State of Tennessee v. Nathaniel T. Williams

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

April 25, 2001 Session

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. NATHANIEL T. WILLIAMS

Direct Appeal from the Criminal Court for Davidson County

No. 98-B-1409 Seth Norman, Judge

No. M1999-00790-CCA-R3-CD - Filed June 11, 2001

The defendant was convicted by a Davidson County Criminal Court jury of second degree murder

and the possession of a weapon by a convicted felon for shooting a man to death in an automobile

shop. The sole issue on appeal is whether the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction of

second degree murder. Specifically, the defendant contends that the State failed to offer sufficient

proof of the victim’s cause of death. In support of his claim, he argues that the autopsy report, which

states the cause of death as multiple gunshot wounds, was improperly admitted into evidence, that

the medical examiner never directly testified that the victim died of gunshot wounds, and that no

other evidence was presented to prove cause of death. After a thorough review, we conclude that

the defendant waived any objection to the admission of the autopsy report by his failure to object at

trial, and further, that sufficient evidence, other than the autopsy report, was presented to show that

the victim died as the result of gunshot wounds. Consequently, the evidence at trial was sufficient

to establish the defendant’s guilt of second degree murder beyond a reasonable doubt. The judgment

of the trial court is affirmed.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Criminal Court Affirmed

ALAN E. GLENN, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which DAVID H. WELLES and NORMA

MCGEE OGLE , JJ., joined.

Michael J. Flanagan (on appeal) and Justin Johnson (at trial), Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellant,

Nathaniel T. Williams.

Paul G. Summers, Attorney General and Reporter; Thomas E. Williams, III, Assistant Attorney

General; Victor S. Johnson, III, District Attorney General; Charles Carpenter, Assistant District

Attorney General; and Pamela Anderson, Assistant District Attorney General, for the appellee, State

of Tennessee.

OPINION

The defendant, Nathaniel T. Williams, was convicted by a jury in the Criminal Court of

Davidson County of one count of second degree murder and one count of possession of a weapon

by a convicted felon for the shooting death of Joseph Cox. The trial court sentenced him to twenty-

four years on the second degree murder conviction, and two years on the possession of a weapon by

a convicted felon conviction, with the sentences to be served consecutively, for an effective sentence

of twenty-six years. In this appeal as of right, the defendant raises the sole issue of whether the

evidence was sufficient to support his conviction of second degree murder beyond a reasonable

doubt. Specifically, he argues that the evidence in the record is insufficient to show that the victim

died of gunshot wounds. Based upon a careful review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

FACTS

On December 31, 1997, at 4:50 p.m., Officers Danny Warren and Randall Moore of the

Metropolitan Police Department in Nashville were dispatched to a report of shots fired at 600 Main

Street in East Nashville, a building which housed a pawn shop in front and an automobile window

tinting and stereo installation business in the rear. En route, they received word that there were three

shooting victims involved. Upon their arrival, Officers Warren and Moore, along with fellow

Officers Robert Hautt and Jonathan Markline, discovered the victims inside the automobile shop

at the rear of the building. Two of the three victims were critically injured and bleeding severely

from gunshot wounds. One of these two, Joseph Cox, was lying face down on the concrete floor of

the shop, while the second, Carlos Stewart, was lying with his head and torso inside a Cadillac

parked inside the shop. The third victim, who had received noncritical wounds to both feet, was

walking back and forth in the rear of the shop, eating a sandwich. Cox subsequently died as a result

of his injuries.

On June 9, 1998, the Davidson County Grand Jury issued an indictment against the

defendant, charging him with first degree murder of Joseph Cox, felony murder of Joseph Cox,

attempted first degree murder of Carlos Stewart, and the unlawful possession of a weapon by a

convicted felon.1 Trial was held in the Davidson County Criminal Court from April 12-14, 1999.

At trial, Officer Danny Warren described finding Joseph Cox bleeding heavily and lying face

down on the floor just inside the bay door leading into the shop. On the floor beside him was a large

speaker box, with wires leading from it to the trunk of a 1992 two-door Cadillac parked inside the

shop. Officer Jonathan Markline testified that Cox, who appeared to be “in a very critical state,” was

lying face down on the ground within five or six feet of the rear bay door, unsuccessfully struggling

to rise to his hands and knees. Officer Markline believed that he was still on the scene, inside the

pawn shop, when Cox died. Sergeant Robert Hautt recalled seeing a large amount of blood by the

1

An unnamed suspect was also indicted for first degree murder and felony murder of Joseph Cox, and attempted

first degree m urder of C arlos Stewa rt. The record does not reflect the disposition of the indictments against this unnamed

suspect.

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bay door of the shop, where Joseph Cox was lying face down on the concrete floor. His best

recollection was that Cox was “flopping around in the floor, ” looking like a “fish out of water.”

Dominique Brown, an eyewitness who was thirteen years old at the time, testified that Cox

and Stewart were lifting a large stereo speaker box into the trunk of the Cadillac when the defendant

walked up to them and fired his weapon. Brown stated that the defendant first shot Stewart and then

shot Cox. Brown ducked for cover. When he looked up again, he saw the defendant and Cox

struggling over the gun, and heard Cox asking, “Why are you shooting me?” He heard the defendant

answer, “You know what you did,” before firing again at Cox. Brown identified the defendant as

the shooter, both at trial, and from a photographic lineup on the night of the shooting.

Lacharsha Jenkins, a friend of the defendant’s, testified that the defendant came to her home

on the evening of the shooting and told her that he had been at the auto shop earlier in the day, where

he had seen the man who had stolen his car. The defendant told her that he planned to steal the

man’s car in turn, but that the man had rushed him, they had scuffled, and his gun had gone off.

According to Jenkins, the defendant had two guns with him that evening, a solid black one and a

black one with a pearl handle. He gave her the solid black gun, with instructions that she throw it

in the river. Instead of disposing of the weapon, however, Jenkins gave it to a friend.2

Officer Damien Huggins, a vice detective with the Metropolitan Police Department, testified

that on February 27, 1998, the defendant, who had been arrested and incarcerated, requested to speak

to him. Before taking his statement, he informed the defendant of his rights and had him sign a

waiver of his rights. According to the defendant’s statement, prior to the shooting, he and two

friends had been carjacked by Cox and Stewart. Later, he and one friend had been in the auto shop

when his friend recognized Stewart as the man who had carjacked them. The defendant thought that

Cox must have seen the handle of the defendant’s gun sticking up out of his coat pocket, because

Cox suddenly rushed the defendant and began fighting for his gun. The defendant’s friend shot at

Stewart. As the defendant struggled with Cox, attempting to get the gun out of his pocket in order

to protect himself, the gun fired twice. The defendant said that Cox then somehow got hold of the

gun and tried to shoot the defendant, but the gun would not fire. Cox weakened and fell, and the

defendant ran off. He told Detective Huggins that he and his friend had later burned their clothes

and disposed of the guns but would not tell Huggins the location. He also steadfastly refused to

disclose the name of his friend.

Dr. Emily Ward of the Davidson County Medical Examiner’s Office testified that she

performed the autopsy of Joseph Cox on January 1, 1998. Her examination of his body revealed

three gunshot wounds: a graze wound to the chest; a penetrating wound caused by a bullet which

entered near the left shoulder blade, went through the left lung, struck the aorta, passed through the

2

Jenkins later re covered the gun and tu rned it in to the police. At trial, a Tennessee Bureau of Investigation

firearms identification expert testified that he had examined the nine-millimete r weapon turned ove r by Jenkins, as well

as bullet fragments recovered from the scene, and determined that at least two cartridge casings discovered at the scene

had bee n fired by the we apon.

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diaphragm and the liver, and exited on the right side of the front of the chest; and a penetrating

wound caused by a bullet which entered the left side of the back above the hip bone, struck the

pelvis, changed directions, and exited on the inside of the left buttock. Referring to the autopsy

report, autopsy notes, and slides that had been taken of the victim’s body, Dr. Ward stated that the

bullet which perforated the lung, aorta, diaphragm, and liver caused “massive internal bleeding.”

They had measured the amount of blood that bled into the inside of the victim’s body and found it

to total more than two liters. Dr. Ward testified that the aorta is the largest blood vessel in the body,

and that more than likely a person who suffered the type of aorta wound inflicted upon the victim

would “bleed very rapidly and within a short period of time be very incapacitated.”

After deliberations, the jury found the defendant guilty of second degree murder and unlawful

possession of a handgun after a felony drug conviction. The trial court sentenced him to twenty-four

years for the second degree murder conviction, and two years for the unlawful possession of a

weapon conviction. The sentences were ordered served consecutively, for an effective sentence of

twenty-six years. Following the denial of his motion for a new trial, the defendant filed a timely

appeal to this court.

ANALYSIS

The sole issue the defendant raises on appeal is the sufficiency of the evidence for his second

degree murder conviction. Specifically, he contends that the State failed to offer sufficient proof that

Joseph Cox died as a result of gunshot wounds. In support, the defendant argues that the medical

examiner’s report, which lists the cause of death as gunshot wounds, was not properly introduced

into evidence, and that the medical examiner did not directly testify that the victim died as a result

of gunshot wounds. The defendant argues that the improper admission of the autopsy report

constituted plain error under the standards established in State v. Adkisson, 899 S.W.2d 626 (Tenn.

Crim. App. 1994). He asserts that, without the autopsy report, the evidence would not have been

sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find that he caused the death of the victim beyond a reasonable

doubt.

The State acknowledges that there was confusion surrounding the admission of the autopsy

report into evidence. It argues, however, that the defendant waived any objection to the trial court’s

admission of the report by his failure to make a timely objection at trial. The State further argues

that the improper admission of the report does not rise to the level of plain error under the five

Adkisson factors, and that, even without the autopsy report, sufficient evidence was presented at trial

from which the jury could reasonably infer that the victim died as a result of gunshot wounds.

When the sufficiency of the convicting evidence is challenged on appeal, the question for

this court is “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any

rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense charged beyond a

reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560

(1979). See also State v. Evans, 838 S.W.2d 185, 190-92 (Tenn. 1992); State v. Anderson, 835

S.W.2d 600, 604 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992); Tenn. R. App. P. 13(e) (“Findings of guilt in criminal

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actions whether by the trial court or jury shall be set aside if the evidence is insufficient to support

the findings by the trier of fact of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”). All questions involving the

credibility of witnesses, the weight and value to be given the evidence, and all factual issues are

resolved by the trier of fact. See State v. Pappas, 754 S.W.2d 620, 623 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987).

“A guilty verdict by the jury, approved by the trial judge, accredits the testimony of the witnesses

for the State and resolves all conflicts in favor of the theory of the State.” State v. Grace, 493

S.W.2d 474, 476 (Tenn. 1973). The defendant’s conviction by the jury removed the presumption

of innocence he enjoyed at trial and replaced it with one of guilt; on appeal, he now has the burden

of demonstrating that the evidence was insufficient. See State v. Tuggle, 639 S.W.2d 913, 914

(Tenn. 1982).

The autopsy report, which was received into evidence and marked as an exhibit for the

record, clearly states the cause of Joseph Cox’s death as multiple gunshot wounds. The defendant

relies upon an ambiguity in the record, however, to argue that the autopsy report was not properly

introduced as an exhibit at trial and, thus, should not have been considered by the jury in making its

determination of his guilt. After Dr. Ward testified that she had brought Joseph Cox’s autopsy report

with her to court, the following exchange between the prosecutor and the medical examiner

occurred:

Q. And if I may approach. If you would compare this against your

original and see if that is a correct photocopy of the autopsy

report.

A. (Witness viewing document.) Yes. What you’ve handed me is

a photocopy of the report.

Q. If I can show you another two-sided copy. Is that also a correct

copy of the body diagram and notes that you took during the

course of your autopsy?

A. Yes, it is.

MS. ANDERSON: Your Honor, at this time we will ask that that be

marked as an exhibit for the State.

THE COURT: It will be Exhibit Number 9.

The transcript does not indicate whether “that,” and “it,” as referred to by the State and the

trial court, was the autopsy notes, the autopsy report, or both. Both documents, however, were

apparently received into evidence and published to the jury. The record contains two documents

labeled Exhibit 9: the one-page “Autopsy Notes,” marked “Trial Exhibit #9A & B,” and the separate

“Autopsy Report,” marked as “Trial Exhibit #9B.” Thus, it appears that the State intended both the

autopsy report and the autopsy notes to be included together as a collective exhibit, and that the trial

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court received them as such. Admissibility of evidence rests within the discretion of the trial court,

and the trial court’s decision to admit evidence will be reversed only upon the showing of abuse of

that discretion. State v. Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d 530, 542 (Tenn. 1994); Inman v. Aluminum Co.

of America, 697 S.W.2d 350, 354 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1985). In this case, there is no question but that

the autopsy report was admissible evidence, as a proper foundation for its introduction was laid. See

Tenn. R. Evid. 901(a)–(b)(1); see also Bolen v. State, 544 S.W.2d 918, 920 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1976)

(stating that physical evidence may properly be introduced at trial either when identified by a

witness, or when established from a proper unbroken chain of custody).

The defendant argues, nonetheless, that the autopsy report should not have been given to the

jury because it was not properly admitted as an exhibit. He offered no objection to its introduction

at trial, however. The record reflects that as Dr. Ward continued her testimony, she referred not just

to her autopsy notes, but also to the autopsy report. Defense counsel did not object to Dr. Ward’s

use of the autopsy report in her testimony. The failure to raise a timely objection to the introduction

of evidence at trial results in a waiver of any complaint about the admission of such evidence. Tenn.

R. App. P. 36(a); see also State v. Smith, 24 S.W.3d 274, 280 (Tenn. 2000) (citing State v.

Harrington, 627 S.W.2d 345, 348 (Tenn. 1981)). This is true even if the party objecting to the

evidence would have had legitimate grounds to object at trial. See id. In this case, as previously

stated, there is no doubt that the autopsy report was admissible evidence, and we have no hesitation

in ruling that the defendant waived his right to object to any irregularity in the manner of its

introduction by his failure to raise a contemporaneous objection at trial. This decision is in line with

our decisions in other cases. See e.g., State v. Richard Allen Kidd, II, No. 03C01-9607-CC-00272,

1997 WL 789909, at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App. Dec. 23, 1997) (concluding that defendant’s failure to

raise timely objection at trial resulted in waiver of objection to irregularity in trial court’s practice

of allowing exhibits to be published to jury without following formal procedures to admit them into

evidence).

Notwithstanding his failure to object, the defendant contends that he is entitled to relief under

the “plain error” doctrine, which allows an appellate court to take notice at any time of plain errors

affecting substantial rights of the accused. See Tenn. R. Evid. 103(d); Tenn. R. Crim. P. 52(b);

Tenn. R. App. P. 36(b). The defendant argues that the five factors set forth in State v. Adkisson, 899

S.W.2d 626, 641-42 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994), for determining when plain error has occurred were

met in his case. We disagree.

In State v. Smith, 24 S.W.3d 274 (Tenn. 2000), our supreme court adopted the Adkisson test

as the proper standard for reviewing a record to determine if an error for which a defendant failed

to offer an objection at trial rises to the level of plain error, entitling the defendant to appellate

review. Id. at 283. Under Adkisson, five factors should be considered to determine if an error rises

to the level of plain error:

(a) the record must clearly establish what occurred in the trial court;

(b) a clear and unequivocal rule of law must have been breached; (c)

a substantial right of the accused must have been adversely affected;

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(d) the accused did not waive the issue for tactical reasons; and (e)

consideration of the error is “necessary to do substantial justice.”

Id. at 282 (quoting Adkisson, 899 S.W.2d at 641-42)). In this case, the ambiguity surrounding the

introduction of the autopsy report, and the confusion in the marking of the exhibits to the trial, do

not constitute the breach of “a clear and unequivocal rule of law.” Consequently, any irregularity

in the admission of the autopsy report does not rise to the level of plain error. We, therefore,

conclude that the autopsy report, unequivocally stating the cause of death as multiple gunshot

wounds, was properly before the jury.

Moreover, we agree with the State that even without the autopsy report, sufficient evidence

was presented from which the jury could conclude that Joseph Cox died of gunshot wounds. At the

beginning of her testimony, Dr. Ward explained that the purpose of an autopsy is to determine the

cause of death. On her autopsy notes, which the defendant concedes were properly admitted as an

exhibit, under a heading entitled “DIAGNOSES,” is written “multiple GSW’s.” The jury heard

testimony that the defendant shot the victim, that the victim was bleeding profusely and lying in a

large pool of blood when police officers arrived at the scene, and that he died shortly thereafter. Dr.

Ward testified that the victim had three bullet wounds, and that one bullet had gone through his left

lung, diaphragm, and liver, and perforated his aorta, the largest blood vessel in the body, resulting

in massive blood loss. The State questioned Dr. Ward about the consequences of a wound to the

aorta:

Q. But wound number one, which was an aorta wound, is it true that

a person would have died very quickly from that wound?

A. Well, it depends on what you mean by very quickly. It wouldn’t

cause instantaneous death, but a wound to the aorta would

typically cause somebody to bleed very rapidly and within a

short period of time be very incapacitated.

Q. Right. It’s hard to say, but more than likely very quickly, I

guess, correct?

A. Yes. That’s right.

Thus, the evidence in the record, apart from the autopsy report, was more than sufficient to prove

cause of death. See State v. Bobby Weaver, No. 02C01-9307-CC-00143, 1995 WL 568420 at *5

(Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 27, 1995) (citing Cathey v. State, 191 Tenn. 617, 619, 235 S.W.2d 601, 602

(1951), for proposition that death may be presumed to have been caused by a victim’s obvious

wounds, especially when there is no suggestion that he died from other any other cause than the one

relied upon by the State).

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Second degree murder is defined at Tennessee Code Annotated Section 39-13-210(a)(1) as

“[a] knowing killing of another.” Tennessee Code Annotated Section 39-11-302(b) provides:

“Knowing” refers to a person who acts knowingly with respect to the

conduct or to circumstances surrounding the conduct when the person

is aware of the nature of the conduct or that the circumstances exist.

A person acts knowingly with respect to a result of the person’s

conduct when the person is aware that the conduct is reasonably

certain to cause the result.

To prove the defendant guilty of second degree murder, the State had to establish that he acted

knowingly, and that his actions resulted in the death of another.

The evidence at trial, viewed in the light most favorable to the State, showed that the

defendant approached Joseph Cox as he was engaged in installing a stereo speaker into the trunk of

a car, pulled a gun, and shot Cox several times. The evidence further showed that Cox died as a

result of his gunshot wounds. The evidence at trial was clearly sufficient to support the defendant’s

conviction of second degree murder.

CONCLUSION

After a careful review of the record, we conclude that sufficient proof was offered to show

that Joseph Cox died as a result of gunshot wounds caused by the defendant. Accordingly, the

evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of second degree murder, and the judgment of the

trial court is affirmed.

___________________________________

ALAN E. GLENN, JUDGE

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