Van Zandt v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania/Department of Corrections

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

THOMAS VAN ZANDT, Administrator of

the Estate of MATTHEW MARTIN VAN

ZANDT, CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:24-CV-486

Plaintiff (MEHALCHICK, J.)

v.

COMMONWEALTH OF

PENNSYLVANIA/DEPARTMENT OF

CORRECTIONS, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM

This action was commenced by Thomas Van Zandt (“Plaintiff”) as the Administrator

of the Estate of Matthew Martin Van Zandt (“Van Zandt”) by filing a complaint against

Defendants the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania/Department of Corrections (the

“Commonwealth/Department”), Casey Hartman (“Hartman”), Officer P. Baummer

(“Baummer”), Officer M. Woomer (“Woomer”), and Sgt. D. Shaffer (“Shaffer”)

(collectively, Commonwealth Defendants), as well as against MHM Services, Inc., MHM

Correctional Services, Inc., MHM Correctional Services, LLC, Centurion Health Services &

Centurion of Pennsylvania and Joyce Knowles (“Knowles”) (collectively, “MHM

Defendants”) (collectively with Commonwealth Defendants, “Defendants”) on March 20,

2024. (Doc. 1). The operative amended complaint was filed on May 10, 2024, against the

aforementioned Defendants. (Doc. 8). The amended complaint alleges violations of the

Eighth Amendment pursuant 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“§ 1983”), the Americans with Disabilities

Act (“ADA”), and the Rehabilitation Act (“RA”). (Doc. 8). Presently before the Court is a

motion to dismiss or to change venue filed by the Commonwealth Defendants (Doc. 18) and

a motion to transfer venue filed by MHM Defendants (Doc. 20). For the following reasons,

the Commonwealth Defendants’ motion to dismiss will be GRANTED. (Doc. 18). The

motions to transfer will be DENIED. (Doc. 18; Doc. 20).

I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The following factual summary is taken from the amended complaint. (Doc. 8). This

case arises from the death of Mr. Van Zandt while he was in the care and custody of SCI

Houtzdale, a state correctional institution in Houtzdale, Clearfield County, Pennsylvania.

(Doc. 8, ¶¶ 5-6). Plaintiff alleges that at the time of his incarceration, Mr. Van Zandt had a

long and serious history of mental health issues, which included, between the years of 2010

through 2019, previous suicide attempts, psychiatric hospitalizations and treatment, as well

as diagnoses of depression, post-traumatic stress disorder, and psychosis. (Doc. 8, at 5-6).

Mr. Van Zandt was detained after killing a man on March 6, 2019. (Doc. 8, ¶ 18). He

was convicted and sentenced to a term of 12 to 24 years based upon a guilty but mentally ill

plea on June 4, 2021. (Doc. 8, ¶ 20-21). As a pretrial detainee, Decedent was incarcerated at

the Lancaster County Prison. (Doc. 8, ¶ 29). While housed there, Decedent experienced

mental health episodes. (Doc. 8, ¶¶ 30-42). He was on suicide watch, attempted suicide while

in custody, and spent time in the State Correctional Institute Torrance State Hospital due to

his suicidality. (Doc. 8, ¶¶ 30-42). After his conviction, Mr. Van Zandt resided in SCI

Smithfield from about June 9, 2021 to about July 9, 2021 and in SCI Camp Hill from about

July 9, 2021 to about September 17, 2021. (Doc. 8, ¶¶ 43-52). Decedent was transferred to

SCI Houtzdale on September 17, 2021. (Doc. 8, ¶ 53). Staff at SCI Houtzdale had access to

all Mr. Van Zandt’s health records, which detailed his previous suicide attempt while

incarcerated. (Doc. 8, ¶ 54). Still, after being screened, Mr. Van Zandt was not placed on

suicide watch or put on psychiatric medication. (Doc. 8, ¶¶ 57-59). Instead, he was placed in

general population where he was assigned to a cell with a cellmate and was not given suicide-

proof bedding or clothing. (Doc. 8, ¶¶ 80, 140-141, 166, 170). Medical staff initially reported

that Mr. Van Zandt was “doing well,” but after his September 2021 case review with Dr.

Saiqa Mushtaq, his mental health began to deteriorate. (Doc. 8, ¶¶ 57-59).

On October 5, 2021, Mr. Van Zandt began reporting hallucinations, anxiety, and

depression with the medical providers and mental health professionals he worked with,

including Defendants Hartman and Knowles. (Doc. 8, ¶¶ 60-74). According to the amended

complaint, beginning in January 2022, Mr. Van Zandt began reporting worsening depression

and by February 28, 2022, he reported multiple sexual assaults and suicidal thoughts to the

Department and their staff, and specifically to Defendant Hartman. (Doc. 8, ¶¶ 71-79). On

one occasion, after reporting his sexual assault, RN Pamela Oliver completed a suicide risk

indicator checklist for Mr. Van Zandt, who reported that he was taking psychiatric medication

and requested self-confinement/protective custody. (Doc. 8, ¶¶ 75-76). It is not clear from the

amended complaint whether he was provided such accommodations. (Doc. 8). In the weeks

following his visit with RN Pamela Oliver, Mr. Van Zandt stopped taking his medication and

his mental health deteriorated further. (Doc. 8, ¶ 79). From March 14, 2022 through March

17, 2022, Mr. Van Zandt reported feeling suicidal and hallucinating. (Doc. 8, ¶¶ 80-85).

Defendant Hartman encouraged him to use coping skills, and Mr. Van Zandt was placed on

constant suicide watch and in a Psychiatric Observation Cell (“POC”) for the first and only

time at SCI Houtzdale. (Doc. 8, ¶¶ 80-105). Plaintiff alleges that prison personnel, including

treatment professionals Dr. Adam Benjamin Bloom and Defendant Knowles, indicated in

their notes that they did not believe Mr. Van Zandt’s suicidal ideations to be genuine. (Doc.

8, ¶¶ 103-116).

Mr. Van Zandt was removed from POC on April 8, 2022 and despite continued

deterioration, “received little support from the medical and mental health providers and staff

at SCI Houtzdale.” (Doc. 8, ¶ 117). He attempted to receive support from prison psychiatry

staff on April 29, 2022 but was not seen. (Doc. 8, ¶¶ 121-123). On May 7, 2022, Mr. Van

Zandt called his mother and told her that “he was as hearing voices, fighting depression, did

not know what to do, and was only prescribed antidepressants that he was not taking and

were not helping.” (Doc. 8, ¶¶ 124-126). His mother called SCI Houtzale to report that she

had information that an inmate was going to do imminent harm to himself. (Doc. 8, ¶ 127).

She was told no psychiatrist or psychologist was available to see her son. (Doc. 8, ¶¶ 128-130).

On May 11, 2022, Mr. Van Zandt was seen by medical and mental health providers and told

them he was going to hurt himself or someone else. (Doc. 8, ¶ 133). Despite his reports, he

was not moved to POC, no changes were made to his medication or treatment, he remained

in the general population without suicide prevention care, and he was scheduled for a follow-

up in two weeks. (Doc. 8, ¶¶ 134-140). In fact, according to a Mental Health Contact Note

prepared by Matthew Fetsko, a Psychological Services Specialist, “POC was deemed not

warranted at this time.” (Doc. 8, ¶ 139). Mr. Van Zandt also informed his cellmate that day

that he was suicidal, and his cellmate encouraged him to speak to someone. (Doc. 8, ¶ 141).

His cellmate left the cell at 6:00pm. (Doc. 8, ¶ 142). At approximately 7:30pm, the cellmate

returned to find that Decedent had committed suicide by hanging himself with a bedsheet

from an air vent. (Doc. 8, ¶ 143).

In the amended complaint, Plaintiff asserts the following Counts: Count One –

Violation of the ADA against the Commonwealth/Department; Count Two – Violation of

the RA against the Commonwealth/Department; Count Three – Eighth Amendment

Deliberate Indifference against Defendants Hartman and Knowles; Count Four – Eighth

Amendment Deliberate Indifference against MHM Services, Inc., MHM Correctional

Services, Inc., MHM Correctional Services, LLC, Centurion Health Services & Centurion of

Pennsylvania; Count Five – Eighth Amendment Denial of Adequate Medical Care against

Defendants Knowles and Hartman; and Count Six – Eighth Amendment Denial of Adequate

Medical Care against MHM Services, Inc., MHM Correctional Services, Inc., MHM

Correctional Services, LLC, Centurion Health Services & Centurion of Pennsylvania. (Doc.

8, at 24-49). As relief, Plaintiff seeks damages, including punitive damages, attorneys’ fees

and costs. (Doc. 8, at 49).

On June 13, 2024, the Commonwealth Defendants filed a motion to dismiss Count

Five as asserted against Defendant Hartman, and Counts One and Two in their entirety. They

also moved to change venue to the Western District of Pennsylvania. (Doc. 18). On June 27,

2024, the Commonwealth Defendants filed their brief in support of their motion to

dismiss/change venue. (Doc. 19). On July 1, 2024, the MHM Defendants filed a motion to

transfer venue. (Doc. 20). On July 15, 2024, the MHM Defendants filed a brief in support of

their motion to transfer. (Doc. 23). On July 19, 2024, Plaintiff filed two briefs in opposition

to each motion, respectively. (Doc. 24; Doc. 25). On August 2, 2024, the Commonwealth

Defendants filed a reply brief. (Doc. 26). Accordingly, both motions to dismiss are ripe and

ready for disposition. (Doc. 18; Doc. 19; Doc. 20; Doc. 23; Doc. 24; Doc. 25; Doc. 26).

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. MOTION TO TRANSFER

A court may transfer venue to any other district court where the civil action might

have been brought if it serves the interests of justice and the convenience of the parties. 28

U.S.C. § 1404(a). Although the district court is given the ultimate discretion in transferring

venue, the exercise of this discretion should not be liberal. Shutte v. Armco Steel Corp., 431 F.2d

22, 25 (3d Cir. 1970). A court adjudicating a motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) must

first determine whether the proposed venue is appropriate—that is, a district court can only

transfer the action to a district or division “where [the case] might have been brought.” 28

U.S.C. § 1404(a) ; see also High River Ltd. P'ship v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 353 F. Supp. 2d 487, 491

(M.D. Pa. 2005). If transfer to the proposed district would satisfy this statutory limitation, the

court must then balance several factors. “While there is no definitive list of factors, courts

generally consider the following: (1) the plaintiff's choice of forum; (2) the defendant's

preference; (3) where the claim arose; (4) the convenience of the parties; (5) the convenience

of the witnesses, but only to the extent that the witnesses may actually be unavailable for trial

in one of the fora; (6) the location of books and records, similarly limited to the extent that

the files could not be produced in the alternative forum; (7) the enforceability of the judgment;

(8) practical considerations that could make the trial easy, expeditious, or inexpensive; (9) the

relative court congestion in the competing courts; (10) the local interest in deciding local

controversies at home; (11) the public policies of the fora; (12) and the familiarity of the trial

judge with the applicable state law.” High River, 353 F. Supp. 2d at 491 (citing Jumara v. State

Farms Ins. Co., 55 F.3d 873, 879-80 (3d Cir. 1995)). The first six factors are considered the

“private interest factors,” while the last six factors are the “public interest factors.” See

Petroleum Serv. Co. v. Santie's Wholesale Oil Co., No. 3:23CV1500, 2024 WL 816619, at *3-8

(M.D. Pa. Feb. 27, 2024).

The moving party bears the burden of showing that these factors warrant

transfer. Jumara, 55 F.3d at 879. However, the moving party “is not required to show ‘truly

compelling circumstances for ... change ... [of venue, but rather that] all relevant things

considered, the case would be better off transferred to another district.’ ” In re United States,

273 F.3d 380, 388 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting In re Balsimo, 68 F.3d 185, 187 (7th Cir. 1995)).

B. MOTION TO DISMISS

Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes a defendant to move

to dismiss for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

12(b)(6). “Under Rule 12(b)(6), a motion to dismiss may be granted only if, accepting all well-

pleaded allegations in the complaint are true and viewing them in the light most favorable to

the plaintiff, a court finds the plaintiff’s claims lack facial plausibility.” Warren Gen. Hosp. v.

Amgen Inc., 643 F.3d 77, 84 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,

555-56 (2007)). Although a court must accept the factual allegations in a complaint as true, it

is not compelled to accept “unsupported conclusions and unwarranted inferences, or a legal

conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Morrow v. Balaski, 719 F.3d 160, 165 (3d Cir.

2013) (quoting Baraka v. McGreevey, 481 F.3d 187, 195 (3d Cir. 2007)). Additionally, a court

need not assume that a plaintiff can prove facts that the plaintiff has not alleged. Associated

Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983).

In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, the United States Supreme Court held that, when considering a

motion to dismiss, a court should “begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no

more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009).

“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory

statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Factual allegations must be enough to

raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. In evaluating a

motion to dismiss, a court may consider the facts alleged on the face of the complaint, as well

as “documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, and matters of which a court

may take judicial notice.” Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007).

C. 42 U.S.C. SECTION 1983

Section 1983 is the vehicle by which private citizens may seek redress for violations of

federal constitutional rights committed by state officials. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute

states, in pertinent part:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,

custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects,

or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within

the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or

immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party

injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.

42 U.S.C. § 1983.

“Section 1983 is not a source of substantive rights,” but is merely a means through

which “to vindicate violations of federal law committed by state actors.” See Pappas v. City of

Lebanon, 331 F. Supp. 2d 311, 315 (M.D. Pa. 2004) (quoting Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S.

273, 284-85 (2002)). To state a cause of action under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege that:

(1) the conduct complained of was committed by persons acting under color of state law; and

(2) the conduct violated a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or laws of

the United States. See Harvey v. Plains Twp. Police Dep’t, 421 F.3d 185, 189 (3d Cir. 2005)

(quoting West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988)).

III. DISCUSSION

A. MOTION TO TRANSFER

Defendants contend that the Western District of Pennsylvania is the proper venue for

this matter since this action might have been brought in the Western District of Pennsylvania

and the balance of the Jumara public and private interest factors weigh in favor of transfer

because the convenience of parties and witnesses and the interests of justice would be best

served by transfer. (Doc. 19, at 13-15; Doc. 23, at 3); see 55 F.3d at 879-80. In opposition,

Plaintiff contends that Defendants have not met their burden to establish that the balance of

the relevant factors strongly favors transfer. (Doc. 24, at 9-18; Doc. 25, at 23).

1. This Action Might Have Been Brought in the Western District of Pennsylvania

If a plaintiff would have had a right to bring suit in the proposed transferee district at

the commencement of the action, “independently of the wishes of [the] defendant,” then the

transferee district is a district where the action “might have been brought.” Hoffman v.

Blaski, 363 U.S. 335, 344 (1960). Thus, in order to prevail on a motion to transfer venue

under § 1404(a), the moving party must demonstrate that venue, personal jurisdiction, and

subject matter jurisdiction would all have been proper in the proposed transferee

district. Hoffman, 363 U.S. at 344; Shutte , 431 F.2d at 24.

Here, Defendants contend that venue is proper in both the Middle and Western

Districts of Pennsylvania. (Doc. 19, at 13; Doc. 23, at 2). Plaintiff does not respond to this

argument in its brief in opposition to either motion and thus seems to concede that the action

“might have been brought” in the Western District. (Doc. 24, at 10-11; Doc. 25, at 12). This

Court agrees that because Defendants are domiciled in Pennsylvania and the alleged events

leading to this action took place in the Western District of Pennsylvania, the action “might

have been brought” in the Western District of Pennsylvania. See Hoffman, 363 U.S. at 344.

2. The Private Interest Jumara Factors

Having found that the action might have been brought in the Western District of

Pennsylvania, the Court now considers the private interest factors. Jumara, 55 F. 3d at 879.

The private interest factors relate to the “convenience of the parties and witnesses,” as well as

“‘all other practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive[.]’”

Petroleum Serv. Co., 2024 WL 816619, at *3 (quoting In re: Howmedica Osteonics Corp, 867 F.3d

390, 402 n.7 (3d Cir. 2017).

The first private interest factor relates to the plaintiff’s choice of forum. Petroleum Serv.

Co., 2024 WL 816619, at *3. Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s forum choice of the Middle

District of Pennsylvania, which is typically “a paramount consideration in any determination

of a transfer request,” should be given less deference here because the events of the case

occurred in Defendants’ preferred forum. (Doc. 19, at 14; Doc. 23, at 3); see High River, 353

F. Supp. 2d at 498–99; Shutte, 431 F.2d at 25. Plaintiff contests this conclusion, averring that

because he “filed suit in his home state (and district, which were also the home state and

district of Decedent), ‘his choice of forum remains a paramount consideration which should

not be lightly disturbed.’” (Doc. 24, at 12) (quoting Chruby v. Bearjar, No. 17-1631, 2018 WL

4051705, at *11 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 24, 2018) (internal quotations and citations omitted). The

Court finds that the first factor, Plaintiff’s choice of forum, strongly disfavors transfer.

Plaintiff’s forum choice is one of paramount importance, and since Plaintiff has chosen to

bring suit in its home district, that is one that should not be disturbed without strong

reasons. Shutte, 431 F.2d at 25.

The second factor, Defendants’ choice of forum, is neutral. See Jumara, 55 F.3d at 879.

Courts in this Circuit have found that this factor is redundant to the transfer analysis because

Defendants’ preference for the Western District of Pennsylvania is inherent in this motion.

See Etheridge v. World Mktg. of Am., Inc., No. 1:20-CV-00272, 2021 WL 1564336, at *4 (M.D.

Pa. Apr. 21, 2021) (“‘in reality [the second factor] does little more than frame the issue,

because there would be no motion to transfer unless the defendant prefers a different forum.’”)

(quoting Edwards v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, 313 F. Supp. 3d 618, 622 (E.D. Pa. 2018)).

The third factor examines where the claim arose. See Jumara, 55 F.3d at 879.

Defendants provide that “[t]he claims in this case occurred at SCI Houtzdale, in the Western

District, favoring transfer.” (Doc. 19, at 14; Doc. 23, at 3). Plaintiff agrees that the events

underlying this action occurred in the Western District, thus favoring transfer. (Doc. 25, at

16). The Court agrees that the third Jumara factor favors transfer. Petroleum Serv. Co., 2024

WL 816619, at *5 (finding that the third factor favored transfer when “plaintiff's claims arose

from the alleged conduct of defendant's Missouri-based employees”).

The fourth and fifth private interest factors consider the convenience of the parties and

any potential witnesses. Jumara, 55 F.3d at 879. The Court finds that these factors slightly

favor transfer. Defendants argue that each individual Defendant reside in or near the Western

District. (Doc. 19, at 14; Doc. 23, at 3). Plaintiff acknowledges that this factor slightly favors

transfer, but also responds that Defendants have not shown any particular hardship that

would arise from litigating in this District. (Doc. 24, at 13; Doc. 25, at 15).

Typically, courts consider identified witnesses and their location for this factor. See

Regmund v. Talisman Energy USA, Inc., No. CV 16-711, 2016 WL 5794227, at *8-9 (W.D. Pa.

Aug. 31, 2016), report and recommendation adopted, No. 2:16CV711, 2016 WL 5720841 (W.D.

Pa. Sept. 30, 2016) (analyzing the parties’ identified witnesses and their locations and

convenience for this factor); Petroleum Serv. Co., 2024 WL 816619, at *5. While neither party

has identified all of its witnesses at this stage in the litigation, it is likely that “on-party fact

witnesses who work at SCI Houtzdale will necessarily reside nearby in the Western District.”

(Doc. 23, at 3). However, the Court agrees with Plaintiff that Defendants have not shown any

likely hardship or unavailability of such key witnesses due to litigation in the Middle District.

The Court finds that the fourth and fifth factors are thus neutral or slightly favor transfer. See

Etheridge, 2021 WL 1564336, at *5-6 (holding that the convenience factors are neutral when

there is no evidence that a particular witness would be unavailable in one forum).

The sixth private interest factor relates to the location of books or records. Courts have

given this factor less weight in the age of modern technology where records can be produced

or transmitted electronically. See Regmund, 2016 WL 5794227, at *11 (“[m]odern

technological advances have rendered this factor less significant than it was previously.)The

parties do not dispute that this factor is neutral here. Therefore, the sixth public interest factor

is neutral. See Petroleum Serv. Co., 2024 WL 816619, at *6 (“the parties have not identified any

documents that cannot be easily reproduced and provided in electronic format. This factor is

thus neutral.”).

3. The Public Interest Jumara Factors

The Court next turns to the six public interest factors. See Jumara, 55 F.3d at 879-80.

The public interest factors ask the Court to consider “‘where litigation can proceed in the most

efficient and inexpensive fashion.’” Petroleum Serv. Co., 2024 WL 816619, at *6 (quoting In re

Amkor Tech., Inc. Sec. Litig., No. CIV.A. 06-298, 2006 WL 3857488, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 28,

2006)).

The parties do not analyze court congestion, nor does any party contest that either

forum would have equal ability to enforce its judgment, that state law is not at issue. (Doc.

19, at 14-15; Doc. 23, at 3; Doc. 24, at 15; Doc. 25, at 19). This Court agrees that these factors

are neutral. See Etheridge, 2021 WL 1564336, at *6-7.

The parties dispute whether the factors that example practical considerations affecting

any potential trial’s ease, efficiency, or expense; local interest; and public policy favor transfer.

(Doc. 19, at 14-15; Doc. 23, at 3; Doc. 24, at 15-17; Doc. 24, at 19-21); see Jumara, 55 F.3d at

879. According to Defendants, “both the practical considerations of trial and local interest in

deciding controversies weigh in favor of a transfer to the western district [sic].” (Doc. 19, at

15). Defendants seem to suggest that the practical considerations factor favors transfer

because witnesses will likely reside in the Western District and that the Western District has

a local interest in resolving matters that occurred there. (Doc. 19, at 15, Doc. 23, at 3).

Defendants do not provide more explanation for this argument. (Doc. 19; Doc. 23). Plaintiff

refutes this conclusion, arguing that this case presents no information about how trial would

be more expeditious in the Western District. (Doc. 24, at 15; Doc. 25, at 20). Plaintiff further

points out that the local interests factor plays a lesser role where the action was filed in the

same state as the proposed forum, and that the Department of Corrections is a statewide

organization, in which all Pennsylvania residents have an interest. (Doc. 24, at 17; Doc. 25,

at 20-21).

The Court agrees that these factors are likely also neutral. As to practical

considerations, this Court again finds that Defendants have not showed how traveling to the

Middle District would be difficult for any Defendant. See Morrison v. Lindsey Lawn & Garden

Inc., No. 13-1467, 2014 WL 831570, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 4, 2014) (finding that the Eastern

and Middle Districts in Pennsylvania do not implicate practical considerations under the

Jumara test because as neighboring Districts, “the Court is not persuaded this case would be

tried more expeditiously or less expensively in either district.”). Regarding public policy and

local interests, the Department of Corrections affects Pennsylvanians in the Western and

Middle District alike and neither forum has a larger local interest than the other, nor can the

Court think of how the public policy between each forum would be differently implicated. See

Emmes Co. v. SAP America, Inc., No. 20-877, 2020 WL 7773903, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 30,

2020).

Having considered all Jumara private and public interest factors, the weight of the

factors disfavor transfer. Accordingly, Defendants’ motions to transfer venue pursuant to

Section 1404(a) will be DENIED. (Doc. 18; Doc. 20).

B. MOTION TO DISMISS COUNT FIVE AGAINST DEFENDANT HARTMAN

In Count Five of the amended complaint, Plaintiff asserts her Eighth Amendment

denial of adequate medical care claims against individual Defendants Knowles and Hartman.

(Doc. 8, at 42). The Commonwealth Defendants move to dismiss Count Five as asserted

against Defendant Hartman because they submit that “[Defendant] Hartman cannot be

deliberately indifferent when she did her job as a therapist and relayed [Decedent’s] concerns

to psychiatry.” (Doc. 19, at 11). Plaintiff responds that resolution of facts related to Defendant

Hartman’s role and responsibilities as a Psychological Services Associate is not properly

decided on a motion to dismiss. (Doc. 24, at 22-24). Instead, Plaintiff contends that evaluating

only the allegations in the amended complaint in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, he

adequately states a claim against Defendant Hartman. (Doc. 24, at 24).

In Estelle v. Gamble, the Supreme Court held that deliberate indifference to serious

medical needs of prisoners violates the Eighth Amendment. 429 U.S. 97, 97 (1976). To state

a claim for deliberate indifference to a medical need, a plaintiff must show “(1) a serious

medical need,1 and (2) acts or omissions by prison officials that indicate deliberate indifference

to that need.” Natale v. Camden Cnty. Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 582 (3d Cir. 2003) (citations

omitted). A prison employee acts with deliberate indifference to an inmate's serious medical

need when the employee “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or

safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that

a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw that inference.” Ponzini v.

PrimeCare Med., Inc., 269 F. Supp. 3d 444, 503 (M.D. Pa. 2017) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan,

511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994)).

The Commonwealth Defendants do not argue that Plaintiff did not allege a serious

medical need but move to dismiss the claims against Defendant Hartman on the grounds that

Plaintiff fails to allege that the Defendant Hartman was deliberately indifferent to that need.

(Doc. 19, at 11). To survive the motion to dismiss, Plaintiff “must allege facts from which it

can reasonably be inferred that the defendant acted with deliberate indifference to [the

Decedent's] serious medical needs.” See Rivera v. PA Diebert, No. 3:13-CV-01399, 2016 WL

4771104, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 17, 2016) (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106; Groman v. Township

of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 637 (3d Cir. 1995)), report and recommendation adopted, No. CV

3:13-1399, 2016 WL 4734683 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 12, 2016)).

Viewing the factual allegations as true and in a light most favorable to Plaintiff, the

Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient facts to survive the Commonwealth

Defendants’ motion to dismiss Count Five against Defendant Hartman. (Doc. 18). Plaintiff

alleges that Defendant Hartman knew that Mr. Van Zandt had mental health issues, including

1 The Commonwealth Defendants do not dispute that Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged

a serious medical need. (Doc. 19, at 9 n.3).

anxiety, when she began treating him in October 2021. (Doc. 8, ¶¶ 62-63). By November 2,

2021, Defendant Hartman knew of his worsening condition when he reported that

“sometimes I have had thoughts it would be easier to not do it anymore, to not be alive.”

(Doc. 8, ¶ 64). Plaintiff further provides that in January 2022, Mr. Van Zandt reported

worsening depressive thoughts to Defendant Hartman, but Defendant Hartman responded by

telling Decedent to, in essence, “cope with his struggles on his own.” (Doc. 8, ¶ 73). On

February 28, 2022, Plaintiff alleges that Mr. Van Zandt reported to Defendant Hartman that

he had been sexually assaulted multiple times since December 2021. (Doc. 8, ¶ 74). In

response, Plaintiff avers that Defendant Hartman reported the incident to medical staff. (Doc.

8, ¶ 75). The next morning, after being evaluated by medical staff, Plaintiff contends that Mr.

Van Zandt reported to Defendant Hartman that his depression was worsening, that “things

are not ok,” and that the situation was hopeless. (Doc. 8, ¶ 77). According to Plaintiff,

Defendant Hartman noted that Mr. Van Zandt described his thoughts as “fleeting.” (Doc. 8,

¶ 78). Thereafter Mr. Van Zandt stopped taking his medication and reported to Defendant

Hartman that he was experiencing suicidal thoughts, that he was “really struggling and

hearing voices,” and that it was “overwhelming.” (Doc. 8, ¶¶ 79, 82-84). Mr. Van Zandt

allegedly told Defendant Hartman that he could not handle it and needed treatment. (Doc. 8,

¶ 84). Plaintiff avers that in response, Defendant Hartman “advised Mr. Van Zandt to use

coping skills to push through his struggles.” (Doc. 8, ¶ 85). Plaintiff asserts that Defendant

Hartman “provided next-to-no-care and essentially told [Decedent] to deal with his mental

health struggles on his own, i.e., by developing coping skills,” despite the fact that Defendant

Hartman was aware that Mr. Van Zandt was experiencing and demonstrating warning signs

including “hallucinations, becoming more depressed, lacking in motivation, repeated

thoughts of suicide, inability to sleep, refusal to take medication, and a decreasing range of

emotion and mood.” (Doc. 8, ¶¶ 210-213). These allegations, taken alone, would sufficiently

allege that Defendant Hartman knew of Decedent’s serious medical need and disregarded it

by failing to properly treat him. See Ponzini, 269 F. Supp. 3d at 503.

Plaintiff’s allegations are contradicted by Defendant Hartman’s notes, from which

Plaintiff quotes when making allegations against Defendant Hartman. (Doc. 8, ¶¶ 62-101).

Such documents are properly considered when Plaintiff has relied on them, and the evidence

in the notes control when there are discrepancies between the documents’ contents and

Plaintiff’s allegations. See Vorchheimer v. Philadelphian Owners Ass'n, 903 F.3d 100, 111-12 (3d

Cir. 2018) (finding that doctor’s notes that a plaintiff attached to her complaint are properly

considered at the motion to dismiss stage and stating that if the “exhibits contradict her

allegations in the complaint, the exhibits control.”) (citing Abcarian v. McDonald, 617 F.3d

931, 933 (7th Cir. 2010)). According to the authentic treatment notes,2 Defendant Hartman

reported Mr. Van Zandt’s suicidal ideation to psychiatry. (Doc. 26-1, at 22). Also of note,

Defendant Hartman last worked with Mr. Van Zandt in March 2022. (Doc. 26-1, at 1). The

treatment notes provide that during Defendant Hartman and Mr. Van Zandt’s final

interactions, Mr. Van Zandt said he was doing better, and Hartman noted that he seemed

“baseline and insightful” and did not present a suicide risk. (Doc. 26-1, at 1-5). According to

the notes, Mr. Van Zandt denied suicidal ideation or thoughts during these final sessions.

(Doc. 26-1, at 1-5). The parties dispute the contours of Defendant Hartman’s role and

responsibilities as a Psychological Services Associate, but these factual disputes are not

properly resolved at the motion to dismiss stage. See Mahalik v. Cantania, No. 18-2703, 2018

2 Plaintiff has not contested the notes’ authenticity.

WL 6725381, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 20, 2018) (finding that defendants’ assumptions of facts

not evidently pleaded by plaintiffs cannot be considered at the motion to dismiss stage).

The Court finds that Plaintiff has adequately alleged an Eighth Amendment claim

against Defendant Hartman. Any factual disputes arising from the treatment notes, or Dr.

Hartman’s roles and responsibilities are more appropriately considered after discovery and at

the dispositive motion stage. Accordingly, Commonwealth Defendants’ motion to dismiss

Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim regarding deliberate indifference to a serious medical

need as asserted against Defendant Hartman is DENIED. (Doc. 18).

C. MOTION TO DISMISS COUNTS ONE AND TWO: VIOLATIONS OF THE

AMERICANS DISABILITY ACT THE REHABILITATION ACT

In Count One and Two of the amended complaint, Plaintiff alleges that the the

Commonwealth Defendants violated the ADA and the RA. (Doc. 8, at 34-37). According to

Plaintiff, prior to his death, Mr. Van Zandt was disabled within the meaning of the ADA and

the RA because he was suicidal and had multiple diagnosed mental health disorders,

including but not limited to bipolar I disorder, depression with psychotic features, unspecified

anxiety disorder, and borderline personality disorder. (Doc. 8, at 34-35). Plaintiff alleges

“Defendant Commonwealth of Pennsylvania/Pennsylvania Department of Corrections

denied [Decedent] his rights under the [ADA and RA] by failing to accommodate his known

disabilities and implement necessary suicide-prevention methods, namely, keeping

[Decedent] in a suicide-proof cell and with suicide proof clothing and bedding.” (Doc. 8, ¶

166). The Commonwealth Defendants argue these claims should be dismissed because they

amount to “failure to treat” claims, to which the ADA and RA do not apply. (Doc. 19, at 11-

13).

Under Title II of the ADA, “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason

of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services,

programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.”

42 U.S.C. § 12132. To establish a claim under Title II of the ADA, a plaintiff must allege that:

“(1) he is a qualified individual with a disability; (2) he was either excluded from participation

in or denied the benefits of some public entity’s services, programs, or activities; and (3) such

exclusion, denial of benefits, or discrimination was by reason of his disability.” McPherson v.

County of Dauphin, No. 19-1865, 2020 WL 1558206, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 24, 2020). The RA

requires the same showing but applies only to “any program or activity receiving Federal

financial assistance” and requires a plaintiff to demonstrate that their disability was the sole

reason for the discrimination, not merely one reason. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a); CG v. Pa. Dep't Educ.,

734 F.3d 229, 235–36 (3d Cir. 2013).

“[D]ecisions about a prisoner's medical treatment generally do not give rise to a claim

under the ADA.” Nunez v. Prime Care Health, Inc., No. 19-CV-859, 2019 WL 1400466, at *1

n.3 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 27, 2019) (collecting cases). These claims would inevitably fail because

the ADA and RA “prohibit[ ] disability-based discrimination, ‘not inadequate treatment for

the disability.’” Kokinda v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Corr., 663 F. App'x 156, 159 (3d Cir. 2016)

(quotation omitted). However, a plaintiff may demonstrate a cognizable claim under the

ADA and the RA if they allege a disabled detainee was denied a reasonable accommodation

that would have granted them meaningful access to prison activities and programs, including

those that implicate medical care. McDonald-Witherspoon v. City of Philadelphia, 481 F. Supp.

3d 424, 439 (E.D. Pa. 2020), aff'd, No.21-1019, 2021 WL 6101246 (3d Cir. Dec. 21, 2021).

The parties dispute the sufficiency of Plaintiff’s ADA and RA claims asserted against

the Commonwealth/Department. (Doc. 19, at 12-13; Doc. 24, at 18-21). The Commonwealth

Defendants submit that the ADA and the RA claims are insufficient because Plaintiff’s

allegations do not implicate any disability-based discrimination. (Doc. 19, at 12-13). The

Commonwealth Defendants further assert that Mr. Van Zandt could not have been

discriminated against on the basis of his mental illness or suicidal ideation because no one

truly believed he was suicidal. (Doc. 19, at 12). Instead, the Commonwealth Defendants

assert that Counts One and Two are, in essence, failure-to-treat claims, which are

incognizable under the ADA and RA. (Doc. 19, at 12). Plaintiff responds that the “basis for

denial of the accommodation” of suicide preventions and care was Mr. Van Zandt’s “mental

illness and the perception that his suicidality was not genuine.” (Doc. 24, at 21).

Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to satisfy the first two prongs of the analysis. First,

Plaintiff has alleged that Mr. Van Zandt was a qualified individual by alleging that he

“disabled within the meaning of the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation

Act because he was suicidal and had multiple mental health disorders at the time of his

death.” (Doc. 8, ¶ 162). Ultimately, this is a question of fact that “ordinarily should be

resolved by a jury.” McKissick v. Cnty. of York, No. 1:09-CV-1840, 2011 WL 5117621, at *2

(M.D. Pa. Oct. 25, 2011). Next, according to the amended complaint, the Commonwealth

Defendants did not provide Mr. Van Zandt with reasonable accommodations because they

denied him necessary suicide prevention methods. (Doc. 8, ¶ 166). “[I]n dictum, the Supreme

Court has stated that a prison's refusal to accommodate inmates’ disabilities ‘in such

fundamentals as mobility, hygiene, medical care, and virtually all other prison programs’

constitutes a denial of the benefits of a prison's services, programs, or activities.” Furgess v.

Pennsylvania Dep't of Corr., 933 F.3d 285, 290 (3d Cir. 2019). Applying this logic to the facts

alleged here, a prison discriminates when they fail to accommodate an inmate’s need for

suicide-related medical care or safe accommodations. See Schiavone, 2022 WL 3142615, at *8

(finding plaintiff sufficiently alleged her ADA and RA claims where she alleged decedent was

denied access to medical care in the prison); cf. McKissick v. Cty. of York, No. 1:09-CV-01840,

2010 WL 1930132, at *7 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 19, 2010) (allowing an ADA claim to proceed where

prison officials refused to provide a detainee with drug treatment); but see Talley v. PA Dep't of

Corr., No. CV 19-1687, 2019 WL 6050744 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 14, 2019) (“A denial of treatment

for a disability [in a prison] is not actionable under the ADA and RA.”). Contrary to the

Commonwealth Defendants’ argument, this premise is distinct from the Third Circuit’s

conclusion that inadequate medical treatment cannot form the basis of an ADA or RA claim.

See, e.g., Kokinda, 663 F. App'x. at 159. To sufficiently allege an ADA or RA claim, a plaintiff

must allege they were denied access to medical care rather than just stating the medical

treatment received was inadequate or deficient. See Kloss v. Correct Care Sols., No. 1:18-CV-

0025, 2018 WL 6268270, at *4 n.4 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 31, 2018) (stating that “[d]enying access

to medications is not, however, a medical judgment or medical negligence, and such claims

can be actionable under the ADA”), report and recommendation adopted sub nom. CV 18-25,

2018 WL 6266921 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 30, 2018); see also McKissick, 2010 WL 1930132, at *7

(allowing an ADA claim to proceed where prison officials refused to provide a detainee with

methadone). Thus, because Plaintiff alleges Mr. Van Zandt was denied necessary suicide

prevention care, Plaintiff has sufficiently pled prong two of her ADA and RA claims. (Doc.

8, ¶ 166).

The Commonwealth Defendants next submit that Plaintiff has not alleged that Mr.

Van Zandt was denied medical care or safe accommodations because of his status as a disabled

person, or in other words, because he was experiencing mental illness. Cf. Talley, 2019 WL

6050744, at *5 (dismissing RA and ADA claims because plaintiff failed to allege facts

supporting their averment that they were denied access to prison activities because of

discrimination based on their mental illness, instead pointing to the fact that the prisoner was

denied access to activities because they were subject to surveillance due to their own claims

of being suicidal). To meet his burden as to prong three of his ADA and RA claims, Plaintiff

must also allege “facts sufficient to show” that Mr. Van Zandt had been excluded from

reasonable accommodations “by reason of” his disability. Brown v. Pa. Dep't of Corr., 290 F.

App'x 463, 467 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12132). The Third Circuit has held that

showing that an accommodation has been denied “by reason of” a disability means showing

that the disability “played a role” in the decision-making process. See CG, 734 F.3d at 236

n.11 (affirming a district court’s bench trial judgment and noting that a plaintiff can show an

ADA violation “so long as disability ‘played a role in the ... decisionmaking process and ...

had a determinative effect on the outcome of that process.’”) (quoting New Directions Treatment

Servs. v. City of Reading, 490 F.3d 293, 300 n. 4 (3d Cir.2007)). However, under the RA,

disability must be the sole cause of the decision. See CG, 734 F.3d at236 n.11.

Here, Plaintiff's conclusory allegation that the Commonwealth Defendants failed to

accommodate Mr. Van Zandt with adequate means of suicide prevention and care because

he was suicidal or experiencing mental illness does not meet Plaintiff’s burden. Talley, 2019

WL 6050744, at *5. Plaintiff avers in his amended complaint that

Commonwealth/Department officials believed that Mr. Van Zandt’s suicidality “was not

genuine. (Doc. 8, ¶¶ 104, 106, 110, 215). This, alone, however does not support the inference

that their disbelief was related to Decedent’s mental illnesses or suicidality and is thus

insufficient to meet Plaintiff’s pleading burden even at this early stage of the litigation. (Doc.

8, at 34-37). Accordingly, the Court will GRANT the Commonwealth Defendants’ motion

to dismiss the ADA and RA claims in Counts One and Two. See Brown v. Deparlos, 492 F.

App'x 211, 215 (3d Cir. 2012) (affirming the dismissal of an ADA claim where plaintiff failed

to provide facts alleging that alleged inadequate medical care was given because of a

disability); see also Kokinda v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Corr., No. 2017 WL 4049255, at *9 (W.D.

Pa. Aug. 29, 2017), report and recommendation adopted, 2017 WL 4046347 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 12,

2017), aff'd, 779 F. App'x 938 (3d Cir. 2019) (dismissing an ADA claim where “the complaint

allege[d], at most, that Plaintiff received inadequate treatment and accommodations for his

[disability]” without demonstrating the inadequate care was because of the alleged disability).

IV. LEAVE TO AMEND

The Third Circuit has instructed that if a complaint is vulnerable to dismissal for failure

to state a claim, the district court must permit a curative amendment, unless an amendment

would be inequitable or futile. Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir.

2002). Further, “[a] district court has ‘substantial leeway in deciding whether to grant leave

to amend.’” In re Avandia Mktg., Sales Practices & Prod. Liab. Litig., 564 F. App'x 672, 673 (3d

Cir. 2014) (not precedential) (quoting Lake v. Arnold, 232 F.3d 360, 373 (3d Cir. 2000)). In this

case, Plaintiff will be granted leave to amend to cure the deficiencies outlined herein. See Miller

v. Little, No. 22-CV-4264, 2023 WL 3674336, at *9 (E.D. Pa. May 25, 2023) (granting leave

to amend when a plaintiff did not sufficiently plead ADA violations and § 1983 claims related

to his care in a correctional facility).

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Commonwealth Defendants’ motion to dismiss will be

GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. (Doc. 18). Count One and Count Two against the

Commonwealth Defendants are DISMISSED without prejudice, and Plaintiff is granted

leave to file an amended complaint. (Doc. 8). Defendants’ motions to transfer will be

DENIED. (Doc. 18; Doc. 20). An appropriate Order follows.

BY THE COURT:

s/ Karoline Mehalchick

Dated: December 30, 2024

KAROLINE MEHALCHICK

United States District Judge