RODRIGUES v. MAIN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

LOUIS RODRIGUES, Civil Action No. 19-14708 (MCA)

Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

v.

SPECIAL TREATMENT UNIT, et al.,

Defendants.

This matter comes before the Court on a motion for summary judgment brought by retired

STU director Merrill Main (ECF No. 183) and a motion for summary judgment brought by

Department of Corrections administrators Crystal Raupp and Marc Sims. (“DOC Defendants”).

(ECF No. 182.) Prior to ruling on the motions for summary judgment, the Court will require the

parties to supplemental their Statement of Material Facts, legal arguments, and evidence regarding

Plaintiff Louis Rodrigues’ religious exercise claim, which he raises under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and

the New Jersey Civil Rights Act (“NJCRA”). The Court will also provide Plaintiff the opportunity

to respond to the supplemental briefing and will administratively terminate this matter and the

motions for summary judgment pending the completion of the supplemental briefing.

Plaintiff filed his Complaint on or about July 9, 2019. (ECF No. 1.) Based on his affidavit

of indigence, the Court granted Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) and

ordered the Clerk of the Court to file the Complaint. The Court then screened the Complaint

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and proceeded the Complaint in part and dismissed it in

part. As to the moving Defendants, the Court proceeded the First Amendment religious exercise

claim regarding the denial of religious services and a “class of one” equal protection claims

regarding the alleged policies of denying social events and denying the purchase/rental of DVDs

and video games. (See ECF No. 4 at 15.)

Plaintiff is involuntarily committed pursuant to the Sexually Violent Predator Act

(“SVPA”), N.J.S.A. 30:4–27.24, et seq., and resides at the Special Treatment Unit (“STU”). His

Complaint alleges, among other things, that he has been denied access to religious services due his

placement in the South Housing Unit and his status as Group Map and Treatment Refusal (“TR”).

(See generally, ECF No. 1, Complaint.)

The record reflects that there are five housing units that make up the STU—North, South,

East, West, and the Annex—and that Plaintiff was initially housed in the East Unit. (183-5, Exhibit

B, 2019 STU Handbook at 43; ECF No. 183-9, Pl. Aug. 24 2023 Dep. at 28:2-9.) Plaintiff testified

that he would attend weekly Christian church services in the Annex on Saturdays and Sundays.

(Id. at 21:3-11.) The record also reflects that Plaintiff is a Christian and has sincerely-held religious

beliefs, which include regularly attending church services. (See Pl. May 24, 2022 Dep. at 58:16-

59:6.) In 2016, Plaintiff was transferred to the South Unit and placed on Treatment Refusal or

“TR” status. (Pl. Aug. 24, 2023 Dep. at 28:10-17.) At the time of his second deposition in August

2023, Plaintiff was still housed in the South Unit and was still on TR status. (Id. at 29:10-12.)

It is undisputed that Plaintiff and other residents of the South Unit are not permitted to

attend religious services, which are held in the Annex, and are available to residents in the general

population. (See Main SUMF ¶ 39;DOC SUMF at ¶¶ 22-23.) It is not clear when this change took

effect. The current summary judgment record reveals disputes over why Treatment Refusers in

the South Unit are not permitted to attend religious services in the Annex and whether religious

services are regularly available to residents in the South Unit.

In their summary judgment motion, both Main and the DOC Defendants contend that

residents in the South Unit are not permitted to attend religious services in the Annex for security

reasons unrelated to their TR status.1 See DOC SUMF ¶¶ 23-24; Main SUMF 38). The DOC

Defendants rely on Defendant Raupp’s certification for the proposition that residents of the STU

are not permitted to attend religious services due to security concerns. (See DOC SUMF § 39

(citing Raupp Cert. ¶ 8).) Main and the DOC Defendants also rely on Plaintiff’s deposition to

support this rationale (see id.), but, as the DOC Defendants acknowledge, Plaintiff testified that

purported security concerns are unfounded due to security cameras and search procedures. (See

Pl. May 24, 2022 Dep at 57:3-24.) Plaintiff also testified that STU residents in “lock up” are

located on the third floor of the South Unit, that treatment refusers are located on the first and

second floors, and that treatment refusers do not interact with residents in “lock up” on the third

floor. (Id. at 22:13-20, 40:23-25.)

In addition, the record suggests that residents on TR status in the South Unit are not

permitted to attend religious services in the Annex for a different reason—to encourage them to

participate in sex offender treatment. It appears undisputed that treatment refusers are denied

certain privileges (such as video games and social events) to encourage them to participate in sex

offender treatment, but it is not clear if access to religious services (or other forms of religious

exercise) is included among these privileges. According to Plaintiff, religious services are a type

of “programming” and the STU handbook states that residents on the South Unit do not have

access to most programming. (Id. at 47:20-48:5.) The parties appear to agree that religious rights

1 Defendant Main also cites to the portion of the 2019 STU Inmate Handbook, which acknowledges

“[t]he right to freedom of religious affiliation and voluntary religious worship” but notes that

“reasonable restrictions based upon the safe, secure, orderly operation of the facility may be

imposed.” (Main SUMF ¶ 34 (citing 2019 STU Handbook at 55).)

are provided by the DOC and not the DHS, which is responsible for residents’ treatment. Plaintiff,

however, testified that Defendant Main ordered that treatment refusers in the South Unit could not

participate in any activities, including religious services. (Pl. Aug. 24, 2023 Dep at 22:15-23:17;

46:17-48:5.) Plaintiff also testified that Defendant Raupp knew there were no religious services

in the South Unit but did not intervene to remedy the situation. For instance, Plaintiff testifies that

when he told Defendant Raupp about the lack of religious services in the South Unit, she told him:

“well, if you want to go to the church, you’ve got to get out of the South Unit.” (Pl. May 24, 2022

Dep. at 53:7-9.)

The parties also dispute whether separate religious services regularly occur in the South

Unit. In moving for summary judgment, the DOC Defendants rely again on Defendant Raupp’s

certification, in which she avers that the DOC provides religious services in the South Unit and

that a DOC Chaplain will tour the South Unit and hold religious services for anyone who wants to

participate. (DOC SUMF § 38 (citing Raupp Certification at ¶ 7).)

Defendants also cite to Plaintiff’s deposition testimony to support their claim that separate

religious services are provided in the South Unit, but they mischaracterize his testimony.2 Indeed,

Plaintiff testified that there are essentially no religious services on the South Unit:

2 For example, Plaintiff’s testimony cited by Main in his SUMF does not support his contention

that separate religious services regularly occur in the South Unit. Main cites to the following

exchange:

Q. So they didn't stop you from going to

have a religious service, but they said you couldn't

go to the Annex?

A. To the Annex, yeah. Anyway, that

happened to us, because the religious service is at

the Annex.

(Pl. May 24, 2022 Dep. at 31:20-25.) Plaintiff’s full response does not indicate that there are

separate services in the South Unit. Instead, it appears to indicate that the Annex is the only

location where religious services occur. The second portion of deposition testimony cited by Main

also does not support his contention that separate services occur in the South Unit. In that

Q. You receive religious services on the

South Housing Unit, correct?

A. No.

Q. You don’t receive any religious services?

A. None.

(Pl. May 24, 2022 Dep at 21:17-22; id. at 45:10-16.)

Plaintiff testified that the Chaplain initially came to the South Unit therapy room for

religious services (or bible study), but the visits stopped completely after three or four weeks, and

the Chaplain no longer held any type of service (or bible study) in the South Unit:

Q. So there are supposed to be someone that

comes regularly. You’re saying that person does not

come regularly?

A. I think three or four times.

Q. When you say three or four times a week?

A. Yeah, like three or four -- like three

weeks in a row. She come one time. I think it was a

Sunday night.

Q. Okay. So she was coming every Sunday,

every week?

A. Yeah, but for three weeks and that was

it. After that, we don’t see her no more.

Q. Okay. And how did you not see her? Did

you not go to the services?

A. No, because they were doing the therapy

-- I mean, they were doing the religious inside the

South room.

Q. Okay. So my question is every Sunday

when she was there, how did you know she wasn't

going? Did you go every Sunday to check to see if

testimony, Plaintiff states that Main told him “if I want to go to church with the population, I’ve

got to get out of South Unit.” (Id. at 35:5-7.)

she was there?

A. Yeah, she came and gave us like little

school or church, study the bible, and then she

stopped coming. I don’t know why.

Q. How do you know she stopped coming? Did

you go every week to see if she was there?

A. No, I am in the South Unit. I am

allowed in the South Unit.

Q. Okay. So where did she have the

religion services?

A. She had the religion service in the

therapy room.

Q. Okay.

A. Of the South Unit.

Q. Did you go to the therapy room ever week

to see if she was there?

A. No. We used to go there. We did the

religion in the South Unit for like three weeks.

After that, did you go every week to see

if she was there and she wasn't there? Is that what

you're saying? I am trying to understand.

A. The South Unit is a unit. The therapy

room. She used to come to the South Unit to visit us

and give us a bible study.

Q. Okay.

A. We can’t go out of the South Unit.

Q. Was there an announcement that she was

there? How did you know she was there?

A. Because she come in and see us, and she

give an announcement to the officer, you know,

religion service at therapy room.

Q. Gotcha. Okay. And after three weeks,

they no longer made that announcement?

A. No, because she wasn't show up.

Q. Okay.

A. She would not show up anymore. I don't

know why. Listen, I think -- this is what I think.

Because we are in the South Unit, they are trying to

say we are the worst people of the whole facility, of

the whole place.

(Id. at 45:13-47:24 (emphasis added).) Thus, Plaintiff testified that the Chaplain came to the South

Unit for religious services three or four times but subsequently stopped coming for religious

services. Plaintiff also testified that he made a request to see the Chaplain for an appointment and

was able to see her twice, but he could not continue to see her for appointments because she

stopped coming to the South Unit altogether; he further testified that no other alternatives or

options were provided. (See id. at 53:13-55:21.) Later in his deposition, Plaintiff reiterated that

“They don’t give a religious service no more in the South Unit” and appears to testify that residents

in the South Unit can only speak to the Chaplain upon request. (Id. at 64:21-67:5.)

Thus, Defendants’ claim that separate religious services are provided in the South Unit

conflicts with Plaintiff’s deposition testimony on this issue, which suggests at best, that residents

of the South Unit had access to religious services for approximately a month before it was

discontinued when the Chaplain stopped coming to the South Unit. Plaintiff also appears to testify

that he requested to meet with the Chaplain several times, but this also ended when the Chaplain

stopped coming. There is no evidence other than Defendant Raupp’s conclusory Certification to

show that separate religious services occur regularly in the South Unit or that adequate alternative

means to exercise his religious beliefs were available to Plaintiff during the relevant time period.

“Persons who have been involuntarily committed are entitled to more considerate treatment

and conditions of confinement than criminals whose conditions of confinement are designed to

punish.” Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321–22 (1982). Civil detainees enjoy constitutional

protection under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause—not the Eighth Amendment,

which analogously protects prisoners—from state facilities’ imposition of restrictions and other

general conditions of confinement that do not reasonably serve a legitimate, non-punitive

government objective. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 538–39 (1979) (discussing rights of

pretrial criminal detainees).

Institutional authorities nevertheless may restrict the constitutional freedoms that

institutionalized persons otherwise would enjoy, so long as those restrictions are rationally related

to a legitimate and neutral governmental objective. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 87, (1987).

This reasonableness standard applies even if the violation of a fundamental right is alleged, see

id., or if the conduct at issue is a central tenet of an inmate’s religious beliefs. See O’Lone v. Estate

of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987). In order to determine if a regulation is reasonable, the court

examines: 1) whether there is a valid, rational connection between the regulation and the asserted

governmental interest; 2) whether alternative means of exercising a right remain available; 3) the

impact of the regulation on prison staff, other inmates, and prison resources; and the 4) availability

of ready alternatives to the regulation. See Turner, 482 U.S. at 89-91. A developed factual record

is typically necessary to assess whether the regulation or practice is reasonably related to legitimate

penological interests. See Ramirez v. Pugh, 379 F.3d 122, 126–30 (3d Cir. 2004) (reversing grant

of a motion to dismiss and remanding for development of the factual record).

As the Third Circuit has observed, Turner did not expressly state which party bears the

burden of proving each of these four factors. Sharp v. Johnson, 669 F.3d 144, 156 (3d Cir. 2012).

Thus, the Third Circuit has developed a two-step, burden-shifting analysis under Turner:

First, the prison has the burden of demonstrating the First Turner

Factor. This burden is slight, and in certain instances, the connection

may be a matter of common sense. Second, if the prison meets its

burden under the First Turner Factor, then we consider the [Second,

Third, and Fourth] Turner Factors.

Sharp, 669 F.3d at 156. Thus, although the prisoner-plaintiff bears the “ultimate burden of

persuasion with regard to the reasonableness of a regulation,” the prison is first required to “put

forward the legitimate governmental interest alleged to justify the regulation and demonstrate that

the policy drafters could rationally have seen a connection between the policy and that interest.”

Id. at 156 (quoting Jones v. Brown, 461 F.3d 353, 360–61 (3d Cir. 2006) (alterations omitted)).

Based on their view of the evidence, the DOC Defendants apply the Turner factors and

argue that they are entitled to summary judgment because residents in the South Unit may not

attend religious services in the Annex for valid penological reasons and that separate religious

services are provided in the South Unit. (See ECF No. 182-1 at 11-12.) In their qualified immunity

arguments, the DOC Defendants frame the right at issue as the right to go to the Annex for group

religious services. (See id. at 21 (“Here, no law clearly establishes that the Defendants’ restriction

of access to a specific location for religious services violated the free exercise clause of the Frist

[sic] Amendment.”); see also id. at 23-24 (“Specifically, there is no clearly established precedent

that a resident in STU who is not prohibited or restricted from religious worship but is denied

access to a particular location, due to safety and security concerns, is a violation of Plaintiff’s

rights.”).) Similarly, Defendant Main also contends that residents in the South Unit have separate

religious services and cites to the portion of the 2019 STU handbook which indicates that residents

of the South Unit have separate programming. (Main SUMF ¶ 36 (citing STU Handbook at 42.)

Defendant Main argues that Plaintiff is simply unable to worship in his preferred location. (ECF

No. 183-1, Main Moving Brief at 7.)

The Court, however, must view the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff and

finds that it is unable to resolve his religious exercise claim on the record provided. At this time,

the Court directs Main and the DOC defendants to supplement their statement of material facts

and legal arguments to reflect the evidence before the Court and provide additional evidentiary

support for their arguments to the extent that evidence exists.

1. First, to the extent Defendants argue that residents on TR status in the South Unit

are excluded from religious services in the Annex for legitimate security reasons, they should

provide additional supporting evidence on this issue.

2. Second, Defendant Main should address whether treatment refusers are excluded

from religious services in the Annex to encourage them to engage in sexual offender treatment,

and, if so, he should address whether he is entitled to summary judgment under the professional

judgment standard. The DOC Defendants should address whether Defendant Raupp and/or

Defendant Simms are entitled to summary judgment as supervisors under the deliberate

indifference standard.3

3. Third, to the extent Defendants still contend that separate religious services were

offered or occurred on a consistent basis in the South Unit during the relevant time periods, they

3 Supervisor liability may attach if the supervisor(s), “with deliberate indifference to the

consequences, established and maintained a policy, practice or custom which directly caused [the]

constitutional harm.” Barkes v. First Correctional Medical, Inc., 766 F.3d 307, 316-19 (3d Cir.

2014) (reversed on other grounds by Taylor v. Barkes, 135 S. Ct. 2042, 2043 (2015)) (quoting

A.M. ex rel. J.M.K. v. Luzerne Cnty. Juvenile Det. Ctr., 372 F.3d 572, 586 (3d Cir. 2004).

Alternatively, “a supervisor may be personally liable under § 1983 if he or she participated in

violating the plaintiff’s rights, directed others to violate them, or, as the person in charge, had

knowledge of and acquiesced in his subordinates’ violations.” A.M. ex rel. J.M.K., 372 F.3d at

856.

should provide the Court with documentary or other evidence showing that separate religious

services were available to residents in the South Unit on a consistent basis during the relevant time

periods. In addition or in the alternative, Defendants are also free to argue that Plaintiff had other

means to exercise his religion, but they must provide evidence showing what alternative means

were actually available to residents in the South Unit and must analyze whether these alternative

satisfy Plaintiff’s First Amendment right to free exercise.

4. Fourth, to the extent Defendant Main or the DOC defendants seek qualified

immunity, they must provide more than legal boilerplate and general claims that there are no

relevant cases on point. Instead, Defendants must view the evidence in the light most favorable to

Plaintiff, provide the Court with relevant decisions in the area of religious exercise (including those

involving prisoners), and distinguish those decisions from the case at hand.

5. And fifth, the Court will require supplemental briefing regarding Plaintiff’s claim

for injunctive relief in connection with his free exercise claim. Defendants should specifically

address who can provide injunctive relief with respect to Plaintiff’s religious exercise claim, the

relief that is warranted, if any, and whether the new STU director (or another individual) should

be substituted as a Defendant given Defendant Main’s retirement.4

4 In his reply brief, Defendant Main states that this Court “curiously” proceeded claims for

injunctive relief against him related to Plaintiff’s visitation claim, though Plaintiff asserted the

damages claims for this alleged violation against different Defendants. The Court proceeded the

claims for injunctive relief against Defendant Main because he, as the then-STU director, could

potentially provide the injunctive relief Plaintiff requested even if he was not personally involved

in denying visitation to Plaintiff. Indeed, it is well established that prison administrators may be

named as defendants for claims seeking injunctive relief even where they had no personal

involvement in the alleged wrongs. See Megginson v. Caldwell, 2015 WL 13229496, at *5 (D.N.J.

Dec. 4, 2015) (holding that prison Warden may be a proper defendant to a claim seeking an

injunction based on denial of necessary medical care despite his lack of personal involvement in

unconstitutional conduct) (citing Colwell v. Bannister, 763 F.3d 1060, 1070 (9th Cir. 2014) (“[A]

corrections department secretary and prison warden were proper defendants in a § 1983 case

because ‘[a] plaintiff seeking injunctive relief against the State is not required to allege a named

IT IS, THEREFORE, on this 31° day of December 2024,

ORDERED that Defendants shall supplement their statement of material facts, their

briefing, and the evidence as explained above within 30 days, send copies of their supplemental

briefing and exhibits to Plaintiff at the address on file, and file a certificate of service on the

docket; and it is further

ORDERED that Plaintiff may submit a supplemental response within 30 days of his

receipt of the Defendants’ supplemental briefing, statement of material facts, and exhibits; and it

is further

ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall ADMINISTRATIVELY TERMINATE

this matter and the motions for summary judgment pending at ECF Nos. 182-183 until the

supplemental briefing is complete; and it is further

ORDERED that the Court retains jurisdiction over this case, and will reopen the matter

for adjudication once the briefing is complete; and it 1s further

ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall send a copy of this Memorandum & Order

to Plaintiff at the address on file.

Cir

/

Hon. Madeline Cox Arleo, District Judge

United States District Court

official’s personal involvement in the acts or omissions constituting the alleged constitutional

violation. Rather, a plaintiff need only identify the law or policy challenged s a constitutional

violation and name the official within the entity who can appropriately respond to injunctive

relief.’”); Gonzalez v. Feinerman, 663 F.3d 311, 315 (7th Cir. 2011) (“Though Gonzalez does not

allege any specific involvement by Gaetz in the treatment of his hernia, the warden . . . is a proper

defendant since Gonzalez seeks injunctive relief. . . . If Gonzalez was seeking only damages, the

warden’s lack of personal involvement would be conclusive, but since Gonzalez also seeks

injunctive relief it 1s irrelevant whether the warden participated in the alleged violations.”));

Mitchell v. Jones, 2022 WL 2657365, at *6 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 9, 2022) (collecting cases).