Cornelius Tatu v. Commissioner of Social Security

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT TIES DISTRI RS

WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK Gr ES

>

DEC 27 2024

GABRIELLE C.-T.!,

COSTER BSI OS

Plaintiff,

v. 23-CV-523 (JLS)

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL

SECURITY,

Defendant.

DECISION AND ORDER

Plaintiff Gabrielle C.-T. brought this action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and

1383(c)(3) of the Social Security Act, seeking review of the decision of the

Commissioner of the Social Security Administration that she was not disabled. Dkt.

1. Plaintiff moved for judgment on the pleadings. Dkt. 6-1. The Commissioner

responded and cross-moved for judgment on the pleadings, to which Plaintiff

replied. Dkts. 7-1, 9. For the reasons below, the Court denies Plaintiffs motion

and grants the Commissioner’s cross-motion.

Pursuant to the Western District of New York’s November 18, 2020 Standing

Order regarding the naming of plaintiffs in Social Security decisions, this decision

and order identifies Plaintiff by first name and last initial.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This action originates from Plaintiffs application for Disability Insurance

Benefits (“DIB”) and her application for Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”), both

filed on September 29, 2020.2 Tr. 260—73.5 Plaintiffs applications were initially

denied, and she requested a hearing before an administrative law judge ALJ”).

Tr. 190-91. Following the hearing, at which Plaintiff was represented by counsel,

ALJ Ifeoma N. Iwuamadi issued a decision finding that Plaintiff was not disabled.

Tr. 15-33. Plaintiffs request for Appeals Council review was denied, after which

Plaintiff commenced this action. Tr. 1-6; Dkt. 1.

LEGAL STANDARDS

I. DISTRICT COURT REVIEW

Judicial review of disability claims under the Act is limited to whether the

Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial evidence and whether the

correct legal standards were applied. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Cichocki v. Astrue, 729

F.3d 172, 177 (2d Cir. 2013). The Commissioner’s factual findings are conclusive

2 Plaintiff applied for both DIB and SSI. To receive DIB, a claimant must show that

he or she became disabled while meeting the Act’s insured status requirements. See

42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A); Schillo v. Kijakazi, 31 F.4th 64, 69-70 (2d Cir. 2022). SSI,

on the other hand, “provides benefits to each aged, blind, or disabled individual who

does not have an eligible spouse and whose income and resources fall below a

certain level.” Clark v. Asirue, 602 F.3d 140, 142 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting 42 U.S.C.

§ 1382(a)) Gnternal quotation marks omitted). The Social Security Administration

uses the same five-step evaluation process to determine adult eligibility for both

programs. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520{a)(4) (concerning DIB), 416.920(a)(4)

(concerning SSJ).

8 The filing at Dkt. 5 is the transcript of the proceedings before the Social Security

Administration. All references to Dkt. 5 are hereby denoted “Tr. __.”

when supported by substantial evidence. See Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148,

1152 (2019). “Substantial evidence” is “more than a mere scintilla” and “means

such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a

conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (internal quotation

marks and citation omitted).

The Court does not determine de novo whether the claimant is disabled, but

the Commissioner’s conclusions of law are not given the same deferential standard

of review. See Byam v. Barnhart, 336 F.3d 172, 179 (2d Cir. 2003). If there is a

reasonable basis of doubt about whether the ALJ applied the correct legal

standards, then upholding the determination “creates an unacceptable risk that a

claimant will be deprived of the right to have his or her disability determination

made according to correct legal principles.” Johnson v. Bowen, 817 F.2d 983, 986

(2d Cir. 1987); see Moran vu. Astrue, 569 F.3d 108, 112 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Cruz

v. Sullivan, 912 F.2d 8, 11 (2d Cir. 1990)) (the Court’s review for legal error ensures

“that the claimant has had a full hearing under the . . . regulations and in

accordance with the beneficent purposes of the . . . Act.”).

Ii, DISABILITY DETERMINATION

Disability under the Act is determined under a five-step test. See Bowen. v.

City of New York, 476 U.S. 467, 470-71 (1986); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920.

First, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant is currently engaged in

substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(b), 416.920(b). “Substantial

gainful activity” is work activity that involves significant physical or mental

activities and is normally done for pay or profit. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1572, 416.972. If

the ALJ finds that the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity, the

claimant cannot claim disability. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(b), 416.920(b).

Second, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has a medically

determinable impairment or a combination of impairments that significantly limits

the claimant’s ability to perform basic work activities. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c),

416.920(c). Absent such impairment, the claimant may not claim disability. Jd.

Third, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant meets or medically

equals the criteria of an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P,

Appendix 1. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 416.920(d). If such criteria are met, then the

claimant is declared disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 416.920(d).

Even if the claimant is not declared disabled under the third step, the ALJ

may still find disability under the next two steps of the analysis. The ALJ must

determine the claimant’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”). 20 C.F.R.

§§ 404.1520(e), 416.920(e). The RFC is a holistic assessment of the claimant's □

medical impairments, both severe and non-severe, that evaluates the claimant’s

ability to perform physical or mental work activities on a sustained basis,

notwithstanding limitations for collective impairments. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1546,

416.945.

In the fourth step, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has the

RFC to perform past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(f, 416.920(). Ifthe

claimant is capable of performing past relevant work, then the claimant is not

disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1560(b)(3), 416.960(b)(3). Ifthe ALJ finds that the

claimant is unable to perform past relevant work, the analysis proceeds to the fifth

and final step. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(g)(1), 416.920(¢)(1).

In this final analytical step, the ALJ must decide whether the claimant is

able to perform any other relevant work corresponding with his or her RFC, age,

education, and work experience. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1560(c), 416.960(c). Here, the

burden of proof shifts from the claimant to the Commissioner to prove that a

significant number of jobs in the national economy exists that the claimant can

perform given his or her RFC, age, education, and work experience. 20 C.F.R.

404.1520(g), 404.1560(c), 416.920(g), 416.960(c); see Rosa v. Callahan, 168 F.3d

72, T7 (2d Cir. 1999).

DISCUSSION

I. THE ALJ’S DECISION

The ALJ determined that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful

activity since her alleged onset date on August 16, 2019. Tr. 18. The ALJ also

found that Plaintiff suffered from the following severe impairments: Crohn’s

disease, bilateral venous insufficiency, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease,

asthma, migraines, chronic pain syndrome, disorder of the spine, posttraumatic

stress disorder, major depressive disorder, generalized anxiety disorder, and

cannabis use disorder. Id. The ALJ concluded, however, that Plaintiff's severe

impairments did not meet or medically equal one of the listed impairments in 20

C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. Tr. 19-21.

After considering the entire record, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had the

RFC to perform light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b)

with the following limitations:

[Plaintiff] can climb ramps and stairs occasionally; can never

climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; can kneel occasionally; can

crouch occasionally; can crawl occasionally; can never work at

unprotected heights; never work around moving mechanical

parts, and never work operating a motor vehicle; must have no

concentrated exposure to dust, odors, fumes, and pulmonary

irritants; can perform simple work-related decisions; can perform

work with occasional contact with supervisors, coworkers|[,] and

the public; can perform work with occasional changes in a routine

work setting.

Tr. 21.

The ALJ found that Plaintiff had no past relevant work. Tr. 31. But the ALJ

concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled because her age, education, work

experience, and RFC allowed her to perform jobs existing in significant numbers in

the national economy. Tr. 32. As such, according to the ALJ, Plaintiff had not been

under a disability since her alleged onset date of August 16, 2019. Tr. 33.

Il. PLAINTIFF'S ARGUMENT

Plaintiff makes two arguments for judgment in her favor. Dkt 6-1, at 1.

First, Plaintiff argues that, despite finding the opinions of L. Haus, Psy.D., (“Dr.

Haus”), and C. Krist, DO, (“Dr. Krist”), to be persuasive, the ALJ ignored the

limitation that she “appears capable of low stress work with low contact with

others.” Dkt. 6-1, at 9-10. Next, she argues that the ALJ improperly weighed her

4 Plaintiffs argument notes that the ALJ found the opinions of Dr. Haus and D.

Brown, Psy.D., (‘Dr. Brown”), to be persuasive, id. at 9, however, the ALJ found Dr.

activities of daily living over psychiatric medical opinions that were more limited

than the RFC assessed. Id. at 12-14.

Ill. ANALYSIS

An ALJ must “weigh all of the evidence available to make an RFC finding

that [is] consistent with the record as a whole.” Matta v. Astrue, 508 F. App’x 53, 56

(2d Cir. 2018) (Summary order); accord Schillo, 31 F.4th at 78. But the RFC need

not correspond perfectly with “any of the opinions of medical sources cited in [the

ALJ’s] decision,” Matta, 508 F. App’x at 56, or even be based on opinion evidence,

see Corbiere v. Berryhill, 760 F. App’x 54, 56 (2d Cir. 2019) (Summary order). As

long as the ALJ considers all the medical evidence and appropriately analyzes the

medical opinions, an RFC consistent with the record is not erroneous. See 20 C.F.R.

§§ 404.1545, 416.945; see also Cichocki v. Astrue, 729 F.8d 172, 177 (2d Cir. 2013)

(remand is not necessary “[w]here an ALJ’s analysis at Step Four regarding a

claimant’s functional limitations and restrictions affords an adequate basis for

meaningful judicial review, applies the proper legal standards, and is supported by

substantial evidence”).

Brown’s opinion to be partially persuasive. Tr. 29. Rather, the ALJ found the

opinions of Dr. Haus and Dr. Krist to be persuasive. Jd. Thus, because Plaintiffs

argument referenced the opinions that the ALJ found persuasive, Dkt. 6—1, at 9,

this Court will address the opinions of Dr. Krist and Dr. Haus.

A. The ALJ’s RFC limitations are consistent with the limitations

opined by Dr. Krist and Dr. Haus.

Plaintiff argues that despite finding the opinions of Dr. Krist and Dr. Haus

persuasive, the ALJ “ignored their conclusions that Plaintiff needed a ‘low stress’

work environment.” Dkt 6-1, at 11. An ALJ’s RFC finding need not incorporate

every limitation contained in a medical opinion to which the ALJ gave weight.

Phoebe B. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2022 WL 4462228, at *7 (W.D.N-Y. Sep. 26, 2022)

(collecting cases). But an ALJ should explain why he or she did not include

limitations in the RFC finding. Linda H. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2021 WL 2075437,

at *3 (W.D.N.Y. May 25, 2021).

“Because stress is ‘highly individualized,’ mentally impaired individuals ‘may

have difficulty meeting the requirements of even so-called “low stress” jobs,’ and the

Commissioner must therefore make specific findings about the nature ofa

claimant’s stress, the circumstances that trigger it, and how those factors affect

{her] ability to work.” Stadler v. Barnhart, 464 F. Supp. 2d 183, 188 (W.D.N.Y.

2006) (quoting SSR 85-15, 1985 WL 56857, at *6 (Jan. 1, 1985)). “[E]ven without

explicitly referencing a stress limitation, an RFC determination may adequately

account for a claimant’s stress-related limitations.” Herb v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,

366 F. Supp. 3d 441, 447 (W.D.NLY. 2019).

Dr. Krist opined that Plaintiff “should have work with low contact, and tasks

that are low stress.” Tr. 143. Dr. Haus opined that Plaintiff “appears capable of

low stress work with low contact with others.” Tr. 134. The ALJ found these

opinions persuasive because they were “well-supported and consistent with the

substantial evidence of record, including treatment records, demonstrating some

anxiety and reactivity to psychological stressors but also indications the claimant is

able to care for her infant child, care for pets, go shopping, and spend time with her

family, suggesting a meaningful, but not profound, degree of mental limitation, with

an adequate capacity for basic mental-work related activities.” Tr. 29.

An RFC limiting a plaintiff to occasional interaction with co-workers and the

public, and to the performance of simple, routine tasks, may account for a plaintiff's

stress-related limitations. Id. (“RFC limiting a plaintiff to occasional interaction

with co-workers and the public, and to performance of simple, routine tasks, may

account for the plaintiffs stress-related limitations.”) (collecting cases); Moxham v.

Comm of Soc. Sec., 2018 WL 1175210, at *10 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 5, 2018) (limitation to

“simple tasks and instructions, decisions on simple work-related matters, and

frequent interaction with others” adequately accounted to the plaintiffs stress

related limitations).

Here, the ALJ limited Plaintiff to work with occasional interaction with

supervisors, coworkers, and the public; performing simple work-related decisions;

and work with occasional changes in a routine work setting. Tr. 21. Those

limitations adequately align with the opinions of Dr. Krist and Dr. Haus. Blocker v.

Saul, 2020 WL 1047737, at *6 (W.D.N_Y. Mar. 4, 2020) (“ALJ adequately accounted

for [p]laintiffs stress-related limitations by incorporating limitations to simple

routine tasks, occasional interaction with coworkers and the general public, and low

stress work defined as work involving only occasional decision making .... [S]uch

limitations have routinely been found to adequately account for a marked limitation

in dealing with stress.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Martinez

v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2017 WL 1155778, at *11 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2017)

(individual limited to “low stress jobs,’ defined as jobs requiring no more than

simple work-related decisions with few, if any, workplace changes”); Evans v.

Comm’ of Soc. Sec., 110 F. Supp.8d 518, 525 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (individual limited to

“low-stress jobs defined as involving only occasional decision-making and

interaction with coworkers, the general public, and supervisors”). So even though

the ALJ did not limit Plaintiff to low stress work, the RFC limitations are

consistent with the definition of low stress jobs.

B. The ALJ was permitted to rely on Plaintiffs activities of daily

living to discount opinions in the record.

Plaintiff additionally argues that the ALJ impermissibly relied on her

activities of daily living to discount the opinions of Todd Deneen, Psy.D., (“Dr.

Deneen”) and Cynthia McPhaden, a licensed mental health counselor (Ms.

McPhaden”). Dkt. 6—1, at 13-14.

On January 4, 2021, Dr. Deneen completed a psychiatric evaluation, and

opined that Plaintiff had no limitations in understanding, remembering, or applying

simple and complex directions and instructions; using reason and judgment to make

work related decisions; maintain personal hygiene and appropriate attire; and in

her awareness of normal hazards and taking appropriate precautions. Tr. 860. Dr.

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Deneen additionally opined that Plaintiff had mild limitations in interacting

adequately with supervisors, coworkers, and the public; sustaining concentration

and performing a task at a consistent pace; and sustaining an ordinary routine and

regular attendance at work. Jd. Lastly, Dr. Deneen found that Plaintiff had

moderate limitations in regulating emotions, controlling behavior, and maintaining

well-being. Id.

The ALJ found Dr. Deneen’s opinion partially persuasive, noting that,

although his “assessment is somewhat consistent with the overall record in

recognizing no marked mental restrictions, it does not adequately account for

[Plaintiffs] deficits in some areas, including social interactions, as established by

the longitudinal record, including treatment records documenting some anxiety in

social setting[s].” Tr. 29. The ALJ additionally noted that “Dr. Deneen’s indication

of moderate restriction in regulating emotions and maintaining well-being

somewhat overstates the degree of limitation established by the record, showing no

history of psychiatric hospitalization, no ongoing psychiatric medication

management, fair to good judgment, and an ability by [Plaintiff] to care for a young

child and seek appropriate treatment for her own conditions.” Id.

On May 5, 2022, Ms. McPhaden completed a mental RFC questionnaire, and

opined that Plaintiff was unable to meet the competitive standards or had no useful

ability to function in maintaining regular attendance and being punctual within

customary, usually-strict tolerances; work in coordination with or proximity to

others without being unduly distracted; make simple work-related decisions;

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complete a normal workday and workweek without interruptions from

psychologically based symptoms; perform at a consistent pace without an

unreasonable number and length of rest periods; ask simple questions or request

assistance; accept instructions and respond appropriately to criticism from

supervisors; get along with co-workers or peers without unduly distracting them or

exhibiting behavioral extremes; and deal with normal work stress. Tr. 1781. Ms.

McPhaden additionally found that Plaintiff was unable to meet competitive

standards in understanding and remembering detailed instructions; carry out

detailed instructions; and in dealing with the stress of semiskilled and skilled work.

Id. at 1782. Lastly, Ms. McPhaden opined that Plaintiff was unable to meet the

competitive standards in interacting appropriately with the general public and

maintaining socially appropriate behavior; seriously limited in traveling in an

unfamiliar place; and had no ability to use public transportation. Id.

The ALJ found Ms. McPhaden’s opinion to be of limited persuasion, noting

that “the rather extreme degree of restriction reflected in her questionnaire is not

adequately supported by, or consistent with, the substantial evidence of record,

including [her] own mental status exams typically reflecting mood disturbance and

some issues with conceptual disorganization and preoccupation with stressors, and

partial insight, but also impaired memory, adequate focus, adequate impulse

control, as noted above.” Tr. 30-31 (citing Tr. 349-805, 1068-1618). The ALJ

additionally noted that the “assessed restrictions are also not consistent with

[Plaintiffs] ability to seek appropriate care, provide her personal history to

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providers, and her own acknowledged reports of daily function to Ms. McPhaden

and consultative examiner Dr. Deneen, such as caring for an infant child, doing

some shopping, spending time with family members, performing self-care tasks,

cooking, cleaning, driving, managing money, and spending time with family.” Jd. at

31 (citing Tr. 349-805, 1068-1618).

In further explaining Plaintiffs RFC, the ALJ noted that, although Plaintiff

“receives assistance with some daily activities that require going outside, some of

her other acknowledged reports of functioning, including generally being able to

perform self-care tasks, doing some cooking and indoor household chores, spending

time with family, caring for her daughter and pets, and doing crafts as a hobby

suggest a level of functioning that is not inconsistent with the above [RFC].” Tr. 31.

The ability to do routine daily activities, such as Plaintiffs, can support a

finding of light work. See Cichocki, 566 F.3d 178 (holding that the ALJ properly

considered the claimant’s reported daily activities, such as walking her dog and

cleaning her house, in support of an RFC finding for light work); Poupore v. Astrue,

566 F.8d 303, 307 (2d Cir. 2009) (the claimant’s varied activities, including

occasional vacuuming, washing dishes, driving, and watching television supported

an RFC finding for light work); see Ortiz v. Saul, 2020 WL 1150213, at *1 (S.D.N.Y.

Mar. 10, 2020) (“Plaintiffs ability to perform a range of light chores, including

cooking, shopping, cleaning, and laundry . .. support{s] a light work RFC finding.”).

Additionally, the ALJ was permitted to consider Plaintiffs ability to care for her

child in formulating the RFC. Krull v. Colvin, 669 F. App’x 31, 32 (2d Cir. 2016)

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(ALJ properly considered plaintiff's ability “to engage in complex tasks” such as

childcare); Poupore, 566 F.3d 307 (“the ALJ correctly noted that Poupore was able to

care for his one-year-old child, including changing diapers, that he sometimes

vacuumed and washed dishes, that he occasionally drove, and that he watched

television, read, and used the computer”). Thus, the ALJ was permitted to consider

Plaintiffs activities of daily living alongside the opinions in the record.

In general, a plaintiffs RFC is the most he or she can do despite his or her

limitations. 20 C.F.R. § 416.945(a)(1). An RFC finding is administrative in nature,

not medical, and its determination is within the province of the ALJ. Id.

§ 416.945(a)(1) (“We will assess your [RFC] based on all the relevance evidence in

your case record.”); see id. § 416.946(c) (‘the administrative law judge or the

administrative appeals judge at the Appeals Council . . . is responsible for assessing

your [RFC}]”). Plaintiff cannot merely disagree with the AL.J’s weighing of the

evidence or argue that evidence in the record could support her position. Plaintiff

must show that no reasonable factfinder could have reached the ALsJ’s conclusions

based on the evidence in the record. See Brault v. Soc. Sec. Admin. Comm’, 683

F.3d 443, 448 (2d Cir. 2012). Ultimately, it is Plaintiffs burden to prove a more

restrictive RFC than the RFC assessed by the ALJ, and Plaintiff fails to do so here.

See Smith v. Berryhill, 740 F. App’x 721, 726 (2d Cir. 2018).

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CONCLUSION

For these reasons, the Court GRANTS the Commissioner’s cross motion for

judgment on the pleadings (Dkt. 7-1) and DENIES Plaintiffs motion for judgment

on the pleadings (Dkt. 6-1). The Clerk of the Court will close this case.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: December 27, 2024

Buffalo, New York

JOFIN L. SINATRA, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT E

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