Bennett v. Butler County Board of Education

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF ALABAMA

NORTHERN DIVISION

REGINA BENNETT, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) CASE NO. 2:18-cv-01061-RAH

) [WO]

BUTLER COUNTY BOARD )

OF EDUCATION, )

)

Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

INTRODUCTION

This case returns after remand from the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals

concerning the Title VII race discrimination claim of Plaintiff Regina Bennett.

Specific to Bennett, the Court previously granted summary judgment in favor of the

Butler County Board of Education (“Board”) and against Bennett, finding that

Bennett “failed to provide sufficient evidence showing that her reassignment within

the same school constituted an actionable adverse action” and that “[h]er subjective

and conclusory assertions, like that she was ‘set up to fail’ or that the position was

less prestigious, [were] insufficient.” West v. Butler Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 614 F. Supp.

3d 1050, 1067–68 (M.D. Ala. 2022), vacated in part, No. 23-10186, 2024 WL

2697987 (11th Cir. May 24, 2024). The Court further found that while Bennett’s

“transfer, [may be] a personal setback, [it] did not arise to ‘severe professional

trauma,’” and thus the reassignment did not constitute an actionable adverse action.

Id. at 1068 (quoting Doe v. Dekalb Cnty. Sch. Dist., 145 F.3d 1441, 1453 (11th Cir.

1998)). While on appeal, the United States Supreme Court released its decision in

Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, 601 U.S. 346 (2024). In that decision, the Supreme

Court clarified the inquiry into what constitutes an actionable adverse employment

action under Title VII. After Muldrow, the Eleventh Circuit remanded Bennett’s

case for this Court to re-examine Bennett’s claim in light of Muldrow. The Court

now does so.

BACKGROUND

The lengthy facts and background concerning this matter were previously

outlined in detail in the Court’s summary judgment opinion issued on July 11, 2022.

See West, 614 F. Supp. 3d at 1058–62. But those facts pertinent to the current issue

are as follows.

In February 2017, the Butler County Board of Education hired Dr. John

Strycker as its new superintendent to revitalize its failing school district. As part of

the overall revitalization and restructuring process, numerous employees were

transferred or reassigned. Bennett, a black female, was one such employee. She

was reassigned from a position as a guidance counselor, a position she had held for

sixteen years, to a kindergarten teacher. (Doc. 162-10 at 33–34, 40–41; Doc. 183-1

at 49.) Bennett’s former position was filled by LeNicki Moore, a black female.

(Doc. 158 at 5–6; Doc. 159 at 11.) Bennett suffered no change in compensation,

work location, or work hours.

Bennett was given no reason for her reassignment (doc. 162-11 at 9), but the

reassignment occurred shortly after a series of disagreements between Bennett and

her principal and immediate supervisor, Jacqueline Thornton (black female), who

Bennett previously accused of harassing her (doc. 154-9 at 3–5; doc. 162-10 at 47–

48, 53, 158–60).

Along with several other affected employees, Bennett filed suit, claiming race

discrimination. She claimed her future job advancement prospects were harmed and

that she was transferred to a less prestigious position that had less student impact.

(Doc. 162-10 at 33; Doc. 183-1 at 25–26; Doc. 189-5 at 11.) She also claimed that

she held a nine-month employment contract, and as a teacher, she now has less

opportunities to procure a ten-month contract and a raise. (Doc. 373 at 58.) Her

race-discrimination claim against the Board is the only claim remaining.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

At this stage in the litigation, the Court once again construes all facts in the

light most favorable to the nonmoving party, resolving any inferences or disputes of

material facts in that party’s favor. See Fla. Int’l Univ. Bd. of Trs. v. Fla. Nat’l Univ.,

Inc., 830 F.3d 1242, 1252 (11th Cir. 2016). Under this lens, “[s]ummary judgment

is [only] proper if the evidence shows ‘that there is no genuine dispute as to any

material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’” Hornsby-

Culpepper v. Ware, 906 F.3d 1302, 1311 (11th Cir. 2018) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P.

56(a)). Conclusory allegations that lack factual support do not suffice to avoid

summary judgment. Jefferson v. Sewon Am., Inc., 891 F.3d 911, 924–25 (11th Cir.

2018). The movant bears the initial burden of demonstrating that there is no genuine

dispute as to any material fact, and the movant must identify the portions of the

record which support this proposition. Hornsby-Culpepper, 906 F.3d at 1311 (citing

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)). The movant may carry this

burden “by demonstrating that the nonmoving party has failed to present sufficient

evidence to support an essential element of the case.” Id. (citation omitted). “The

burden then shifts to the [nonmoving party] to establish, by going beyond the

pleadings, that a genuine issue of material fact exists.” Id. at 1311–12 (citation

omitted). The Court only considers disputes that involve material facts, and the

relevant substantive law that governs the case determines such materiality of fact.

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

DISCUSSION

The substantive law applicable here — Title VII — prohibits employers from

intentionally discriminating against their employees based on “race, color, religion,

sex, or national origin.” Lewis v. City of Union City, 918 F.3d 1213, 1220 (11th Cir.

2019) (en banc) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)). To survive summary

judgment, a plaintiff asserting an intentional discrimination claim under Title VII

“must make a sufficient factual showing to permit a reasonable jury to rule in her

favor.” Id. at 1217. In this Court’s previous opinion, it found that Bennett woefully

lacked direct evidence of intentional discrimination. West, 614 F. Supp. 3d at 1064.

Thus, to survive summary judgment, she had to either navigate the three-part,

McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework or present a convincing mosaic of

circumstantial evidence that would allow a jury to infer intentional discrimination

by the decisionmaker.

The McDonnell Douglas framework and the convincing mosaic are “one and

the same—both simply ways to describe the ‘ordinary summary judgment

standard.’” Bogle v. Ala. L. Enf’t Agency, No. 23-13947, 2024 WL 4635025, at *4

(11th Cir. Oct. 31, 2024) (quoting McCreight v. AuburnBank, 117 F.4th 1322, 1335

(11th Cir. 2024)) (explaining that the convincing mosaic theory is no different from

the usual summary judgment standard). Regardless of the framework or terminology

that the parties employ, the Court’s “ultimate task [is] to consider whether [Bennett]

put enough evidence in the record to convince a jury that [she] faced [race]

discrimination.” McCreight, 117 F.4th at 1338. Here, regardless of the analytical

tool that the Court uses, applying Muldrow and the favorable light that the evidence

must be viewed from, Bennett has presented sufficient evidence showing that a jury

could find that Bennett’s reassignment was a form of race discrimination in the

workplace. Because Bennett only invokes the McDonnell Douglas framework, that

framework will be considered.1

Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, it is the plaintiff’s burden to first

establish her prima facie case of race discrimination. Lewis, 918 F.3d at 1220. To

do this, a plaintiff must show: (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) “she was

subjected to an adverse employment action”; (3) the “employer treated ‘similarly

situated’ employees outside her class more favorably”; and (4) she was qualified to

perform her job. Id. at 1220–21; Holifield v. Reno, 115 F.3d 1555, 1562 (11th Cir.

1997) (per curiam). If the plaintiff meets these four elements, she creates a

rebuttable presumption of discrimination. See Cleveland v. Home Shopping

Network, Inc., 369 F.3d 1189, 1193 (11th Cir. 2004). The burden then shifts to the

defendant “to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for” the challenged

conduct. Id. Notably, the defendant’s burden at this stage is merely one of

production, and it need not “persuade the court that it was motivated by the

[proffered] reason.” Id. By meeting this burden, the defendant eliminates the

presumption of discrimination and leaves the plaintiff with the ultimate burden of

proving that the defendant acted with intentional discrimination. Id. Specifically,

the plaintiff must proffer sufficient evidence to create a genuine dispute of material

fact as to whether the defendant’s proffered reasons are pretextual. Failure to do so

entitles the defendant to summary judgment on the claim.

1 Bennett does not have to use the magic words “convincing mosaic” or McDonnell Douglas in

presenting her arguments for race discrimination. See McCreight, 117 F.4th at 1336–38 (“So long

as a plaintiff argues that she has presented enough evidence for a reasonable juror to infer

intentional discrimination, she has preserved that issue and put the court on notice of the relevant

standard. Regardless of the term used—“pretext,” “convincing mosaic,” “summary judgment”—

the substance of the argument is the same.”). But because the evidence presented fits easily within

a McDonnell Douglas analysis and Bennett does not present other evidence of discrimination, the

Court need not analyze the same evidence twice to come to the same conclusion. See id.

It is undisputed that Bennett is a member of a protected class and that she is

qualified to serve as a school counselor, so the Court proceeds through the remaining

elements of her prima facie case.

A. Adverse Employment Action: On Remand after Muldrow

The issue on remand is whether Bennett provided sufficient evidence of an

actionable adverse employment action when analyzed under Muldrow. She bears

that burden regardless of whether the McDonnell Douglas or a convincing mosaic

framework is applied. See Lewis, 918 F.3d at 1220 & n.6.

Muldrow lightened the load for plaintiffs who seek to establish an adverse

employment action. Previously, a plaintiff had to show a “serious and material

change in the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.” West, 2024 WL

2697987, at *2 (per curiam) (citation and internal quotations omitted). Now, a

plaintiff “need only show some injury respecting . . . employment terms or

conditions” rather than “a significant employment disadvantage.” Muldrow, 601

U.S. at 359 (emphasis added). In other words, a plaintiff need only show that the

“transfer . . . left her worse off[] but need not have left her significantly so.” Id. A

plaintiff no longer must show that the “adverse action specifically involve[d] a

reduction in pay, prestige, or responsibility” or that the transfer substantially “altered

the employee’s compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,

deprived . . . her of employment opportunities, or adversely affected his or her status

as an employee.” West, 2024 WL 2697987, at *2 (cleaned up).

In Muldrow, the plaintiff alleged that her employer engaged in sex

discrimination when she was transferred from her position as a plainclothes officer

in a specialized division to a uniformed officer position outside the specialized

division. Muldrow, 601 U.S. at 350–51. With that transfer, the plaintiff lost

“substantial responsibility over priority investigations and frequent opportunit[ies]

to work with police commanders” and instead was tasked with the supervision of

only “one district’s patrol officers,” which meant she traded her involvement in

“high-visibility matters” for primarily “administrative work.” Id. at 359. Her

“schedule [also] became less regular, often requiring her to work weekends; and she

lost her take-home car.” Id. The only thing that remained the same was her rank

and pay. Id. at 351. The Supreme Court explained that if all the plaintiff’s

allegations held sufficient evidence, then she “was left worse off several times over,”

and remanded the case for the district court to decide whether evidence demonstrated

that her transfer indeed left her “worse off.” Id. at 359.

While Muldrow has lowered a plaintiff’s burden, Muldrow did not change a

plaintiff’s obligation of presenting actual evidence of “some injury” when viewed

by the reasonable person standard; that is, an objective standard based on the

evidence. Davis v. Town of Lake Park, 245 F.3d 1232, 1239 (11th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he

employee’s subjective view of the . . . employer’s action is not controlling.”); see

also Jefferson, 891 F.3d at 921 (“The impact cannot be speculative and must at least

have a tangible adverse effect on the plaintiff’s employment.” (internal quotations

and citation omitted)); cf. Muldrow, 601 U.S. at 359 (changing only the plaintiff’s

burden from significant injury related to terms and conditions of employment to

“some injury”).

While it is undisputed that Bennett suffered no change in pay, work hours, or

work location as a result of the reassignment, she had “invest[ed her] time, money,

and [her] commitment to becoming a better counselor,” and her reassignment to a

kindergarten teacher position placed her, instead, in a position where she had not had

any experience or “professional development” in sixteen years. (Doc. 189-5 at 7.)

Bennett also held a nine-month employment contract, and “[a]s a teacher, there [are]

less opportunities for [Bennett] to get a [ten-month] contract[,] and there is less room

for growth and promotions.” (Id. at 11.) Bennett has sufficiently shown that these

changes constitute at least “some injury respecting [Bennett’s] . . . employment terms

or conditions,” such that she has shown that her reassignment has “left her worse

off.” Muldrow, 601 U.S. at 359 (emphasis added). Therefore, employing the some-

injury standard, Bennett has satisfied the requisite showing of an adverse

employment action.

B. Similarly Situated Employee Treated More Favorably

Bennett also satisfies the next prong of the framework: the treatment of a

similarly situated employee outside her protected class more favorably. See Lewis,

918 F.3d at 1220–21. The next prong of McDonnell Douglas is met when the

plaintiff presents “evidence of a comparator.” Jenkins v. Nell, 26 F.4th 1243, 1249

(11th Cir. 2022); see Lewis, 918 F.3d at 1218 (explaining that a plaintiff is required

to provide the court with a sufficient comparator at the prima facie stage). To present

sufficient comparator evidence, a plaintiff “must demonstrate that she and her

proffered comparators were ‘similarly situated in all material respects.’” Lewis, 918

F.3d at 1218. This standard does not require a plaintiff to offer an employment-

doppelganger except for their protected characteristic. Id. at 1226. Comparators do

not have to have the same job title or exactly the same job responsibilities—the

relevant inquiry is whether the employer subjected the comparator and plaintiff to

different employment policies. Id. at 1227 (citing Lathem v. Dep’t of Child. & Youth

Servs., 172 F.3d 786, 793 (11th Cir. 1999)). Basically, a valid comparison turns on

substantive likenesses—“not . . . formal labels.” Id. at 1228. While these rules serve

as a guidepost, “precisely what sort of similarity the in ‘all material respects’

standard entails [must] be worked out on a case-by-case basis, in the context of

individual circumstances.” Id. at 1227. And this objective analysis of whether a

plaintiff chose a valid comparator asks whether that plaintiff and her comparator can

“reasonably be distinguished.” Id. at 1228 (quoting Young v. United Parcel Serv.,

Inc., 575 U.S. 206, 231 (2015)). If they can be, then the two are not similarly situated

in all material respects. “An employer is well within its rights to accord different

treatment to employees who are differently situated in ‘material respects’—e.g., who

engaged in different conduct, who were subject to different policies, or who have

different work histories.” Id. “Treating different cases differently is not

discriminatory.” Id. at 1222–23.

Here, LeNicki Moore, a black female who the Board transferred from another

school within the school district, replaced Bennett as W.O. Parmer Elementary

School’s guidance counselor. (Doc. 154-8 at 5; Doc. 159 at 11; Doc. 165-8 at 168–

69.) Thus, Bennett argues that the school district should be viewed as a whole—not

as individual schools and places of employment—and that her comparators should

be the three guidance counselors within the school district who are white, who did

not receive a reassignment, and who all work at different schools: Charles T.

Henderson (white male), Tonya Coker (white female), and Haden Horton (white

female). (Doc. 183-1 at 27; Doc. 373 at 13.) She urges that while “none of the

[w]hite counselors have the same first-level supervisor” as her, the counselors are

still valid comparators because Dr. Stryker and the Board are the counselors’

“second and third level supervisors,” none of the counselors were “subject to

different personnel policies, procedures, rules [or] workplace guidelines” (doc. 183-

1 at 27), “all counselors have the same job description,” and under the Students First

Act, see Ala. Code (1975) § 16-24C-7(b), and the Board’s Policy Manual, the

superintendent may make reassignments within his “professional judgment” (id. at

28). She argues that with these statements, the evidence of the job description, and

the language of both Alabama law and the Board’s Policy Manual, that she has

shown that she is similarly situated with the three white counselors. (Id.)

The Board argues that Bennett has no valid comparator and therefore cannot

support a prima facie case because 1) Bennett was replaced with an individual of the

same protected class and 2) Bennett cannot point to another counselor to whom she

was similarly situated yet treated differently and who was under the supervision of

Ms. Thornton, principal of W. O. Palmer Elementary School and Bennett’s

immediate supervisor. (Doc. 159 at 29.)

The Board is wrong. Just because an employee is replaced by someone of her

same protected class does not automatically mean that the employee cannot establish

a prima facie case. See Howard v. Ry. Exp., Inc., 726 F.2d 1529, 1534 (11th Cir.

1984). Instead, the relevant inquiry is whether Bennett can provide evidence

showing the Board treated her differently than someone similarly situated to her.

See Lewis, 918 F.3d at 1218. And here, Henderson and Coker pass the test.2

The record reveals that Bennett, Henderson, and Coker cannot be “reasonably

. . . distinguished,” id. at 1228 (quoting Young, 575 U.S. at 231), because they have

the same job title, job description, same employer (the Board), and they have the

same “second and third level supervisors.” (Doc. 183-1 at 27.) While the Board is

correct in that all guidance counselors directly report to their respective principals,

the requirement that a plaintiff and the proposed comparator share the same

immediate supervisor is not absolute. See Lewis, 918 F.3d at 1228. More

importantly, the Board’s stated rationale for its differing immediate supervisor

argument is problematic because there is a question of fact about whether the school

principals actually recommended the guidance counselors’ transfers and

2 Ms. Horton is not a valid comparator. Ms. Horton is only similar in some material respects—she

is not “similarly situated in all material respects.” Lewis, 918 F.3d at 1218 (emphasis added).

Here, there is a material difference in that Ms. Horton’s immediate supervisor expressly opposed

Ms. Horton’s transfer (doc. 159 at 10; doc. 165-8 at 192), and there is no evidence of Bennett’s

immediate supervisor opposing her reassignment (doc. 154-9 at 5). There is no dispute that Ms.

Horton’s immediate supervisor expressly opposed Ms. Horton’s transfer. (Doc. 165-8 at 192–93;

Doc. 167-12 at 279–80; Doc. 168-1 at 295; Doc. 159 at 10.) And the only evidence presented that

concerns Principal Thornton’s attitude toward Bennett’s reassignment is that she was amicable to

the reassignment. (Doc. 183-1.) Regardless of who the ultimate decisionmaker was, an objective

analysis “in the context of [this case’s] individual circumstances” of the fact that an immediate

supervisor expressly opposed Ms. Horton’s transfer, “reasonably distinguishe[s],” her from

Bennett such that Ms. Horton is an invalid comparator. Lewis, 918 F.3d at 1227–28.

reassignments (and therefore put the wheels in motion) or whether the transfer

directives came directly from the Central Office.

For example, Bennett presented an email from the Board’s Administrative

Assistant, Joe Eiland, to Principal Thornton, directing Principal Thornton to

“copy/paste” her recommendation to reassign Bennett to Principal Thornton’s

letterhead and thanking her for her “cooperation in [the] matter.” (Doc. 186-1.) And

Dr. Strycker testified in his deposition that he “rel[ied] on Joe and Lisa’s

[(administrators in the Central Office)] recommendation” when he approved

Bennett’s reassignment from a guidance counselor to a kindergarten teacher. (Doc.

165-8 at 180; Doc. 183-1 at 19.)

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Bennett, a reasonable jury

could find that the decision to reassign Bennett came from Dr. Strycker or members

of the Board and not her immediate supervisor (Principal Thornton). All told,

Bennett has presented sufficient evidence to create a question of fact on this issue,

and therefore Bennett has sufficiently met her burden to establish her prima facie

case of race discrimination.

C. The Board’s Legitimate, Nondiscriminatory Reason for Bennett’s

Reassignment

Because Bennett has established her prima facie case of race discrimination,

the Board bears the burden “to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for”

Bennett’s reassignment. See Cleveland, 369 F.3d at 1193. Again, the Board’s

burden at this stage is merely one of production, and it need not “persuade the

[C]ourt [that] it was motivated by the [proffered] reason.” Id. “[T]o satisfy this

intermediate burden, the employer need only produce admissible evidence which

would allow the trier of fact rationally to conclude that the employment decision had

not been motivated by discriminatory animus.” Combs v. Plantation Patterns, 106

F.3d 1519, 1528 (11th Cir. 1997) (quoting Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affs. v. Burdine, 450

U.S. 248, 257 (1981)).

As for the decision to reassign Bennett, the Board states as follows in its

summary judgment brief:

Ms. Bennett’s principal reassigned her after . . . W.O. Parmer lost a half

counseling unit. The unit was reassigned as a teaching unit and Ms.

Thornton elected to use it for [Response to Instruction (“RTI”)]

purpose[s], a more focused form of instruction for students in need of

extra assistance. . . . Ms. Bennett was not RTI trained in academics.

Bennett’s reassignment was initiated by her immediate supervisor,

Principal Jackie Thornton. . . . Thornton . . . testified that [her]

legitimate reasons for reassigning Bennett [were] to best allocate the

personnel resources at her school after her school lost [half] of a

counseling unit (which was reallocated as a teaching unit). Principal

Thornton thought it was in the best interest of the students at her school

to reassign Ms. Bennett to the reallocated teaching unit.

(Doc. 159 at 29–30.)

This is a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason to reassign Bennett. So, the

burden shifts back to Bennett to show that this stated reason was a pretext for

discrimination.

To show pretext, Bennett can identify weaknesses, inconsistencies, or

contradictions in the Board’s articulated reasons for its actions such that a reasonable

factfinder would find them unworthy of credence. See Alvarez v. Royal Atl. Devs.,

Inc., 610 F.3d 1253, 1265 (11th Cir. 2010). In other words, Bennett cannot merely

attempt to recast the articulated nondiscriminatory reasons or substitute her business

judgment for that of the Board. A reason cannot be pretext for discrimination unless

it is shown both that the reason was false and that discrimination was the real reason.

Brooks v. Cnty. Comm’n of Jefferson Cnty., 446 F.3d 1160, 1163 (11th Cir. 2006).

As evidence of pretext, Bennett points to the Board’s shifting, inconsistent,

and nebulous reasons for her reassignment. The Eleventh Circuit has been clear that

evidence of an employer’s “shifting explanations for its actions” can constitute

sufficient evidence of pretext. See Cleveland, 369 F.3d at 1194 (“These inconsistent

reasons allowed the jury to question his credibility. Once [the decisionmaker’s]

credibility was damaged, a rational jury could infer that he did not fire [the plaintiff]

because of the infomercial, but rather because of her disability.”); Bechtel Constr.

Co. v. Sec’y of Lab., 50 F.3d 926, 935 (11th Cir. 1995) (“The pretextual nature of

[the decisionmaker’s] terminating [the plaintiff] is further demonstrated by [the

decisionmaker’s] shifting explanations for its actions.”). The Eleventh Circuit has

also recognized that vague and nebulous reasons can constitute evidence of pretext.

See Increase Minority Participation by Affirmative Change Today of Nw. Fla., Inc.

(IMPACT) v. Firestone, 893 F.2d 1189, 1194 (11th Cir. 1990) (rejecting the

statement that a candidate was best qualified as too vague because it “leaves no

opportunity for the employee to rebut the given reason as a pretext”). Indeed, a

“subjective reason is a legally sufficient, legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason only

if the [employer] articulates a clear and reasonably specific factual basis upon which

it based its subjective opinion.” Chapman v. AI Transp., 229 F.3d 1012, 1034 (11th

Cir. 2000) (en banc); see also Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255–56 (discussing that a

defendant must present its legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason with sufficient

clarity so that the plaintiff will have a full and fair opportunity to demonstrate

pretext).

Bennett points to an inconsistency within the Board’s “legitimate reasoning”

for her reassignment. She argues that while one of the Board’s reasons for

reassigning her was that she was not RTI trained, her replacement LeNicki Moore

“does not possess any type of certificate indicating she is RTI trained.” (Doc. 183-

1 at 30; Doc. 154-9 at 5 (discussing Moore’s training in aspects of RTI but failing

to assert that Moore holds a certificate in RTI training).) And even though she also

lacks RTI certification, Bennett previously was asked to and provided RTI services

when she was a guidance counselor. (Doc. 183-1 at 30.) Bennett also points to the

fact that while Principal Thornton claims to have initiated Bennett’s reassignment,

the Board’s Policy Manual and the Students First Act both state that the decision to

make reassignments belong to a chief executive officer or the superintendent, and

Principal Thornton is neither of those. (Id. at 31.)

Further, Bennett points to the inconsistency between Principal Thornton’s

affidavit and Dr. Stryker’s deposition. While Principal Thornton’s affidavit states

that “Bennett’s reassignment was solely [her] decision and did not require approval

from the BCBOE,” that she “advised the central office of [her] intent to reassign Ms.

Bennett toward the end of the 2018 spring semester,” and that she “unders[tood] that

Dr. Strycker then advised the Board of [her] decision for informational purposes

only,” (doc. 154-9 at 5), Dr. Stryker testified that he “took the recommendations of

‘Lisa’ and ‘Joe’ as to . . . Bennett’s reassignment.” (Doc. 183-1 at 32.) Bennett

argues that the shifting inconsistencies between the explanation for her reassignment

and the shifting explanation as to who had authority over her reassignment are

pretext for discrimination. These shifting, somewhat inconsistent and vague reasons

are sufficient evidence for Bennett to meet her burden to show the Board’s reasons

may be pretextual. See Cleveland, 369 F.3d at 1194; Bechtel Constr. Co., 50 F.3d

at 935.

Bennett has adequately shown material issues of fact as to whether the

proffered reasons for her transfer were the true reasons for the employment decision

as to Bennett. Accordingly, summary judgment as to Bennett’s race discrimination

claim is due to be denied.

CONCLUSION

After applying the some-injury standard to the adverse employment action

prong and considering the evidence in the light favorable to Plaintiff Regina Bennett

for the rest of the pertinent inquiry, the Board has not shown its entitlement to

summary judgment as to Bennett’s race discrimination claim against it.

Accordingly, it 1s hereby ORDERED that the Defendant’s Motion for Summary

Judgment as it relates to Regina Bennett (doc. 150) is DENIED.

DONE and ORDERED on this the 3rd day of January 2025.

R. Mp JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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