Com. v. McDaniel, M.

J-S33043-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

: PENNSYLVANIA

:

v. :

:

:

MARCUS D. MCDANIEL :

:

Appellant : No. 275 MDA 2024

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered February 6, 2024

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lycoming County Criminal Division at

No(s): CP-41-CR-0000925-2022

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

: PENNSYLVANIA

:

v. :

:

:

MARCUS DRAKE MCDANIEL :

:

Appellant : No. 276 MDA 2024

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered February 6, 2024

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lycoming County Criminal Division at

No(s): CP-41-CR-0001133-2022

BEFORE: OLSON, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and NICHOLS, J.

MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.: FILED: DECEMBER 31, 2024

Appellant Marcus Drake McDaniel appeals from the judgments of

sentence imposed following his convictions for six counts each of rape of a

child, involuntary deviate sexual intercourse with a child, three counts of

indecent assault of a person less than 13 years of age, two counts of unlawful

contact with a minor, and one count each of criminal solicitation of rape of a

child, endangering the welfare of children, corruption of minors, and

J-S33043-24

obstruction.1 On appeal, Appellant raises challenges to the trial court’s

evidentiary rulings and the discretionary aspects of his sentence. We affirm.

The factual history of this case is well known to both parties, and we

need not re-state it here. Briefly, Appellant was charged with multiple

offenses based on allegations that he sexually assaulted his girlfriend’s

daughter in 2022. The trial court set forth the following procedural history:

Following a jury trial in his absence, [Appellant] was found guilty

of two counts of rape of a child; two counts of involuntary deviate

sexual intercourse with a child; two counts of unlawful contact

with a minor; one count of indecent assault (under 13 years of

age); one count endangering [the] welfare of children; and one

count of corruption of minors—sexual offenses at Lycoming

County Docket Number CR-925-2022. Under Lycoming County

Docket Number CR 1133-2022, Appellant was found guilty of four

counts of rape of a child; four counts of involuntary deviate sexual

intercourse with a child; one count of indecent assault (under 13

years of age); one count of criminal solicitation; and one count of

obstruction in child abuse cases. The victim in both cases was the

[six-year-old] daughter of Appellant’s paramour.

[On] February 6, 2024, [] Appellant was sentenced under CR-925-

2022 to a period of ten (10) to twenty (20) years [of] incarceration

in a state correctional institution on Counts 1 and 2, rape of a

child, to run consecutive to each other. On Counts 3-4,

involuntary deviate sexual intercourse with a child, and Counts 5-

6, unlawful contact with a minor, the Appellant was sentenced to

a period of incarceration in a state correctional institution of ten

(10) to twenty (20) years. Counts 3, 4, 5, and 6 are to run

concurrent to each other, and concurrent to Counts 1 and 2. On

Counts 7 and 8, indecent assault of a person less than 13 years

of age; Count 9, endangering the welfare of children; and Count

10, corruption of minors, [] Appellant was sentenced to a period

of incarceration in a state correctional institution of eighteen (18)

to thirty-six (36) months, to run concurrent to all other counts in

____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 3121(c), 3123(b), 3126(a)(7), 6318(a)(1), 902(a),

4304(a)(1), 6301(a)(1)(ii), and 4958(b.1), respectively.

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case number CR-925-2022. Under CR-1133-2022, Appellant was

sentenced to a period of ten (10) to twenty (20) years [of]

incarceration in a state correctional institution on Counts 1-4, rape

of a child, each to run consecutive to all other counts. On counts

5-8, involuntary deviate sexual intercourse with a child, []

Appellant was sentenced to a period of incarceration in a state

correctional institution of ten (10) to twenty (20) years, to run

concurrent to all other counts. On Count 9, indecent assault of a

person less than 13 years of age, and Count 10, criminal

solicitation of rape of a child, [] Appellant was sentenced to a

period of incarceration in a state correctional institution of ten (10)

to twenty (20) years, to run concurrent to all other counts.

Finally, on Count 11, obstruction, [] Appellant was sentenced to a

period of incarceration in a state correctional institution of fifteen

(15) to thirty (30) months, to run consecutive to all other counts.

The aggregate sentence of Appellant was sixty-one (61) years and

three (3) months to one hundred twenty-two (122) years and six

(6) months incarceration in a state correctional institution. []

Appellant was also designated a sexually violent predator [(SVP)].

Trial Ct. Op., 5/7/24, at 1-3 (unpaginated).

Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal and a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P.

1925(b) statement. The trial court subsequently filed an opinion addressing

Appellant’s claims.

Appellant raises the following issues for our review:

1. Whether the trial court erred by precluding relevant and

exculpatory evidence that the victim named another individual

and not [Appellant] as the perpetrator of abuse when she was

initially interviewed.

2. Whether the trial court erred in permitting [Appellant’s]

supervised bail officer to testify at trial because his testimony

was unfairly prejudicial, irrelevant, and it improperly provided

criminal propensity evidence to the jury.

3. Whether the sentencing court abused its discretion and

imposed a manifestly excessive and unduly harsh sentence and

did so without sufficiently considering the fundamental norms

of the sentencing process.

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Appellant’s Brief at 7 (some formatting altered).

Evidentiary Issues

Appellant’s first two claims relate to the trial court’s evidentiary rulings.

First, Appellant contends that he was “deprived of a fair trial because the trial

court precluded from evidence the fact that the victim named another

individual and not [Appellant] as the perpetrator of her abuse.” Id. at 16.

Specifically, Appellant argues that because the evidence at issue is

exculpatory, the trial court abused its discretion when it excluded evidence

that the victim named her father as the perpetrator of abuse. Id. at 16-17.

Appellant further argues that the trial court, by precluding the evidence at

issue, engaged in a “manipulation of the facts and the manipulated facts were

presented to the jury rather than the actual facts,” thereby abusing its

discretion. Id. at 17-18.

Procedurally, we note that the evidentiary ruling at issue was the result

of a Commonwealth motion in limine seeking to preclude any testimony from

the victim concerning allegations against her father, D.T. See N.T. Trial,

10/25/23, at 30. On the record, the trial court made the following ruling:

At this point, I am granting the Commonwealth’s motion to

preclude the testimony regarding accusations against [D.T.] that

are outside of those that are against [Appellant] in this

particular case. [Appellant] is permitted to cross-examine

witnesses regarding the identity of the perpetrator for the

allegations in this particular case. So the scope is whether if the

allegations are what’s against [Appellant] are not, that hopefully

sets out the line.

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Id. (emphasis added). In its brief, the Commonwealth notes that the trial

court provided Appellant with the opportunity to cross-examine the victim

regarding the identity of the perpetrator in the instant case and that Appellant

failed to do so. Commonwealth’s Brief at 26-27.

Upon further consideration, the trial court issued the following ruling on

the record after the victim’s testimony:

After reviewing the arguments, the legal citations provided by

counsel, and the additional stuff submitted by counsel, the

accusations regarding [D.T.] do not make it more or less likely

that [Appellant] committed the alleged crimes in this matter.

Further, the accusations regarding [D.T.] would place the --

highlight confusion to the jury regarding the allegations in this

matter as there is a factual distinction of the nature of the

allegations.

N.T. Trial, 10/25/23, at 78.

We review a trial court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion.

Commonwealth v. Luster, 234 A.3d 836, 838 (Pa. Super. 2020). It is well

settled that “[a]n abuse of discretion is not merely an error of judgment, but

is rather the overriding or misapplication of the law, or the exercise of

judgment that is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of bias, prejudice, ill-

will or partiality, as shown by the evidence of record.” Commonwealth v.

Santos, 176 A.3d 877, 882 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation omitted).

In his brief, Appellant argues that the victim’s statements accusing her

father of sexual abuse was both relevant and exculpatory. Appellant’s Brief

at 16-18. The Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence define relevant evidence as

evidence that “has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it

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would be without the evidence; and the fact is of consequence in determining

the action.” Pa.R.E. 401 (formatting altered). When determining whether

evidence of third-party guilt is admissible, our Supreme Court has explained:

In the case of third person guilt evidence, the relevant inquiries

into admissibility are: Does the third person guilt evidence have a

tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence

to the determination of the issue, e.g., the defendant’s culpability,

more probable or less probable than it would be without the

evidence.

Commonwealth v. Yale, 249 A.3d 1001, 1022 (Pa. 2021) (citing Pa.R.E.

401). The Yale Court further stated:

Ultimately, the question is whether the evidence supports an

inference that the defendant did not commit the crime and

someone else did. The more detailed the similarity, the more

likely a finding of relevance. But a lesser level of detail combined

with other circumstances attendant to the crime charged and the

third person’s relationship to it are also pertinent considerations.

So too are the temporal factors relative to the third person’s bad

acts and the crime charged. Trial courts regularly exercise

discretion in determining the relevancy of evidence.

Id. at 1024.

Here, the allegations against D.T. center around disclosures the victim

made to Children and Youth Services in Northumberland County in a separate

investigation. N.T. Trial, 10/25/23, at 20, 23. During argument before the

trial court, the Commonwealth noted that the allegations against D.T. were

not consistent with the allegations against Appellant. Id. at 70. Specifically,

the Commonwealth described pictures drawn by the victim as follows: “The

first drawing at the bottom it says, [the victim] indicated what happened with

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[her father] was not the same as what happened with [Appellant].” Id.

Appellant’s counsel conceded that the victim’s allegations against her father

were “not identical to the allegations against [Appellant].” Id. at 73.

In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court addressed Appellant’s claim

as follows:

After hearing the argument of counsel, the [trial court] granted

the Commonwealth’s motion to preclude the testimony regarding

accusations against the victim’s father that were outside of those

that were against [Appellant] in this particular case. [Appellant’s]

counsel was given permission to cross examine witnesses

regarding the identity of the perpetrator for the allegations the

victim may have made against her father which were substantially

similar to the allegations made against [Appellant]. The [trial

court] found that any other allegations the victim may or may not

have lodged against her father would not tend to prove or disprove

whether [Appellant] committed the crimes against the victim for

which he was being tried. Additionally, even if the [trial court]

were to have concluded that such evidence was relevant, the

prejudice would outweigh the probative value as the likelihood of

confusion to the jury or the speculation that just because the

victim’s father may have committed a separate crime [Appellant]

might not have committed this separate act. Accordingly, the

[trial court] submits it committed no abuse of discretion in limiting

the scope of [Appellant’s] questioning of witnesses and

introduction of evidence regarding allegations of sexual abuse the

victim made against her father.

Trial Ct. Op., 5/7/24, at 5 (unpaginated).

Based on our review of the record, we discern no abuse of discretion by

the trial court. See Luster, 234 A.3d at 838. We agree with the trial court

that the victim’s testimony regarding allegations against her father did not

make it more or less likely that Appellant committed the crimes alleged in the

instant case and that this testimony could potentially confuse the jury.

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Accordingly, Appellant has not established that the precluded evidence would

“have a tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to

the determination of the issue, . . . more probable or less probable than it

would be without the evidence.” See Yale, 249 A.3d at 1022 (citation

omitted). Accordingly, Appellant is not entitled to relief.

In his second issue, Appellant alleges that the trial court abused its

discretion when it permitted Appellant’s bail release officer, Adam Welteroth,

“to testify as to his conversations with [Appellant] regarding his whereabouts

prior to trial.” Appellant’s Brief at 18. Appellant argues that the probative

value of such testimony was “far exceeded by the prejudicial effect on the

jury.” Id. Specifically, Appellant contends that the testimony would be

unfairly prejudicial because Appellant being placed in custody and the fact that

Appellant was fitted with a GPS ankle monitor for a period of two years prior

to trial was discussed in the statements at issue. Id. at 20-21.2

In response, the Commonwealth stated that the bail officer’s testimony

establishes Appellant’s consciousness of guilt, which is permitted under

existing case law. Commonwealth’s Brief at 27-29.

Pennsylvania courts have held that evidence of a defendant’s

consciousness of guilt is admissible. Commonwealth v. Ivy, 146 A.3d 241,

251 (Pa. Super. 2016). “Further, our Supreme Court has noted that flight

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2 The trial court overruled Appellant’s objection to Officer Welteroth’s

testimony on these grounds prior to the start of Officer Welteroth’s testimony.

See N.T. Trial, 10/26/23, at 56.

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may constitute circumstantial evidence of consciousness of guilt.”

Commonwealth v. Carter, 320 A.3d 140, 148 (Pa. Super. 2024) (citing,

inter alia, Commonwealth v. Housman, 986 A.2d 822, 831 (Pa. 2009)).

[W]hen a person commits a crime, knows that he is wanted

therefor, and flees or conceals himself, such conduct is evidence

of consciousness of guilt, and may form the basis of a conviction

in connection with other proof from which guilt may be inferred.

It is permissible to infer that a defendant knows he is wanted for

a crime from the circumstances attendant to his flight.

Carter, 320 A.3d at 149 (quoting Commonwealth v. Rios, 684 A.2d 1025,

1035 (Pa. 1996)).

The mere failure of a defendant to appear for trial, however, “does not

have the same connotation as pre-arrest flight or concealment and cannot be

said to point unerringly to consciousness of guilt.” Commonwealth v.

Holloman, 621 A.2d 1046, 1052 (Pa. Super. 1993) (citations omitted).

Evidence of a defendant’s failure to appear for trial accompanied by other

evidence that a defendant took steps to conceal his or her identity and/or

whereabouts is admissible. See Commonwealth v. Toro, 638 A.2d 991,

400-01 (Pa. Super. 1994) (collecting cases).

Here, at trial, the Commonwealth elicited testimony from Officer

Welteroth, that Appellant was required to wear a GPS monitor as part of his

bail conditions, and that in the event the monitor runs out of power, Appellant

was required to disclose his location to Officer Welteroth when asked. N.T.

Trial, 10/26/23, at 58. Officer Welteroth further testified that Appellant told

him that he was aware of those conditions. Id.

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The record reflects that prior to trial, Officer Welteroth attempted to

ascertain Appellant’s whereabouts. Id. at 60. Via text message, Appellant

told Officer Welteroth that he intended to check in to the Super 8 Motel in

Danville, Pennsylvania, so that he could attend his trial. Id. Officer Welteroth

testified at trial that on the day before trial, Appellant indicated to him that

Appellant intended to appear at the courthouse by 8:30 a.m. Id. at 62.

Officer Welteroth stated that he had no further communications with

Appellant. Id. The next day, Appellant did not appear for trial and the trial

was held in absentia.

In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court addressed Appellant’s claim

as follows:

The testimony of [Appellant’s] bail release officer was relevant to

substantiating the consciousness of guilt instruction that the

Commonwealth requested due to [Appellant’s] failure to appear

for trial, as it gave the jury an opportunity to determine whether

[Appellant] made deliberate efforts to avoid trial and engage in

deceptive behaviors to conceal his whereabouts. Given the fact

that the [trial court] did not allow the bail release officer to render

his own opinion regarding what he believed [Appellant’s]

intentions were, the [trial court] believes there was no prejudice

to [Appellant] and that there was no error of law or abuse of

discretion in allowing the bail release officer to testify.

Trial Ct. Op., 5/7/24, at 7 (unpaginated).

Based on our review of the record, we discern no abuse of discretion by

the trial court. See Luster, 234 A.3d at 838. On this record, we agree with

the trial court that Officer Welteroth’s testimony provided the jury with the

“opportunity to determine whether [Appellant] made deliberate efforts to

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avoid trial and engage in deceptive behaviors to conceal his whereabouts.”

Trial Ct. Op., 5/7/24, at 7 (unpaginated); see also Toro, 638 A.2d at 400-

01; Holloman, 621 A.2d at 1052. Accordingly, we find that the trial court did

not abuse its discretion when it permitted Officer Welteroth’s testimony, and

Appellant is not entitled to relief. See Luster, 234 A.3d at 838.

Discretionary Aspects of Sentence

In his remaining issue, Appellant challenges the discretionary aspects of

his sentence. Specifically, Appellant argues that the trial court imposed a

manifestly excessive sentence because it failed to “follow the fundamental

norms underlying the sentencing process.” Appellant’s Brief at 21. Further,

Appellant claims that the trial court failed to give adequate consideration to

the enumerated sentencing factors as set forth in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b). Id.

at 24.

“[C]hallenges to the discretionary aspects of sentencing do not entitle

an appellant to review as of right.” Commonwealth v. Derry, 150 A.3d 987,

991 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citations omitted). Before reaching the merits of such

claims, we must determine:

(1) whether the appeal is timely; (2) whether Appellant preserved

his issues; (3) whether Appellant’s brief includes a [Pa.R.A.P.

2119(f)] concise statement of the reasons relied upon for

allowance of appeal with respect to the discretionary aspects of

sentence; and (4) whether the concise statement raises a

substantial question that the sentence is inappropriate under the

sentencing code.

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Commonwealth v. Corley, 31 A.3d 293, 296 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citations

omitted).

“The determination of what constitutes a substantial question must be

evaluated on a case-by-case basis.” Commonwealth v. Battles, 169 A.3d

1086, 1090 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation omitted). “A substantial question

exists only when the appellant advances a colorable argument that the

sentencing judge’s actions were either: (1) inconsistent with a specific

provision of the Sentencing Code; or (2) contrary to the fundamental norms

which underlie the sentencing process.” Commonwealth v. Grays, 167 A.3d

793, 816 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation omitted).

Here, the record confirms that Appellant preserved his sentencing claims

in a post-sentence motion, filed a timely notice of appeal, and raised the issues

in his Rule 1925(b) statement. Appellant has also included a Rule 2119(f)

statement in his brief. See Appellant’s Brief at 13-15. Additionally, we

conclude that Appellant’s claim raises a substantial question for review. See

Commonwealth v. Swope, 123 A.3d 333, 339 (Pa. Super. 2015)

(concluding that the appellant raised a substantial question raised where he

challenged consecutive sentences as excessive and claimed that the court

failed to consider his rehabilitative needs and mitigating factors);

Commonwealth v. Raven, 97 A.3d 1244, 1253 (Pa. Super. 2014)

(explaining that a claim that a sentence was excessive raised in conjunction

with a claim that the trial court failed to consider mitigating factors raises

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substantial question). Accordingly, we will consider the merits of Appellant’s

challenge to the discretionary aspects of his sentence.

Our standard of review is as follows:

Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the

sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal

absent a manifest abuse of discretion. In this context, an abuse

of discretion is not shown merely by an error in judgment. Rather,

the appellant must establish, by reference to the record, that the

sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law, exercised its

judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or

arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision.

Additionally, our review of the discretionary aspects of a sentence

is confined by the statutory mandates of 42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(c) and

(d). Subsection 9781(c) provides:

The appellate court shall vacate the sentence and remand

the case to the sentencing court with instructions if it finds:

(1) the sentencing court purported to sentence within

the sentencing guidelines but applied the guidelines

erroneously;

(2) the sentencing court sentenced within the

sentencing guidelines but the case involves

circumstances where the application of the guidelines

would be clearly unreasonable; or

(3) the sentencing court sentenced outside the

sentencing guidelines and the sentence is

unreasonable.

In all other cases the appellate court shall affirm the sentence

imposed by the sentencing court.

42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(c).

In reviewing the record, we consider:

(1) The nature and circumstances of the offense and the

history and characteristics of the defendant.

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(2) The opportunity of the sentencing court to observe the

defendant, including any presentence investigation [(PSI)].

(3) The findings upon which the sentence was based.

(4) The guidelines promulgated by the commission.

42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(d).

Raven, 97 A.3d at 1253-54 (some citations omitted and some formatting

altered).

“When imposing a sentence, the sentencing court must consider the

factors set out in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b), [including] the protection of the public,

[the] gravity of [the] offense in relation to [the] impact on [the] victim and

[the] community, and [the] rehabilitative needs of the defendant.”

Commonwealth v. Fullin, 892 A.2d 843, 847 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citation

omitted and formatting altered). Additionally, the trial court “must consider

the sentencing guidelines.” Id. at 848 (citation omitted). Where a PSI report

exists, this Court will “presume that the sentencing judge was aware of

relevant information regarding the defendant’s character and weighed those

considerations along with mitigating statutory factors.” Commonwealth v.

Watson, 228 A.3d 928, 936 (Pa. Super. 2020) (citation omitted).

“Generally, Pennsylvania law affords the sentencing court discretion to

impose its sentence concurrently or consecutively to other sentences being

imposed at the same time or to sentences already imposed. [An a]ppellant is

not entitled to a ‘volume discount’ on his multiple convictions by the imposition

of concurrent sentences.” Commonwealth v. Brown, 249 A.3d 1206, 1216

(Pa. Super. 2021) (citations omitted and formatting altered).

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The balancing of the sentencing factors is the sole province of the

sentencing court, which has the opportunity to observe the defendant and all

witnesses firsthand. See Commonwealth v. Kurtz, 294 A.3d 509, 536 (Pa.

Super. 2023), appeal granted on other grounds, 306 A.3d 1287 (Pa. 2023).

In conducting appellate review, this Court “cannot reweigh sentencing factors

and impose judgment in place of [the] sentencing court where [the] lower

court was fully aware of all mitigating factors[.]” Id. (citation omitted).

Here, the trial court addressed Appellant’s sentencing claims as follows:

The [trial court] submits that it considered several factors when

fashioning [] Appellant’s sentence and choosing to run certain

counts consecutive to each other and the remaining counts

concurrent to each other, including the mandatory minimum

sentence required for certain counts, and the need to protect the

public given [Appellant’s] propensity for sexually abusing children,

the age of the victim, the intrusive nature of the sexual contact of

the victim, and the Sexual Offender Assessment Board member’s

finding that [Appellant] displayed characteristics associated with

pedophilic disorder which is a lifetime condition and significantly

increases his likelihood for sexual re-offense. Additionally, the

[trial court] considered [Appellant’s] attempt to avoid all

responsibility by deliberately misleading his counsel and the [trial

court] regarding his intention to appear for jury selection and trial

yet failed to appear for either proceeding and was ultimately taken

into custody in the State of New Hampshire and returned to

Pennsylvania. Finally, and perhaps most significantly, the [trial

court] considered [Appellant’s] apparent lack of remorse, and

noted its belief that [Appellant] did not want his own family

present at the sentencing because he did not want them to hear

the things that were said about him. [The trial court] is of the

opinion that it was not an abuse of discretion to impose the

sentence it did upon [Appellant] given the individual

circumstances of the matter.

Trial Ct. Op., 5/7/24, at 8-9 (unpaginated).

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Following our review of the record, we discern no abuse of discretion by

the trial court. See Raven, 97 A.3d at 1253. The record reflects that the

trial court ordered a PSI report, which it reviewed prior to sentencing. See

N.T. Sentencing Hr’g, 2/6/24, at 8. Therefore, we presume that the trial court

was fully aware of all sentencing factors set forth by the Sentencing Code and

considered them when imposing Appellant’s sentence. See Watson, 228

A.3d at 936; see also Kurtz, 294 A.3d at 536. Further, we will not re-weigh

the trial court’s consideration of the relevant sentencing factors on appeal.

See Kurtz, 294 A.3d at 536. Moreover, as noted previously, it is well settled

that defendants convicted of multiple criminal offenses are not entitled to a

volume discount on their aggregate sentence. See Brown, 249 A.3d at 1216;

see also Commonwealth v. Pisarchuk, 306 A.3d 872, 881 (Pa. Super.

2023). For these reasons, we conclude that Appellant is not entitled to relief.

Accordingly, we affirm.

Judgment of sentence affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judge Olson joins the memorandum.

Judge Kunselman concurs in the result.

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Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 12/31/2024

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