Doe v. Riverside School District

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

JANE DOE, a minor, by her mother : Civ. No. 3:23-CV-1118

and natural guardian, Jennifer Nied, :

and JENNIFER NIED, individually, :

:

Plaintiffs, :

:

v. : (Chief Magistrate Judge Bloom)

:

RIVERSIDE SCHOOL DISTRICT, :

d/b/a Riverside Junior/Senior :

High School, et al., :

:

Defendants. :

MEMORANDUM OPINION

I. Introduction

This case comes before us for consideration of a motion to dismiss

the plaintiffs’ amended complaint filed by several defendants—Riverside

School District (the “District”), Robert Presley, Christopher Lazor, and

Paul Brennan. (Doc. 48). Jennifer Nied filed this action on behalf of

herself and her daughter Jane Doe, a minor student in the Riverside

School District. (Doc. 1). The complaint alleged that Jane Doe was

sexually assaulted off school grounds by another student, A.P., who

attended the same school, and that following that student’s adjudication

of delinquency, the school failed to expel him or otherwise keep him away

from Jane Doe. ( Doc. 1). This, in turn, allegedly led to Jane

Doe’s abuser harassing her during school hours and at school functions.

( ).

The original complaint asserted a host of claims against the School

District and the School Board, as well as Paul Brennan, the

Superintendent, and Robert Presley and Christopher Lazor, both of

whom served as the principal of the school at some time during the

alleged events. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, which

we granted in part. (Docs. 36, 37). Specifically, we concluded that the

plaintiffs’ complaint adequately pleaded a claim for discrimination

against the District under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972

(“Title IX”), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681, ., but that the remaining claims

failed as pleaded. ( ). We further dismissed the claims against the

School Board. ( ). We permitted the plaintiffs leave to amend their

complaint against the School District and the individual District

defendants. ( ).

The plaintiffs have now filed their amended complaint, which is

currently the operative pleading. (Doc. 45). The amended complaint

asserts a Title IX discrimination claim, as well as claims brought

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of the plaintiffs’

Fourteenth Amendment rights. ( ). Specifically, the plaintiffs allege

that the individual defendants, as well as the District, were deliberately

indifferent to the harassment perpetrated against Jane Doe by A.P. They

assert that this conduct violated the plaintiffs’ Equal Protection and Due

Process rights. The District defendants have moved to dismiss the

amended complaint, arguing that the amended complaint suffers from

the same flaws as the original complaint, and thus, fails to state a claim

against them.1 (Doc. 48).

The motion is fully briefed and ripe for resolution. (Docs. 49, 57, 58).

After consideration, the defendants’ motion will be granted in part and

denied in part as set forth below.

II. Background

The factual background of this Memorandum Opinion is taken from

the well-pleaded facts alleged in the plaintiffs’ amended complaint (Doc.

45), which we must accept as true for purposes of the instant motion to

dismiss. The minor plaintiff, Jane Doe, was enrolled as a student in the

1 Bryan and Nicole Pica, the remaining defendants, also filed a motion to

dismiss the negligence claim brought against them, which we denied on

December 4, 2024. (Docs. 62, 63).

Riverside School District (“the District”) at Riverside Junior/Senior High

School, located in Lackawanna County, Pennsylvania. (Doc. 45 ¶ 26).

Jane Doe was a student with a disability and had a 504 Service

Agreement with the District that outlined the accommodations she

required. ( ¶¶ 27-28).

In January and February of 2021, Jane Doe was sexually assaulted

by A.P., a minor who was also enrolled at Riverside Junior/Senior High

School. (Doc. 45 ¶¶ 34-35). The assaults occurred outside of the school

setting. ( ). Following the assaults, the Luzerne County District

Attorney’s Office filed a Petition Alleging Delinquency, claiming that A.P.

raped and/or sexually assaulted Jane Doe. ( ¶ 36). After a hearing, the

Court adjudicated A.P. delinquent of Felony 2 Sexual Assault pursuant

to 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3124.1. ( ¶ 37).

The amended complaint alleges that following this adjudication,

A.P. was permitted to continue to attend the same school as Jane Doe.

(Doc. 45 ¶ 40-41). The plaintiffs assert that A.P. continued to harass Jane

Doe during school hours and on school grounds. ( ¶ 47). For example,

the amended complaint asserts that in January of 2022, A.P. attended

the semi-formal dance, during which he sat at a table next to Jane Doe

and her friends and allegedly harassed and tormented her all night,

claiming she “made the whole thing up.” ( ¶¶ 55, 57). Additionally, the

amended complaint alleges that while passing Jane Doe in the hallway,

A.P. mockingly shouted at her. ( ¶ 60). Jennifer Nied brought these

issues to the District and requested a meeting with the principals and

guidance counselor. ( ¶ 61). The meeting occurred on February 23,

2022. ( ¶ 62). During the meeting, Nied was told that nothing could

be done and that if Jane Doe was having issues, she could move to a

different school district. ( ).

The plaintiffs allege that school continued to be a threatening and

hostile environment for Jane Doe due to the District’s failure to protect

her from A.P. (Doc. 45 ¶¶ 53-54). The plaintiffs assert that the individual

defendants, and specifically Superintendent Brennan, were made aware

of these instances of harassment and torment because Jennifer Nied

corresponded with him directly. ( ¶ 40). The amended complaint

further asserts that Jennifer Nied specifically informed Defendants

Lazor and Presley of several incidents, including Jane Doe being

ridiculed in front of her class by a teacher alleged to be a friend of the

Pica defendants, as well as threats made to Jane Doe’s friends regarding

removal from the football team after they spoke up on her behalf. ( ¶¶

43-44).

The plaintiffs filed their initial complaint on July 5, 2023. (Doc. 1).

After the defendants’ filed a motion to dismiss, which we granted in part

and denied in part, the plaintiffs then filed the amended complaint. (Doc.

45). As to the District defendants, the plaintiffs assert a Title IX

discrimination claim, as well as Equal Protection and Due Process claims

under § 1983. ( ). The defendants have now moved to dismiss the

amended complaint. (Doc 48).

This motion is fully briefed and ripe for resolution. (Docs. 49, 57,

58). After consideration, the motion will be granted as to the Due Process

claim and denied in all other respects.

III. Discussion

A. Motion to Dismiss - Standard of Review

The defendants have filed a motion to dismiss the complaint

pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule

12(b)(6) permits the court to dismiss a complaint if the complaint fails to

state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

Under federal pleading standards, a complaint must set forth a “short

and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to

relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).

In determining whether a complaint states a claim for relief under

this pleading standard, a court must accept the factual allegations in the

complaint as true, , 550 U.S. 544, 555

(2007), and accept “all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from

them after construing them in the light most favorable to the non-

movant.” , 20 F.3d 1250,

1261 (3d Cir. 1994). However, a court is not required to accept legal

conclusions or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.”

; , 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare

recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory

statements, do not suffice”).

As the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has aptly summarized:

[A]fter , when presented with a motion to dismiss for

failure to state a claim, district courts should conduct a two-

part analysis. First, the factual and legal elements of a claim

should be separated. The District Court must accept all of the

complaint’s well-pleaded facts as true, but may disregard any

legal conclusions. Second, a District Court must then

determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint are

sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a “plausible claim for

relief.” at 1950. In other words, a complaint must do more

than allege the plaintiff’s entitlement to relief. A complaint

has to “show” such an entitlement with its facts. ,

515 F.3d at 234–35. As the Supreme Court instructed in ,

“[w]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer

more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint

has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—‘that the pleader is

entitled to relief.’ ” , 129 S. Ct. at 1949. This “plausibility”

determination will be “a context-specific task that requires

the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and

common sense.”

, 578 F.3d 203, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2009).

Generally, when considering a motion to dismiss, a court relies on

the complaint and its attached exhibits, as well as matters of public

record. , 502 F.3d 263, 268 (3d Cir. 2007). A court

can also consider “undisputedly authentic document[s] that a defendant

attached as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss if the plaintiff’s claims are

based on the [attached] documents.”

, 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993). Additionally, if

the complaint relies on the contents of a document not physically

attached to the complaint but whose authenticity is not in dispute, the

court may consider such document in its determination.

, 288 F.3d 548, 560 (3d Cir. 2002).

However, the court may not rely on any other part of the record when

deciding a motion to dismiss. , 20 F.3d at 1261.

B. The Motion will be Granted in Part and Denied in Part.

As we have noted, the defendants have moved to dismiss all the

claims against them, arguing that the plaintiffs have failed to state a

claim upon which relief can be granted. As we will discuss below, we find

that the plaintiffs have adequately pleaded a discrimination claim under

Title IX. Additionally, we conclude that the plaintiffs have adequately

stated an Equal Protection claim against the defendants, both against

the individual defendants and the District under . However,

because the plaintiffs have failed to address the defendants’ arguments

regarding the Due Process claim, this claim will be dismissed.

1. Title IX

The plaintiffs assert a claim against the District under Title IX,

alleging that the District discriminated against Jane Doe. The amended

complaint alleges that Jane Doe was subjected to a hostile educational

environment when the District was aware of and permitted sexual

harassment against her by her abuser, A.P. The defendants challenged

this claim in their initial motion to dismiss, and we found that the

complaint adequately stated a claim for discrimination under Title IX.

(Doc. 36 at 11-15). After a review of the amended complaint, we conclude

that the allegations are sufficient to state a Title IX discrimination claim

against the District.

Title IX prohibits entities receiving federal financial assistance

from discriminating against, excluding, or denying benefits of an

educational program or activity to individuals on the basis of sex. 20

U.S.C. § 1681(a). Under Title IX, the School District may be liable for

student-on-student sexual harassment if the District (1) had “substantial

control over both the harasser and the context in which the harassment

occurred”; (2) “had ‘actual knowledge’ of the harassment”; (3) “was

‘deliberately indifferent’ to the harassment”; and (4) the harassment was

so severe or pervasive that it effectively deprived the victim of access to

educational benefits and opportunities provided by the school.

, 170 F. Supp. 3d 722, 736 (D.N.J. 2015)

(quoting , 526 U.S. 629, 645, 650

(1999)).

At the outset, it is undisputed that the District receives federal

funds as required under § 1681. Further, the plaintiffs have pleaded that

Jane Doe was subjected to sexual harassment.

, 389 F. Supp. 3d 304, 314 (E.D. Pa. 2019) (citing

, 2013 WL 2371413, at *9 (M.D. Pa. May

21, 2013)) (“When a sexual assault triggers a course of harassment, the

total course of events can be considered sexual harassment.”).

Accordingly, we conclude that the amended complaint sufficiently alleges

that Jane Doe was subjected to sexual harassment.

We further conclude that the amended complaint adequately pleads

that the District had knowledge of the harassment, had control over the

harasser and the context in which the harassment occurred, and was

deliberately indifferent to the harassment. Here, the plaintiffs allege that

the District was informed by Jennifer Nied, as well as by A.P.’s juvenile

probation officer, that A.P. was adjudicated delinquent of sexually

assaulting Jane Doe. It is further alleged that A.P. harassed Jane Doe

during school hours and at a school dance, and that Jennifer Nied

informed the District of this harassment during a meeting with the

principals and guidance counselor. The amended complaint asserts that

even after the District was informed of the harassment, the District did

nothing to prevent A.P. from further harassing Jane Doe; in fact, it is

alleged that Jane Doe and A.P. were placed in the same lunch period,

that Jane Doe was placed in a class taught by a friend of the Pica

defendants who ridiculed her in front of her peers, that A.P.’s picture was

placed on a banner on her route to school, and that her friends were

threatened with removal from the football team after they spoke up on

her behalf.

The District argues that the plaintiffs have not alleged sufficient

facts to establish that Jane Doe was deprived of educational benefits and

opportunities. However, as we concluded with respect to the original

complaint, in our view, the plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged facts to

satisfy this element. Like the original complaint, the amended complaint

asserts that, in addition to the physical and emotional harm Jane Doe

suffered, she also suffered a decline in her grades and an increase in

absences from school due to A.P.’s continued harassment and the

District’s failure to stop it. She further alleges that the District denied

her request to transfer out of a class taught by a teacher who was hostile

toward her. While a decline in grades, by itself, is not sufficient to prove

a denial of educational opportunities, , 526 U.S. at 652, in our view,

the allegations taken together are sufficient at this stage to show that

Jane Doe was denied educational benefits or opportunities. Accordingly,

we find that the allegations in the amended complaint are sufficient to

state a claim for Title IX discrimination against the District, and this

claim will proceed forward.

2. Section 1983 Claims

The plaintiffs also assert several claims against the District and the

individual defendants pursuant to § 1983, alleging violations of their

Fourteenth Amendment rights. Specifically, the plaintiffs assert an

Equal Protection Claim, as well as a claim against the District,

and a Due Process claim. We will discuss each of these claims in turn.

a. Equal Protection

The plaintiffs contend that the defendants’ failure to respond to the

ongoing harassment and torment of Jane Doe amounted to deliberate

indifference and intentional discrimination in violation of the Equal

Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The plaintiffs assert

this claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Section 1983 provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,

regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the

District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any

citizen of the United States or other person within the

jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges,

or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be

liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity,

or other proper proceeding for redress.

42 U.S.C. § 1983. Therefore, “Section 1983 imposes civil liability

upon any person who, acting under the color of state law, deprives

another individual of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution or laws of the United States.”

, 422 F.3d 141, 146 (3d Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). Section

1983 “does not create any new substantive rights but instead provides a

remedy for the violation of a federal constitutional or statutory right.”

(citation omitted).

The Fourteenth Amendment provides that no state may “deny to

any person within its jurisdiction equal protection of the laws.” U.S.

Const. amend. XIV § 1. A plaintiff alleging an Equal Protection claim

based on student-on-student harassment “must allege that she ‘was

subjected to the discriminatory peer harassment.’”

, 2024 WL 4311492, at *9 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 26, 2024)

(quoting , 911 F.3d 674, 702 (4th Cir.

2018) (citation omitted)). Further, the plaintiff must show that school

officials “responded to the discriminatory peer harassment with

deliberate indifference, i.e. in a manner clearly unreasonable in light of

the known circumstances.” (quoting , 911

F.3d at 702) (internal quotation marks omitted)). As one court in this

district has noted, while “[t]he United States Supreme Court and the

Third Circuit Court of Appeals . . . have not addressed whether the Equal

Protection Clause protects students from a school’s deliberate

indifference to student-on-student harassment[,]” there is “a robust

consensus of persuasive authority” that such a right exists.

, 2024 WL 2393038, at *22 (M.D. Pa. May 23,

2024) (Munley, J.) (collecting cases).

Here, we conclude that the amended complaint sufficiently alleges

that Jane Doe was subject to discriminatory peer harassment, and that

the individual defendants knew of the harassment and responded in an

unreasonable manner in violation of the Equal Protection clause. As we

have discussed with respect to the Title IX claim, the alleged harassment

of Jane Doe by A.P. arose out of a prior sexual assault. Such an allegation

is sufficient to establish that Jane Doe was subjected to discriminatory

peer harassment. , 389 F. Supp. 3d at 314 (citing , 2013

WL 2371413, at *9 (“When a sexual assault triggers a course of

harassment, the total course of events can be considered sexual

harassment.”)).

Additionally, the plaintiffs’ amended complaint sufficiently alleges

that the individual defendants knew of the ongoing harassment and

responded unreasonably considering the circumstances. Unlike the

initial complaint, the amended complaint sets forth specific instances in

which Jennifer Nied informed the individuals defendants of A.P.’s

ongoing torment of Jane Doe. Specifically, the amended complaint alleges

that Jennifer Nied informed Defendants Presley and Lazor that Jane Doe

was ridiculed in front of her class by a teacher alleged to be a friend of

the Pica defendants, as well as an instance in which threats were made

to Jane Doe’s friends regarding removal from the football team after they

spoke up on her behalf. (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 43-44). The amended complaint also

alleges that Jennifer Nied directly informed Superintendent Brennan of

the ongoing harassment, as the “District’s Discrimination Policy requires

the Superintendent to be informed of complaints of discrimination[.]” (

¶ 40). The plaintiffs assert that rather than respond to and investigate

these complaints of harassment, the defendants intentionally placed

Jane Doe in a class taught by a friend of the Pica defendants, who was

also a football coach and who allegedly ridiculed Jane Doe in front of her

peers ( ¶ 50); placed Jane Doe in the same lunch period as A.P. ( ¶

52); permitted A.P. to attend the semi-formal dance and sit at a table

directly next to Jane Doe ( ¶¶ 55-56); and placed a banner with A.P.’s

photograph on Jane Doe’s route to school. ( ¶ 58).

At the motion to dismiss stage, where we must accept these factual

allegations as true, we conclude that the plaintiffs have sufficiently

alleged that Jane Doe was subjected to discriminatory peer harassment,

and that the individual defendants were deliberately indifferent to this

student-on-student harassment in violation of the Equal Protection

clause. , , 2024 WL 4311492, at *10. Accordingly, the

motion to dismiss this claim will be denied.

b. Monell

We further conclude that the plaintiffs have adequately pleaded a

claim against the District regarding the alleged Equal Protection

violation. A municipal entity may be liable for a constitutional violation

under § 1983 if the violation was a direct result of the entity's policy,

custom, or practice. ,

436 U.S. 658, 695 (1978). However, an entity may not be held liable

“solely because injuries were inflicted by its agents or employees.”

, 503 F.3d 247, 249 (3d Cir.

2007). Rather, a plaintiff must demonstrate a “direct causal link”

between the alleged constitutional violation and the municipal policy or

custom. , 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989).

The Supreme Court has recognized four categories of municipal

policies or customs—(1) formally approved rules, (2) unofficial

widespread customs, (3) actions of municipal policymakers, and (4)

deliberate indifference by a municipal entity. , 436 U.S. at 691;

, 475 U.S. 469, 479 (1986);

, 563 U.S. 51, 61 (2011); ,

318 F.3d 575, 584 (3d Cir. 2003). A formally approved rule is one issued

by a decisionmaker who has final authority to establish municipal policy.

, 914 F.3d 789, 798 (3d Cir. 2019). By

contrast, an unofficial custom is a “persistent and widespread” practice

that, though uncodified, is “so permanent and well settled as to constitute

a custom or usage with the force of law.” , 436 U.S. at 691 (quoting

, 398 U.S. 144, 167–68 (1970)). Finally, a

municipality is deliberately indifferent only if a “municipal actor

disregarded a known or obvious consequence of his action.”

, 520 U.S. 397, 410 (1997).

Here, the plaintiffs have alleged that the District, specifically

through its Title IX coordinator Superintendent Brennan, failed to

implement adequate nondiscrimination policies and failed to adequately

address the complaints of sexual harassment. The amended complaint

asserts that Superintendent Brennan was made aware of the complaints

of harassment directly by Jennifer Nied, and that he failed to investigate

the complaints or take any action to quell the ongoing harassment. The

plaintiffs allege that this failure by the District resulted in her injuries.

In our view, the amended complaint sufficiently states a claim

against the District regarding its policies, or lack thereof, concerning

discrimination and harassment. ,

, 2023 WL 2332251, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 2, 2023) (finding that the

complaint’s allegations concerning the school district’s failure to enforce

its policies were sufficient to state a claim).

Accordingly, the motion to dismiss the claim against the

District will be denied.

c. Due Process

The plaintiffs also appear to assert a Due Process claim against the

defendants, alleging that the defendants denied Jane Doe her legitimate

entitlement to a public education as a property right under the

Fourteenth Amendment by permitting the ongoing harassment by A.P.

and creating a hostile educational environment.

In the brief in support of their motion to dismiss, the defendants

characterize this claim as one alleging substantive Due Process and

contend that the plaintiffs have not adequately pleaded a substantive

Due Process violation. (Doc. 49 at 18-21). For their part, the plaintiffs’

brief does not address any of the defendants’ arguments regarding the

Due Process claim. ( Doc. 57). Thus, we conclude that the plaintiff’s

failure to oppose the defendants’ arguments with respect to this claim

constitutes an abandonment of this claim.

, 183 F. Supp. 3d 701, 712 (E.D. Pa. 2016) (collecting cases)

(finding that the plaintiff “abandoned those claims upon which she failed

to make an substantive arguments” in opposition to a motion to dismiss);

, 2024 WL 4826053,

at *4 (D.N.J. Nov. 19, 2024) (concluding that the plaintiff’s failure to

address arguments in opposing a motion to dismiss constituted an

abandonment of such claims). Accordingly, the plaintiffs’ Due Process

claim will be dismissed.

Finally, we note that the plaintiffs have requested leave to amend

their complaint. Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits

a party to amend a pleading once as a matter of course, if amended within

a particular timeframe, and with either consent of the opposing party or

leave of court in all other cases. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). Leave to amend

should be freely given “when justice so requires.” However, the

decision to grant a party’s request to amend a pleading lies within the

discretion of the court. , 213 F.3d 113, 115 (3d Cir. 2000).

A court may deny a party’s request to amend if amendment would result

in undue delay, is motivated by bad faith, would prejudice the nonmoving

party, or would be futile. , 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962).

Here, the plaintiffs have already amended their complaint once.

Further, the plaintiffs had the opportunity to defend the merits of this

Due Process claim and chose not to do so in their opposition to the instant

motion. ( Doc. 57). Thus, in our view, permitting amendment would

result in prejudice to the defendants, who have already expended time

and resources arguing against the merits of this claim, both in the instant

motion and in the previous motion to dismiss. ,

434 F.3d 196, 204 (3d Cir. 2006) (“[P]rejudice to the non-moving party is

the touchstone for the denial of an amendment.”) (internal quotation

marks and citations omitted). Accordingly, the plaintiffs’ request for

leave to amend will be denied.

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the defendants’ motion to dismiss (Doc.

48) will be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART as follows:

1. The motion will be GRANTED with respect to the plaintiffs’

Due Process claim;

2. The motion will be DENIED with respect to the Title IX claim

against the District, the Equal Protection claim against the

individual defendants, and the claim against the

District; and

3. The plaintiffs’ request for leave to amend will be DENIED.

An appropriate order follows.

Daryl F. Bloom

Chief United States Magistrate Judge

Dated: December 23, 2024