Amity Dimock v. City of Brooklyn Center

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

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No. 24-1728

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Amity Dimock, Trustee for the Heirs and Next of Kin of Kobe Dimock-Heisler

Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

City of Brooklyn Center; Brandon Akers, in their individual and official capacities;

Steve Holt, in their individual and official capacities; Cody Turner, in their

individual and official capacities; Joseph Vu, in their individual and official

capacities

Defendants - Appellees

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Appeal from United States District Court

for the District of Minnesota

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Submitted: October 23, 2024

Filed: December 26, 2024

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Before GRUENDER, BENTON, and KOBES, Circuit Judges.

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BENTON, Circuit Judge.

Amity Dimock—the mother of Kobe E. Dimock-Heisler—sued the City of

Brooklyn Center and four officers in their individual and official capacities, alleging

unconstitutional warrantless entry and unconstitutional use of deadly force. The

defendants moved for summary judgment. The district court 1 granted summary

judgment to the officers based on qualified immunity. Dimock appeals. Having

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, this court affirms.

I.

On summary judgment, this court views the evidence and draws all reasonable

inferences most favorably to the nonmoving party. Rusness v. Becker Cnty., 31

F.4th 606, 614 (8th Cir. 2022). However, only facts that are genuinely disputed are

viewed most favorably to the nonmovant. Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d

1031, 1042 (8th Cir. 2011) (en banc). A fact is not genuinely disputed if a party’s

story is “blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe

it.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007). Here, due to footage of the encounter

from the officers’ body cameras, there are few disputed facts. For the defense of

qualified immunity, the only facts considered are those “that were knowable to the

defendant officers.” White v. Pauly, 580 U.S. 73, 77 (2017).

On August 31, 2019, Erwin B. Heisler called 911, saying that his grandson

had threatened him with a knife and hammer. After answering questions for about

one minute, Heisler hung up, saying “Oh, forget it.” From dispatch, officers learned

that a 21-year-old man was fighting with his grandfather, that he had a hammer and

a knife, and that Heisler called 911, said “Oh, forget it,” and hung up. Several

officers arrived at Heisler’s house. Four officers—Brandon Akers, Cody Turner,

Steve Holt, and Joseph Vu—approached the front door. Walking there, Officer

Turner told Officer Akers that Kobe had stabbed himself earlier that year.

Opening the front door, Heisler stepped onto the front steps to meet the

officers. Officer Akers greeted him and asked, “What’s going on tonight?”

Obviously referring to Kobe, Heisler told the officers, “He’s going to be okay.”

1

The Honorable Donovan W. Frank, U.S. District Judge for the District of

Minnesota.

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Officer Akers, a few feet from the front step, asked Heisler who was in the house.

Heisler replied, his wife (Kobe’s grandmother), himself, and Kobe. Officer Akers

said, “Ok. We gotta make sure that everybody’s okay before we leave. I get families

have disturbances and stuff like that.” Peering through a window, Officer Turner

pinpointed Kobe sitting in the front room. Heisler said “ok,” turned, and reentered

his home. Officer Akers asked Heisler if Kobe had any weapons on him. Heisler

responded, “No.” From inside the entryway, Heisler told his wife, “They just want

to make sure everything is okay.”

Heisler stood silently within the entryway as the four officers entered the

home. Officer Akers asked Heisler to speak with him outside. They walked out to

the driveway. Officers Holt and Vu began speaking with Kobe in the front room.

Also sitting there, Kobe’s grandmother had the weapons collected in a bag. She

gave the knife to Officer Turner when he asked for it. Later, she gave him the

hammer when asked. Officer Turner walked out to the driveway to speak with

Heisler, who told Officers Akers and Turner that Kobe was afraid of being

hospitalized.

Talking with Heiser, Officers Akers and Turner heard commotion from inside

the house. The officers ran in there. Officers Holt and Vu were trying to restrain

Kobe on a couch. It tipped over. Officer Holt rolled over the couch and out of the

front door. Officers Turner and Akers deployed their tasers against Kobe, which did

not immobilize him. Instead, Kobe got a knife in his hand (not the one that Kobe’s

grandmother gave the officers). Kobe tried to run back further into the house.

Officer Vu grabbed his legs. Kobe fell to the floor. Officer Holt reentered the house.

Officer Akers asked, “What’s he got, a knife?” Officer Turner shouted,

“Knife, Knife, Knife!” It is disputed whether Kobe was stabbing and slashing at

Officer Vu with the knife. Because the body-camera footage does not clearly resolve

this dispute, this court infers that Kobe was only holding the knife. Officer Vu began

to stand up. Viewing the facts most favorably to Dimock, Kobe began to stand back

up to run away, with the knife in his right hand and one foot underneath him. To

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leave the room, Kobe would have had to run right by at least one of the officers.

Kobe was directly in front of his grandmother, who was seated. Officer Turner fired

three shots. Officer Akers also fired three shots. Their bullets killed Kobe.

Applying qualified immunity, the district court determined that a reasonable

officer would have believed that exigent circumstances justified entry. Dimock v.

City of Brooklyn Center, 2024 WL 991361, at *5 (D. Minn. Mar. 7, 2024). The

district court also concluded that Officer Turner and Officer Akers “had probable

cause to believe that Kobe posed an immediate threat of death or serious bodily

injury to others at that point, which justified their use of deadly force.” Id. at *8.

The district court granted summary judgment, dismissing all of Dimock’s claims.

Dimock appeals the dismissal of her claims against the officers in their individual

capacities.

II.

This court reviews de novo a district court’s decision on summary judgment.

Torgerson, 643 F.3d at 1042. Summary judgment shall be granted if “the movant

shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Qualified immunity

bars suits against officials in their individual capacities so long as officials did not

“violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable

person would have known.” White, 580 U.S. at 78-79. If qualified immunity

applies, then summary judgment is proper here because Dimock cannot sue the

officers in their individual capacities.

“A right is ‘clearly established’ when it is ‘sufficiently clear that every

reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right.’”

Rivas-Villegas v. Cortesluna, 595 U.S. 1, 5 (2021). A clearly established right is

dictated either by “controlling authority” or “a robust ‘consensus of cases of

persuasive authority.’” District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 63 (2018).

Existing precedent can clearly establish a right, even if there is not a case “directly

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on point,” so long as existing precedent places the question “beyond debate.” Id. at

64. “The ‘clearly established’ standard also requires that the legal principle clearly

prohibit the officer’s conduct in the particular circumstances before him.” Id. at 63.

The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides: “The

right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against

unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall

issue, but upon probable cause.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. Summary judgment is

proper here if not all reasonable officers would, under the facts knowable to them in

this case, be aware that their conduct here violated the Fourth Amendment.

This court need not decide whether the officers’ conduct here actually violated

constitutional rights. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009). See also

Swearingen v. Judd, 930 F.3d 983, 987 (8th Cir. 2019). Instead, this case is resolved

by answering the question of whether the rights asserted were clearly established.

III.

Dimock argues that the officers’ warrantless entry into the home violated the

Fourth Amendment because it was an unreasonable search. Generally, warrantless

entry into a home is an unreasonable search. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573,

586 (1980). Several exceptions exist. As relevant here, if exigent circumstances

exist, then officers may enter a home without a warrant or even probable cause.

United States v. Quarterman, 877 F.3d 794, 800 (8th Cir. 2017).

Exigent circumstances may justify the officers’ entry into the home. Exigent

circumstances exist when officers “have an objectively reasonable basis that some

immediate act is required to preserve the safety of others or themselves.” Id. The

reasonableness of an entry under exigent circumstances turns not on any officer’s

subjective state of mind, but objectively on the circumstances surrounding the entry.

Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 404 (2006). If the officers here had an

objectively reasonable basis to believe that someone in the house needed immediate

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aid, then their entry into the house did not violate the Fourth Amendment. See

Quarterman, 877 F.3d at 797.

Heisler told the officers that his wife and Kobe were inside the house. In

determining the reasonableness of an officer’s concern for safety, this court

recognizes that “domestic disturbances are highly volatile and involve large risks.”

Id. at 798. Officers knew that Kobe had threatened his grandfather earlier that day

with a knife and hammer. This court “has consistently found exigent circumstances

where officers reasonably believe a gun or an armed individual presents a danger to

others or themselves.” Id. (collecting cases).

On the other hand, the weapons the officers knew about were a knife and a

hammer, not a gun. Cf. id. Also, the presence of a weapon inside the home does not

necessarily create exigent circumstances. United States v. Murphy, 69 F.3d 237,

243 (8th Cir. 1995). And the officers here did not see Kobe make any quick

movements before they entered Heisler’s home. Cf. Quarterman, 877 F.3d at 797

(holding that exigent circumstances existed when officers reasonably believed that

defendant was armed and that there was an ongoing domestic dispute between him

and his girlfriend, and then he made “quick movements” while officers could not see

the gun). The arrest of a suspect in a domestic dispute does not necessarily justify

warrantless entry when no facts indicate that the suspect is a threat to others. Smith

v. Kansas City Police Dep’t, 586 F.3d 576, 580 (8th Cir. 2009).

However, officers here may have had a reasonable basis to believe that Kobe

was a threat to others. They knew he threatened his grandfather with weapons earlier

that day. Cf. Quarterman, 877 F.3d at 799 (holding that, because officers knew

Quarterman was carrying a gun while making his girlfriend move out of his

apartment and that he had earlier that day been in a heated verbal altercation with

his girlfriend’s mother, “officers had an objectively reasonable basis to believe that

Quarterman was armed and a threat to [his girlfriend] or others”). Officers Turner

and Akers also knew that Kobe had the potential for violence because he had

previously stabbed himself earlier that year. Under existing precedent, not every

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reasonable officer would know that Kobe being inside the house with his

grandmother did not constitute exigent circumstances. See also Cotten v. Miller, 74

F.4th 932, 935 (8th Cir. 2023) (granting qualified immunity to officers for their

warrantless entry of an apartment when they “had reasonable grounds to believe that

a domestic violence suspect was still inside the home with a putative victim”).

Dimock argues that officers could not have reasonably believed that Kobe was

armed and dangerous because Heisler said “Oh, forget it” on his 911 call, told the

officers that Kobe would “be okay,” and told them that Kobe did not have any

weapons on him. But officers can reasonably disbelieve individuals. Due to the

nature of domestic disputes, “an officer need not take a putative victim’s statement

at face value when assessing whether a suspect presents an ongoing threat to the

victim.” Id. (holding that officers were reasonable in entering a residence, even

though the putative victim denied that there had been any domestic violence, and the

officers had no evidence of weapons inside the residence).

The key to exigent circumstances is what officers reasonably believe.

Quarterman, 877 F.3d at 798-99. Faced with the facts here, not every reasonable

officer would know that it was unreasonable to believe that some immediate act was

necessary to protect the safety of Kobe’s grandmother or themselves. Not every

reasonable officer would know, in the particular circumstances of this case, that

entering the house violated the Fourth Amendment. The right was not “clearly

established.” Rivas-Villegas, 595 U.S. at 5. The district court correctly granted

qualified immunity on the officers’ warrantless entry.

IV.

Dimock argues that Officers Turner and Akers are not entitled to qualified

immunity for their use of deadly force against Kobe. The use of deadly force to

restrain a person is a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. Tennessee v. Garner,

471 U.S. 1, 7 (1985). Objectively unreasonable uses of deadly force violate the

Fourth Amendment. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989). “The key

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question is ‘whether the officers’ actions are “objectively reasonable” in light of the

facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent

or motivation.’” Nance v. Sammis, 586 F.3d 604, 610 (8th Cir. 2009).

“The ‘reasonableness’ of a particular use of force must be judged from the

perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of

hindsight.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. This court evaluates the reasonableness of

an officer’s use of deadly force by looking primarily at the threat present at the time

the force is deployed. Banks v. Hawkins, 999 F.3d 521, 525-26 (8th Cir. 2021).

Determining whether an officer used reasonable force “requires careful attention to

the facts and circumstances of each particular case, including the severity of the

crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the

officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade

arrest by flight.” Graham, 490 U.S at 396. “The calculus of reasonableness must

embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-

second judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly

evolving—about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation.” Id.

at 396-97; Swearingen, 930 F.3d at 987-98.

“To begin, ‘absent probable cause’ for an officer to believe the suspect poses

‘an immediate threat of death or serious bodily injury’ to others, ‘use of deadly force

is not objectively reasonable.’” Cole Estate of Richards v. Hutchins, 959 F.3d

1127, 1132 (8th Cir. 2020). Precedent puts officers “on notice . . . that they may not

use deadly force under circumstances in which they should know that the suspect

does not present an immediate threat of serious physical injury or harm.” Craighead

v. Lee, 399 F.3d 954, 963 (8th Cir. 2005). See also Nance, 586 F.3d at 611.

The Supreme Court emphasizes: “Specificity is especially important in the

Fourth Amendment context, where . . . it is sometimes difficult for an officer to

determine how the relevant legal doctrine, here excessive force, will apply to the

factual situation the officer confronts.” Kisela v. Huges, 584 U.S. 100, 104 (2018).

Because use of excessive force is an area of the law “in which the result depends

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very much on the facts of each case,” qualified immunity applies “unless existing

precedent ‘squarely governs’ the specific facts at issue.” Id. “An officer ‘cannot be

said to have violated a clearly established right unless the right’s contours were

sufficiently definite that any reasonable official in the defendant’s shoes would have

understood that he was violating it.’” Id. at 105.

No precedent of the Supreme Court or this circuit squarely governs the

specific facts of this case. Kobe was holding a knife, so this case is distinguishable

from cases where the person shot was unarmed. See, e.g., Banks, 999 F.3d at 524.

See also Marks v. Bauer, 107 F.4th 840, 849 (8th Cir. 2024). Dimock cites cases

where it was unreasonable for an officer to use deadly force against a person holding

a gun when that person had not yet pointed the gun at anyone or taken some other

“menacing action.” Cole Estate of Richards, 959 F.3d at 1132. See also Partridge

v. City of Benton, 929 F.3d 562, 565-66 (8th Cir. 2019); Craighead, 399 F.3d at

959; Nance, 586 F.3d at 610-11. Dimock argues that the same analysis applies to

Kobe’s holding of the knife because a knife is less dangerous than a gun. Viewing

the facts most favorably to Dimock, Kobe did not take a menacing act with the knife.

But a person at close distance holding a knife, even if not directing the blade at

another person, could still cause “serious injury or death in a matter of seconds by

repositioning himself and the knife.” Swearingen, 930 F.3d at 988.

Dimock argues that Kobe’s mental health and fear of hospitalization should

influence the reasonableness of the officers’ use of deadly force against him. Cf.

Ludwig v. Anderson, 54 F.3d 465, 473-74 (8th Cir. 1995) (denying qualified

immunity for officers who, without an immediate warning, used deadly force against

a man who seemed emotionally disturbed, wielded a knife, was trying to run away

from officers in an outdoor area with bystanders 150 feet away, and was not running

toward the bystanders). But the reasonableness of an officer’s use of deadly force

does not always differ based on what the officer knows about a person’s mental state.

Id. at 472 (holding only that “emotionally disturbed status may be relevant to the

trial court’s determination of objective reasonableness”) (emphasis added). See also

Hassan v. City of Minneapolis, 489 F.3d 914, 919 (8th Cir. 2007) (holding that a

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suspect’s “mental state does not change the fact he posed a deadly threat to the

officers and the public”). Also, Ludwig v. Anderson was a “close” case. Ludwig,

54 F.3d at 473. It did not clearly establish a right that the officers violated by their

use of deadly force against Kobe.2 See generally Sok Kong Trustee for Map Kong

v. City of Burnsville, 960 F.3d 985, 992-95 (8th Cir. 2020) (distinguishing Ludwig).

An officer has probable cause to believe that a man poses an immediate threat

of serious physical harm when the man has a knife, ignores repeated orders to drop

the knife, stands up “with the knife pointed downward and his arm at his side,” and

raises his right leg as if to take a step toward an officer who is at most 12 feet away.

Estate of Morgan v. Cook, 686 F.3d 494, 496-97 (8th Cir. 2012). Dimock tries to

distinguish the facts here from Estate of Morgan v. Cook, spotlighting that Kobe’s

body position was away from the officers rather than toward them. But Kobe was

facing his grandmother as he stood up, and to run out of the room Kobe would have

had to face at least one of the officers. Kobe was within a few steps of his

grandmother and each of the officers. Cf. Swearingen, 930 F.3d at 988 (applying

qualified immunity to an officer who used deadly force when “suddenly confronted,

at a distance of only three feet, with a suspect who was armed with a knife after

ignoring multiple commands to drop it”). It is undisputed that Kobe moved with the

knife in his hand. It is undisputed he had struggled with the officers. It is undisputed

that Officers Turner and Akers knew he stabbed himself earlier that year. Even with

the disputed facts construed most favorably to Dimock, not all reasonable officers

here would have known that they lacked probable cause to believe Kobe “posed an

2

Likewise, a right is not clearly established here by Maras v. City of Brainerd,

502 N.W.2d 69, 77 (Minn. App. 1993). First, one state appellate case is not a

“robust” consensus of persuasive authority that clearly establishes a right. See Lane

v. Nading, 927 F.3d 1018, 1023 (8th Cir. 2019). Second, Maras is distinguishable.

There, a court held it unreasonable for an officer to shoot a man who was holding a

knife but never raised it above his waist, was obviously intoxicated, and could barely

stand. Maras, 502 N.W.2d at 77. Here, Kobe was not obviously intoxicated and

did not have trouble moving. Also, the man in Maras was 14 feet away from the

officer who shot him. Id. at 73. Here, Kobe was within a few steps of his

grandmother and the officers.

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immediate threat of serious physical harm” to his grandmother or to themselves.

Estate of Morgan, 686 F.3d at 497. See also Kisela, 584 U.S. at 101 (granting

qualified immunity to an officer who shot a woman who had been acting erratically,

was holding a large kitchen knife, had walked toward another woman and stopped

no more than six feet from her, and ignored at least two orders to drop the knife).

Dimock emphasizes that the officers never warned Kobe that they would use

deadly force if he did not drop the knife. Officers did tell Kobe multiple times to

“Get down on the ground.” See generally Ngo v. Storlie, 495 F.3d 597, 603 (8th

Cir. 2007) (quoting warnings from several cases). True, “[w]hen a warning is

feasible, the failure to warn ‘adds to the unreasonableness’ of the use of deadly

force.” Cole Estate of Richards, 959 F.3d at 1133. See also Garner, 471 U.S. at

11-12; Estate of Morgan, 686 F.3d at 498 (highlighting that the officer there drew

his pistol, pointed it at the suspect, and repeatedly ordered him to drop the knife);

Swearingen, 930 F.3d at 986 (noting that officers told the suspect multiple times to

drop the knife). But, although failure to feasibly warn does “‘exacerbate the

circumstances’ and mitigates against finding use of deadly force objectively

reasonable,” it does not “‘automatically’ render use of deadly force unreasonable.”

Cole Estate of Richards, 959 F.3d at 1133. Precedent did not clearly establish that

the officers’ failure to explicitly warn Kobe made their use of deadly force against

him unreasonable.

Dimock concludes that a reasonable jury could find a violation of Kobe’s

Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable use of deadly force. But even if the

officers’ use of force was “over the line of reasonableness,” that does not mean the

right they violated was clearly established. Swearingen, 930 F.3d at 988. The

“right’s contours” were not “sufficiently definite” at the time of the shooting that

“any reasonable official in the defendant’s shoes would have understood that he was

violating it.” Kisela, 584 U.S. at 105. Not every reasonable officer would have

understood that the use of deadly force here violated the Fourth Amendment. The

right was not “clearly established.” Rivas-Villegas, 595 U.S. at 5. The district court

correctly granted qualified immunity on the officers’ use of deadly force.

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*******

The judgment is affirmed.

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