“[I]n those instances in which the factual predicate of a petitioner’s Rule 60(b) motion attacks the manner in which the earlier habeas judgment was procured and not the underlying conviction, the Rule 60(b) motion may be adjudicated on the merits.”
How later courts described this case
- “[I]n those instances in which the factual predicate of a petitioner’s Rule 60(b) motion attacks the manner in which the earlier habeas judgment was procured and not the underlying conviction, the Rule 60(b) motion may be adjudicated on the merits.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
PITTSBURGH DIVISION
JI'HAAD AMORE HARRISON, )
)
) Civil Action No. 2:22-cv-01453-CBB
Petitioner, )
) Christopher B. Brown
vs. ) United States Magistrate Judge
)
SUPERINTENDENT LONNIE J. )
)
OLIVER, and DISTRICT ATTORNEY
)
OF MERCER COUNTY, )
)
)
Respondents.
MEMORANDUM OPINION DENYING “MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM
JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO FED.R.CIV. RULE 60(b)(1), 60(b)(2), and
60(b)(6)” (ECF No. 61)
Pending before the Court is Petitioner Ji’Haad Amore Harrison’s second
Motion for Relief from Judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
60(b(1), 60(b)(2), and 60(b)(6). ECF No. 61. For the reasons that follow, the motion
will be transferred to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit for
consideration as an application to file a successive petition as required under 28
U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A).
I. Background and Procedural History
The background and procedural history of this case, as well as the
background of Harrison’s criminal proceedings, were described in detail in the
Court’s Memorandum Opinion of August 20, 2024, denying Harrison’s first motion
for relief pursuant to Rule 60(b). ECF No. 58. The Court transferred that motion to
the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit for consideration as an
application to file a successive petition as required under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A).
Id. On November 11, 2024, the Court of Appeals denied Harrison’s motion finding,
he has not satisfied the requirements for obtaining
authorization under § 2244 to file a new habeas petition,
as he has not made a prima facie showing that any of his
proposed claims relies on either “a new rule of
constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral
review by the Supreme Court, that was previously
unavailable,” or newly discovered evidence that
demonstrates his actual innocence.
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, C.A. No. 24-2572, Order,
11/15/2024. (Document No. 8).
On December 5, 2024, Harrison filed the instant motion. ECF No. 61. It
appears he is moving to set aside the judgment dismissing his federal habeas
petition based on two new claims: (1) trial counsel failed to investigate the crime
scene and (2) the district attorney’s office withheld exculpatory material. Id. at 2-3.
II. The Pending Motion
As thoroughly explained in this Court’s August 20, 2024, Memorandum
Opinion, ECF No. 58, because this is a federal habeas action, the Court must
initially determine whether Harrison’s motion is actually an unauthorized second or
successive petition or whether it is a true Rule 60(b) motion. In the habeas context,
a motion labeled as a Rule 60(b) motion should be treated as a second or successive
petition if it “seeks to add a new ground for relief” from the underlying conviction or
“attacks the federal court’s previous resolution of a claim on the merits.” Gonzalez
v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 532 (2005).
Conversely, the motion should be properly treated as a Rule 60(b) motion
when it “attacks, not the substance of a claim on the merits, but some defect in the
integrity of the federal habeas proceedings.” Id.; see Pridgen v. Shannon, 380 F.3d
721, 727 (3d Cir. 2004) (“[I]n those instances in which the factual predicate of a
petitioner’s Rule 60(b) motion attacks the manner in which the earlier habeas
judgment was procured and not the underlying conviction, the Rule 60(b) motion
may be adjudicated on the merits.”). Harrison may not circumvent AEDPA’s rules
by couching an unauthorized second or successive habeas petition as a motion under
Rule 60(b).
If the Court concludes that the motion is actually an unauthorized second or
successive habeas petition, it must be dismissed for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction or be transferred to the court of appeals for consideration as an
application to file a second or successive petition. Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 538.
However, if the Court concludes that the motion is a true Rule 60(b) motion, the
motion will be ruled upon without precertification by the Court of Appeals. Id. at
531-32; see also Lesko v. Sec’y Pennsylvania Dep’t of Corr., 34 F.4th 211, 222 (3d Cir.
2022) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2), (b)(3)(A)).
Notwithstanding the “dismissal” language in § 2244(b), federal appellate
courts have ruled that if the prisoner improperly files a second or successive petition
without having first obtained authorization by the court of appeals, the district
court has the option of transferring the petition to the court of appeals. The Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit permits, but does not mandate, transfer. Robinson
v. Johnson, 313 F.3d 128, 139 (3d Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 826 (2003).
III. Discussion
Once again, Harrison’s motion is exactly the sort of motion the Supreme
Court has stated is in actuality a second or successive petition - the factual
predicate of his claim attacks his underlying state court conviction by raising new
grounds for relief. Gonzalez, 545 U.S. at 530-31; Pridgen, 380 F.3d at 727.
Accordingly, the Court holds that Harrison’s motion should properly be treated as a
second or successive petition and not as a Rule 60(b) motion. As such, this Court
lacks jurisdiction to consider it in the absence of prior authorization by the Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit.
The record is clear that Harrison has not obtained leave from the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit to file a second or successive petition.
Because Harrison has not obtained the required authorization, the instant motion
constitutes an unauthorized second or successive petition.
IV. Conclusion
As such, this Court has two options: either dismiss Harrison’s motion for
want of jurisdiction or transfer the motion to the Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit. See Robinson, 313 F.3d at 139. In the interest of justice, the Court chooses
the latter option. Harrison’s motion will be transferred to the Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit for consideration as an application to file a successive petition as
required under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A).1
An appropriate Order follows.
Dated: January 2, 2025 BY THE COURT:
s/Christopher B. Brown
Christopher B. Brown
United States Magistrate Judge
cc: JI' HAAD AMORE HARRISON
NA3893
SCI Somerset
1590 Walters Mill Road
Somerset, PA 15510-0001
(via U.S. First Class Mail)
All Counsel of Record
(via ECF electronic notification)
1 This Opinion should not be read as a comment upon the merits of any claim
that Harrison could raise in a second or successive habeas petition or whether such
a petition would be subject to dismissal on other grounds.