Kneisler v. Legacy Health

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF OREGON

DOMINICA KNEISLER, an individual, Case No. 3:24-cv-01011-IM

Plaintiff, OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING

IN PART AND DENYING IN PART

v. DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO

DISMISS

LEGACY HEALTH, a corporation,

Defendant.

Paul Robert Armstrong Janzen and Caroline Janzen, Rugged Law, Inc., 4550 SW Hall

Boulevard, Beaverton, OR 97005. Attorneys for Plaintiff.

Brenda K. Baumgart and Megan S. Bradford, Stoel Rives LLP, 760 SW Ninth Avenue, Suite

3000, Portland, OR 97205. Attorneys for Defendants.

IMMERGUT, District Judge.

Plaintiff Dominica Kneisler brings claims against Defendant Legacy Health for failure to

accommodate under Title VII and Oregon law. Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), ECF 9, arguing that Plaintiff fails to state a claim

under either statute and that the Oregon law claim should be dismissed as time-barred. For the

reasons below, this Court concludes that Plaintiff sufficiently states a failure-to-accommodate

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claim, but failed to bring her Oregon law claim within the applicable statute of limitations. This

Court therefore grants in part and denies in part the Motion to Dismiss.

LEGAL STANDARDS

To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a plaintiff must allege facts that, if

accepted as true, are sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level” and to state a

“claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 570,

(2007). That means the “factual content . . . allows the court to draw the reasonable inference

that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678

(2009). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more

than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. If a plaintiff cannot “nudge the

claim across the line from conceivable to plausible, the complaint must be dismissed.” Twombly,

550 U.S. at 570 (cleaned up). At this stage, the court must accept as true all factual allegations,

Dowers v. Nationstar Mortg., LLC, 852 F.3d 964, 969 (9th Cir. 2017), draw all reasonable

inferences in favor of the non-moving party, id., and take care to “examine the allegations of the

complaint as a whole,” Khachatryan v. Blinken, 4 F.4th 841, 854 (9th Cir. 2021). A “judge’s

disbelief of a complaint’s factual allegations” is not grounds for dismissal on a motion to

dismiss. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989).

BACKGROUND

For purposes of the Motion to Dismiss, this Court takes the allegations of the complaint,

summarized here, as true. Plaintiff was employed by Defendant for eleven years as a Laboratory

Client Services Representative. Complaint (“Compl.”), ECF 1 ¶ 16. Plaintiff states she worked

evening shifts from a cubicle, which involved little contact with coworkers and none with

patients. Id.

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In the summer of 2021, Defendant imposed a COVID-19 vaccine mandate on its

employees. Id. ¶ 7. Plaintiff Kneisler is a devout Christian, id. ¶ 17, whose religious convictions

prevented her from taking the vaccine. Id. ¶¶ 8, 17. Plaintiff accordingly applied for a religious

exception to the vaccine mandate. Id. ¶ 17. Her exemption request explained that she is a

Christian who believes that she is a divine being created in the image and likeness of God. Id.

She further explained that she believes that her body is a sacred vessel with the innate ability to

heal itself, and that she takes no substance into her body that alters or inhibits her immune

system. Id. Plaintiff also stated that she believes the vaccine to be the “mark of the beast,” as

foretold by Revelations. Id. For the previous five years, Plaintiff had been granted a religious

exception to the flu vaccine. Id.

Defendant denied Plaintiff’s request, placed her on administrative leave on October 4,

2021, and terminated her employment on October 19, 2021. Id.

Plaintiff filed a religious discrimination complaint with the Oregon Bureau of Labor and

Industries (“BOLI”) on August 15, 2022, which she requested be cross-filed with the EEOC.

ECF 10-1, Ex. 1. Plaintiff was mailed a right-to-sue letter from BOLI on May 19, 2023. Id.

Ex. 2. She was mailed a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC on March 26, 2024. Id. Ex. 3. She

filed the present action on June 24, 2024. Compl., ECF 1.

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant wrongfully terminated her employment after failing to

make a good-faith effort to accommodate her sincere religious beliefs. Id. ¶ 22–23. She brings

claims for employment discrimination under both Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and

O.R.S. 659A.030. Id. ¶ 19–31. Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint under Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing that Plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient facts to state

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a failure-to-accommodate claim.1 Motion to Dismiss (“Mot.”), ECF 9 at 5–10. Defendant also

contends that Plaintiff’s state law claim is barred by the statute of limitations. Id. at 21–22. This

Court concludes that Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to state a claim for employment

discrimination, but her claim under O.R.S. 659A.030 is time-barred.

A. Failure to State a Claim

To make out a prima facie case of religious discrimination,2 Plaintiff must demonstrate

that (1) she had a sincere religious belief that conflicted with Defendant’s vaccine mandate,

(2) she informed Defendant of the belief and conflict, and (3) she was discharged because of her

failure to comply with Defendant’s vaccine mandate. See Berry v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 447 F.3d

642, 655 (9th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). Defendant contends that Plaintiff has failed to

establish either of the first two elements. Mot., ECF 10 at 5–10.

Defendant first argues that Plaintiff’s beliefs are not “religious in nature,” but rather

“medical or scientific” or reflecting “generalized fears or anxieties.” Mot., ECF 10 at 8.

Defendant also argues that, even if religious, these beliefs do not conflict with Defendant’s

1 Plaintiff’s counsel agreed to withdraw all claims that were the subject of Defendant’s

Motion to Dismiss other than the failure-to-accommodate claims. Plaintiff’s Response in

Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss (“Resp.”), ECF 16 at 1; Defendant’s Reply, ECF 17 at 2

n.1. This Opinion therefore only addresses those claims.

2 Both parties assume that Plaintiff must plead all the elements of a prima facie case of

religious discrimination to survive a motion to dismiss, see Mot., ECF 10 at 5; Resp., ECF 16 at

3, and this Court will likewise look to these elements to assess the sufficiency of Plaintiff’s

Complaint. But see Austin v. Univ. of Or., 925 F.3d 1133, 1136–37 (9th Cir. 2019) (citing

Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 511 (2002)) (holding that a plaintiff need not

necessarily establish a prima facie case of discrimination to survive a motion to dismiss because

the prima facie case is an evidentiary standard, not a pleading requirement); Savel v.

MetroHealth Sys., 96 F.4th 932, 943 (6th Cir. 2024) (holding the same in a vaccination case).

PAGE 4 – OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART

vaccine mandate. Id. This Court concludes that Plaintiff has satisfied her minimal pleading

burden on both issues.

1. Sincere religious belief

First, this Court concludes that Plaintiff’s objection is clearly religious in nature. An

“assertion of a sincere religious belief is generally accepted.” Keene v. City & Cnty. of S.F.,

No. 22-16567, 2023 WL 3451687, at *2 (9th Cir. May 15, 2023). “It is not within the judicial

ken to question the centrality of particular beliefs or practices to a faith, or the validity of

particular litigants’ interpretations of those creeds.” Hernandez v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue,

490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989). The Supreme Court has warned, “[r]epeatedly and in many different

contexts,” that “courts must not presume to determine the place of a particular belief in a religion

or the plausibility of a religious claim.” Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 887 (1990).

Plaintiff grounds her objection to the vaccine mandate in her belief that “she is a divine

being created in the image and likeness of God” and her “body is a sacred vessel” in which she

can take “no substance . . . which alters or inhibits her miraculous immune system that was

created by God.” Compl., ECF 1 ¶ 17. She further pleads that she believes the vaccine to be the

mark of the beast described in Revelations. Id. Such views cannot reasonably be understood as

secular and are “almost self-evidently enough to establish” a religious objection. Lucky v.

Landmark Med. of Mich., P.C., 103 F.4th 1241, 1243 (6th Cir. 2024); see, e.g., Kather v. Asante

Health Sys., No. 1:22-cv-01842-MC, 2023 WL 4865533, at *4 (D. Or. July 28, 2023) (holding

that plaintiff adequately alleged a religious belief by stating that receiving a vaccine would

conflict with his “sincerely held religious belief not to interfere with the function of the human

immune system which God created”); Callahan v. Woods, 658 F.2d 679, 685–86 (9th Cir. 1981)

(concluding that a belief that Social Security numbers are the “mark of the beast,” which was

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“derived from the New Testament’s Book of Revelation,” “clearly addresse[d] spiritual, not

merely worldly, concerns”).

Defendant points to other cases in which this Court and others in this district have

concluded that a plaintiff’s objections were not religious. But those cases largely turned not on

the religiosity of the plaintiff’s objection, but on the fact that the plaintiff failed to establish any

conflict between their general or overarching religious beliefs and their specific objections to the

vaccine. Defendant cites Craven v. Shriners Hospitals for Children, No. 3:22-cv-01619-IM,

2024 WL 21557 (D. Or. Jan. 2, 2024). This Court made clear that it was not “question[ing] the

sincerity of Plaintiff’s belief that his ‘body is a temple of the Holy Spirit.’” Craven, 2024 WL

21557, at *4. That claim failed because the plaintiff drew no connection between that sincere

religious belief and his opposition to the vaccine. See id. (describing the beliefs as “independent

of one another”). In Prakash v. Oregon Health & Science University, this Court likewise did not

“question the sincerity of Plaintiff’s religious beliefs” or that they were religious; that claim also

failed because plaintiff failed to make any statement as to how her beliefs conflicted with

receiving a COVID-19 vaccine. No. 3:23-cv-01653-IM, 2024 WL 3494981, at *3 (D. Or.

July 22, 2024). And in Stephens v. Legacy-GoHealth Urgent Care, the plaintiff stated that she

did not believe the vaccine was consistent with her faith, but provided no other details. No. 3:23-

cv-00206-SB, at *6 (D. Or. Oct. 23, 2023), report & recommendation adopted as clarified sub

nom. Stephens v. Legacy Health, 2023 WL 7623865 (D. Or. Nov. 14, 2023).3 This Court views

3 Defendant cites two additional cases, but neither is exactly on point. In Ruscitti v.

Legacy Health, No. 3:23-cv-00787-JR, 2024 WL 2092949 (D. Or. Mar. 18, 2024), report &

recommendation adopted, 2024 WL 2078399 (D. Or. May 8, 2024), the court concluded that

Plaintiff’s objection that the vaccine would “taint[] the purity of her body” was not religious. Id.

at *3. Plaintiff’s Complaint in this case grounds her religious objection in her beliefs that she

may not consume any “substance . . . which alters or inhibits her miraculous immune system that

was created by God” and that the vaccine is the mark of the beast, ECF 1, ¶ 17, which are more

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the requests in Craven and Prakash as presenting examples of exemption requests based

“entirely in safety considerations with no plain and express connection to religion,” which other

courts have similarly indicated is insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. Passarella v.

Aspirus, Inc., 108 F.4th 1005, 1011 (7th Cir. 2024) (emphasis added) (denying motion to dismiss

because the claim was not based entirely on safety considerations). Plaintiff Kneisler, by

contrast, makes allegations that can be read as “plausibly based in part on an aspect of [her]

religious belief or practice,” which is sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. Id. In sum,

Plaintiff states a sincere religious belief.

2. Conflicting religious belief

Second, this Court concludes that Plaintiff pleads a conflict between her sincere religious

belief and the vaccination mandate. Title VII “requires employers to accommodate the religious

practice of their employees.” Groff v. DeJoy, 143 S. Ct. 2279, 2286 (2023). Title VII defines

religion expansively, including “all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as

belief.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j). Plaintiff pleads that she believes her body is a sacred vessel with

the innate ability to heal itself, that she takes no substance into her body which alters or inhibits

her miraculous immune system that was created by God, and that the vaccine is the mark of the

clearly religious views than the plaintiff’s vague references to “bodily integrity” and “purity” in

Ruscitti.

Defendant also cites Coates v. Legacy Health, No. 3:23-CV-00931-JR, 2024 WL

1181827 (D. Or. Jan. 8, 2024), report & recommendation adopted, 2024 WL 1177124 (D. Or.

Mar. 19, 2024), for the proposition that a plaintiff did not state a religious conflict by alleging

that she believes God gave her body sufficient tools to protect itself. Mot., ECF 9 at 7. But

Coates reached that conclusion in part because the plaintiffs in that case (1) took other

vaccinations and (2) did not cite “the Bible or any other conflicting religious tenet or teaching.”

Coates, 2024 WL 1181827, at *5–6. Setting aside whether that was appropriate, see Hernandez,

490 U.S. at 699, Plaintiff has pled that her beliefs led her to oppose other vaccines and cited the

Bible, Compl., ECF 1 ¶ 17, both of which distinguish this case from Coates.

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beast as foretold by Revelations. Compl., ECF 1 ¶ 17. Plaintiff connects her objection to the

vaccination to her religious principles, which is sufficient at this stage to show that her

opposition to the vaccine was an “aspect” of her religious observance or belief. Viewing

Plaintiff’s religious exemption request in the light most favorable to her and drawing all

inferences in her favor, this Court concludes that Plaintiff has met her burden.

Defendant argues that Plaintiff has failed to allege “that the COVID-19 vaccines would

somehow ‘alter[] or inhibit[] her miraculous immune system.’” Mot., ECF 9 at 9. Plaintiff need

not allege such facts because they are obvious. This Court can take judicial notice of the well-

known principle that vaccines work by “altering” the immune system by provoking an immune

response, which allows the immune system to respond more quickly and effectively if the

pathogen is encountered in the future than it could without vaccination. See Centers for Disease

Control and Prevention, Epidemiology and Prevention of Vaccine-Preventable Diseases 3

(Elisha Hall et al. eds., 14th ed. 2021), https://perma.cc/KNY2-HAQS.4 Plaintiff could

reasonably expect Defendant, a hospital system, to be familiar with these medical concepts.

Defendant also faults Plaintiff for failing to identify how a belief that the vaccine was the

mark of the beast “conflicted with receiving a COVID-19 vaccine.” Mot., ECF 9 at 9. Defendant

attempts to contrast this case with Quinn v. Legacy Health because the plaintiff in that case,

“[u]nlike Plaintiff here . . . alleged that the Mark of the Beast refers to a concept from the

Christian Bible.” No. 3:23-cv-00331-JR, 2024 WL 620344, at *2 (D. Or. Feb. 13, 2024). But

Plaintiff’s Complaint states that she believes the vaccine to be the mark of the beast as “foretold

by Revelations.” Compl., ECF 1 ¶ 17. Revelation is a book of the Bible, making this case

4 This Court may take judicial notice of basic scientific principles that are not subject to

reasonable dispute. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592 n.11 (1993).

PAGE 8 – OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART

indistinguishable from Quinn. In any event, Revelation makes quite clear that receiving the mark

of the beast is not good. See Revelation 14:9-10 (explaining how those who “receive [the beast’s]

mark. . . shall be tormented with fire and brimstone”). This conflict, again, is clear. Plaintiff need

not explain in detail what Revelation says or that being “tormented with fire and brimstone” is

generally undesirable to successfully plead a conflict.

This Court’s prior cases are again not to the contrary. In Craven, the plaintiff stated that

vaccine “ingredients can cause serious harm,” but did not draw a connection between that view

and his belief that his “body is a temple of the Holy Spirit.” 2024 WL 21557, at *4 (D. Or.

Jan. 2, 2024). In Prakash, the plaintiff likewise did not provide “any explanation as to why a

COVID-19 vaccine would be in conflict” with her religious beliefs. 2024 WL 3494981, at *3.

And in Niemeyer v. NW Permanente, the plaintiff stated she had “serious objections to taking the

vaccine,” but did not clearly connect those objections to her faith. No. 3:23-cv-00815-IM, 2024

WL 1999734, at *2 (D. Or. May 6, 2024); see also Bulek v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., No. 3:23-cv-

01585-MO, 2024 WL 1436134, at *3 (D. Or. Apr. 3, 2024) (granting motion to dismiss where

plaintiff did not allege any conflict). By contrast, Plaintiff here alleges a clear conflict between

several of her religious beliefs and the vaccine. This Court therefore concludes that Plaintiff has

stated a failure-to-accommodate claim under Title VII and denies the motion to dismiss on that

issue.

B. Statute of Limitations

Separately, Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s failure-to-accommodate claim is untimely

under state law. Mot., ECF 10 at 21. This Court agrees and concludes that Plaintiff’s claim under

O.R.S. 659A.030 is time-barred. This Court has held in several similar cases that, when a

plaintiff files a complaint with BOLI, the statute of limitations for claims brought under O.R.S.

PAGE 9 – OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART

659A.030 is 90 days following the mailing of the right-to-sue letter.5 O.R.S. 659A.875(2).

Plaintiff filed a complaint with BOLI. Bradford Decl., ECF 10, Ex. 1. BOLI mailed its right to

sue letter on May 19, 2023.6 Id. Ex. 2. Plaintiff therefore had 90 days—until August 17, 2023—

to file suit under O.R.S. 659A.030. Plaintiff filed suit on June 24, 2024. This action is therefore

time-barred, and Plaintiff offers no justification for equitably tolling the limitations period.

This Court grants Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s state law claim as untimely.

No amendment would remedy this defect, see Platt Elec. Supply, Inc. v. EOFF Elec., Inc., 522

F.3d 1049, 1060 (9th Cir. 2008), so this dismissal is without leave to amend.

CONCLUSION

Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, ECF 9, is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

Plaintiff’s claim under O.R.S. 659A.030 is DISMISSED without leave to amend. Defendant is

advised that in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(a)(4)(A), it has fourteen (14)

days to file a responsive pleading to Plaintiff’s remaining claim.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

5 See Starks v. Legacy Health, No. 3:24-cv-01094-IM, slip op. at 5–6 (D. Or. Dec. 5,

2024); Mikityuk v. Legacy Health, No. 3:24-cv-01072-IM, slip op. at 5–6 (D. Or. Dec. 2, 2024);

Miller v. Legacy Health, No. 3:24-cv-01073-IM, slip op. at 5–6 (D. Or. Nov. 26, 2024);

Bowerman v. St. Charles Health Sys., Inc., No. 6:23-cv-01488-MC, 2024 WL 3276131, at *8 (D.

Or. July 1, 2024); Riser v. St. Charles Health Sys., Inc., No. 6:23-cv-01720-AA, 2024 WL

2864405, at *2–3 (D. Or. June 6, 2024); Craven v. Shriners Hosps. for Child., No. 3:22-cv-

01619-IM, 2023 WL 5237698, at *4 (D. Or. Aug. 15, 2023); see also Leland v. Supervalu

Wholesale Ops., Inc., No. 3:19-cv-02076-IM, slip op. at 10 (D. Or. Apr. 15, 2020).

6 Plaintiff’s Complaint states that she received a 90-day letter on March 26, 2024.

Compl., ECF 1 ¶ 2. This appears to refer to the 90-day letter from the federal Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission. See Bradford Decl., ECF 10 ¶ 2, Ex. 3. A plaintiff’s claim under

O.R.S. 659A is time-barred “when filed more than 90 days after the mailing of the BOLI letter,”

even if filed “less than 90 days after receiving an EEOC letter.” Sharer v. Oregon, 481 F. Supp.

2d 1156, 1164 (D. Or. 2007).

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DATED this 20th day of December, 2024.

/s/ Karin J. Immergut

Karin J. Immergut

United States District Judge

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