The opinion
[Cite as Samadder v. Ohio State Univ. Wexner Med. Ctr., 2024-Ohio-6104.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
Anjana Samadder et al., :
Plaintiffs-Appellants, :
No. 23AP-774
v. : (Ct. of Cl. No. 2021-00536JD)
The Ohio State University : (REGULAR CALENDAR)
Wexner Medical Center,
:
Defendant-Appellee.
:
D E C I S I O N
Rendered on December 31, 2024
On brief: Colley Shroyer & Abraham Co. LPA, and David I.
Shroyer, for appellants. Argued: David I. Shroyer.
On brief: Reminger Co., L.P.A, Justin D. Harris, Taylor C.
Knight, and Hannah R. Duschl; Dave Yost, Attorney General,
and Brian M. Kneafsey, Jr. for appellee. Argued: Brian M.
Kneafsey, Jr.
APPEAL from the Court of Claims of Ohio
BOGGS, J.
{¶ 1} Plaintiffs-appellants, Dr. Anjana Samadder and Dr. Gautam Samadder,
appeal the decision of the Court of Claims of Ohio, which granted the motion for summary
judgment of defendant-appellee, the Ohio State University Wexner Medical Center
(“OSUWMC”). For the following reasons, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand
this matter to the Court of Claims.
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND FACTS
{¶ 2} On April 7, 2020, Dr. Anjana Samadder (hereinafter “Dr. Samadder”) was
admitted as a patient to the OSUWMC to receive treatment for COVID-19. Dr. Samadder
alleged that, during her hospital stay, she was placed on a venovenous extracorporeal
No. 23AP-774 2
membrane oxygenation (“ECMO”). (Sept. 23, 2021 Compl. at 2.) On April 17, 2020, the
cannulation was changed from the ECMO to an Avalon catheter. Id. Dr. Samadder claims
that during the placement of the Avalon catheter she experienced a perforation to her right
ventricle which required an emergency sternotomy and repair. Id. She further alleged that
she experienced swelling and a loss of pulse in her left arm following that procedure. Id.
{¶ 3} On April 18, 2020, Dr. Mounir Haurani, a vascular surgeon and employee of
the OSUWMC, performed a bedside thrombectomy on Dr. Samadder’s left arm. Dr.
Samadder maintains that following the thrombectomy she developed compartment
syndrome that was not diagnosed until April 27, 2020, for which she then received a
fasciotomy as treatment. Now, Dr. Samadder argues that, because of the delayed diagnosis
of compartment syndrome, she has suffered irreparable and permanent damage to her left
arm that has rendered it deformed and useless.
{¶ 4} On September 23, 2021, Dr. Samadder and her husband, Dr. Gautam
Samadder, filed a complaint against OSUWMC asserting claims of medical negligence and
loss of consortium and seeking judgment for “economic and non-economic damages in
excess of $1 million, attorneys’ fees, costs, and any other legal and/or equitable relief that
[the] Court deems just and proper. Id. at 4.
{¶ 5} On February 11, 2022, OSUWMC filed a motion for judgment on the
pleadings, arguing that it was immune from suit under the Public Readiness and
Emergency Preparedness Act and Am.Sub.H.B. No. 606 and that the Samadders failed to
state a claim upon which relief could be granted. On March 25, 2022, the Court of Claims
denied OSUWMC’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, finding that whether OSUWMC
is entitled to qualified civil immunity may not be determined based solely on the pleadings.
{¶ 6} On September 15, 2023, OSUWMC filed a motion for summary judgment,
arguing that it is entitled to qualified civil immunity under Am.Sub.H.B. No. 606. Dr.
Samadder responded that OSUWMC is not entitled to immunity because the standard of
care, which she contends requires the performance of a fasciotomy at the same time as a
brachial thrombectomy, was not altered by the COVID-19 pandemic and that nothing about
Dr. Samadder’s diagnosis or the pandemic would have prevented the exercise of the
standard of care.
No. 23AP-774 3
{¶ 7} On November 29, 2023, the Court of Claims granted OSUWMC’s motion for
summary judgment. The court found that OSUWMC met its burden to establish immunity
under Am.Sub.H.B. No. 606. The court looked to the evidence and determined that Dr.
Samadder was a hospitalized patient at OSUWMC in April 2020 when Am.Sub.H.B. No.
606 was in effect, that Dr. Samadder was one of OSUWMC’s first COVID-19 patients who
was critically ill, that OSUWMC provided care to Dr. Samadder, and that during that time,
OSUWMC medical providers were seeing thrombosis and clotting in COVID-19 patients as
well as more instances of patients with acute ischemia to extremities. The court determined
that the health care services provided by OSUWMC to Dr. Samadder, a COVID-19 patient,
were a result of or in response to the state of emergency due to COVID-19 and therefore fall
within the qualified civil immunity provision of Am.Sub.H.B. No. 606.
{¶ 8} The Court of Claims also found that Dr. Samadder failed to demonstrate that
an exception to immunity applies under Am.Sub.H.B. No. 606(B)(2), namely that
OSUWMC’s actions constituted a reckless disregard or willful or wanton misconduct. The
court determined that Dr. Samadder’s complaint only alleged negligence, and the
complaint failed to allege that OSUWMC’s health care providers exhibited a reckless
disregard for the consequences of their actions, so as to affect the life or health of the
patient, or that those health care providers exhibited intentional misconduct or willful or
wanton misconduct.
{¶ 9} Dr. Samadder now appeals the Court of Claims’ decision on summary
judgment.
II. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
{¶ 10} Dr. Samadder argues the following assignments of error:
(1) The trial court erred in finding that OSU Wexner Medical
Center sustained its burden of proof to establish immunity
under H.B. 606.
(2) The trial court erred by requiring the Samadders to plead
an exception to immunity in their Complaint.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
{¶ 11} Appellate review of summary judgment is de novo. Accurate Elec. Constr. v.
Ohio State Univ., 10th Dist. No. 17AP-211, 2019-Ohio-4992; Koos v. Cent. Ohio Cellular,
No. 23AP-774 4
Inc., 94 Ohio App.3d 579, 588 (8th Dist.1994). In appellate review of summary judgment,
we stand in the shoes of the Court of Claims, conduct an independent review of the record,
and affirm the Court of Claims’ judgment if any of the grounds the movant raised in the
Court of Claims supports the court’s judgment, even if the Court of Claims failed to consider
those grounds. See Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 292 (1996); Coventry Twp. v.
Ecker, 101 Ohio App.3d 38, 41-42 (9th Dist.1995).
{¶ 12} Summary judgment is appropriate only where: (1) no genuine issue of
material fact remains to be litigated; (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law; and (3) viewing the evidence most strongly in favor of the nonmoving party,
reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion and that conclusion is adverse to the
nonmoving party. Tokles & Son, Inc. v. Midwestern Indem. Co., 65 Ohio St.3d 621, 629
(1992), citing Harless v. Willis Day Warehousing Co., Inc., 54 Ohio St.2d 64, 65-66 (1978).
IV. LEGAL ANALYSIS
A. Assignment of Error No. 1
{¶ 13} In her first assignment of error, Dr. Samadder argues that the Court of Claims
erred in finding OSUWMC sustained its burden of proof to establish qualified civil
immunity under Am.Sub.H.B. No. 606. Dr. Samadder argues that Am.Sub.H.B. No. 606
limits the liability of health care providers only as to treatment decisions specific to COVID-
19 and that the negligence that caused Dr. Samadder’s injuries did not occur as a result of
treatment for COVID-19. We do not agree.
{¶ 14} We first turn to the language of Am.Sub.H.B. No. 606 to interpret the
qualified civil immunity provision of this temporary law. The primary goal of statutory
interpretation is to ascertain and give effect to the General Assembly’s intent in enacting
the statute. Brooks Capital Servs., L.L.C. v. 5151 Trabue Ltd., 10th Dist. No. 12AP-30, 2012
Ohio App. LEXIS 3901 *9 (Sept. 27, 2012), citing Yonkings v. Wilkinson, 86 Ohio St.3d
225, 227 (1999). In determining legislative intent, we first look to the plain language of the
statute. Hubbell v. Xenia, 115 Ohio St.3d 77, 2007-Ohio-4839, ¶ 11, citing State ex rel.
Burrows v. Indus. Comm., 78 Ohio St.3d 78, 81 (1997). A court must “evaluate a statute ‘as
a whole and giv[e] such interpretation as will give effect to every word and clause in it.’ ”
Boley v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 125 Ohio St.3d 510, 2010-Ohio-2550, ¶ 21, quoting
No. 23AP-774 5
State ex rel. Myers v. Bd. of Edn. of Rural School Dist. of Spencer Twp., 95 Ohio St. 367,
373 (1917).
{¶ 15} As the Court of Claims noted, Am.Sub.H.B. No. 606, as stated in its title, was
an act to “make temporary changes related to qualified civil immunity for health care and
emergency services provided during a government-declared disaster or emergency and for
exposure to or transmission or contraction of certain coronaviruses.” Am.Sub.H.B. No.
606(B)(1) states:
Subject to division (C)(3) of this section, a health care provider
that provides health care services, emergency medical
services, first-aid treatment, or other emergency professional
care, including the provision of any medication or other
medical equipment or product, as a result of or in response to
a disaster or emergency is not subject to professional
disciplinary action and is not liable in damages to any person
or government agency in a tort action for injury, death, or loss
to person or property that allegedly arises from any of the
following:
(a) An act or omission of the health care provider in the health
care provider’s provision, withholding, or withdrawal of
those services;
(b) Any decision related to the provision, withholding, or
withdrawal of those services;
(c) Compliance with an executive order or director’s order
issued during and in response to the disaster or emergency.
(Emphasis added.)
{¶ 16} The parties do not dispute that OSUWMC is a hospital and a health care
provider under Am.Sub.H.B. No. 606 1(A)(15) and (20). The parties also do not dispute
that OSUWMC, through its employed health care professionals, provided health care
services and emergency services to Dr. Samadder under the relevant definitions within
Am.Sub.H.B. No. 606 1(A) (19) and (20).
{¶ 17} However, the parties do dispute whether Dr. Samadder’s delayed treatment
for compartment syndrome, and alleged subsequent injury, was “as a result of or in
response to a disaster or emergency” as required for immunity under Am.Sub.H.B. No.
606(B)(1) to apply. Dr. Samadder argues that because the standard of care for
No. 23AP-774 6
compartment syndrome is the same for COVID patients and non-COVID patients, the care
provided was not related to or in response to the COVID-19 health emergency. In other
words, she argues the medical negligence at issue was unrelated to Dr. Samadder’s COVID-
19 diagnosis and treatment.
{¶ 18} However, in our reading of Am.Sub.H.B. No. 606(B)(1), the plain language of
the rule conditions its application on whether the healthcare services at issue were provided
“as a result of” the COVID-19 pandemic, not whether the standard of care was altered by
the pandemic. Dr. Samadder was a critically ill COVID-19 patient at OSUWMC, and the
treatment at issue here is inextricably linked to her treatment as a COVID-19 patient. We
cannot divorce her treatment at OSUWMC from the pandemic. The evidence in the record
indicates that Dr. Samadder was suffering from a life-threatening COVID-19 infection,
which necessitated the need for several life-support measures. This included the ECMO
and Avalon catheter, which led to the need for the sternotomy. The sternotomy led to Dr.
Samadder’s subsequent blood clot, which then required a thrombectomy. The
thrombectomy led to her developing compartment syndrome and requiring a fasciotomy.
All of these conditions and treatments arose from her COVID-19 infection and were all a
part of the overarching goal of keeping Dr. Samadder from dying of COVID-19. We agree
with the Court of Claims that Dr. Samadder’s treatment was a direct result of or in response
to COVID-19, and the care and treatment for her arm arose as a direct result of the care for
her COVID-19 infection. Accordingly, we overrule Dr. Samadder’s first assignment of error.
B. Assignment of Error No. 2
{¶ 19} In her second assignment of error, Dr. Samadder argues that the Court of
Claims erred in its ruling on summary judgment by requiring the Samadders to plead an
exception to immunity in their complaint. We agree.
{¶ 20} As discussed above, Am.Sub.H.B. No. 606(B)(1) establishes qualified civil
immunity, but Am.Sub.H.B. No. 606 (B)(2) also establishes an exception to that immunity
where the health care provider’s actions exhibit “reckless disregard” or “intentional
misconduct or willful or wanton misconduct.” It states:
Division (B)(1) of this section does not apply in a tort action
if the health care provider’s action, omission, decision, or
compliance constitutes a reckless disregard for the
consequences so as to affect the life or health of the patient
or intentional misconduct or willful or wanton misconduct
No. 23AP-774 7
on the part of the person against whom the action is
brought.
(Emphasis added.) Am.Sub.H.B. No. 606 (B)(2).
{¶ 21} The temporary law further defines “reckless disregard” as follows:
[A]s it applies to a given health care provider rendering health
care services, emergency medical services, first-aid treatment,
or other emergency professional care, conduct by which, with
heedless indifference to the consequences, the health care
provider disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the
health care provider’s conduct is likely to cause, at the time
those services or that treatment or care were rendered, an
unreasonable risk of injury, death, or loss to person or
property.
Am.Sub.H.B. No. 606 (A)(42).
{¶ 22} In responding to OSUWMC’s motion for summary judgment, Dr. Samadder
had argued that OSUWMC was not entitled to immunity because its alleged failure to timely
perform a fasciotomy constituted a reckless disregard of Dr. Samadder’s health. Dr.
Samadder directed the Court of Claims to the affidavit of Dr. Maseed A. Bade who avered
that it was reckless of OSUWMC to not perform a fasciotomy at the time of the
thrombectomy. The Court of Claims, however, noted that Dr. Samadder’s complaint did
not allege that OSUWMC’s health care providers provided medical care with a reckless
disregard for the consequences, but instead alleged only negligence on the part of
OSUWMC and its employees.
{¶ 23} The Court of Claims relied on Munday v. Village of Lincoln Heights, 1st Dist.
No. C-120431, 2013-Ohio-3095, in rejecting Dr. Samadder’s argument. There, the First
District Court of Appeals held that a complaint “must contain allegations suggesting malice,
bad faith, or wanton or reckless conduct for a plaintiff to raise these issues in opposing the
employee’s motion for summary judgment based on the immunity found in R.C.
2744.03(A)(6).” Id. at ¶ 46. Applying Munday, the Court of Claims reasoned that because
Dr. Samadder did not allege that OSUWMC acted with reckless disregard in her complaint
that she could not do so in opposing OSUWMC’s motion for summary judgment. The Court
of Claims looked to its own analysis in denying OSUWMC’s motion for judgment on the
pleadings, where it noted that Dr. Samadder’s complaint did not allege that OSUWMC’s
No. 23AP-774 8
“health care providers provided medical care with a reckless disregard for the consequences
so as to affect [her] life or health, or with intentional, or willful, or wanton misconduct.”
(Mar. 25, 2022 Decision at 12.)
{¶ 24} Here, we disagree with the Court of Claims. We note that Ohio is a notice-
pleading state and that the plaintiff need not prove his or her case at the pleading stage.
York v. Ohio State Hwy. Patrol, 60 Ohio St.3d 143, 144-45 (1991). Further, a plaintiff need
not affirmatively dispose of the immunity question altogether at the pleading stage. Fink
v. Twentieth Century Homes, Inc., 8th Dist. No. 94519, 2010-Ohio-5486, ¶ 29. Requiring
a plaintiff to affirmatively demonstrate an exception to immunity at this stage would be
tantamount to requiring the plaintiff to overcome a motion for summary judgment at the
pleading stage. Id. at ¶ 27. Instead, a plaintiff must merely allege a set of facts that, if
proven, would plausibly allow for recovery. Id. at ¶ 29, citing Gallo v. Westfield Natl. Ins.
Co., 8th Dist. No. 91893, 2009-Ohio-1094.
{¶ 25} Here, reviewing the Court of Claims’ decision on OSUWMC’s motion for
summary judgment, the question is not whether Dr. Samadder pled allegations in the
complaint to disprove that OSUWMC is entitled to immunity under Am.Sub.H.B. No. 606
but, rather, does the evidence presented to the court establish OSUWMC’s entitlement to
immunity as a matter of law. As noted above, a plaintiff is not required to affirmatively
demonstrate an exception to immunity at the pleading stage. The Supreme Court of Ohio
has stated that
a plaintiff is not required to prove his or her case at the pleading
stage. Very often, the evidence necessary for a plaintiff to
prevail is not obtained until the plaintiff is able to discover
materials in the defendant’s possession. If the plaintiff were
required to prove his or her case in the complaint, many valid
claims would be dismissed because of the plaintiff’s lack of
access to relevant evidence.
York, 60 Ohio St.3d at 145.
{¶ 26} Here, Dr. Samadder was not required to anticipate and plead around
affirmative defenses, such as civil liability immunity under Am.Sub.H.B. No. 606. “Indeed,
‘ “complaints need not anticipate and attempt to plead around defenses.” ’ ” Main v. Lima,
3d Dist. No. 1-14-42, 2015-Ohio-2572, ¶ 13, quoting Savoy v. Univ. of Akron, 10th Dist. No.
11AP-183, 2012-Ohio-1962, ¶ 8, quoting United States v. N. Trust Co., 372 F.3d 886, 888
No. 23AP-774 9
(7th Cir.2004). Further, a motion for summary judgment differs from a motion for
judgment on the pleadings, or other motions made before discovery, in what the Court of
Claims can consider. “A motion for summary judgment is based on evidence presented to
the court and allows consideration of facts beyond the allegations included in the
pleadings.” Parrish v. Jones, 138 Ohio St.3d 23, 2013-Ohio-5224, ¶ 13. While OSUWMC
points this court to Munday, we find this reliance misplaced, as the First District’s
reasoning was specific to the presumption of political subdivision immunity under R.C.
2744.03, which is not applicable to this case. Munday at ¶ 46.
{¶ 27} While the complaint alleges negligence on the part of OSUWMC, it also states
that Dr. Samadder “developed compartment syndrome which was not diagnosed until
April 27, 2020, at which time she promptly had a fasciotomy. By that time however, Anjana
Samadder had suffered irreparable and permanent damage to her left arm rendering it
deformed and useless.” (Compl. at 2-3.) These allegations could be construed as Dr.
Samadder’s contention that OSUWMC acted with reckless disregard for the consequences
as to affect her life or health. We accordingly sustain Dr. Samadder’s second assignment of
error and hold that the Court of Claims erred in granting OSUWMC’s motion for summary
judgment based on its determination that Dr. Samadder’s complaint did not plead an
exception to immunity under Am.Sub.H.B. No. 606.
{¶ 28} While we reverse the Court of Claims’ judgment, we also remand the matter
to that court for it to determine whether Dr. Samadder has established through evidence
that OSUWMC employees acted with reckless disregard with respect to the delayed
fasciotomy treatment for Dr. Samadder’s compartment syndrome. Because the Court of
Claims determined that Dr. Samadder was required to, but did not raise, recklessness or
intentional, willful or wanton misconduct in her complaint, that court has not determined
whether the evidence before it supports her contention that OSUWMC’s acts or omissions
exhibited a reckless disregard for the consequences, so as to preclude application of
immunity under Am.Sub.H.B. No. 606.
{¶ 29} Dr. Samadder argued below and points this court to evidence in the record,
such as Dr. Maseed A. Bade’s affidavit, that OSUWMC acted with reckless disregard for Dr.
Samadder by waiting so long to perform a fasciotomy to treat her compartment syndrome.
In a deposition, Dr. Mounir Haurani, the OSUWMC physician who performed the
No. 23AP-774 10
thrombectomy on Dr. Samadder, stated that he would typically consult with a hand surgeon
to perform a fasciotomy following the thrombectomy but could not recall that happening
in Dr. Samadder’s case, and it was not documented in his notes. (Sept. 15, 2023 Def.’s Mot.
for Summ. Jgmt, Ex. C, Haurani Dep. at 66-68.) We leave this question, whether
OSUWMC’s actions or omissions rise to reckless disregard, for the Court of Claims to
address.
V. CONCLUSION
{¶ 30} For these reasons, we overrule Dr. Samadder’s first assignment of error,
sustain her second assignment of error, and remand this matter to the Court of Claims for
further proceedings consistent with this decision and the law.
Judgment affirmed in part,
reversed in part, cause remanded.
DORRIAN and JAMISON, JJ., concur.