Walton v. United States

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA

HAMMOND DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) Cause No. 2:17-CR-47-PPS-JEM

)

ANTONIO WALTON, )

)

Defendant. )

OPINION AND ORDER

From July 2015 to November 2016, Defendant Antonio Walton was one of the

leaders of a large-scale drug conspiracy in Gary, Indiana. In all, 21 defendants were

charged with various drug offenses. Walton in particular was charged with conspiring

to possess with the intent to distribute 280 grams or more of cocaine, in violation of 21

U.S.C. § 846. [DE 485]. Walton’s case proceeded to a jury trial on March 9, 2020. [DE

788]. After a six-day trial, the jury found Walton guilty of the charge. [DE 806].

On March 11, 2021, following the jury’s finding of guilty, I sentenced Walton to

360 months imprisonment to be followed by five years’ supervised release. [DE 1120].

Walton appealed his conviction and sentence to the Seventh Circuit arguing that it was

improper for me to hold a trial at the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic and asserting

that I imposed a substantively unreasonable sentence. [DE 1122; DE 1268-1]. On October

14, 2022, the Seventh Circuit affirmed Walton’s conviction and sentence. [DE 1268].

Walton sought review in the U.S. Supreme Court [7th Cir. DE 60], but the Supreme

Court denied his petition. [7th Cir. DE 61]. Thereafter, Walton timely filed a pro se

motion to vacate his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 which is ripe for my review.

[DE 1321; see DE 1330; DE 1346]. Walton’s motion raises several arguments for relief

based on ineffective assistance of counsel. [DE 1321]. For the reasons explained below,

Walton’s motion will be denied.

Legal Standard

Let’s begin with the standards governing my decision making. § 2255(a) allows a

prisoner who has been sentenced to return to the court in which he was convicted and

request his release on the grounds that his sentence was imposed in violation of the

Constitution or laws of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). A petitioner seeking relief

under §2255 faces a tall order. Indeed, such relief is only available “in extraordinary

situations, such as an error of constitutional or jurisdictional magnitude or where a

fundamental defect has occurred which results in a complete miscarriage of justice.”

Harris v. United States, 13 F.4th 623, 627 (7th Cir. 2021) (quoting United States v. Coleman,

763 F.3d 706, 708 (7th Cir. 2014)). See also, Coleman v. United States, 79 F.4th 822, 826 (7th

Cir. 2023) (describing relief under §2255 as an “extraordinary remedy and therefore

only available in limited circumstances”).

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees a criminal

defendant the assistance of counsel for his defense. U.S. Const. amend. VI. Here, Walton

is requesting relief under §2255 claiming that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right

to the effective assistance of counsel. [DE 1321]. When reviewing a §2255 motion

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claiming ineffective assistance of counsel, I evaluate the claim using the two-prong test

established in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). McDowell v. Kingston, 497

F.3d 757, 761 (7th Cir. 2007) (“Generally, claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are

evaluated under a two-prong analysis announced in Strickland.”).

“The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether

counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that

the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686.

“Under Strickland, a claimant must prove (1) that his attorney's performance fell below

an objective standard of reasonableness and (2) that the attorney's deficient

performance prejudiced the defendant such that ‘there is a reasonable probability that,

but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been

different.’” McDowell, 497 F.3d at 761 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). If the

petitioner fails to illustrate that either prong of the test is satisfied, there is no need for

me to evaluate the other prong of the test. “A defendant's failure to satisfy either prong

is fatal to his claim.” Ebbole v. United States, 8 F.3d 530, 533 (7th Cir. 1993).

Generally, I take a deferential view of attorney performance with the underlying

assumption being that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable

professional assistance. See United States v. Holman, 314 F.3d 837, 840 (7th Cir. 2002).

“Counsel is strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and made all

significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment.” Jordan v.

Hepp, 831 F.3d 837, 846 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690). For me to

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decide that counsel’s representation was inadequate, counsel’s representation must

have fallen “below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Harrington v. Richter, 562

U.S. 86, 104 (2011). Making a showing that counsel’s representation was constitutionally

inadequate is not easy. Jordan, 831 F.3d at 846.

As for the second prong, to make a showing that counsel’s inadequate

representation led to prejudice, a defendant must show “a reasonable probability that,

but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been

different.” Lee v. Galloway, 106 F.4th 668, 673 (7th Cir. 2024) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S.

at 694). “It is not enough to show that the errors had some conceivable effect on the

outcome of the proceeding.” Gilbreath v. Winkleski, 21 F.4th 965, 989 (7th Cir. 2021).

Counsel’s conduct must have “so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial

process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.” United States

v. Hise, 65 F.4th 905, 909 (7th Cir. 2023). A review of whether counsel’s performance

caused prejudice is “highly deferential to counsel and presumes reasonable judgment

and effective trial strategy.” Hays v. United States, 397 F.3d 564, 568 (7th Cir. 2005).

Discussion

With this standard in mind, let’s turn to the grounds for relief presented by Mr.

Walton. First, Walton asserts that his counsel failed to adequately advise him regarding

alternatives to trial. [DE 1321 at 4]. More specifically, he argues that his attorney

informed him that the Government would not offer him a plea deal, but failed to inform

him that he could plead guilty by way of a “blind” plea. [Id.] Walton argues that this

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prevented him from obtaining a three-point reduction under the sentencing guidelines.

[Id.]

There was a revolving door of lawyers who represented Walton along the way in

his case. Walton was initially represented by two private attorneys, both of whom later

withdrew. [DE 189-90; DE 349-50; DE 360]. Walton was then represented by attorney

Bryan Truitt following his appointment as counsel. [DE 362-63]. During his arraignment

on May 10, 2019, Walton, appearing by his attorney Bryan Truitt, entered a plea of not

guilty. [DE 524]. During his representation of Mr. Walton, Mr. Truitt became

unavailable, and Walton was subsequently appointed attorney David Jones. [DE 542-

43]. Mr. Jones provided Walton with representation during his trial. [DE 788].

The right to effective assistance of counsel extends to the plea-bargaining

process. Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 162 (2012) (“Defendants have a Sixth Amendment

right to counsel, a right that extends to the plea-bargaining process.”). If Walton’s

counsel received a plea offer from the prosecution but did not present it to his client,

that would likely constitute constitutionally deficient performance. The Supreme Court

has held that an attorney who fails to make a meaningful attempt to inform his client of

an existing written plea offer has performed deficiently under the Sixth Amendment.

Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 149 (2012). However, Walton has presented no evidence

that the prosecution ever presented his attorney with a plea offer which was not

presented to him. Walton surmises that it was likely his lawyer received a plea offer

from the prosecution because, as stated by Walton, “over 95% of all federal cases are

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resolved by plea agreement.” [DE 1321 at 5]. As aptly stated by the government, such as

a vague allegation absent support is insufficient to support a request for relief under

§2255. [DE 1330 at 13].

Walton focuses most of his argument on the fact that his attorney did not advise

him to plead guilty despite the absence of an offer from the prosecution. Here’s what he

tells me: “[c]ounsel’s failure to inform Mr. Walton that he could plead guilty in a “blind

plea”, if indeed it was true that the government would not offer him a plea

agreement…. constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel.” [DE 1321 at 5]. Even if I

determined that Walton’s attorney’s failure to inform him of a “blind plea” fell below

an objective standard of reasonableness such that it was constitutionally deficient, any

claim that this prejudiced Walton is too speculative. Walton makes several assumptions

about what would have happened had he entered a “blind” guilty plea. First, Walton

assumes that he would have met the requirements for the two-point acceptance of

responsibility reduction. Second, Walton assumes that he would have made his plea in

such a manner that the government would have agreed to the third point. Finally,

Walton assumes that I would have sentenced him at the low end of the guidelines

range.

Walton has not shown that he would have met the requirement for the

reductions that acceptance of responsibility provides. In Hicks v. United States, 886 F.3d

648 (7th Cir. 2018) the Seventh Circuit addressed a similar argument to the argument

Walton has put before me. In Hicks, a jury found the defendant guilty of multiple drug

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offenses related to a drug ring he led on Chicago’s south side. Hicks, 886 F.3d at 649.

Hicks was sentenced to 360 months in prison and subsequently filed a pro se motion

under §2255 arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because there was

a reasonable probability that a “blind” guilty plea would have led to a lower sentence.

Id. at 650. Hicks’ argument assumed a reduction in accordance with acceptance of

responsibility and the Seventh Circuit made the keen observation that “the reduction is

for accepting responsibility, not simply pleading guilty.” Id. at 651. The application

notes to the guidelines include a whole slew of factors which should be taken into

consideration when determining whether a defendant qualifies for a decrease in offense

levels. See, U.S.S.G. §3E1.1, comment. (n.1).

This illustrates that Walton’s assumption that a “blind” plea would have

automatically garnered the two-point reduction for accepting responsibility is

misplaced. See also, United States v. Boyle, 484 F.3d 943, 945 (7th Cir. 2007) (“merely

pleading guilty does not entitle [a defendant] to acceptance points….as the commentary

to the Guidelines and our caselaw make clear, this benefit is reserved for those who

show contrition and remorse by giving an honest and full account of their offense

conduct”). Additionally, for the three-point reduction Walton claims he would have

received he must also assume that the government would have requested he received

the additional point reduction. Without a motion from the government, Walton would

not have received the third point reduction. Hicks, 886 F.3d at 651; United States v. Nurek,

578 F.3d 618, 624 (7th Cir. 2009).

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But let’s suppose that Walton is correct, and he received a three-point reduction

in his offense level by taking a blind plea. Where would that have gotten him? Walton

was assigned a criminal history category of VI. [DE 975 at 14, 20]. With Walton’s offense

level of 43 combined with a criminal history category of VI the guidelines suggested a

sentence of life imprisonment. U.S.S.G. Ch. 5, Pt. A. At sentencing, notwithstanding

how widespread and rampant Walton’s criminal conduct was, I varied from the

guidelines and gave Walton a sentence of 360 months—a sentence below what the

guidelines suggested. [DE 1124]. I simply did not believe that a life sentence for a drug

offense was appropriate.

Now, let’s consider the counterfactual: suppose Walton was a criminal history 40

(as he now argues) because he received full credit for accepting responsibility. He still,

of course, would’ve been in criminal history category VI. Under the guidelines, he

would have been facing a suggested sentence of 360-Life. U.S.S.G. Ch. 5, Pt. A. The 360-

month sentence I imposed was therefore within the hypothetical guideline range if his

offense level was 40 as he argues. Id. Walton’s entire argument hinges upon the

assumption that he would have received a lighter sentence if the criminal offense level

was calculated to be 40 and not 43. But that assumption doesn’t hold up. As noted

above, I already varied from the guidelines range of a life sentence to a sentence of 360

months. If I had believed that a greater variance was appropriate, I would have done so

at the time of sentencing. But I didn’t vary downward any further because I didn’t think

at the time (nor do I now believe) that any additional consideration was called for given

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the gravity of Walton’s offense and the breadth of his criminal history. In sum, Walton’s

argument assumes that he would have received a below guidelines sentence if he had

been at an offense level of 40. Such a claim is far too speculative to illustrate prejudice.

The substantial amount of speculation required to show that Walton’s sentence

would have been different if his attorney informed him to take a “blind” plea is a fog in

which his claim for ineffective assistance of counsel gets lost. Since we cannot determine

that Walton has been prejudiced because he was not informed of the “blind” plea

option, there is no need for me to engage in an analysis of whether the failure to inform

Walton of the blind plea option fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. As

I’ve already mentioned, “[a] defendant's failure to establish either prong of the test is

fatal to his ineffective assistance of counsel claim.” Carter v. Butts, 760 F.3d 631, 635 (7th

Cir. 2014).

Moving on to Walton’s second argument for ineffective assistance of counsel,

Walton argues that he “was denied the effective assistance of counsel at sentencing

where counsel failed to file for a downward variance based upon COVID-19 making the

conditions of confinement cruel and harsher.” [DE 1321 at 6]. COVID-19 is a deadly

virus which gripped the nation and the world. It undoubtedly had an impact on prison

conditions as well. However, as pointed out by the prosecution, Walton has made no

claims that he has or had a medical condition which would make him particularly

susceptible to COVID-19 and place him at risk for severe illness or death. In fact,

Walton does not mention his physical health at all in his brief. [See DE 1321]. In his reply

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brief, Walton states “Mr. Walton does not have to put forth medical conditions for

which would increase his risk of illness or death.” [DE 1346 at 8]. Walton holds fast to

his general assertion that COVID-19 “made the conditions of confinement harsher both

physically and psychologically, than they would otherwise normally be.” [DE 1321 at

6].

Walton again runs into issues with the prejudice prong of the ineffective

assistance of counsel test. Absent any medical conditions that make him susceptible to

serious illness or death due to COVID-19, it’s extremely unlikely that I would have

given him a downward variance considering the serious drug crimes of which he was

convicted. When a defendant moves for a reduction based on COVID-19, the factors to

be considered are: (1) the specificity of the defendant's COVID-19 concerns, (2) whether

the defendant has a medical condition that makes him especially susceptible to the

dangers of COVID-19, and (3) the extent that the defendant's release would mitigate or

aggravate the COVID-19 pandemic. United States v. Dominguez, 2020 WL 5700742, at *2

(N.D. Ind. Sept. 24, 2020).

Walton’s presentence investigation report states that Walton’s physical health

issues involve “high blood pressure, high cholesterol, and pain in his left shoulder…

[and] that the defendant also suffers from thyroid issues.” [DE 975 at 18]. The

information I had regarding Walton’s health during sentencing does not suggest he

would have been especially susceptible to COVID-19 and Walton has made no

argument that he would have been especially susceptible to COVID-19. Walton was

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given a below guidelines sentence and has failed to illustrate that he would have

received an even lower sentence if his attorney had requested a downward variance

due to COVID-19. Walton again fails to illustrate the prejudice required to make a

showing of ineffective assistance of counsel.

Walton’s third ground for relief states that he was denied effective assistance of

counsel “where counsel failed to challenge the sentencing enhancement under §3B1.1.”

[DE 1321 at 9]. Walton states that “[a]ppellate counsel provided ineffective

representation by failing to challenge this enhancement where theses affirmative acts

are missing.” [DE 1321 at 11-12]. Walton will again need to show (1) deficient

performance and (2) that the deficiency prejudiced him to demonstrate that appellate

counsel was constitutionally ineffective. Suggs v. United States, 513 F.3d 675, 678 (7th Cir.

2008). “Only if an ignored issue is clearly stronger than the arguments raised on appeal

will the attorney's performance be considered constitutionally deficient.” Id. Walton

does not satisfy a showing of deficient performance.

Vanessa K. Eisenmann, Walton’s appointed counsel on appeal, submitted a 78-

page appellant brief (including attachments) on Mr. Walton’s behalf. [7th Cir. DE 16].

Mr. Walton is correct that his appellate counsel did not challenge the §3B1.1 sentencing

enhancement, but it is not clear that such an argument is “clearly stronger” than the

other arguments presented on appeal. A significant portion of Mr. Walton’s appellant

brief raises arguments challenging the reasonableness of his sentence but does not

mention the §3B1.1. enhancement. [See 7th Cir. DE 16 at 19-27]. Mr. Walton’s appellate

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brief discusses the impact of Walton’s sentence in relation to his age, the disparities

between the sentences of black defendants and white defendants, Mr. Walton’s prior

convictions involving non-violent drug offenses, and the disparities in the way the

sentencing guidelines treat crack cocaine versus powder cocaine. [Id.] Mr. Walton has

offered no basis for me to conclude that a challenge to the §3B1.1 sentencing

enhancement would have been clearly stronger than the arguments counsel did present

on appeal, and, frankly, I don’t think a challenge to the §3B1.1. sentencing enhancement

is a stronger argument than the arguments counsel presented on appeal.

It was plain as day from the evidence adduced at trial that Walton was an

organizer/leader of a large and menacing drug ring. For the enhancement to apply, the

government had to establish that the criminal activity in this case involved five or more

participants or was otherwise extensive. That’s the test under §3B1.1(a). U.S.S.G.

§3B1.1(a). During the trial, Keana Porter, Mr. Walton’s sister testified that he provided

the crack cocaine that she sold at the trap house. [DE 868 at 734-35].1 Ms. Porter also

testified that she, Charles Gould, and Courtney Crouch would bring the proceeds from

the drug operation to Mr. Walton daily. [Id. at 771-72]. Ms. Porter also testified that

others such as Lafayette Caldwell would bring proceeds from the drug operation to Mr.

Walton. [Id. at 811-13]. Courtney Crouch testified at trial that he first spoke with Mr.

Walton about getting involved in selling crack cocaine at 50th and Massachusetts

1 DE 868 is the full transcript of day four of Walton’s jury trial held on 03/13/2020. The

page number pin cites to this document refer to the page of the transcript in the upper right-

hand corner of the page.

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because he “just kn[ew] that’s who stuff it was.” [DE 869 at 962].2 Crouch also testified

that he gave the drug proceeds only to Mr. Walton. [Id. at 964]. Without relitigating this

entire issue and going through a complete recital of all the testimony introduced at trial,

I can say that there was more than enough evidence showing that Walton was an

organizer or leader of the criminal activity involved in this case such that a challenge to

the §3B1.1. sentencing enhancement was not a clearly stronger argument than the

arguments raised on appeal. Appellate counsel was wise to leave that argument on the

cutting room floor. In sum, there is no basis for a finding of ineffective assistance of

counsel on appeal.

Walton has also filed a Motion/Request for an Evidentiary Hearing and

Appointment of Counsel to Fully Develop Grounds One and Three of the §2255 Motion.

[DE 1347]. The Seventh Circuit has explained that “[a] section 2255 proceeding is an

independent civil suit for which there is no constitutional right to appointment of

counsel. Oliver v. United States, 961 F.2d 1339, 1343 (7th Cir. 1992). Absent an evidentiary

hearing, I retain my discretion to decide whether counsel should be appointed. Id. For

the reasons explained above, Walton’s §2255 motion has no merit. Because Walton’s

request for relief under §2255 has no merit, I will not appoint Walton counsel or hold a

hearing. Where the motion, findings, and records of the case show that a petitioner is

not entitled to relief under §2255, there is no error in using my discretion to deny a

2 DE 869 is the full transcript of day five of Walton’s jury trial held on 03/16/2020. The

page number pin cites to this document refer to the page of the transcript in the upper right-

hand corner of the page.

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request for appointment of counsel.3 Kapsalis v. United States, 345 F.2d 392, 395 (7th Cir.

1965). See also, Moreland v. Eplett, 18 F.4th 261, 272 (7th Cir. 2021) (explaining that

appointing counsel or holding a hearing is unnecessary where the motion, files, and

records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief); Howard v.

Gramley, 225 F.3d 784, 794 (7th Cir. 2000) (explaining that a refusal to appoint counsel

should be reversed only where the defendant had a reasonable chance of winning with

an attorney).

Certificate of Appealability

Pursuant to Rule 11 of the Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings, a district

court must “issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it enters a final order

adverse to the applicant.” A certificate of appealability may issue only if the applicant

“has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. §

2253(c)(2). To make such a showing, a defendant must show that “reasonable jurists

could debate whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the petition should have been

resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented were adequate to deserve

encouragement to proceed further.” Dalton v. Battaglia, 402 F.3d 729, 738 (7th Cir. 2005).

For the reasons set forth above, I find no basis for a determination that reasonable

3 Walton has also filed a Verified Motion of Indigent Defendant to Notify the Court and

Request Emergency Court Appointed Counsel for Prosecutorial Misconduct. [DE 1359]. In this

motion, Walton argues that he suffered prosecutorial misconduct because a witness provided a

false name during grand jury proceedings, the government made improper statements to the

media, the government submitted an improper sentencing memorandum, that the government

delayed his initial hearing, and that he was wrongfully detained. The records of the case show

no merit in these arguments. Thus, I will also deny this motion for the appointment of counsel.

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jurists would find this decision debatable or incorrect or that the issues deserve

encouragement to proceed further. Therefore, a certificate of appealability will not be

issued. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). If Walton wishes to appeal this Opinion and Order, he

must seek a certificate of appealability from the Court of Appeals under Federal Rule of

Appellate Procedure Rule 22.

ACCORDINGLY:

Defendant Antonio Walton’s Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct his

Sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §2255 [DE 1321] is DENIED and a certificate of

appealability is DENIED. Walton’s Motion/Request for an Evidentiary Hearing and

Appointment of Counsel to Fully Develop Grounds One and Three of the §2255 Motion

[DE 1347] is also DENIED. Walton’s Verified Motion of Indigent Defendant to Notify

the Court and Request Emergency Court Appointed Counsel for Prosecutorial

Misconduct [DE 1359] is also DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

ENTERED: December 30, 2024.

/s/ Philip P. Simon

PHILIP P. SIMON, JUDGE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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