016)).
70 Opp. to State MTD 25.
federal law, not just the likelihood that harm could result.71 Plaintiffs have failed to meet that
standard.
Plaintiffs reference Tenth Circuit cases where the court identified obviously
unconstitutional conduct, including where a forensic chemist fabricated evidence to wrongfully
convict a defendant,72 state officers seized a high school student and coerced her to live with her
abusive father,73 and where an off-duty officer in civilian clothing followed a driver home for no
law-enforcement purpose and then pointed a gun at the driver.74 But Plaintiffs do not articulate
how Defendants’ actions in this case are similarly obviously violative of federal law. Other cases
cited by Plaintiff found that the officer’s conduct was not obviously unlawful.75 Again, Plaintiffs
fail to distinguish, or even discuss, any of these cases.
In sum, Plaintiffs have failed to carry their burden to demonstrate that the law was clearly
established such that every reasonable defendant would know that their conduct violated federal
law at the relevant time. Accordingly, Defendants’ motions to dismiss must be granted on the
federal claims.
71 See Wesby, 583 U.S. at 64; Ziglar v. Abbasi, 582 U.S. 120, 151 (2017) (“Whether qualified immunity can be
invoked turns on the objective legal reasonableness of the official’s acts. And reasonableness of official action, in
turn, must be assessed in light of the legal rules that were clearly established at the time the action was taken.”)
(citations omitted).
72 Pierce v. Gilchrist, 359 F.3d 1279, 1298 (10th Cir. 2004) (court found that a forensic chemist would have had fair
warning that fabricating evidence was a constitutional violation).
73 Jones v. Hunt, 410 F.3d 1221, 1231 (10th Cir. 2005) (“A social worker who lacks any legitimate justification for
seizing a child, but nonetheless seizes the child and demands, in direct contravention of a court order, that she enter
the custody of her abusive father, would clearly know that his conduct is unconstitutional.”)
74Rosales v. Bradshaw, 72 F.4th 1145, 1157 (10th Cir. 2023).
75 Lowe v. Raemisch, 864 F.3d 1205, 1210 (10th Cir. 2017) (depriving an inmate of outdoor exercise for two years
and one month “would not have obviously crossed a constitutional line” so defendants were entitled to qualified
immunity).
I. State Claims
Under 28 USC § 1367(c)(3), the court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
over a claim if it has “dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.”’° “When all
federal claims have been dismissed, the court may, and usually should, decline to exercise
jurisdiction over any remaining state claims.””’ Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted on their federal claims; therefore, the court declines to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ state law claims.
ORDER
Defendants’ motions to dismiss are GRANTED without prejudice on Plaintiffs’ federal
claims (styled as the First Cause of Action and Fifth Cause of Action).’* The court declines to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ remaining state law claims. If they have a
basis for so doing, Plaintiffs may move for leave to amend their Complaint within 30 days of this
order. If they do not so move, the court will remand this case to Utah state court.
Signed January 3, 2025.
BY THE COURT:
David Barlow
United States District Court Judge
7 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).
™ Crane v. Utah Dept of Corr., 15 FAth 1296, 1314 (10th Cir. 2021) (quoting Koch v. City of Del City, 660 F.3d
1228, 1248 (10th Cir. 2011)); see also St. George v. City of Lakewood, Colorado, No. 22-1333, 2024 WL 3687780,
at *6 (10th Cir. 2024) (district court properly acted within its discretion in declining to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over state-law claims after dismissing § 1983 claims).
78 ECF 55; ECF 56; ECF 80.
13