Opinion

DRUMM v. BEAVER AREA SCHOOL DISTRICT

Court
District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania
Filed
Dec 27, 2024
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 33.5%

The opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

SHYLER DRUMM, )

)

Plaintiff, ) 2:24-cv-00438-CB-MPK

)

v. ) Judge Cathy Bissoon

) Magistrate Judge Maureen P. Kelly

BEAVER AREA SCHOOL )

DISTRICT, et al., )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM ORDER

This case has been referred to United States Magistrate Judge Maureen P. Kelly for

pretrial proceedings in accordance with the Magistrates Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 636(b)(l)(A) and (B),

and Local Rule of Civil Procedure 72.

On November 14, 2024, the Magistrate Judge issued a Report (Doc. 19) recommending

that the moving Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 8) be granted in part and denied in part.

Service of the Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) was made on the parties, and Plaintiff has

filed Objections. See Doc. 20.

Having conducted a de novo review, the Court adopts the dispositions recommended in

the Report, subject to the following modifications ‒ which relate to Plaintiff’s “state created

danger” claim in Count II. The District Court declines to adopt the R&R’s indication that a

“drastic change” to the status quo is required for Plaintiff to state a claim. Although the language

is contained in the cited decision, there is no indication that it constitutes a necessary element.

Placing this to one side, it bears acknowledgement that Plaintiff’s averments regarding

state created danger ‒ as contained in Count II ‒ are of the type rejected in Morrow v. Balaski,

719 F.3d 160 (3d Cir. 2013). See Compl. (Doc. 1-8) at ⁋⁋ 41-46 (alleging failures to act,

as opposed to affirmative conduct). Elsewhere in the Complaint ‒ and sharpened in his

opposition brief and Objections‒ Plaintiff has identified one affirmative act: Defendant Beltz

“told the students who were bullying and harassing [him] to stop because his mother had called”

the school to complain. Id. at ⁋ 14. Allegedly, this “exacerbated the situation,” causing Plaintiff

“to suffer additional embarrassment, hazing and bullying.” Id.

While the R&R agreed “that such a statement would not have helped [Plaintiff’s]

situation,” it did not view the circumstances as reflecting a “drastic change” in the status quo.

Doc. 19 at 8. Nevertheless, after noting Defendant’s assertion of qualified immunity, the Report

recommended that the claim be dismissed without prejudice to amendment. See id. at 9.1

Given the Court’s conclusion that a “drastic change” is not required, the R&R’s analysis

does not answer the question. Plaintiff’s state created danger theory cannot be viewed as a

strong one, in any event. This is so given the requirements: that the harm was a “foreseeable

and fairly direct” result of Beltz mentioning, in his admonishment of the bullies, that Plaintiff’s

mother had telephoned; that Beltz’s alleged comment reflected “a degree of culpability that

shocks the conscience”; and that the statement made Plaintiff “more vulnerable to danger than

had [Defendant] not acted at all.” Morrow, 719 F.3d at 177 (citation omitted).

The mountains to climb are, indeed, high. The Court must bear in mind, however,

the relatively lenient standards applicable at this stage. In light of them, there has been some

reluctance to resolve such issues at the 12(b) stage. See, e.g., J.R. v. Greater Latrobe Sch. Dist.,

1 Defense counsel reads Plaintiff’s other concession(s) to mean that the School District cannot be

liable under the state created danger theory. See Defs.’ Reply Br. (Doc. 16) at 1. Plaintiff does

not resist this assertion, having directed his Objections to “Defendant,” singular, and “Beltz.”

See Doc. 20 at 2-7.

688 F.Supp.3d 243, 256-57 (W.D. Pa. 2023) (Colville, J.) (although the school “point[ed] to

certain issues of fact that might ultimately have an impact on the viability of [the p]laintiff’s

claim,” his allegations “permit[ted] inference[s]” supporting a plausible claim).2

The District Court cannot resolve these issues on the present record. Doing so would

require a good deal of extrapolation given the sparsity of the actual pleadings. Cf. Pl.’s Objs.

(Doc. 20) at 1 (alleging that Beltz’s action “greatly inflamed the situation,” but citing paragraphs

of the Complaint that neither contain such language, nor supply details warranting the

characterization). The R&R, moreover, did not reach the issue of qualified immunity “because

such analysis may be dependent on the sufficiency of [Plaintiff’s] pleading[s].” Doc. 19 at 8-9.

In the end, the Court is in agreement with the disposition ultimately recommended.

Count II cannot, on the current record, proceed. Even assuming Plaintiff clears the hurdles

above, he also must contend with Defendant’s assertion of qualified immunity. The Court of

Appeals for the Third Circuit has acknowledged the “inherent tension between federal qualified

immunity jurisprudence and the concept of notice pleading,” and has highlighted the utility of

Rule 12(e)’s motion for a more definite statement (a vehicle invoked by defense counsel here,

albeit regarding other Counts). Thomas v. Independence Twp., 463 F.3d 285, 299-302 (3d Cir.

2006); see also the decision cited in Plaintiff’s Objections, Lagano v. Bergen Cty. Prosecutor’s

Office, 769 F.3d 850, 859-60 (3d Cir. 2014) (reversing the district court’s finding of qualified

2 In J.R., the school allegedly “was on notice of extreme hazing activity among the wrestling

team, as well as encouragement of such activity from the team’s coaches, but nonetheless

affirmatively required” the plaintiff to “report to a gymnasium where [the team] would be

unsupervised for a period of forty-five minutes.” Id. at 256. The degree to which this case is

similar can be, and surely will be, debated. On one hand, the “action versus inaction”

distinction, here, is more easily drawn (i.e., Beltz allegedly told Plaintiff’s bullies that his mother

had telephoned to complain). On the other hand, the level of culpability in J.R. was significantly

higher (given the allegation that hazing was encouraged by the team’s coaches).

immunity based on a lack of published decisions extending the state created danger theory to

confidential informants, but “express[ing] no opinion as to whether” qualified immunity, in fact,

attached).3 Counsel must be prepared to address the relevant standards through amendment and

the renewed motions practice likely to follow.

Plaintiff’s remaining objection, to the recommended dismissal of Count V,

is OVERRULED. The R&R is adopted consistent with the above (although on page 11,

“Count VI pursuant to the ADA” is amended to read, “Count IV pursuant to the ADA”).

Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 8) is GRANTED, and Counts I, V, VI and VII are

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE (Count VII as to the moving Defendants). Count IV is

DISMISSED without prejudice to amendment should Plaintiff wish to attempt a cure. Plaintiff is

ORDERED to amend Count II, consistent with the discussions herein, or the claim will be

deemed abandoned.

Plaintiff’s deadline for filing an amended complaint is January 10, 2025. Amendment is

limited to the topics contemplated herein. Further opportunity for amendment will not be

afforded, so Plaintiff must make last, best efforts to plead legally supportable claim(s).

The amended complaint must stand on its own, without reference to, or incorporation of,

the original Complaint. Should Plaintiff not timely file an amended complaint, he will be

deemed to stand on the original pleadings and the dismissal of Counts II and IV will be

converted to with-prejudice.

3 Estate of Lagano has surface appeal, from Plaintiff’s perspective, given its recognition that

“[i]t ha[d] been clearly established . . . [for] decades that a state-created danger violates due

process.” Id. at 859. Likening Plaintiff’s circumstances to that of a confidential informant

whose identity has been intentionally or recklessly revealed seems quite a stretch, however.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

December 27, 2024 s\Cathy Bissoon

Cathy Bissoon

United States District Judge

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All Counsel of Record

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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