Walker v. Meadows

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS

CENTRAL DIVISION

BRIAN LEE WALKER *

#942844 *

*

Plaintiff, *

v. * No. 4:24-cv-00036-JJV

*

HEATHER MEADOWS, *

Lieutenant, WCDC, et al. *

*

Defendants. *

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER1

I. INTRODUCTION

Brian Lee Walker (“Plaintiff”) has filed this pro se action, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983,

alleging Defendants violated his constitutional rights at the White County Detention Center

(“WCDC”). (Doc. 7.) Plaintiff says: (1) Officer Christopher Dunn and Lieutenant Heather

Meadows used excessive force against him on August 23, 2023, during evening pill call; (2)

Sergeant Caleb Miller failed to protect him from that use of force; (3) Lieutenant Meadows, Officer

Dunn, Sergeant Miller, and LPN Nurse Katy Williams denied him adequate medical care for his

injuries; and (4) Sheriff Phillip Miller and Jail Administrator Clayton Edwards knew about the

inadequate medical care but failed to take corrective action and properly train and/or supervise the

other Defendants. Plaintiff brings these claims against Defendants in their official and individual

capacities.2 And he seeks $900,000 in compensatory and punitive damages.

1 On May 3, 2024, the parties consented to proceed before me. (Doc. 26.)

2 In her Brief, Defendant Williams says it is “unclear” if she is being sued in both her official and

individual capacities. (Doc. 46 a 1.) But Plaintiff checked the box on his Amended Complaint

form indicating he was bringing both types of claims. (Doc. 7 at 2.)

LPN Williams has filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. (Docs. 44-46.) And the Officer

Dunn, Lieutenant Meadows, Sergeant Miller, Sheriff Miller, and Jail Administrator Edwards

(“County Defendants”) have also filed a separate Motion for Summary Judgment.3 (Docs. 48-52,

56.) Plaintiff has not responded to either Motion, and the time to do so has expired. Thus, the

facts in Defendants’ Statement of Undisputed Facts are deemed admitted. See Local Rule

56.1(c); Jackson v. Ark. Dep’t of Educ., Vocational & Tech. Educ. Div., 272 F.3d 1020, 1027

(8th Cir. 2001) (pursuant to Local Rule 56.1(c), a plaintiff who failed to respond to the motion for

summary judgment “forfeited her ability to contest the facts presented” by the defendant). And,

as will be explained herein, those facts are supported by the record. After careful consideration

and for the following reasons, Defendants’ Motions will be GRANTED, Plaintiff’s claims

against them DISMISSED with prejudice, and this case CLOSED.

II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Under Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is proper “if

the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the

affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving

party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex v. Catrett, 477

U.S. 317, 321 (1986). When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court must view the

evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Naucke v. City of Park Hills, 284 F.3d

923, 927 (8th Cir. 2002). The nonmoving party may not rely on allegations or denials but must

3 LPN Williams’s Motion includes 289 pages of grievances and medical records, many of which

are irrelevant to this lawsuit. (Doc. 44-1; Doc. 44-2.) And the County Defendants’ Motion

includes 65 pages of grievances, with only a portion being relevant. (Doc. 50-1). In the future, it

would be helpful if Defendants included only relevant records with their Motions.

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demonstrate the existence of specific facts that create a genuine issue for trial. Mann v. Yarnell,

497 F.3d 822, 825 (8th Cir. 2007). The nonmoving party’s allegations must be supported by

sufficient probative evidence that would permit a finding in his favor on more than mere

speculation, conjecture, or fantasy. Id. (citations omitted). A dispute is genuine if the evidence is

such that it could cause a reasonable jury to return a verdict for either party; a fact is material if its

resolution affects the outcome of the case. Othman v. City of Country Club Hills, 671 F.3d 672,

675 (8th Cir. 2012). Disputes that are not genuine or that are about facts that are not material will

not preclude summary judgment. Sitzes v. City of West Memphis, Ark., 606 F.3d 461, 465 (8th

Cir. 2010).

III. FACTS4

In August 2023, Plaintiff was in custody at the WCDC for a probation violation and housed

on the second floor of a disciplinary pod. (Doc. 7; Doc. 50-2.) On August 21, 2023, Plaintiff

slipped and fell while walking up the stairs in that pod because the floor in the common area was

wet. (Doc. 44-1 at 30-50; Doc. 44-4 at 7, 13-15). Jailers took Plaintiff to a local hospital where

he received a spinal CT and a pelvic x-ray showing no injuries. (Doc. 44-1 at 30-50.) Based on

Plaintiff’s subjective complaints of pain, doctors diagnosed tailbone and cervical sprains and

released Plaintiff in good condition. Upon returning to the WCDC later that day, Plaintiff refused

to be examined by WCDC medical personnel. (Id.) And on August 23, 2023, around 1:00 p.m.,

Plaintiff refused to allow Nurse Williams to conduct a follow-up exam. (Id. at 51.)

What happened on August 23, 2023 during evening pill call is partially captured on Officer

4 The following facts are taken from Defendants’ Statement of Facts (Docs. 45, 50); Plaintiff’s

medical records (Doc. 44-1); Plaintiff’s Medical Requests (Doc. 44-2); Plaintiff’s deposition (Doc.

44-4); and affidavits signed by Defendants Williams (Doc. 44-3), Edwards (Doc. 50-1); Meadows

(Doc. 50-2), and Sergeant Miller (Doc. 50-3). Defendant Dunn did not file an Affidavit.

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Dunn’s and Sergeant Miller’s body cameras, which contain video and audio. (Doc. 56.) Officer

Dunn’s body camera starts at 7:54 p.m. with him escorting Plaintiff from his cell, down the stairs,

through the pod common area, out a door, and into the infirmary. Once there, Plaintiff argued with

LPN Williams about whether she had given him all of his medications. And he accused her of

being a racist. Plaintiff then approached Officer Dunn with his mouth open to demonstrate he had

swallowed his pill. Officer Dunn lightly touched Plaintiff’s chest and ordered him to step back.

Plaintiff yelled at Officer Dunn, falsely accused him of punching him, and asked him if he too was

a racist. Officer Dunn then ordered Plaintiff to return to his cell several times.

After initially refusing, Plaintiff walked out of the infirmary and back into the common

area while falsely accusing Officer Dunn of pushing him. (Doc. 56.) At the base of the stairs,

Plaintiff turned toward Officer Dunn and refused to go up because he fallen two days earlier

walking up the same stairs. Officer Dunn again ordered Plaintiff to go up the stairs and back to

his cell. After protesting, Plaintiff began to climb the stairs in a deliberately slow manner while

yelling to Officer Dunn that he was going to take his time. Plaintiff periodically stopped and

taunted Officer Dun that he would have to “drag” him up. Officer Dunn then approached

Plaintiff’s left side. The camera angle does not capture where Officer Dunn touched Plaintiff, and

he has not filed an affidavit or incident report explaining what happened. However, during his

deposition Plaintiff said Officer Dunn “reached up” under his arm and began “pulling” him up the

stairs, causing Plaintiff to come out of his “slippery shoes” and fall down the stairs. (Doc. 44-4 at

8, 21-22.) Officer Dunn’s body camera shows Plaintiff slide down five to six steps, feet first, on

his left side. (Doc. 56.) He did not tumble or roll, as Plaintiff claimed in his deposition. (Id.; Doc.

44-4 at 8). And he never let go of a piece of paper in his left hand.

Officer Dunn called for back-up assistance, as Plaintiff, who had no visible injuries,

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remained still at the bottom of the stairs dramatically demanding that no one touch him and that

he be taken to a doctor. (Doc. 56). Lieutenant Meadows and Sergeant Miller, who responded to

the call for back-up assistance, stood at the base of the stairs near Plaintiff. Defendants gave

Plaintiff several direct orders to stand up. Plaintiff refused, claimed the fall had exacerbated his

August 21, 2023 back injuries, and demanded to be taken back to the hospital. Lieutenant

Meadows ordered Officer Dunn to move Plaintiff’s belongings from the second floor to a first

floor cell where he was being reassigned. As Officer Dunn was doing so, Lieutenant Meadows

called someone on a cell phone, went to the infirmary, confirmed from Plaintiff’s medical records

that he did not have any preexisting injuries, and returned to the base of the stairs.5

Sergeant Miller’s body camera starts at 8:02 p.m. (Doc. 56.) Both Sergeant Miller’s and

Officer Dunn’s body cameras show Plaintiff lying still on the bottom of the stairs exhibiting no

visible injuries or physical signs of pain. Nevertheless, Plaintiff proclaimed he could not walk and

that Defendants would have to “drag” him to his new cell on the first floor. After several

minutes of Plaintiff’s refusal to move, Lieutenant Meadows grabbed Plaintiff’s left wrist,

Officer Dunn grabbed his right wrist, and the two officers slowly dragged Plaintiff on his back to

his new cell as he howled in exaggerated pain. While entering the cell, Plaintiff’s right hip

lightly contacted the door frame, and he began to complain of hip pain. Both videos end with

the Defendants leaving Plaintiff in his first floor cell at 8:05 p.m. During his deposition, Plaintiff

said that after the officers left, he cleaned the cell and washed the walls. (Doc. 44-4 at 9.)

5 In her Affidavit, Lieutenant Meadows does not explain who she called during the incident. (Doc.

50-2.) In his Affidavit, Jail Administrator Edwards says he was not present during the incident

and that he cannot recall if he spoke to Lieutenant Meadows on the phone during the matter. (Doc.

50-1.)

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Sergeant Miller’s body camera starts again at 9:53 p.m. that evening when he opened the

door to Plaintiff’s cell and told him to pack his property so that he could be moved to the second

floor. (Doc. 56.) Plaintiff, who was calmly sitting on his bunk in no apparent physical distress,

got up, gathered some papers that he carried in his left hand, and walked up the stairs - quicker

than he did two hours earlier - without difficulty. And, importantly, he did not report pain or ask

for medical assistance at that time. The video ends at 9:56 p.m. with Sergeant Miller closing the

cell door.

On August 25 and 29, 2023, Plaintiff refused medical care at the WCDC from Nurse

Williams and a non-party. (Doc 44-1 at 65-66.) On August 30 and September 1, 2, and 4, 2023,

Plaintiff filed medical request forms reporting pain in his back, tailbone, left side, left knee, and

elbow. (Doc. 44-2 at 4-7.) But he did not report any hand injuries. The floater nurse instructed

Plaintiff to submit sick call requests, but it does not appear that he did so.

On September 11, 2023, which was nineteen days after his August 23, 2023 fall, Plaintiff

got into a fight with two other detainees “until both of [his] hands were swollen.” (Doc. 44-4 at

10.) The following day, Plaintiff was taken to a local hospital where tests revealed he had a

fractured left ring finger, but no other injuries. (Doc. 44-1 at 67-98.) Plaintiff received a finger

splint, over the counter pain medications, and instructions to follow up with an orthopedic surgeon.

And he returned to the WCDC later that day. (Id.) Thereafter, Plaintiff refused medical treatment

at the WCDC on several occasions. In October and November 2023, Plaintiff was examined by

orthopedists, who instructed Plaintiff to wear a splint, take over the counter pain medications, and

begin extension exercises for his left ring finger. (Doc. 44-1 at 105-08, 115-116.) Surgery was

not recommended.

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IV. ANALYSIS

A. Individual Capacity Claims

The County Defendants argue they are entitled to qualified immunity from Plaintiff’s

request for monetary damages from them in their individual capacities. Qualified immunity

protects government officials from § 1983 liability for damages if their conduct “does not violate

clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have

known.” Lockhart v. Siloam Springs, 113 F.4th 844, 847 (8th Cir. 2024); Irvin v. Richardson, 20

F.4th 1199, 1204 (8th Cir. 2021). Whether qualified immunity applies to this case is a question of

law, not fact, for the court to decide. Kelsay v. Ernest, 933 F.3d 975, 981 (8th Cir. 2019).

Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity if: (1) the evidence, viewed in the light most

favorable to Plaintiff, does not establish a violation of his constitutional rights; or (2) that

constitutional right was not clearly established such that a reasonable official would not have

known his or her actions were unlawful. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009);

MacKintrush v. Pulaski Cty. Sheriff's Dep’t, 987 F.3d 767, 770 (8th Cir. 2021). Courts may

“exercise their sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity

analysis should be addressed first.” Pearson 555 U.S. at 236; Mogard v. City of Milbank, 932 F.3d

1184, 1188 (8th Cir. 2019). I agree with County Defendants’ that they are entitled to qualified

immunity based on the first prong of the analysis on each of Plaintiff’s claims, which I will address

separately.

1. Excessive Force Claim

Plaintiff says Officer Dunn and Lieutenant Meadows used excessive force against him

during the August 23, 2023 incident. Because Plaintiff was in custody at that time for a probation

violation, his claims fall under the Eighth Amendment. Peterson v. Heinen, 89 F.4th 628, 634 (8th

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Cir. 2023). As explained in Peterson, “the infliction of pain in the course of prison security

measures . . . does not amount to cruel and unusual punishment simply because it may appear in

retrospect that the degree of force authorized or applied for security purposes was unreasonable,

and hence unnecessary in the strict sense.” Id. at 635. Instead, the relevant question is whether

there is evidence Officer Dunn and Lieutenant Meadows used force “maliciously and sadistically

to cause harm” rather than in “a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline.” See Wilkins

v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34, 37 (2010); Peterson, 89 F.4th at 635. That is a high burden to meet. And

the factors I must consider when determining whether it has been satisfied are: (1) the objective

need for force; (2) the relationship between the need and the amount of force used; (3) the threat

reasonably perceived by the defendants; (4) any efforts by the defendants to temper the severity of

the forceful response; and (5) the extent of the plaintiff’s injuries. Peterson, 89 F.4th at 635;

Jackson v. Gutzmer, 866 F.3d 969, 974 (8th Cir. 2017).

Based on the undisputed facts and videos, it is clear that on August 23, 2023 Plaintiff was

being verbally aggressive, defiant, and noncompliant with Officer Dunn’s efforts to safely return

him to his cell after pill call. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380-81 (2007) (no genuine issue

of fact when a video recording “blatantly contradicts” a party’s assertions). Only after Plaintiff

continued to resist several direct orders did Officer Dunn put his hand under Plaintiff’s arm to urge

him to continue climbing the stairs. It is well settled that prison officials do not violate the Eighth

Amendment when using a limited amount of force to regain control of a recalcitrant inmate. See

Wright v. Shelton, No. 21-3270, 2022 WL 386238, at *1 (8th Cir. Feb. 9, 2022); Burns v. Eaton,

752 F.3d 1136, 1140 (8th Cir. 2014). And nothing in the record suggests Officer Dunn acted in a

malicious or sadistic manner when he put his hand under Plaintiff’s arm and guided him up the

stairs or that he intended for Plaintiff to fall. Instead, it is clear he used a limited amount of force

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in a good faith effort to restore discipline and that Plaintiff’s fall was an accident, which is not a

sufficient basis for imposing Eighth Amendment liability.

After the fall, the videos demonstrate Plaintiff refused numerous direct orders to get up and

return to his cell, he did not have any visible injuries, and he did not exhibit any physical symptoms

of pain. Defendant Meadows explains in her affidavit that she had to clear the stairs, for safety

reasons, so that the other inmates in the disciplinary pod could have recreation time. (Doc. 50-2.)

And Plaintiff has not offered any contrary evidence. Further, it is undisputed that moments before

the fall, Plaintiff falsely accused Officer Dunn of punching him in the chest and pushing him while

they walked towards the stairs. Given these falsehoods and Plaintiff’s exaggerated behavior, I

agree with Defendants that it appeared Plaintiff was malingering when he said he could not get up

and walk to his cell. And I note that it was only after verifying from the medical records that

Plaintiff did not have any preexisting injuries that Lieutenant Meadows and Officer Dunn decided

to drag a resisting Plaintiff a short distance to his nearby cell. As previously stated, under the

Eighth Amendment, the issue is not whether the amount of force used was reasonable or whether

the defendants made “an error in judgment” when deciding, in the heat of the moment, what force

to use to regain control of a defiant prisoner. Wright, 2022 WL 386238 at *1; Jackson, 866 F.3d

at 974-75 (“a mere dispute over the reasonableness of a particular use of force or the existence of

arguably superior alternatives” is insufficient to defeat summary judgment). Instead, the issue is

whether there is evidence the defendants acted “maliciously and sadistically.” Given the videos

and undisputed facts, I conclude no reasonable juror could find that either Lieutenant Meadows or

Officer Dunn acted maliciously and sadistically on August 23, 2023. Accordingly, I conclude they

are entitled to qualified immunity from the excessive force claim raised against them in their

individual capacities.

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2. Failure to Protect Claim

Plaintiff says Sergeant Miller violated his constitutional rights by failing to stop Officer

Dunn and Lieutenant Meadows from using excessive force against him. Plaintiff is correct that

jailers have a constitutional obligation, under the Eighth Amendment, to protect inmates from the

excessive use of force by other officials. Livers v. Schenck, 700 F.3d 340, 360 (8th Cir. 2012);

Krout v. Goemmer, 583 F.3d 557, 565 (8th Cir. 2009). However, because I find no evidence

Lieutenant Meadows or Officer Dunn used excessive force against Plaintiff on August 23, 2023,

Plaintiff’s failure to protect claim against Sergeant Miller in his individual capacity fails as a matter

of law. See Peterson, 89 F.4th at 640.

3. Inadequate Medical Care Claim

Plaintiff says LPN Williams, Officer Dunn, Sergeant Miller, and Lieutenant Meadows

violated his Eighth Amendment rights by failing to provide him with any medical care after he fell

down the stairs on August 23, 2023. To proceed to trial on that claim, Plaintiff must have evidence:

(1) he had an objectively serious need for medical care; and (2) Defendants subjectively knew of,

but deliberately disregarded, that serious medical need. See Peterson, 89 F.4th at 640; Shipp v.

Murphy, 9 F.4th 694, 703 (8th Cir. 2021); Barr v. Pearson, 909 F.3d 919, 921 (8th Cir. 2018).

As to the first element, an objectively serious medical need is one that has been “diagnosed

by a physician as requiring treatment” or one “so obvious that even a layperson would easily

recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.” Presson v. Reed, 65 F.4th 357, 366 (8th Cir.

2023); De Rossitte v. Correct Care Sols., LLC., 22 F4th 796 (8th Cir. 2022). Plaintiff says he

broke his left ring finger and bruised his back, elbow, side, and knee during the August 23, 2023

fall. But there is no medical evidence to support those assertions, which are clearly contrary to the

videos and Plaintiff’s behavior after the fall when he cleaned his cell, washed the walls, carried

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papers in his left hand, walked up the stairs without difficulty, and did not mention any pain or

seek medical treatment. Nothing about that behavior or Plaintiff’s physical appearance made it

obvious to a lay person that he had objectively serious needs. Further, it is undisputed Plaintiff

refused medical care on August 25 and 29, 2023, thus making it impossible for medical staff to

document whether he sustained any injuries. See Gibson v. Weber, 433 F.3d 642, 646 (8th Cir.

2006) (a prisoner’s refusal of medical care is relevant when determining whether summary

judgment is appropriate on an inadequate medical care claim.) And there is no evidence Plaintiff

followed the medical staff’s instructions to file sick call requests after reporting pain and injuries

on August 30 and September 1, 2, and 4, 2023. Instead, the only medical evidence in the record

is that Plaintiff broke his finger after he fought two other inmates eleven days after his fall on

September 11, 2023. And during the September 11, 2023 examination, doctors did not detect any

back, side, knee, or other injuries Plaintiff allegedly sustained during his fall. Given the admitted

facts and the lack of evidence here, I conclude a reasonable juror could not find that Plaintiff had

an objectively serious medical need as a result of his August 23, 2023 fall.

Further, Plaintiff’s evidence also falls short on the subjective component of deliberate

indifference, which is a high threshold that goes well beyond negligence or gross negligence. Hall

v. Higgins, 77 F.4th 1171, 1179 (8th Cir. 2023); Langford v. Norris, 614 F.3d 445, 460 (8th Cir.

2010). To establish deliberate indifference, there must be evidence the defendants “recognized

that a substantial risk of harm existed and knew that their conduct was inappropriate in light of

that risk.” Shipp, 9 F.4th at 703 (emphasis in the original); Smith v. Lisenbe, 73 F.4th 596, 660

(8th Cir. 2023). This level of mental culpability is “akin to criminal recklessness.” Presson, 65

F.4th at 367.

LPN Williams says in her affidavit that on August 23, 2023, she did not see Plaintiff fall

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or enter the pod after he fell. (Doc. 44-3.) And she says no one told her Plaintiff needed medical

care on that day. (Id.) Given Plaintiff’s false accusations and exaggerated behavior during the

August 23, 2023 incident, there is no indication Officer Dunn, Lieutenant Meadows, or Sergeant

Miller subjectively knew Plaintiff had sustained injuries requiring medical attention. See Rusness

v. Becker Cnty., Minn., 31 F.4th 606, 616 (8th Cir. 2022) (“The threshold question is whether [a

prisoner] manifested signs of a serious medical need that would be sufficiently obvious to jail staff

without medical training”). And it is undisputed that none of them were personally involved in

Plaintiff’s medical care after August 23, 2023. Finally and importantly, there is no medical

evidence that Plaintiff was harmed by the eleven-day delay in being seen by doctors on September

11, 2023. See Presson, 65 F.4th at 366-67 (a “prisoner alleging a delay in treatment must present

verifying medical evidence that the prison officials ignored an acute or escalating situation or that

these delays adversely affected his prognosis”).

For these reasons, I conclude Officer Dunn, Lieutenant Meadows, and Sergeant Miller are

entitled to qualified immunity from the inadequate medical care claims raised against them in their

individual capacities. And, for the same reasons, I conclude LPN Williams is entitled to judgment

as a matter of law on the same claim. 6

4. Corrective Inaction & Failure to Train Claims

Plaintiff’s corrective inaction and failure to train claims against Jail Administrator

Edwards and Sheriff Miller in their individual capacities fail, as a matter of law, because there is

6 As an employee of a for-profit medical provider, LPN Williams cannot raise the qualified

immunity defense. Davis v. Buchannan Cnty, Mo., 11 F.4th 604, (8th Cir. 2021). However, I

conclude she is entitled to judgment as a matter of law because there is no evidence she violated

Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights, which is the same conclusion I have reached as to the County

Defendants under the first prong of the qualified immunity analysis.

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no evidence of an underlying constitutional violation. See Brockinton v. City of Sherwood, Ark,

503 F.3d 667, 673 (8th Cir. 2007); Sims v. Lay, Case No. 05-2136, 2007 WL 328769, *1 (8th Cir.

Feb. 2, 2007).

B. Official Capacity Claims

Qualified immunity does not apply to the claims Plaintiff has raised against the County

Defendants in their official capacities, which are actually claims against the county itself.

Thurmond vy. Andrews, 972 F.3d 1007, 1013 (8th Cir. 2020); Hall, 77 F.4th at 1178. To proceed

with an official capacity claim against White County, there must be evidence that a constitutional

violation resulted from: “(1) an official municipal policy, (2) an unofficial custom, or (3) a

deliberately indifferent failure to train or supervise.” Jackson v. Stair, 944 F.3d 704, 709 (8th Cir.

2019). Because there is no evidence of an underlying constitutional violation, Plaintiff's official

capacity claim against White County fails as a matter of law. See Stearns vy. Wagner, F.4th _

*3, 2024 WL 4965989 (8th Cir. Dec. 4, 2024); Thurmond, 972 F.3d at 1013.

V. CONCLUSION

IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED THAT:

1. Defendants’ Motions for Summary Judgment (Doc. 44, 48) are GRANTED,

Plaintiffs claims against Defendants are DISMISSED with prejudice, and this case is CLOSED.

2. I certify, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an in forma pauperis appeal from

this Memorandum and Order would not be taken in good faith.

DATED this 2nd day of January 2025.

\ \ AL

or Ly OLPE

NITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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