Ruggiero v. Jones

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

ANTHONY RUGGIERO,

Plaintiff,

OPINION & ORDER

-against-

23-CV-07157 (PMH)

STEPHANIE E. JONES, Correction Officer,

Fishkill C.F., et al.,

Defendants.

PHILIP M. HALPERN, United States District Judge:

Anthony Ruggiero (“Plaintiff”), who is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis,

commenced this action on August 11, 2023. (Doc. 1).1 On March 8, 2024, Plaintiff filed, with the

Court’s permission, an amended complaint. (Doc. 64, “Am. Compl.”). Plaintiff, in his Amended

Complaint, asserts five claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Claims Numbered 1-4, and 6) predicated

upon violations of the First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution,

as well as a State law claim (Claim 5). (Id.). He asserts that during his confinement at Fishkill

Correctional Facility (“Fishkill”), the following New York State employees violated his rights:

Stefanie Jones, Paul Julien, Kevin Eschmann, Alexandra Gibbons, Chris Churns, Ana Figueroa,

Edward Burnett, Jerome Holloway, David Valentino, David Juskim (referred herein as Nicholas

Juskin),2 and a Jane Doe that Plaintiff refers to as “Ms. A” (the “State Defendants”). Plaintiff also

1 Plaintiff, in his original complaint, had included John P. Broas, Shawn T. Sawyer, Veronica Vasquez

Anthony J. Annucci, and Kaylah V. Pryear as defendants, but Plaintiff later voluntarily dismissed his claims

against them pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41. (Docs. 54, 55, 57).

2 After Plaintiff filed his Amended Complaint, the New York Attorney General’s Office clarified in a letter

to the Court that there is no New York State Police Officer by the name of “David Juskim.” (Doc. 82). The

letter continued, however, that “Investigator Nicholas Juskin” is employed by the New York State Police.

(Id.). Plaintiff has since advised the Court that he “intends to sue Investigator Nicholas Juskin” (Doc. 90),

who has received service of process. To the extent Plaintiff seeks an amendment, nunc pro tunc, to the

Amended Complaint to replace “David Juskim” with Nicholas Juskin as a Defendant, that application is

granted.

brings a State law claim against other Fishkill inmates: Dario Torres, Timothy McKenny, Zaire

Birks, Eric Johnson, German Castillo, and two John Doe inmates (the “Inmate Defendants” and

together with the State Defendants, “Defendants”).3

The State Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint under Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) on April 17, 2024. (Doc. 71; Doc. 72, “Def. Br.”).4 Plaintiff filed his

memorandum of law in opposition on May 15, 20245 (Doc. 75, “Pl. Br.”),6 and State Defendants’

motion to dismiss was fully briefed with the filing of their reply memorandum of law on October

26, 2023. (Doc. 77). With respect to the Inmate Defendants, none of them are represented by

counsel. Although Defendant Torres filed an answer to the original complaint (Doc. 24), none of

the Inmate Defendants have answered or moved with respect to the Amended Complaint.7 To that

end, none of the Inmates Defendants have joined this motion.

3 Plaintiff, in his original complaint, named as a defendant Scott Durant, an incarcerated individual. (Doc.

1). Plaintiff does not name Mr. Durant as a defendant in the Amended Complaint. (See generally Am.

Compl.). However, the docket sheet still shows Mr. Durant as a defendant in this action. The Clerk of Court

will be directed to terminate Mr. Durant as a defendant herein.

4 Although the State Defendants’ Notice of Motion omits Juskin as a moving Defendant, the Court has

subsequently granted the State Defendants’ request to “join him” in the “fully briefed Motion to Dismiss.”

(Docs. 95, 96). The State Defendants also argue on behalf of Ms. A in their memorandum of law, despite

Ms. A, as a Jane Doe, not being served with process. (See, e.g., Def. Br. at 11 n.1). The Court therefore

construes the State Defendants’ motion as being made on behalf of all the State Defendants.

5 The docket sheet reflects two opposition briefs by Plaintiff on May 15, 2024, and May 17, 2024. (Docs.

75, 76). But the May 15 and 17 submissions are of the same brief. As such, citations herein reference only

Plaintiff’s first-filed opposition.

6 Given the liberality afforded pro se litigants, it is appropriate to consider new allegations in a pro se

plaintiff’s opposition to a motion to dismiss where they are consistent with the allegations contained in the

pleading. Vail v. City of New York, 68 F. Supp. 3d 412, 427 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (“Where new allegations in a

pro se plaintiff’s opposition memoranda ‘are consistent with the allegations contained’ in the Complaint,

they may be read ‘as supplements to th[e] pleadings . . . .’” (quoting Boyer v. Channel 13, Inc., No. 04-CV-

02137, 2005 WL 2249782, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 2005))). Accordingly, the Court considers on this

motion the additional allegations relevant to this motion in Plaintiff’s opposition.

7 The docket reflects that none of the Inmate Defendants have been served with the Amended Complaint.

Accordingly, as explained infra, Plaintiff is directed, within 60-days of this Order, to serve each of the

Inmate Defendants with the Amended Complaint, and file to the ECF docket proof of service thereof.

For the reasons set forth below, the State Defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED in

part and DENIED in part.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff was an inmate at Fishkill in 2022. (Am. Compl. ¶ 26). Plaintiff alleges that, during

this period, Fishkill “[s]security staff” and gang members “work[ed] in tandem” to “oppress[] []

everyone.” (Id. ¶ 32). On June 13, 2022, Plaintiff received a misbehavior report written by

Defendant Jones. (Id. ¶ 27). Plaintiff, that same month, was found “not guilty” during a disciplinary

hearing arising out of Defendant Jones’ report. (Id. ¶ 28). Plaintiff alleges that he suffered various

forms of retaliation as a result of the disposition at the disciplinary hearing, including Defendant

Gibbons “squeez[ing] [his] genitals” during a “pat-fisk” [sic] on August 10, 2022 (Id. ¶¶ 30-31,

34-36).

Two days later, Plaintiff informed Defendants Eschmann and Julien of his intent to file a

complaint against Defendant Gibbons under the Prison Rape Elimination Act. (Id. ¶¶ 37-38).

Around ten minutes after this encounter, Defendant Torres and two incarnated John Doe

Defendants “jumped and assaulted” Plaintiff in the bathroom, “cut[ting]” his ear and “hit[ting]

[him] with their fists.” (Id. ¶ 41). As a result of injuries sustained during this alleged physical

assault, Defendants Eschmann and Julien took Plaintiff to the facility hospital. (Id. ¶¶ 45-47).

Plaintiff, after arriving at the facility hospital, “requested hoiusing [sic] in protective custody”;

Defendant Eschmann responded that “[t]here is No Protective Custody Unit at Fishkill.” (Id. ¶¶

48-49). Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Burnett and Churns “dismantl[ed]” the Protective Custody

Unit. (Id. ¶¶ 78, 99).

After Plaintiff returned from the facility hospital, he was placed in “B-West dorm,” which

correction officers and inmates allegedly call “gangland.” (Id. ¶¶ 55-56, 61). Defendant Figueroa,

as Plaintiff arrived at in B-West dorm, “loudly announce[d]” that “this whiteboy doesn’t like

n*****s and sp**s.” (Id. ¶ 57). A few weeks later, Plaintiff was again physically assaulted by

other inmates, who also took Plaintiff’s “commissary bag.” (Id. ¶ 65). Plaintiff then rushed to

Defendants Valentino and Holloway seeking protection and informing them that he had been

“assaulted and robbed” by a “mob” in his “cube.” (Id. ¶¶ 66-67, 105). As alleged, Defendants

Valentino and Holloway “did nothing” and told Plaintiff to return to his “cube.” (Id. ¶ 68). Plaintiff,

upon returning, was physically assaulted by Defendants Castillo, McKenney, Johnson, and Birks.

(Id. ¶ 69). Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Eschmann and Juskin, a State Trooper (id. ¶ 85), refused

to properly investigate, or “initiate the process to criminally charge,” the Inmate Defendants (id. ¶

108).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court may dismiss a complaint for “failure to state a claim

upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a

complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).8 A claim is plausible on its face “when the ple[d] factual

content allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “The plausibility standard is not akin

to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant acted

unlawfully.” Id. The factual allegations pled “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the

speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

8 Unless otherwise indicated, case quotations omit all internal citations, quotation marks, footnotes, and

alterations.

“When there are well-ple[d] factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and

then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.

Thus, the Court must “consider the legal sufficiency of the complaint, taking its factual allegations

to be true and drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.” Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d

66, 71 (2d Cir. 2009). The presumption of truth, however, “is inapplicable to legal conclusions,

and threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory

statements, do not suffice.” Id. at 72. A plaintiff must provide “more than labels and conclusions”

to show entitlement to relief. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

A complaint submitted by a pro se plaintiff, “however inartfully ple[d], must be held to

less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers . . . .” Estelle v. Gamble, 429

U.S. 97, 106 (1976) (internal quotation marks omitted). Because pro se plaintiffs “‘are often

unfamiliar with the formalities of pleading requirements,’ courts must ‘apply a more flexible

standard in determining the sufficiency of a pro se [complaint] than they would in reviewing a

pleading submitted by counsel.’” Smith v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 218 F. Supp. 2d 357, 361 (W.D.N.Y.

2002) (quoting Platsky v. Cent. Intell. Agency, 953 F.2d 26, 28 (2d Cir. 1991)). However, while

“[p]ro se complaints are held to less stringent standards than those drafted by lawyers, even

following Twombly and Iqbal,” dismissal is “appropriate where a plaintiff has clearly failed to

meet minimum pleading requirements.” Thomas v. Westchester Cty., No. 12-CV-06718, 2013 WL

3357171, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 3, 2013) (internal citations omitted); see also Chavis v. Chappius,

618 F.3d 162, 170 (2d Cir. 2010) (“Even in a pro se case . . . although a court must accept as true

all of the allegations contained in a complaint, that tenet is inapplicable to legal conclusions, and

threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements,

do not suffice.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Therefore, while the Court must “draw the

most favorable inferences that [a plaintiff’s] complaint supports, [it] cannot invent factual

allegations that [a plaintiff] has not pled.” Chappius, 618 F.3d at 170. The Court does, however,

have a duty to interpret “the pleadings of a pro se plaintiff liberally and interpret them ‘to raise the

strongest arguments that they suggest.’” McPherson v. Coombe, 174 F.3d 276, 280 (2d Cir. 1999)

(quoting Burgos v. Hopkins, 14 F.3d 787, 790 (2d Cir. 1994)).

ANALYSIS

Plaintiff presses five claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. That law provides, in pertinent part,

that “[e]very person who, under color of any statute . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any

citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured

by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “[T]his

language does not create substantive rights; rather, it creates a mechanism by which individuals

can vindicate the violation of rights secured elsewhere.” Linares v. Annucci, No. 19-CV-11120,

2021 WL 2689736, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. June 30, 2021) (quoting Santucci v. Levine, No. 17-CV-10204,

2021 WL 76337, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 2021) (alteration in original)).

I. Plaintiff’s First Claim for Relief: First Amendment Retaliation

Plaintiff’s first claim for relief is for retaliation against Defendants Jones, Julien, Gibbons,

Figueroa, Eschmann, and Ms. A in violation of the First Amendment. (Am. Compl. at 14).9

A plaintiff asserting a First Amendment retaliation claim must establish that: “(1) his

speech or conduct was protected by the First Amendment; (2) the defendant took an adverse action

against him; and (3) there was a causal connection between this adverse action and the protected

speech.” Cox v. Warwick Valley Cent. School Dist., 654 F.3d 267, 272 (2d Cir. 2011). A plaintiff

9 Citations to specific pages of the Complaint and other filings on the docket correspond to the pagination

generated by ECF.

must allege, with respect to the third element, that the retaliatory motive was a “but for” cause of

the adverse action. See Barkai v. Mendez, 629 F. Supp. 3d 166, 198 (S.D.N.Y. 2022). In other

words, “[i]t is not enough to show that an official acted with a retaliatory motive and that the

plaintiff was injured—the motive must cause the injury.” Nieves v. Bartlett, 587 U.S. 391, 398

(2019).

With respect to Defendants Gibbons and Jones, the State Defendants argue that Plaintiff

failed to allege that he engaged in protected speech or conduct. (Def. Br. at 19-20). To meet this

element, Plaintiff alleges he was retaliated against for being found “not guilty of all charges”

related to a disciplinary report by Defendant Jones. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 26-34, 94; Pl. Br. at 3, 5). But

“[b]eing found not guilty does not qualify as protected activity, or for that matter, activity at all.”

Davis v. Jackson, No. 15-CV-05359, 2018 WL 358089, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 2018) (collecting

cases).10 Nor does Plaintiff allege that he filed a grievance or engaged in any other protected

activity before Defendants Gibbons and Jones allegedly retaliated against him. Plaintiff therefore

fails to allege the first element of his retaliation claim against them.

With respect to Defendants Eschmann, Julien, and Ms. A, Plaintiff alleges that that they

orchestrated an attack by the Inmate Defendants against him as a result of his threat to file a

grievance against Defendant Gibbons. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 34-45). The State Defendants argue that

Plaintiff failed to satisfy the causal-connection element against these Defendants. (Def. Br. at 23-

10 Plaintiff, in his opposition brief, adds an allegation that Defendant Jones retaliated against him for

“refusing her direct order[s].” (Pl. Br. at 5). But refusing a correctional officer’s orders is also not protected

activity under the First Amendment. See Rodriguez v. Phillips, 66 F.3d 470, 478 (2d Cir. 1995) (“[T]he

First Amendment is subject to severe curtailment when its protections are inconsistent with the limitations

inherent in incarceration, especially those limitations necessary for the safety and security of the prison

environment.”); Coleman v. Cuomo, No. 18-CV-00390, 2019 WL 6829613, at *10 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 13,

2019) (“[S]everal courts [within the Second Circuit] have made clear that a verbal confrontation with a

correction officer based on an inmate’s dissatisfaction with that officer’s directive is one example of speech

that is not constitutionally-protected activity” (collecting cases)), adopted sub nom. Coleman v. Racette,

No. 18-CV-00390, 2020 WL 896785 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2020).

24). The Court agrees. Plaintiff pleads no allegations tying Defendants Eschmann, Julien, or Ms.

A to the later assault. He instead only alleges that he had informed Defendants Eschmann and

Julien of his intent to file a grievance before the assault (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 37-38, 41), that they

“became argumentative” with him (Pl. Br. at 9), and that they spoke with Ms. A right before the

assault (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 39, 41). These allegations provide no grounds for the Court to infer, even

interpreting the pro se complaint with the required liberality, that Defendants Eschmann, Julien,

and Ms. A conspired with and directed the Inmate Defendants to attack Plaintiff. To that end, it is

well-established that “[c]onclusory allegations will not suffice [for a retaliation claim]; instead, a

prisoner’s claim for retaliation must be supported by specific and detailed factual allegations.”

Vogelfang v. Capra, 889 F. Supp. 2d 489, 517 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); see, e.g., Crichlow v. Doccs, No.

18-CV-03222, 2022 WL 6167135, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 7, 2022) (dismissing a plaintiff’s

retaliation claim and explaining “[s]imply stating, in conclusory fashion, that” the defendants

retaliated against him “d[id] not establish causation”); Zielinski v. Annucci, No. 17-CV-01042,

2019 WL 2870337, at *10 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 2019) (denying the plaintiff’s motion to amend his

First Amendment claim and finding the plaintiff’s allegations that prison guards “orchestrated” an

attack by inmates as “vague, speculative, and conclusory”), adopted by, 2019 WL 2869608

(N.D.N.Y. July 3, 2019). The claim as to Defendants Eschmann, Julien, and Ms. A fails and is

dismissed.

Finally, as to Defendant Figueroa, the State Defendants argue that Plaintiff fails to allege

an adverse action. (Def. Br. at 20-21). Defendant Figueroa’s only alleged adverse action was

screaming at Plaintiff that “this whiteboy doesn’t like n*****s and s***s.” (Am. Compl. ¶ 57). As

a general matter, “verbal threats may constitute an adverse action.” Mateo v. Bristow, No. 12-CV-

05052, 2013 WL 3863865, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. July 16, 2013). Such verbal threats, however, must be

“specific and direct” to allow the court to infer that they would deter an inmate from exercising

his First Amendment rights. Id.; accord Fabricio v. Griffin, No. 16-CV-08731, 2019 WL 1059999,

at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 2019). Here, Plaintiff fails to allege that Defendant Figueroa made a

“specific and direct” threat. Indeed, it is unclear from the Amended Complaint whether Defendant

Figueroa’s statement was even a threat. The alleged statement, at most, amounts to a “vague

intimation[ ] of some unspecified harm” that “[does] not rise to the level of adverse action.”

Amaker v. Annucci, No. 14-CV-09692, 2016 WL 5720798, at *5 n.8 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2016)

(quoting Bumpus v. Canfield, 495 F. Supp. 2d 316, 326 (W.D.N.Y. 2007)); aff’d, 721 F. App’x 82

(2d Cir. 2018); see also Ross v. Westchester Cnty. Jail, No. 10-CV-03937, 2012 WL 86467, at *7

(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 11, 2012) (explaining that “harassing comments . . . do not constitute adverse

actions sufficient to state a retaliation claim”).

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s first claim for relief is dismissed.11

II. Plaintiff’s Second Claim for Relief: 1983 Conspiracy

Plaintiff’s second claim for relief is for Section 1983 conspiracy against Defendants

Eschmann, Julien, and Ms. A in violation of the Eighth Amendment. (Am. Compl. at 14-15).

Plaintiff alleges that these Defendants “conspired together to have [him] beaten up.” (Id. ¶ 96).

According to the Amended Complaint, Defendants Torres and John Doe “jumped and assaulted”

Plaintiff shortly after he spoke with Defendants Eschmann and Julien and saw Ms. A. (Id. ¶¶ 37-

39, 41). Defendants argue that these allegations fail to state an underlying constitutional violation,

and thus Plaintiff’s conspiracy claim fails. (Def, Br. at 30-32).

11 Given the Court’s ruling herein, the Court need not and does not address the other arguments made by

the State Defendants in support of their motion to dismiss the First Amendment claim.

“To establish a claim for a [Section] 1983 conspiracy, Plaintiffs must demonstrate: ‘(1) an

agreement between a state actor and a private party; (2) to act in concert to inflict an

unconstitutional injury; and (3) an overt act done in furtherance of that goal causing damages.’”

Singer v. City of New York, 417 F. Supp. 3d 297, 327 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (quoting Phillips v. Cnty.

of Orange, 894 F. Supp. 2d 345, 381 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (quoting Ciambriello v. Cnty. of Nassau,

292 F.3d 307, 324-25 (2d Cir. 2002))). Moreover, a conspiracy claim under § 1983 requires a

plaintiff to state an underlying violation of constitutional rights. See Schultz v. Inc. Vill. of Bellport,

479 F. App’x 358, 360 (2d Cir. 2012) (“Because [plaintiff] was unable to establish an underlying

violation of his constitutional rights . . . his conspiracy . . . necessarily fail[s] as well.” (citing Droz

v. McCadden, 580 F.3d 106, 109 (2d Cir. 2009))).

Liberally construed, the underlying violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights alleged is a

failure to protect by Defendants Eschmann, Julien, and Ms. A in violation of the Eighth

Amendment. See Avincola v. Maldonado, No. 04-3529, 2005 WL 3116760, at *1 (2d Cir. Nov.

22, 2005) (“A prison official’s ‘deliberate indifference’ to a substantial risk of serious harm to an

inmate violates the Eighth Amendment’ and will give rise to a failure-to-protect claim.”). The

Eighth Amendment requires that prison officials “take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety

of inmates in their custody.” Rennalls v. Alfredo, No. 12-CV-05300, 2015 WL 5730332, at *3

(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2015) (quoting Hayes v. New York City Dep’t of Corr., 84 F.3d 614, 620 (2d

Cir. 1996)); see also Rembert v. Cheverko, No. 12-CV-09196, 2014 WL 3384629, at *5 (S.D.N.Y.

July 10, 2014) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994)); Randle v. Alexander, 960

F. Supp. 2d 457, 471 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). However, while prison officials have a duty to protect

prisoners, “not . . . every injury suffered by one prisoner at the hands of another . . . translates

into constitutional liability for prison officials responsible for the victim’s safety.” Fair v. Weiburg,

No. 02-CV-09218, 2006 WL 2801999, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2006) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S.

at 834).

To state a failure to protect claim, a plaintiff must plead facts sufficient to establish both

an objective and subjective prong. See Camacho v. DuBois, No. 21-CV-06180, 2022 WL

17807433, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 2022). The objective prong in a failure to protect case requires

that “[a] plaintiff show a substantial risk of harm from either a specific assailant or a more general

risk of harm due to the conditions at the time of the attack, such as where a substantial risk of

inmate attacks was longstanding, pervasive, [or] well-documented.” Dietrich v. Cnty. of Orange,

No. 19-CV-10485, 2020 WL 5209816, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 1, 2020) (alterations in original,

internal citations and quotation marks omitted). As for the subjective prong, “a prison official has

sufficient culpable intent if he has knowledge that an inmate faces a substantial risk of serious

harm and he disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate the harm.”

Rennalls, 2015 WL 5730332, at *3; see also Bacon v. Evans, No. 20-CV-06337, 2021 WL

5643038, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 1, 2021) (explaining that a plaintiff must sufficiently allege that

“the defendant acted with deliberate indifference” to state a failure to protect claim).

The State Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s allegations fail to satisfy the subjective element.

(Def. Br. at 31). The Court agrees. Plaintiff fails to plead any allegations establishing that

Defendants Eschmann, Julien, and Ms. A possessed the requisite knowledge that Plaintiff faced a

substantial risk. He does not, for instance, allege that these Defendants were aware that Defendants

Torres and John Doe had made specific threats to Plaintiff. Cf. Ayers v. Coughlin, 780 F.2d 205,

209 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding that a plaintiff stated a failure-to-protect claim where the defendant

officer knew that another inmate had made death threats against the plaintiff). Nor does Plaintiff

allege that he had requested to be transferred to a different cell block because of these other

inmates. Cf. Walker v. Shaw, No. 08-CV-10043, 2010 WL 2541711, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. June 23,

2010) (finding that a “trier of fact could conclude that the prison officials failed to take reasonable

measures to abate the harm” faced by the plaintiff where he had “requested a transfer from his

[rival gang’s] cell block”). Thus, there is no basis on which to infer that these Defendants were

aware of a threat of harm to Plaintiff. Moreover, as explained supra, Plaintiff’s theory that certain

of the State Defendants orchestrated the attack by Defendant Torres and two incarnated John Doe

Defendants (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 96-97) is mere speculation unsupported by allegations in the

Amended Complaint.

Separately, Plaintiff’s allegations amount to a surprise attack. Although the Court

sympathizes with Plaintiff’s situation, “unexpected incidents are insufficient to propagate a

deliberate indifference claim.” Gilmore v. Rivera, No. 13-CV-06955, 2014 WL 1998227, at *4

(S.D.N.Y. May 14, 2014); see also Rivera v. Royce, No. 19-CV-10425, 2021 WL 2413396, at *8

(S.D.N.Y. June 11, 2021) (“It is well-established that prison officials cannot be deliberately

indifferent to a surprise attack.”). Plaintiff thus has not adequately alleged an underlying

constitutional violation for his conspiracy claim. As such, Plaintiff fails to state his Section 1983

conspiracy claim. See, e.g., Anderson v. City of New York, No. 16-CV-06629, 2017 WL 2729092,

at *5 (S.D.N.Y. June 23, 2017) (“[The plaintiff] fails to state a § 1983 conspiracy claim because

he has failed to allege a violation of his rights.”).

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s second claim for relief is dismissed.

III. Plaintiff’s Third Claim for Relief: Deliberate Indifference

Plaintiff’s third claim for relief is for deliberate indifference against Defendants Burnett

and Churns in violation of the Eighth Amendment. (Am. Compl. at 15). Plaintiff alleges that

they—as Superintendent and Deputy Superintendent of Fishkill—displayed “deliberate

indifference to Plaintiff’s health and safety by dismantling and not maintaining a Protective

Custody Unit.” (Id. ¶¶ 98-99). The State Defendants argue that Plaintiff fails to “demonstrate any

personal involvement” by Defendants Burnett and Churns, and, in the alternative, that Plaintiff

fails to meet the subjective prong of his deliberate indifference claim. (Def. Br. at 25). Plaintiff, in

response, states that he has “no counter argument.” (Pl. Br. at 18).

“To state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege facts showing defendants’

direct and personal involvement in an alleged constitutional deprivation.” Johnson v. City of

Newburgh, 690 F. Supp. 3d 224, 238 (S.D.N.Y. 2023). The Second Circuit, in Tangreti v.

Bachmann, explained that “there is no special rule for supervisory liability.” 983 F.3d 609, 618

(2d Cir. 2020). The Second Circuit continued: “a plaintiff must plead that each Government-

official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” Id.

In other words, for a deliberate indifference claim, a plaintiff must show that a supervisor

defendant “herself acted with deliberate indifference—meaning that [the defendant] personally

knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to [the plaintiff’s] health or safety.” Id. at 619 (cleaned

up).

Since Tangreti, some district courts in this Circuit “have determined that personal

involvement still may be established for a supervisory defendant if he or she created a policy or

custom under which unconstitutional practices occurred, or allowed the continuance of such a

policy or custom.” Sanchez v. Nassau Cnty., 662 F. Supp. 3d 369, 416 (E.D.N.Y. 2023) (collecting

cases). These courts, however, have required a plaintiff to plead “the necessary mens rea of

deliberate indifference” “permit[ing] the inference that [the defendant] had subjective knowledge

of the risk.” E.g., Stone #1 v. Annucci, No. 20-CV-01326, 2021 WL 4463033, at *9 (S.D.N.Y.

Sept. 28, 2021). Moreover, these courts have stressed that the “requisite inference of mens rea

cannot be established merely by showing that a supervisory defendant ‘should have known of the

substantial risk of [] abuse’”; a plaintiff must plead that the “defendant-official [] subjectively

kn[ew] of the risk” and “consciously disregard that risk.” Id. at *11 (quoting in Tangreti, 983 F.3d

at 618; emphasis in Tangreti).

Here, the Court need not wade into the viability of a post-Tangreti deliberate indifference

claim against a prison “policymaker.” Even if such a claim is cognizable, Plaintiff’s allegations do

not allow the Court to infer that Defendants Burnett or Churns acted with the requisite state of

mind. Indeed, in his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff only makes allegations about his own

experience.12 He does not make any allegation that either Defendants Burnett or Churns were

aware of his specific circumstances. Instead, Plaintiff’s sole allegation about the dangers he and

other Fishkill inmates faced was that “B-West dorm” is referred to as “gangland” by staff and

inmates. (Am. Compl. ¶ 61). Allegations that Plaintiff was incarcerated with dangerous

individuals, alone, are not enough to state a deliberate indifference claim. See Thomas v. Demeo,

No. 15-CV-09559, 2017 WL 3726759, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 2017) (“Given that inmates in

federal prison are often incarcerated specifically because of some record of violence, it can hardly

12 Plaintiff, in his opposition brief, adds an allegation that “[i]nmates getting assaulted by other inmates

because the correctional staff told them to do it” is an “everyday occurrence.” (Pl. Br. at 15). But this

allegation is also insufficient to establish that Defendants Burnett or Churns acted with the requisite state

of mind. At most, this allegation shows that Defendants Burnett or Churns should have known about the

risks faced by Fishkill inmates. That is not enough. By way of contrast, courts within this Circuit post-

Tangreti have required a plaintiff to plead far more substantial allegations to establish that the prison

officials knew of a substantial risk. See, e.g., Stone #1, 2021 WL 4463033, at *10 (plaintiff satisfied the

subjective prong by pleading “(1) statistical reports on prison rape, including DOCCS reports of which [the

defendant prison officials] were likely aware . . . ; (2) the steps taken by several states and local correctional

institutions to require the presence of female staff to guard women prisoners, and to remove men from

guarding women prisoners in housing areas . . .; (3) the fact that [the defendant prison officials] are named

defendants in multiple suits in which imprisoned women have brought claims of being sexually abused by

staff in DOCCS facilities . . .; and (4) the fact that staff sexual misconduct at DOCCS facilities has resulted

in numerous prosecutions and convictions of correction officers”); Myers on behalf of Est. of Myers v.

Davenport, No. 1:21-CV-00922, 2022 WL 3017367, at *7 (N.D.N.Y. July 29, 2022) (same where the

“Department of Justice had previously issued a ‘scathing’ report on the facility regarding the dangers the

residents there faced”).

be said that Plaintiff’s comments to [the defendant officer] warranted a need for further protection,

especially in the absence of any history of violence between [the other inmate] and Plaintiff.”); see

also Miller-Santiago v. Warden, No. 23-CV-00393, 2023 WL 4564485, at *2 (D. Conn. July 17,

2023) (dismissing a deliberate indifference claim against the prison Warden and Commissioner

because the plaintiff failed to allege “facts showing that” these defendants “had subjective

knowledge of [a] substantial risk he faced and disregarded that risk”); Elting v. Lassiter, No. 22-

CV-08573, 2023 WL 8699454, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 14, 2023) (similar).

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s third claim for relief is dismissed.

IV. Plaintiff’s Fourth Claim for Relief: Failure to Protect

Liberally construed, Plaintiff’s fourth claim for relief is for failure to protect against

Defendants Valentino and Holloway in violation of the Eighth Amendment. (Am. Compl. at 16;

see also id. ¶ 105 (alleging that Defendants Valentino and Holloway did not provide Plaintiff with

“requested protection” and did not “protect[]” him from other Fishkill inmates). As discussed

supra, Plaintiff must plead facts sufficient to establish both the objective and subjective prongs to

make out his claim.

The State Defendants argue that Plaintiff has again merely alleged a “surprise attack”

without satisfying the subjective prong. (Def. Br. at 26-28). The Court disagrees. Plaintiff alleges

that he sought Defendants Valentino and Holloway’s “protection” “immediately” after being “hit

and robbed.” (Id. ¶ 105; see also id. ¶¶ 64-69). Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Valentino and

Holloway then sent him right back to that area—where he was again physically assaulted. (Id.).

The second assault was thus not a “surprise”; Plaintiff had put Defendants Valentino and Holloway

on notice that he faced a specific threat of assault by his fellow inmates in a specific area of the

prison and was then assaulted. See Davis v. Torres, No. 10-CV-02236, 2012 WL 3070092, at *5

(S.D.N.Y. May 2, 2012) (“Courts have found that a prisoner validly states an Eighth Amendment

claim based on a failure to protect when he alleges that he informed corrections officers about a

specific fear of assault and is then assaulted.” (collecting cases)), adopted sub nom. Davis v. New

York State Dep’t of Corr., No. 10-CV-02236, 2012 WL 3070083 (S.D.N.Y. July 27, 2012).

Contrary to the State Defendants’ suggestion, Plaintiff does not have to allege that he had

“identified his assailants” at the time to state a claim. (Def. Br. at 26). It is enough for Plaintiff to

allege that “prison officials were sufficiently aware that he was at risk of substantial harm.” Stewart

v. Fisher, No. 11-CV-02184, 2011 WL 6153084, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 12, 2011) (rejecting the

defendants’ argument on a motion to dismiss that the plaintiff failed to state a failure-to-protect

claim because he “did not identify” his assailant to prison staff).

Accordingly, Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged his claim for failure to protect against

Defendants Valentino and Holloway.

V. Plaintiff’s Sixth Claim for Relief: Failure to Prosecute

Plaintiff’s sixth claim for relief is for failure to prosecute against Defendants Eschmann

and Juskin. (Am. Compl. at 17). The State Defendants argue that a claim for a failure to prosecute

is not “cognizable” under Section 1983. (Def. Br. at 28). “[T]here is no constitutional right to the

criminal prosecution of a third party.” Leeke v. Timmerman, 454 U.S. 83, 87 (1981). It is thus also

well-established that “there is no constitutional right to an adequate investigation.” Newton v. City

of New York, 566 F. Supp. 2d 256, 278 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (citing Campbell v. Giuliani, No. 99-CV-

02603, 2000 WL 194815, at *3 n.6 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 16, 2000)); see also McCaffrey v. City of New

York, No. 11-CV-01636, 2013 WL 494025, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 7, 2013) (“[A] ‘failure to

investigate’ is not independently cognizable as a stand-alone claim[.]”). As such, Plaintiff’s sixth

claim—grounded in his allegations that Defendants Eschmann and Juskin failed to “initiate the

process to criminally charge” other inmates and “failed to conduct[] an investigation” (Am. Compl.

¶ 108)—does not state a cognizable claim.

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s sixth claim for relief is dismissed.

VI. Qualified Immunity

Finally, the State Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s claims should be dismissed because they

are entitled to qualified immunity. (Def. Br. at 32).

“Qualified immunity protects public officials from liability for civil damages when one of

two conditions is satisfied: (a) the defendant’s action did not violate clearly established law, or (b)

it was objectively reasonable for the defendant to believe that his action did not violate such law.”

Garcia v. Does, 779 F.3d 84, 92 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting Russo v. City of Bridgeport, 479 F.3d 196,

211 (2d Cir. 2007)). “A Government official’s conduct violates clearly established law when, at

the time of the challenged conduct, the contours of a right are sufficiently clear that every

reasonable official would have understood that what he is doing violates that right.” Almighty

Supreme Born Allah v. Milling, 876 F.3d 48, 59 (2d Cir. 2017) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563

U.S. 731, 741 (2011)). If an official’s belief that his action does not violate clearly established law

is “objectively reasonable,” he is shielded from liability by qualified immunity. Cooper v. City of

New Rochelle, 925 F. Supp. 2d 588, 608 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); see also al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 743

(“Qualified immunity gives government officials breathing room to make reasonable but mistaken

judgments. . . . [I]t protects all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the

law.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). However, on a motion to dismiss, Plaintiff’s entitlement

to qualified immunity must “appear on the face of the complaint.” Hyman v. Abrams, 630 F. App’x

40, 42 (2d Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted).13

13 The Court does not address Defendants Jones, Julien, Gibbons, Figueroa, Eschmann, Ms. A, Burnett,

Churns, and Juskin’s qualified immunity defense, having found that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim

against them. See Close v. Bedford Cent. Sch. Dist., No. 23-CV-04595, 2024 WL 3427213, at *14 n.23

(S.D.N.Y. July 16, 2024) (“Because all of Plaintiffs’ federal claims fail on the merits, the Court need not

address the parties’ arguments concerning qualified immunity.”); Robles v. Khahaifa, No. 09-CV-00718,

With respect to Defendants Valentino and Holloway, at the time of his alleged incident

with Plaintiff, a failure to protect claim under the Eighth Amendment was clearly established law.

See Jenkins v. Officer S (Downstate), No. 19-CV-10728, 2021 WL 4392611, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Sept.

24, 2021) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834)). As stated supra, Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a

violation of that constitutional right as to Defendants Valentino and Holloway. However, at this

stage in litigation, the Court cannot find that they are entitled to qualified immunity. Although the

Court is unable to conclude that Defendants Valentino and Holloway are entitled to qualified

immunity based on the face of the Amended Complaint, “a factual basis for qualified immunity

may arise as the proceedings develop.” Rodriguez v. Burnett, No. 22-CV-10056, 2024 WL

1466880, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 4, 2024) (quoting Terranova v. New York, 144 F. App’x 143, 146-

47 (2d Cir. 2005)). They may revisit this argument after developing the record in discovery.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED in part and

DENIED in part. Defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED as to the first, second, third, and

sixth claims for relief. The motion is DENIED as to the fourth claim for relief.

Defendants Valentino and Holloway are directed to file an answer to the Amended

Complaint within 14 days of the date of this Order. The Court will separately docket a Notice of

Initial Conference.

Plaintiff, within 60-days of this Order, is directed to (i) serve Defendants Dario Torres,

Timothy McKenny, Zaire Birks, Eric Johnson, and German Castillo with the Amended Complaint;

and (ii) file to the ECF docket proof of service thereof. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m); Fed. R. Civ. P.

2012 WL 2401574, at *9 (W.D.N.Y. June 25, 2012) (“Given that no constitutional violation was found,

this Court need not address defendants’ alternative contention that they deserve qualified immunity for their

actions.” (emphasis deleted)).

5(a)(1)(B). Plaintiffs failure to comply with this Order may result in dismissal of this case as to

Defendants Dario Torres, Timothy McKenny, Zaire Birks, Eric Johnson, and German Castillo.

Plaintiff is further directed to provide an updated address for Defendant Torres. (See Sept. 24, 2024

Entry (noting that mailing to Defendant Torres has been returned for “Insufficient Address”)).

The Clerk of Court is respectfully requested to: (1) terminate Jones, Julien, Gibbons,

Figueroa, Eschmann, Ms. A, Burnett, Churns, Juskin, and Scott Durant as Defendants; (2)

terminate the pending motion (Doc. 71); and (3) mail a copy of this Opinion and Order to Plaintiff.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: White Plains, New York

December 23, 2024 (dom/

PHILIPM.HALPERN =——<“i‘“SCS

United States District Judge

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