Opinion

Robert Ferguson v. M. Brown Construction, Inc.

Court
Court of Appeals of Tennessee
Filed
Dec 27, 2024
Status
Published
On the bench
Judge W. Neal McBrayer
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 33.5%

recognizing “[a]n issue may be deemed waived, even when it has been specifically raised as an issue, when the brief fails to include an argument satisfying the requirements of Tenn. R. App. P. 27(a)(7)”

How later courts described this case

  • recognizing “[a]n issue may be deemed waived, even when it has been specifically raised as an issue, when the brief fails to include an argument satisfying the requirements of Tenn. R. App. P. 27(a)(7)”
  • explaining 7 that “‘intentional misrepresentation,’ ‘fraudulent misrepresentation,’ and ‘fraud’ are different names for the same cause of action”
  • explaining that “depending on the intention of the parties manifested by the terms of the contract” a contract made by an agent for a disclosed principal “may bind the agent alone, or the principal alone, or both together”
  • holding that “the burden of proof is on the party asserting agency”

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

12/27/2024

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

November 7, 2023 Session

ROBERT FERGUSON v. M. BROWN CONSTRUCTION, INC. ET AL.

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Cheatham County

No. 6442 Larry J. Wallace, Judge

___________________________________

No. M2022-01637-COA-R3-CV

___________________________________

A property owner hired a local contractor to build a custom-designed home. A payment

dispute arose midway through construction, and the contractor stopped working. The

owner paid others to repair and complete the home. Then he filed suit against the contractor

asserting multiple theories of recovery. Among other things, the trial court found the

contractor liable for breach of contract and fraudulent misrepresentation. As compensatory

damages, it awarded the owner the additional costs he incurred to repair and complete the

home above the contract price. We affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand for

recalculation of compensatory damages.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed in

Part; Vacated in Part; Case Remanded

W. NEAL MCBRAYER, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which ANDY D. BENNETT

and JEFFREY USMAN, JJ., joined.

Paul T. Housch, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Timothy Brown.

Harold E. Rushton, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellee, Robert Ferguson.

OPINION

I.

A.

Robert Ferguson sued M. Brown Construction, Inc., Michael Brown, and Timothy

Brown, asserting claims for negligence, conversion, breach of contract, fraudulent and

negligent misrepresentation, and violation of the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act. See

Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-18-109(a)(1) (Supp. 2024). According to the operative complaint,1

Tim and Michael Brown built houses as employees or agents of M. Brown Construction,

Inc., a family-owned business. Mr. Ferguson signed a written contract with M. Brown

Construction for the construction of his home. Tim Brown signed the contract on the

corporation’s behalf. But the contractor did not finish the specified work. And the work

was defective, requiring expensive repairs. In the aftermath, Mr. Ferguson discovered that

neither Tim Brown nor M. Brown Construction were properly licensed for the project. See

id. § 62-6-103(a)(1) (2019). He sought compensatory and punitive damages, treble

damages under the Consumer Protection Act, and costs and attorney’s fees.

For their part, the defendants denied liability. And, on the eve of trial, they asserted

a counterclaim for unjust enrichment, alleging that Mr. Ferguson failed to pay for

completed work.

B.

At trial, Mr. Ferguson and his wife, Roxanna Ferguson, maintained that they hired

Tim Brown to build their home, not M. Brown Construction. After reviewing the design

plans, Tim Brown assured the Fergusons that he was qualified to build their home. He

claimed to have extensive experience with large residential construction projects. And he

showed them a portfolio of his previous builds. Based on these assurances, the Fergusons

chose Tim Brown to build their custom home.

Mr. Brown provided the Fergusons with a project quote based on their design plans.

Armed with the contractor’s bid, the Fergusons applied for a construction loan. But their

initial application was denied, at least in part, because of the estimated cost of the

construction. The lender also required a signed contract reflecting the contractor’s contact

information, license number, and insurance information.

The Fergusons notified Mr. Brown, who agreed to revise his quote. He also drafted

a construction contract using the license and insurance information of his brother’s

company. According to the contract, M. Brown Construction, Inc. would “provide

material, labor and complete job as specified [in the custom plans] for . . . $263,299.68.”

The contract identified “Tim Brown” as “a Representative” for the company and the

designated “contact for all [c]onstruction and money draws.” When the Fergusons

questioned the identification of the contractor, Mr. Brown explained that this was just

“standard procedure” to satisfy the lender. Both Mr. Brown and Mr. Ferguson signed the

contract on June 28, 2015.

1

After Michael Brown’s death, Mr. Ferguson amended his complaint to substitute Michael

Brown’s estate and children as defendants.

2

Tim Brown agreed that the Fergusons hired him as their contractor, not his brother’s

company. But, as he explained, because he did not have a contractor’s license, he “[u]sed

[his] brother’s license to get the loan, so [he] . . . could build [the Ferguson home].” He

acknowledged that Michael Brown was the sole owner of M. Brown Construction. Tim

Brown had never been an employee, officer, member, or agent of the company. Still, he

routinely built houses using the company’s license and insurance information.

Beyond the question of Tim Brown’s authority to involve the company, M. Brown

Construction’s license had a monetary limit of only $180,000. Although the contract price

exceeded that limit, Tim Brown was not concerned with this deficiency. He insisted that

the monetary limit applied separately to each permit pulled for the project, not the total

project cost.

The lender approved the revised application in October. And Mr. Ferguson gave

Mr. Brown a $10,000 deposit to begin construction. As Mr. Brown requested, all checks

were made payable to “Tim Brown” individually.

Unable to begin construction immediately, Mr. Brown signed the deposit check over

to Mr. Ferguson. Mr. Ferguson used the money to obtain a building permit. He also hired

Terry Wallace, a local mason, to build the home’s foundation. The Fergusons claimed that

Mr. Brown directed them to take these steps. Mr. Brown disputed their claims. As he told

it, the Fergusons were so anxious for construction to begin that they started without him.

Still, Mr. Brown admitted that he had planned to hire Mr. Wallace as the foundation

subcontractor on the Ferguson project. And he supervised the subcontractor’s work. At

Mr. Brown’s direction, the subcontractor added multiple stone piers to the foundation, a

deviation from the design plans. According to Mr. Brown, this change was necessary to

provide greater support for the wooden trusses he planned to use during construction

instead of the steel beams called for in the plans.

The Fergusons complained that Mr. Brown also deviated from the plans in other

ways. He lowered the ceiling heights throughout the home. He changed the flooring on

the back patio from concrete to wood. And he eliminated some architectural details such

as columns for built-in shelving. Feeling they had no other choice, the Fergusons

acquiesced to these unilateral changes.

During construction, Mrs. Ferguson paid Mr. Brown upon request. After the initial

deposit, she paid him another $110,000 for his materials and labor. She claimed she also

paid other suppliers for various materials, supplies, and fixtures at Mr. Brown’s direction.

Among other things, the Fergusons purchased windows, doors, and cabinets for the home.

They insisted that nothing was purchased for the home without Mr. Brown’s approval.

3

Proof at trial revealed that financial concerns ultimately derailed the project.

Mrs. Ferguson recalled that a few months into construction, Mr. Brown told her to pay an

overdue invoice for drywall materials at Midway Supply. Mrs. Ferguson complied, but

she questioned why Mr. Brown had not paid the invoice with a previous draw. He

reportedly told her that sometimes he had to “rob Peter to pay Paul.” And he asked for an

additional $30,000 to continue construction. But Mrs. Ferguson had exhausted the

proceeds from the construction loan. And, by her estimate, the house was only about 40%

complete. The Fergusons refused Mr. Brown’s request, which they perceived as a demand

for additional funds above the contract price. And Mr. Brown walked off the job.

As the Fergusons attempted to complete construction without a contractor, they

encountered problems with Mr. Brown’s workmanship. Uneven subflooring had to be

replaced before hardwood floors could be installed. Several windows were inoperable.

The roof leaked and ruined the drywall in two rooms. And the plumbing failed inspection.

Including the payments to Mr. Brown, the Fergusons claimed they ultimately spent

a grand total of $406,600.08 to complete their custom home. This total included the cost

of repairing defects in the construction. Mrs. Ferguson submitted cancelled checks,

receipts, and invoices that reflected their expenditures. She also created a spreadsheet

detailing each expense. She acknowledged that the contract excluded costs associated with

clearing the land, grading for the driveway, landscaping, and the well. And she testified

that, although she tried to eliminate from her calculations costs that were beyond the scope

of the contract, some of those costs were mistakenly included.

Tamika Parker, a licensed engineer, inspected the Ferguson home before trial.

Admitted as an expert in residential construction, Ms. Parker identified multiple deviations

from the design plans. In her opinion, some of these deviations were dangerous. Others

merely impacted the aesthetics of the home. Deviations in the foundation and framing

coupled with a lack of precision in the work caused her to question the structural integrity

of the home. In her opinion, gravity was the only force keeping the home intact. She

recommended several remedial measures. She also identified significant tripping hazards

caused by poor construction of a staircase and the change from concrete to wood flooring

for the back patio. And she noted several flaws in the roofing.

Mr. Brown defended his workmanship. As he explained, he built the Ferguson

home “to code,” not to satisfy a higher engineering standard. He pointed out that the home

passed inspection while he was on site. He blamed any problems with the roof on the

unusual design plans. Although he was aware that the roof leaked in one area, he insisted

that he took steps to alleviate the problem before he installed the drywall. To his

knowledge, the house was dry when he left the job site. Any problems with the windows

he attributed to product defects, not installation. He also blamed the Fergusons’ door

choice for the tripping hazard at the back door. And he insisted that the Fergusons

approved his deviations from the design plans.

4

Except for the drywall invoice, Mr. Brown claimed he never directed the Fergusons

to buy materials or supplies for the build. And he only asked Mrs. Ferguson to pay for the

drywall because he was out of town on vacation. Mr. Brown maintained that the Fergusons

paid him a total of $110,000 during this project. And he only stopped work because they

refused to pay him as specified in the contract.

C.

The court ruled in favor of the Fergusons. It found that Tim Brown was the primary

contractor on the Ferguson home. He personally directed and supervised the construction.

By his own admission, he drafted the contract in the company name for the sole purpose

of circumventing the statutory licensure requirement. He had never been an officer,

employee, or agent of his brother’s company. As such, he “did not have authority to enter

the contract on behalf of the corporation.”

The court found that Mr. Brown offered to construct the Fergusons’ custom-

designed home for a fixed price. And he misled Mr. Ferguson about his licensure status.

In reliance on Mr. Brown’s representations, Mr. Ferguson accepted his offer. Yet

Mr. Brown failed to fulfill his contractual obligations. And he unlawfully engaged in

contracting activity in violation of the licensure statute. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 62-6-

103(a)(1).

Based on the proof at trial, the court found Tim Brown individually liable for breach

of contract and fraudulent misrepresentation. It also found that his conduct constituted

constructive fraud, negligence per se, and a violation of the Tennessee Consumer

Protection Act. See id. § 47-18-104(b)(35) (Supp. 2024).

The court determined that the additional costs Mr. Ferguson incurred to repair and

complete the construction after Mr. Brown ceased work was an appropriate measure of

damages. It found that Mr. Ferguson proved that he “incurred total costs to repair and build

the home in the amount of $406,600.08,” which was $143,300.50 more than the contract

price. So the court awarded Mr. Ferguson compensatory damages of $143,300.50 as well

as double damages under the Consumer Protection Act. See id. § 47-18-109(a)(3)-(4).

The court dismissed all defendants other than Tim Brown. It also dismissed

Mr. Brown’s counterclaim for lack of proof. As an unlicensed contractor, Mr. Brown was

limited to recovering his documented expenses as established by clear and convincing

evidence. Id. § 62-6-103(b). And he “failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence

that he paid for any expenses on the Ferguson project.”

5

II.

On appeal, Mr. Brown attacks the judgment against him on multiple fronts. He

challenges the court’s findings with respect to fraudulent misrepresentation, constructive

fraud, and breach of contract. He insists the court erred in awarding damages against him

individually. And he questions the amount of compensatory damages awarded.2

Because this was a bench trial, our review is de novo on the record with a

presumption that the trial court’s factual findings are correct, unless the evidence

preponderates otherwise. TENN. R. APP. P. 13(d). We review questions of law de novo

with no presumption of correctness. Kaplan v. Bugalla, 188 S.W.3d 632, 635 (Tenn.

2006).

A.

1. Fraudulent Misrepresentation

Mr. Brown contends that the proof of fraudulent misrepresentation fell short. To

recover under this theory of liability, Mr. Ferguson had to prove:

(1) that the defendant made a representation of a present or past fact; (2) that

the representation was false when it was made; (3) that the representation

involved a material fact; (4) that the defendant either knew that the

representation was false or did not believe it to be true or that the defendant

made the representation recklessly without knowing whether it was true or

false; (5) that the plaintiff did not know that the representation was false

when made and was justified in relying on the truth of the representation; and

(6) that the plaintiff sustained damages as a result of the representation.

Hodge v. Craig, 382 S.W.3d 325, 343 (Tenn. 2012).

The court determined that Tim Brown “committed fraudulent misrepresentation

when he made false or misleading statements to Mr. Ferguson regarding his qualifications

to build the . . . home.” Mr. Brown represented that he was a “building contractor . . .

[with] extensive experience [in] . . . construction and contracting work.” “[T]hrough his

words, actions and overall conduct[,]” Mr. Brown “led [Mr. Ferguson] . . . to believe he

was a licensed Tennessee home builder, when in fact he was not.” He also “led

[Mr. Ferguson] to believe that he had extensive experience building homes even larger than

2

Mr. Ferguson asks this Court for an award of attorney’s fees and costs on appeal. An appellee

properly requests an award of attorney’s fees on appeal “by raising it in the body of the brief, adequately

developing the argument, and specifying that relief in the brief’s conclusion.” See Charles v. McQueen,

693 S.W.3d 262, 284 (Tenn. 2024). Because Mr. Ferguson failed to do so, this issue has been waived.

6

the Ferguson home, when in fact that was not true.” Mr. Ferguson “relied upon those

assertions in making his decision to hire . . . [Mr.] Brown.” And Mr. Ferguson incurred

damages because of Mr. Brown’s deception.

Mr. Brown claims he only told Mr. Ferguson that he “could build his new home.”

As such, Mr. Brown asserts that Mr. Ferguson failed to establish the first two elements of

his fraud claim. But the proof showed otherwise. Mr. Brown assured the Fergusons that

he was a qualified builder with extensive experience on large residential construction

projects. This was not true. And he drafted a contract using his brother’s license number

solely to avoid the licensure requirement. Through his words and actions, he misled the

Fergusons about his qualifications to build their home.

Mr. Brown also challenges the proof of actual reliance. Using the contract language

to his advantage, he now insists that the Fergusons could not have relied on his

representations because they hired another entity to build their home. We do not find his

argument persuasive. Mr. Brown readily admitted at trial that he drafted the contract in

the name of his brother’s company to satisfy the Fergusons’ lender so that the Fergusons

would hire him for the job. There was ample proof at trial that the Fergusons hired

Mr. Brown to build their home. And they did so in reliance on his representations.

2. Constructive Fraud

Mr. Brown also challenges the court’s constructive fraud finding. Constructive

fraud, as its name suggests, is a type of fraud. Alley v. Connell, 40 Tenn. 578, 582, (1859);

Kincaid v. SouthTrust Bank, 221 S.W.3d 32, 39-40 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006); Clore v. The

Vill., Inc., No. C.A. 117, 1986 WL 4590, at *6 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 18, 1986). It differs

from actual fraud only in the element of intent. Kincaid, 221 S.W.3d at 39; see also

McCord v. Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry., 213 S.W.2d 196, 206 (Tenn. 1948) (describing

constructive fraud as “an elusive creature of equity characterized by an absence of intent”).

As an equitable doctrine, it is particularly useful “for the purpose of canceling or rescinding

transactions where there has been an overreaching or undue advantage taken between

parties who are not dealing at arm’s length.” Land Devs., Inc. v. Maxwell, 537 S.W.2d

904, 918 (Tenn. 1976).

Mr. Ferguson first raised this theory of liability in his opening statement at trial. Yet

he requested no additional relief on this basis. And the court awarded none. The court

appears to have made the constructive fraud finding to ensure that the judgment would not

“be dischargeable in bankruptcy.” See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) (providing a fraud

exception to the bankruptcy discharge).

Because Mr. Ferguson requested no equitable relief and an award of damages was

an adequate remedy here, we vacate the constructive fraud finding. The proof at trial

supported the court’s finding of actual fraud. See Hodge, 382 S.W.3d at 342 (explaining

7

that “‘intentional misrepresentation,’ ‘fraudulent misrepresentation,’ and ‘fraud’ are

different names for the same cause of action”). As the defrauded party, Mr. Ferguson had

a choice of remedies. He could “treat the contract as voidable and sue for the equitable

remedy of rescission or . . . treat the contract as existing and sue for damages at law under

the theory of ‘deceit.’” Vance v. Schulder, 547 S.W.2d 927, 931 (Tenn. 1977).

Mr. Ferguson chose the latter option. As he was successful, the constructive fraud finding

served no purpose. See Groover v. Torkell, 645 S.W.2d 403, 409 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1982)

(noting that “[t]o say that [the defendant’s conduct] also amounts to a constructive fraud is

redundant and adds nothing to the available remedies of the plaintiff”).

B.

1. Written Contract

The trial court also found Mr. Brown liable for breach of contract. Mr. Brown

questions the court’s finding that he committed the first material breach. “Whether a party

has fulfilled its obligations under a contract or is in breach of the contract is a question of

fact.” Forrest Constr. Co. v. Laughlin, 337 S.W.3d 211, 225 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009). We

look to the contract to ascertain each party’s responsibilities. Id. at 221.

As previously discussed, Mr. Brown maintains on appeal that he was not a party to

the written contract. Contract interpretation is a question of law, which we review de novo.

Guiliano v. Cleo, Inc., 995 S.W.2d 88, 95 (Tenn. 1999). Here, the contract terms are clear

and unambiguous. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Watson, 195 S.W.3d 609, 611 (Tenn. 2006)

(explaining that contract terms are ambiguous when they are “susceptible to more than one

reasonable interpretation”). So we must interpret the contract according to the “plain

meaning of the words in the document.” Id. On its face, the written contract was between

Mr. Ferguson and M. Brown Construction, Inc. And it identified Mr. Brown as the

company representative on the project.

Mr. Brown insists that he signed the contract only in a representative capacity.

Nothing in the contract language suggests otherwise. See Brown v. Mays, 241 S.W.2d 871,

873 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1949) (explaining that “depending on the intention of the parties

manifested by the terms of the contract” a contract made by an agent for a disclosed

principal “may bind the agent alone, or the principal alone, or both together”). Ordinarily,

contracts signed by an agent for a disclosed principal are binding on the principal alone.

Holt v. Am. Progressive Life Ins. Co., 731 S.W.2d 923, 925 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987). But a

principal cannot be “bound by a contract made by a person who is not his agent.” Regions

Bank v. Bric Constructors, LLC, 380 S.W.3d 740, 764 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2011). And the

evidence does not preponderate against the court’s finding that Mr. Brown lacked authority

to bind his brother’s company. See Jack Daniel Distillery, Lem Motlow, Prop. v. Jackson,

740 S.W.2d 413, 416 (Tenn. 1987) (holding that “the burden of proof is on the party

asserting agency”).

8

Even so, Mr. Brown’s lack of authority, without more, does not override the plain

meaning of the contract. “[T]he fact that an agent acted without power to subject the

principal to liability does not make the agent a party to the contract.” RESTATEMENT

(THIRD) OF AGENCY § 6.01 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 2006). Mr. Brown may be personally

liable for breach of an implied warranty of authority, but he cannot be held liable for breach

of this written contract. See Memphis Cotton Press & Storage Co. v. Hanson, 4 Tenn. App.

293, 302 (1926); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 6.10 (AM. LAW INST. 2006)

(describing an agent’s implied warranty of authority).

2. Oral Contract

This conclusion does not end our contract analysis. As he readily admitted at trial,

Mr. Brown orally agreed to build the Ferguson home as provided in the written contract.

The Fergusons accepted his offer. An oral contract is enforceable when its terms are

sufficiently definite. Castelli v. Lien, 910 S.W.2d 420, 426 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995).

As his next argument, Mr. Brown complains that Mr. Ferguson committed the first

material breach by paying the deposit late and usurping his role as prime contractor. Even

if we were to agree with Mr. Brown on this point, we conclude he waived his right to make

this argument. “A non-breaching party may . . . waive its right to assert first material

breach as a bar to recovery if it accepts the benefits of the contract with knowledge of a

breach.” Madden Phillips Const., Inc. v. GGAT Dev. Corp., 315 S.W.3d 800, 813 (Tenn.

Ct. App. 2009). And here, Mr. Brown moved forward with construction fully aware of

Mr. Ferguson’s actions.

The trial court found that Mr. Brown committed the first material breach of contract

“when he knowingly entered into the contract to build the [Ferguson] home without first

obtaining licensure to do so.” This conduct may have violated the licensure statute. See

Tenn. Code Ann. § 62-6-103(a)(1). But it was not a breach of contract. “The rights and

obligations of contracting parties are governed by their . . . agreements.” Hillsboro Plaza

Enters. v. Moon, 860 S.W.2d 45, 47 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993). A breach occurs when one

party fails to fulfill a contractual obligation. See Fed. Ins. Co. v. Winters, 354 S.W.3d 287,

291 (Tenn. 2011) (explaining that a breach of contract action requires proof of “deficiency

in the performance amounting to a breach”); McClain v. Kimbrough Constr. Co., 806

S.W.2d 194, 199 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990) (reasoning “[o]nly [one party’s] uncured material

failure to perform its own contractual obligations would have excused [the other party]

from performing its remaining obligations”). Here, the parties’ agreement did not

expressly require Mr. Brown to comply with the licensure statute.

We recognize that an “implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is imposed

in the performance and enforcement of every contract.” Dick Broad. Co. v. Oak Ridge FM,

Inc., 395 S.W.3d 653, 668 (Tenn. 2013). And “each party to a contract promises to perform

9

its part of the contract in good faith.” Barnes & Robinson Co. v. OneSource Facility Servs.,

Inc., 195 S.W.3d 637, 642 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006). But the duty of good faith does not

apply to the negotiation or formation of a contract. Wallace v. Nat’l Bank of Commerce,

938 S.W.2d 684, 687 (Tenn. 1996); Barnes & Robinson Co., 195 S.W.3d at 643. So

Mr. Brown did not breach the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing “by bidding and

offering to build the Ferguson home without first obtaining licensure.”

Even so, we agree that Mr. Brown committed the first material breach of contract.

Mr. Brown promised the Fergusons he would build them a custom home for a fixed price.

Yet he never completed the home, and much of the work was defective. A contractor has

an implied duty to perform the work skillfully, carefully, and in a workmanlike manner.

See Fed. Ins. Co., 354 S.W.3d at 291-93. Here, the court found numerous defects in the

construction. The roof and the plumbing leaked. There was a significant tripping hazard

at the back door. And Mr. Brown made unilateral changes to the home’s foundation that

jeopardized the structural integrity of the home.

Mr. Brown blamed his failure to complete construction on the Fergusons’ failure to

pay him as specified in the contract. But the court credited the Fergusons’ testimony that

Mr. Brown directed them to pay others directly for both materials and labor on the project.

And when Mr. Brown requested another $30,000, they had already paid the full contract

price. The Fergusons supported their testimony with documentary evidence such as

cancelled checks, receipts, and invoices. We recognize that Mr. Brown testified

differently, but we discern no basis to disturb the court’s finding. See Wells v. Tenn. Bd.

of Regents, 9 S.W.3d 779, 783 (Tenn. 1999).

In sum, the court did not err in finding Mr. Brown individually liable for breach of

contract. Mr. Brown orally agreed to construct the Ferguson home for a fixed price. And

he materially breached the contract by failing to complete construction and performing

defective work.

C.

Initially, Mr. Brown complains that the court erred in awarding damages against

him personally for breach of contract. Given the foregoing analysis, we discern no error.

Besides, the court also found Mr. Brown liable for fraudulent misrepresentation. So the

court could have made a similar award based on that theory of recovery. See Boling v.

Tenn. State Bank, 890 S.W.2d 32, 35 (Tenn. 1994); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 549 (AM. LAW INST. 1977); see also Shahrdar v. Glob. Hous., Inc., 983 S.W.2d 230, 238

(Tenn. Ct. App. 1998) (noting “the Plaintiff is only entitled to one recovery” when the

damages claimed under multiple theories of recovery overlap).

10

Mr. Brown also challenges the amount of compensatory damages awarded.3 The

amount of damages awarded is a question of fact. Poole v. Union Planters Bank, N.A., 337

S.W.3d 771, 789 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2010). Mr. Brown argues that the evidence does not

support the court’s finding that Mr. Ferguson’s total cost to complete and repair the home

was $406,600.08. And Mr. Brown submits that this figure improperly included costs for

items outside the scope of work.

Mr. Ferguson asserts that Mr. Brown waived this issue by failing to object to the

introduction of his damages evidence at trial. A litigant’s “[f]ailure to object [to] evidence

in a timely and specific fashion precludes taking issue on appeal with the admission of the

evidence.” Grandstaff v. Hawks, 36 S.W.3d 482, 488 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000). But

Mr. Brown does not challenge the admission of this evidence. Rather, he complains that

the evidence does not support the court’s finding.

It was Mr. Ferguson’s burden to prove his damages. Discover Bank v. Morgan, 363

S.W.3d 479, 496 (Tenn. 2012). The Fergusons testified that they spent $406,600.08 to

repair and finish construction. In support of their testimony, Mrs. Ferguson submitted

copies of cancelled checks, receipts, and invoices, as well as a spreadsheet listing and

identifying their asserted costs. She acknowledged the spreadsheet listed three payments

for the installation of a well on the property. But she explained that those payments had

been excluded from the spreadsheet total. And the record supports her testimony on this

point.

Mr. Brown questioned Mrs. Ferguson extensively about her calculation of total

costs. She acknowledged that the spreadsheet contained some inadvertent errors.

Specifically, she admitted that the cost of grass, gravel, gardening tools, and straw should

have been excluded from the spreadsheet total. She also conceded that two other invoices,

one for stone and one for framing, should not have been included. The court erred in not

excluding these costs.

But we cannot fault the court for failing to exclude the cost of purchasing windows

and doors for the Ferguson home. The Fergusons claimed Mr. Brown directed them to

purchase these items, which were included in the contract price. Although Mr. Brown

testified otherwise, the court credited the Fergusons’ testimony. We will not disturb the

court’s credibility finding on this record. See Wells, 9 S.W.3d at 783.

And while Mr. Brown complains that the Fergusons also included furniture costs in

3

Mr. Brown failed to properly challenge the measure of damages. So that issue is waived. See

Hodge, 382 S.W.3d at 335 (recognizing “[a]n issue may be deemed waived, even when it has been

specifically raised as an issue, when the brief fails to include an argument satisfying the requirements of

Tenn. R. App. P. 27(a)(7)”).

11

their total, he did not alert the trial court to this issue. So he cannot raise this complaint on

appeal. See TENN. R. APP. P. 36(a).

Because the evidence preponderates against the court’s calculation of damages, we

vacate the award of $143,300.50 in compensatory damages. On remand, the court should

recalculate the Fergusons’ damages based on the proof at trial. Specifically, the court

should subtract from the Fergusons’ asserted total cost any amounts Mrs. Ferguson

admitted were not included within the contract scope.

III.

We affirm the court’s decision to hold Mr. Brown individually liable for breach of

contract and fraudulent misrepresentation. We vacate the constructive fraud finding and

the award of compensatory damages for breach of contract. This case is remanded for

recalculation of damages and further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

s/ W. Neal McBrayer

W. NEAL MCBRAYER, JUDGE

12

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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