stating that “when video firmly settles a factual issue, we will not indulge stories clearly contradicted by the footage because there is no genuine factual dispute.”
How later courts described this case
- stating that “when video firmly settles a factual issue, we will not indulge stories clearly contradicted by the footage because there is no genuine factual dispute.”
- stating that “any evidence or argument about indemnification is barred at trial as irrelevant and highly prejudicial under Federal Rules of Evidence 401 and 403”
- holding that “[p]robable cause is an absolute defense to a false arrest claim”
- “In Brooks, this court held that an officer had probable cause to arrest for resisting under 720 ILCS 5/31–1(a) when the subject pulled back from the officer’s attempt to seize him.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 23-1463
NATHANIEL PRYOR,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
MICHAEL CORRIGAN, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 1:17-cv-01968 — Steven C. Seeger, Judge.
____________________
ARGUED FEBRUARY 5, 2024 — DECIDED DECEMBER 23, 2024
____________________
Before ROVNER, BRENNAN, and KIRSCH, Circuit Judges.
BRENNAN, Circuit Judge. After receiving a tip about drug
activity linked to a van in a specific area of Aurora, Illinois,
officers pulled over a vehicle that fit the description. Once the
van stopped, Nathaniel Pryor and another man exited
quickly. An officer yelled to Pryor to get on the ground, ran
to him, took him down, struck him twice, and later searched
him. Although officers determined that Pryor was not
2 No. 23-1463
involved with drug activity, the state charged him with ob-
structing/resisting a police officer. The state later dropped the
charge.
Pryor sued several officers and the City of Aurora. He
brought multiple federal and state law claims, including un-
der 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court granted in part defend-
ants’ motion for summary judgment. The remaining claims
went to trial, at which the jury found for the defendants. Pryor
appeals, claiming the district court erred in its summary judg-
ment decision and in many evidentiary and procedural rul-
ings at trial.
The district court did not err in granting defendants sum-
mary judgment on Pryor’s false arrest claim and qualified im-
munity on part of his excessive force claim. And Corrigan’s
two searches were proper incident to Pryor’s arrest. The dis-
trict court also did not abuse its discretion in its trial decisions.
So, we affirm the district court in full.
I. Background
A. Factual
On March 23, 2015, Aurora police received a tip from a
confidential informant that someone would be “cooking crack
cocaine at a home on Kane Street,” and “would be in a con-
version van.” Five police officers joined a stakeout of that lo-
cation. Officer Damien Cantona and another officer surveilled
the home from a distance in their vehicle. Officer Michael Cor-
rigan and another officer cruised the neighborhood. Officer
Nathaniel Isaak parked further down Kane Street with direc-
tions, if probable cause existed, to stop the van.
Later that evening, a conversion van drove into the neigh-
borhood. Pryor sat in the front passenger seat and the man
No. 23-1463 3
named in the tip sat in the back seat. They were headed to
Pryor’s house to grab his gym bag and then to “go to the gym
for a workout.”
Isaak was the first officer to see the van. He watched it ap-
proach the intersection of Kane and Ohio Streets, stop at a
stop sign, signal, and then turn right. But the van failed to sig-
nal 100 feet before turning, a violation of Illinois law. Isaak
decided to stop the van, so he began to follow it. Corrigan fol-
lowed Isaak’s squad car in their cruiser, trailing by a few
blocks.
Corrigan’s and Isaak’s police car dash cameras captured
this sequence, the ensuing traffic stop, and the events that fol-
lowed. The two dashcams recorded video and audio, some of
which overlapped. Corrigan’s camera showed Pryor’s initial
actions after the traffic stop. Isaak’s camera captured the be-
ginning of the interaction between Pryor and Corrigan, and
Corrigan’s camera showed the end.
The parties characterize what took place differently, but
the videos tell their own story. On appeal, we “view the facts
and draw reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to
the party opposing the summary judgment motion.” Scott v.
Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007) (cleaned up). But when parties
tell two different stories, “one of which is blatantly contra-
dicted by the record,” we “should not adopt that version of
the facts… .” Id. at 380. And “[w]hen video ‘firmly settles a
factual issue,’ we will not ‘indulge stories clearly contradicted
by the footage’ because there is no genuine factual dispute.”
Smith v. Finkley, 10 F.4th 725, 730 (7th Cir. 2021) (citing Horton
v. Pobjecky, 883 F.3d 941, 944 (7th Cir. 2018)). The district court
found that certain parts of the videos are susceptible to differ-
ent interpretations (creating an issue of fact) or were unclear.
4 No. 23-1463
But most of the video depictions were clear. There is no sug-
gestion that the recordings are unreliable or inauthentic.
The dashcam from Isaak’s squad car shows him following
the van for about 20 seconds over two blocks before pulling it
over. The driver of the van hit the brakes, activated his turn
signal, and within a few seconds pulled into a driveway. Isaak
parked his squad car in front of the house just before the
driveway.
As soon as the van parked, the man in the back seat exited
the vehicle and took off running. Isaak then called into his ra-
dio, “I got—I got a male bailing out of the house! 1123 Fen-
ton.” Isaak ran toward the van and then pursued the fleeing
man, yelling, “Get on the ground! Get on the ground now! Get
on the ground!”
At the same time, Corrigan’s squad car approached the
scene. That car’s dashcam recorded Pryor exiting the van,
shutting the passenger door, and moving down the driveway
toward the street. Pryor did not run, but he did not walk ei-
ther. His feet moved quickly, yet he did not cover much
ground, taking about 12 steps in roughly four seconds.
As Pryor reached the end of the driveway, Corrigan and
Christoffel pulled in behind Isaak’s vehicle. One officer yelled,
“Go” five times, and “He’s out, he’s out! He’s running, he’s
running!” Pryor slowed to a stop where the driveway met the
street, directly in front of the hood of Isaak’s squad car. He
faced the squad cars and raised both hands, which were
empty, in the air. He stood still for a few seconds, looking at
the officers. Corrigan twice yelled for Pryor to “Get on the
ground!” Then, Corrigan ran toward Pryor. Pryor claims that
No. 23-1463 5
Corrigan had his gun drawn, but if so, this was outside of the
dashcam view.
Corrigan approached Pryor, who was a much larger man,
from the front. Corrigan later testified that because Pryor had
not been searched and was larger than him, Corrigan feared
Pryor was going to gain control over the situation and harm
him.
Corrigan ran behind Pryor and put both arms around his
midsection. Corrigan then used his right leg to sweep Pryor’s
left leg, taking him to the ground, and then tackled him. Pryor
claims he was not given time to get on the ground, he did not
resist Corrigan, and Corrigan did not tell him he was under
arrest or why he was being arrested.
Pryor landed on his side in the snow-spotted pavement.
He was face down with Corrigan straddling him. Pryor says
he hit his head on the cement, making him woozy. Pryor then
asked, “what’s going on?” Corrigan yelled, “don’t fight, stop
fighting!” Pryor responded, “I’m not fighting.” Corrigan or-
dered Pryor to put his hands behind his back. Pryor asked,
“Sir, what is the problem?” The video shows that Pryor may
not have put his hands behind his back right away. Pryor re-
peated, “what is the problem?”
Corrigan then raised his right arm and hit Pryor. The
video does not show where the blow landed, but Pryor says
it was on his head. Corrigan once again commanded Pryor to
put his hands behind his back. Pryor repeatedly asked, “Sir,
what is the problem?” Corrigan told Pryor “don’t move.”
Meanwhile, Corrigan reached for his handcuffs, grabbed
Pryor’s arms, and placed him in the restraints. This took about
30 seconds. While handcuffing Pryor, Corrigan struck him a
6 No. 23-1463
second time. The video does not make clear if Pryor was fully
handcuffed during the second strike. The officer continued to
yell “stop fighting” and “don’t move!” Corrigan then stood
up, and Pryor laid on the ground in handcuffs, asking to get
up.
About a minute later, Corrigan asked, “Why didn’t you
get on the ground when I told you to get on the ground?”
Pryor responded, “I had got my hands up! You didn’t see me
with my hands up?” After some back and forth, Corrigan
said, “When the police stop a car, and you get out and run
from it, that’s a problem.” He added, “The crazy part is, when
you normally get stopped by the police, you don’t run from
the car. That’s the crazy part.”
Corrigan searched Pryor while he laid on the pavement.
Pryor wore black jeans over a pair of sweatpants. Under the
sweatpants were basketball shorts and then underwear. Cor-
rigan later helped Pryor to his feet and searched him a second
time. The dashcam videos do not show the details of Corri-
gan’s searches.
Eventually, the police put Pryor into a transport vehicle
and took him to the police station. Pryor testified that, while
he sat in the back of the vehicle, Cantona searched him a third
time. Cantona denied this search happened, and the alleged
third search was not captured on video. Pryor testified, and
the officers denied, that Corrigan and Cantona inappropri-
ately touched Pryor during their respective searches of him.
Those searches uncovered no contraband. The officers found
no contraband in the conversion van or in the area where the
other passenger had fled the scene.
No. 23-1463 7
B. Procedural
Pryor was charged with “obstructing/resisting a police of-
ficer in violation of 720 ILCS 5/31-1.” He was not charged with
any other crime, and the state eventually dismissed the
charge.
Pryor filed suit against Corrigan, Cantona, several other
officers, and the City of Aurora. He brought six claims: three
under federal law, 42 U.S.C. § 1983—false arrest, excessive
force, and illegal search; one under both federal and state
law—malicious prosecution; and two under state law alone—
battery and indemnification.
The parties cross-moved for summary judgment. The dis-
trict court denied Pryor’s motion in its entirety and granted in
part and denied in part defendants’ motion. In a lengthy and
detailed order, the court dismissed the false arrest and mali-
cious prosecution claims in their entirety; dismissed part of
the excessive force, illegal search, and battery claims; and dis-
missed all defendants except Corrigan and Cantona. Three
claims survived for trial: (1) the excessive force claims under
§ 1983 against Corrigan for the two punches; (2) the illegal
search claims under § 1983 against Cantona for the third
search; and (3) the state law battery claims against Corrigan,
Cantona, and the City of Aurora.
Before trial, the parties filed nearly forty motions in limine
and raised multiple evidentiary disputes. The district court is-
sued two thorough sets of orders and rulings resolving these
challenges. During trial, Pryor filed largely duplicative mo-
tions on which the court also ruled. A four-day trial took place
in February 2023, and the jury found defendants not liable on
all remaining claims.
8 No. 23-1463
On appeal, Pryor claims the district court erred in granting
defendants summary judgment on his three § 1983 claims—
false arrest, excessive force, and illegal search. 1 Pryor also
challenges five of the district court’s evidentiary and proce-
dural rulings for trial.
II. Summary Judgment
We review de novo a trial court’s summary judgment rul-
ing. Turubchuk v. S. Ill. Asphalt Co., Inc., 958 F.3d 541, 548 (7th
Cir. 2020). Summary judgment is appropriate when there is
no dispute of material fact, and the moving party is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a); Brown v.
Osmundson, 38 F.4th 545, 549 (7th Cir. 2022). The same princi-
ples apply when parties file cross-motions for summary judg-
ment. We treat each cross-motion “separately in determining
whether judgment should be entered in accordance with Rule
56.” Marcatante v. City of Chicago, 657 F.3d 433, 439 (7th Cir.
2011).
Pryor claims the district court erred in granting defend-
ants summary judgment on his false arrest, excessive force,
and illegal search claims. We discuss each in turn.
A. False Arrest
Pryor was arrested and charged with “obstructing/resist-
ing a police officer in violation of 720 ILCS 5/31-1.” He claims
1 Pryor mentions his malicious prosecution claim in his opening brief,
but he does not explicitly address it, except to conclude without analysis
that he is entitled to summary judgment. Absent more discussion, Pryor
waives this argument on appeal. See Bradley v. Village of University Park, 59
F.4th 887, 897 (7th Cir. 2023).
No. 23-1463 9
Corrigan could not arrest him on this charge, so he was falsely
arrested.
Probable cause is an absolute defense to a false arrest
claim, and we analyze it objectively. Abbott v. Sangamon
County, 705 F.3d 706, 713 (7th Cir. 2013). Probable cause exists
if the “totality of the facts and circumstances known to the of-
ficer at the time of the arrest would warrant a reasonable, pru-
dent person in believing that the arrestee had committed, was
committing, or was about to commit a crime.” Id. at 714. Only
a probability or substantial chance of criminal activity is re-
quired, not an actual showing of such activity. See United
States v. Carroll, 750 F.3d 700, 706 (7th Cir. 2014).
Obstruction of Justice. 720 ILCS 5/31-1 prohibits a person
from knowingly “obstruct[ing] the performance by one
known to the person to be a peace officer… .” 720 ILCS 5/31-
1. As the dashcam videos showed, after the traffic stop Pryor
exited the van, shut the passenger door, and moved down the
driveway toward the street. Pryor traveled quickly, but he did
not cover a lot of ground—taking about 12 steps in roughly
four seconds. As Pryor reached the end of the driveway, Cor-
rigan arrived at the scene. Observing Pryor leave the van and
head south away from him and the other officers, Corrigan
yelled for Pryor to “Get on the ground!”
Pryor argues that Corrigan did not have probable cause to
arrest him for obstruction of justice. His argument rests on
Corrigan’s discovery response to one of Pryor’s requests to
admit, which stated:
The individual defendant responding to this Re-
quest to Admit is not claiming that he/she had
probable cause to arrest NATHANIEL PRYOR
10 No. 23-1463
on March 23, 2015, for any charge other than re-
sisting arrest.
RESPONSE: Officer Corrigan admits.
Pryor contends that Corrigan’s response is a judicial admis-
sion that there was not probable cause to arrest Pryor for any
crime other than resisting arrest. Accordingly, no probable
cause existed for an underlying offense, such as obstruction
of justice by leaving a lawful traffic stop.
But Pryor misunderstands the impact of Corrigan’s
discovery response. Probable cause is an objective standard.
Corrigan’s subjective understanding of probable cause is ir-
relevant to the objective existence of probable cause. See
Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 153 (2004) (“[An officer’s]
subjective reason for making the arrest need not be the crimi-
nal offense as to which the known facts provide probable
cause.”). As the Supreme Court has explained, “the fact that
the officer does not have the state of mind which is hypothe-
cated by the reasons which provide the legal justification for
the officer’s action does not invalidate the action taken as long
as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action.”
Id.
Instead, the court must view all facts from the standpoint
of an “objectively reasonable police officer” and determine,
based on those facts, whether probable cause existed. District
of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 57 (2018); see also Washington
v. City of Chicago, 98 F.4th 860, 875 (7th Cir. 2024) (“Probable
cause is ‘assessed objectively based on ‘the conclusions that
the ... officer reasonably might have drawn from the infor-
mation known to him.’” (citing Young v. City of Chicago, 987
F.3d 641, 644 (2021))). So, even if Corrigan’s response were an
No. 23-1463 11
admission, probable cause could have supported Corrigan’s
decision to arrest Pryor for obstruction of justice.
Considering the totality of the evidence, a reasonable of-
ficer in Corrigan’s position could have concluded that Pryor
was leaving a lawful traffic stop. When a passenger does so,
an officer has probable cause to arrest for resisting or obstruct-
ing a police officer. See People v. Johnson, 945 N.E.2d 2, 14–15
(Ill. App. Ct. 2010) (defendant, a passenger in vehicle lawfully
stopped for traffic infraction, attempted to evade police by
running from vehicle; officers had probable cause to arrest
him for obstruction under Illinois law). Corrigan thus had
probable cause to arrest and charge Pryor with obstruction of
justice under 720 ILCS 5/31-1. The district court did not err,
therefore, in granting Corrigan summary judgment on
Pryor’s false arrest claim as to his obstruction of justice
charge.
Resisting Arrest. To evaluate whether defendants appropri-
ately arrested Pryor for this crime, we must decide (1)
whether probable cause for an underlying offense existed to
arrest Pryor, (2) when Pryor was under arrest, and (3) whether
Pryor resisted arrest as defined by 720 ILCS 5/31–1. See 720
ILCS 5/31–1; Abbott, 705 F.3d at 719–20.
First, as explained above, a reasonable officer in Corrigan’s
position could have concluded that Pryor was leaving a law-
ful traffic stop. Corrigan consequently had probable cause to
arrest and to charge Pryor.
Second, an arrest occurs when “a reasonable person in the
suspect’s position would have understood the situation to
constitute a restraint on freedom of movement” and submits
to the known police officer. Tebbens v. Mushol, 692 F.3d 807,
12 No. 23-1463
816 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing Ochana v. Flores, 347 F.3d 266, 270
(7th Cir. 2003)). Here, the emergency lights were activated on
Corrigan’s police vehicle, and he ran toward Pryor ordering
him to “get on the ground.” Pryor stopped and raised his
hands, then lowered them as Corrigan approached. As the
district court explained, Pryor’s actions constituted submis-
sion because no reasonable person would have felt “free to
decline the officer’s request or otherwise terminate the en-
counter.” Kernats v. O’Sullivan, 35 F.3d 1171, 1177 (7th Cir.
1994) (quoting Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 435–36 (1991)).
So, at this point Pryor was under arrest.
Third, because Pryor was under arrest, any subsequent re-
sistance violates 720 ILCS 5/31–1. Resistance under Illinois
law is an action that “impedes, hinders, interrupts, prevents,
or delays the performance of the officer's duties” and is de-
fined as “withstanding the force or effect of or the exertion of
oneself to counteract or defeat.” Brooks v. City of Aurora, 653
F.3d 478, 484 (7th Cir. 2011) (quoting People v. Agnew-Downs,
936 N.E.2d 166, 173 (2010)). This is true even if the arrest was
“unlawful.” Id. (quoting Hardrick v. City of Bolingbrook, 522
F.3d 758, 762 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing People v. Villarreal, 604
N.E.2d 923, 926–27 (1992))).
In Brooks, this court held that an officer had probable cause
to arrest for resisting under 720 ILCS 5/31–1(a) when the sub-
ject pulled back from the officer’s attempt to seize him. 653
F.3d at 483–84. Here, Pryor refused Corrigan’s orders to “get
on the ground.” Instead, Pryor began to lower his arms as
Corrigan ran toward him. This prevented Corrigan from gain-
ing control of Pryor and placing him in handcuffs. Once on
the ground, Pryor continued to resist Corrigan’s attempt to
place his hands behind his back to restrain him. A reasonable
No. 23-1463 13
officer in Corrigan’s place could have believed that Pryor re-
sisted within the meaning of 720 ILCS 5/31-1(a).
Altogether, Corrigan could appropriately arrest Pryor for
resisting arrest. The district court did not err in granting Cor-
rigan summary judgment on Pryor’s false arrest claim on this
charge. 2
B. Excessive Force
Qualified immunity rests on two questions: “first, whether
the facts presented, taken in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff, describe a violation of a constitutional right; and sec-
ond, whether the federal right at issue was clearly established
at the time of the alleged violation.” Smith, 10 F.4th at 737. If
the plaintiff fails to prove either prong, “the defendant official
is protected by qualified immunity.” Id. (citing Koh v. Ustich,
933 F.3d 836, 844 (7th Cir. 2019)). Pryor argues the district
court erred in granting Corrigan qualified immunity against
Pryor’s claim of excessive force during the leg sweep and
tackle, in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 3
The district court, in its discretion, addressed only the sec-
ond prong of the qualified immunity analysis—whether the
2 Pryor sued the remaining ten defendants under theories of failure to
intervene and supervisor liability. Given that Corrigan had probable cause
to arrest Pryor for resisting arrest or obstructing justice, there is no under-
lying constitutional violation in the arrest. See supra, Section II.A. Thus, the
district court properly granted summary judgment to the remaining de-
fendants on Pryor’s false arrest claim.
3 Pryor also argues that the district court should not have granted
qualified immunity when facts are disputed. But, as discussed above, the
district court correctly interpretated the dashcam video footage. So, we
reject this argument.
14 No. 23-1463
right at issue was “clearly established” at the time of the inci-
dent—without first determining whether a constitutional vi-
olation occurred. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236
(2009) (“judges of the district courts and the courts of appeals
should be permitted to exercise their sound discretion in de-
ciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity
analysis should be addressed first”). A constitutional right is
clearly established “if the right in question is sufficiently clear
that a reasonable official would understand that what he is
doing violates that right.” Smith, 10 F.4th at 742 (cleaned up).
In addition, the right must be “defined with specificity.” Id.
To decide whether a right satisfies these requirements, we
“analyze whether precedent squarely governs the facts at is-
sue… .” Id. (citing Strand v. Minchuk, 910 F.3d 909, 917 (7th
Cir. 2018)).
The parties discuss two cases, Johnson v. Scott, 576 F.3d 658
(7th Cir. 2009) and Hollingsworth v. City of Aurora, No. 11 CV
4597, 2014 WL 7204083 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 11, 2014). But neither
parallels this one. In Johnson and Hollingsworth, officers were
granted qualified immunity for tackling suspects. But both
cases involved violent underlying crimes. See Johnson, 576
F.3d at 660 (noting that “there were two serious crimes at is-
sue: a shooting and reckless flight from the police in a vehi-
cle”); Hollingsworth, 2014 WL 7204083, at *3 (explaining that
“the initial crime at issue was a robbery involving a substan-
tial amount of money”). And both involved longer police
chases. See Johnson, 576 F.3d at 661 (characterizing Johnson’s
attempt to evade police in his car and on foot as “reckless and
determined”); Hollingsworth, 2014 WL 7204083, at *4 (describ-
ing Hollingsworth’s “jump out of a moving vehicle”). This
case does not present such extreme facts.
No. 23-1463 15
Relying on these differences, Pryor submits that an officer
tackling someone was acceptable in Johnson and Hollingworth,
but this case is not like Johnson and Hollingsworth, so tackling
was unacceptable here. Pryor’s argument is flawed because
those two cases do not clearly establish when tackling is im-
permissible. To satisfy his burden, Pryor needs to show that
it is “beyond debate” that the tackle here was unacceptable.
See Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011). He must estab-
lish that tackling is clearly a constitutional violation in cases
like this one. Neither Johnson nor Hollingsworth does that, so
Pryor fails to meet his burden.
Pryor also cites two cases explaining that “police officers
do not have the right to shove, push, or otherwise assault in-
nocent citizens without any provocation whatsoever.” Taylor
v. City of Milford, 10 F.4th 800, 808 (7th Cir. 2021) (citing Clash
v. Beatty, 77 F.3d 1045, 1048 (7th Cir. 1996)); see also Gupta v.
Melloh, 19 F.4th 990, 1001 (7th Cir. 2021). Again, these cases
are distinguishable. Here, because of the informant’s tip about
the possibility of drugs and the surveillance background, a
reasonable officer in Corrigan’s circumstances could have be-
lieved Pryor committed a dangerous act of provocation when
he exited the van and traveled down the driveway. Common
v. City of Chicago, 661 F.3d 940, 943 (7th Cir. 2011) (“This stand-
ard requires that a fact finder analyze whether the officer’s ac-
tions are objectively reasonable in light of the facts and under
the circumstances confronting the officer at the time of the in-
cident, without regard to the underlying motive or intent of
the officer, and without the benefit of hindsight.”). For all Cor-
rigan knew, he faced a dangerous situation involving drugs
and two individuals fleeing a lawful traffic stop. What Corri-
gan knew before the alleged use of force matters, not what he
learned after. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989)
16 No. 23-1463
(“The ‘reasonableness’ of a particular use of force must be
judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the
scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.”).
Qualified immunity “protects actions in the hazy border
between excessive and acceptable force.” Mullenix v. Luna, 577
U.S. 7, 18 (2015) (cleaned up). Pryor has not shown that it was
clearly established when he was tackled that such force was
excessive under the Fourth Amendment. So, the district court
did not err in finding Corrigan’s tackle protected by qualified
immunity. 4
* * *
We affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment
on parts of Pryor’s false arrest and excessive force claims. Our
dissenting colleague takes a different view of the factual rec-
ord. We offer an overarching response and then counter the
specific contentions.
Our review and consideration of the Corrigan and Isaak
dashcam videos is criticized as “usurp[ing] the jury’s role”
and invading “the province of the jury.” But our dissenting
colleague has not offered a clear line separating when a video
4 Pryor contends the district court erred by granting Corrigan sum-
mary judgment on his leg sweep and tackle of Pryor but allowing Corri-
gan’s two punches of Pryor to go to trial. By separating these actions that
occurred only seconds apart, Pryor claims the court “creat[ed] an almost
impossible case to try.”
But Pryor cites no authority in support of his claim. And we see no
error in presenting to the jury the punches, on which the parties presented
conflicting evidence and the video is inconclusive. Nor did the court err
in deciding that Corrigan warranted qualified immunity for the tackle.
Pryor has failed to offer case law that holds beyond debate that the tackle
here is impermissible.
No. 23-1463 17
depiction allows for recognizing facts as established for sum-
mary judgment versus reserving a factual dispute for a jury.
After innumerable viewings of the videos and thorough re-
view of this voluminous record, we remain comfortable
drawing that line in the same place as the district court. As
that court correctly concluded, certain video depictions are
susceptible to different reasonable interpretations, such as the
excessive force claim on the two punches. Or, the video is cap-
tured from too far away, such as Corrigan’s second search of
Pryor. But most of the events that form the basis for Pryor’s
many claims are plainly portrayed, unobstructed and in their
entirety, in one or both videos. So, neither the parties nor the
district court were mistaken to consider and rely on them in
the manner they did. 5
5 The dissent cites several authorities which suggest it is improper to
rely on videos in these circumstances. But those decisions are factually
distinguishable.
Kailin v. Village of Gurnee, 77 F.4th 476 (7th Cir. 2023), involved a six-
second video, without audio, in which an officer shot a dog, and in which
the audio was key to the case’s resolution. Id. at 482. The dashcam videos
here are much longer (Corrigan’s 52 minutes, Isaak’s 31 minutes), and
even if only the traffic stop and arrest portions are considered, they last a
few minutes and include audio.
In Jackson v. Curry, 888 F.3d 259 (7th Cir. 2018), this court said a “video
is bound to be subject to varying interpretations.” Id. at 264. There—oppo-
site from here—the district court did not even view the video in question,
id. at 263, and our court concluded it lacked jurisdiction to review that
decision not to watch the video. Id. at 263–64.
In Gant v. Hartman, 924 F.3d 445 (7th Cir. 2019), the video depicted the
plaintiff standing in a doorway, arm extended holding a door, and then
his arm lowering slightly before an officer fired, all occurring within a
18 No. 23-1463
The dissent also reviews several resisting and obstructing
episodes, disputing that the videos show that probable cause
existed to arrest Pryor. But the dissent’s descriptions of the
videos and findings of disputed inferences are unduly
cramped.
Before the traffic stop, the officers had substantial infor-
mation about drugs, as well as surveillance that had been per-
formed concerning the driver and the van. The videos also
show the officers driving behind the van through Aurora for
blocks before the traffic violation.
As for resisting arrest, when Corrigan approached Pryor
at the end of the driveway, Pryor was seized when he was no
longer free to leave. See Tebbens, 692 F.3d at 816 (7th Cir. 2012)
(citation omitted). The video unquestionably conveys Corri-
gan’s commands to Pryor and his failure to follow those com-
mands. Our colleague cites to “common sense” that resistance
is not possible before an arrest has been attempted. But these
events occurred in 2015, and not until 2021 did Illinois enact
the version of 720 ILCS 5/31-1(d) which requires an underly-
ing offense before arrest for resisting.
The videos do not require inferences to conclude that
Pryor leaving the van and traveling down the driveway con-
stituted obstruction. The officers were executing a lawful traf-
fic stop. Regardless of how fast Pryor traveled, he left the van
during that stop, proceeded away from the vehicle, admitted
single second. Id. at 450. From that snippet our court concluded that
material facts were in dispute, foreclosing interlocutory appellate jurisdic-
tion. Id. at 448–51. The videos here are much longer than in Gant and de-
pict most of the events that form the basis of Pryor’s claims and the offic-
ers’ defenses.
No. 23-1463 19
he was moving away from the officers, and stopped only after
Corrigan’s commands.
The same is true for obstruction for Pryor’s refusal to get
on the ground. Our dissenting colleague says the videos are
not definitive, and that Pryor’s protest that he had insufficient
time to get down created a fact issue. But his claim is “clearly
contradicted” by the dashcam videos which capture the com-
mands for Pryor to get on the ground, his failure to do so, and
the duration of his delay. See Finkley, 10 F.4th at 730.
As for resisting during handcuffing, Illinois law prohibits
an individual from delaying, impeding, or hindering the per-
formance of a police officer’s duties. The videos are not un-
clear that Pryor’s actions meet at least one, if not all three of
these prohibitions. The Isaak dashcam video shows the one
minute in which Corrigan approached Pryor, executed the leg
sweep and tackle, and Corrigan handcuffed him. 6 The Corri-
gan dashcam video, for approximately three and a half
minutes, shows Pryor stopping at the end of the driveway;
Corrigan leg sweeping, tackling, handcuffing, and searching
Pryor; them discussing why he was taken down; and Corri-
gan helping Pryor up. 7
Last, our dissenting colleague concludes that Corrigan
should not have been granted summary judgment on the leg
sweep and tackle because whether that force was excessive
depends on if Pryor was resisting or submitting to the officers.
Even if there was a fact dispute as to the resisting, though,
6 Dist. Ct. Ex. 18, Isaak dashcam video and audio, 0:53–1:50.
7 Dist. Ct. Ex. 17, Corrigan dashcam video and audio, 1:00–4:34.
20 No. 23-1463
Pryor has cited no case law that in these circumstances Corri-
gan’s actions were impermissible. 8
Without clearly established case law that the leg sweep
and tackle here were impermissible beyond debate, the dis-
trict court properly granted Corrigan qualified immunity on
this portion of Pryor’s excessive force claim.
C. Illegal Searches
Pryor claims certain defendants searched him three times.
The district court granted defendants summary judgment on
the two searches performed by Corrigan and recorded on
video. The third search, performed by Cantona and not rec-
orded, was contested at trial. Pryor reasserts that the police
did not have probable cause or reasonable suspicion to be-
lieve he possessed drugs or a gun. To Pryor, defendants had
no justifiable reason to search him, and the district court erred
in granting defendants summary judgment on the first two
searches.
We have “recognized that, given the dangers of drug traf-
ficking, guns and drugs often go hand in hand.” United States
v. Jones, 900 F.3d 440, 449 (7th Cir. 2018). Corrigan assisted in
a lawful traffic stop of a van related to suspected drug activity.
8 Neither of the authorities our dissenting colleague references on this
point involved facts remotely like the leg sweep and tackle here.
In Gupta v. Melloh, 19 F.4th 990 (7th Cir. 2021), an intoxicated arrestee
was handcuffed and fell and fractured a vertebra in his neck. Id. at 995–
1000. There, an officer placed his hands on the arrestee’s arm and pulled
him forward, purportedly because the arrestee was actively resisting ar-
rest. Id. at 997–98. And in Miller v. Gonzalez, 761 F.3d 822 (7th Cir. 2014),
the officer leaped a chain link fence and landed with his knee directly on
the plaintiff’s head, breaking his jaw. Id. at 825.
No. 23-1463 21
He saw Pryor get out of the van and move quickly down the
driveway toward the street. For these reasons, Corrigan could
have reasonably believed that Pryor was fleeing and had
drugs or a weapon on his person.
It is a “bright-line rule that police are entitled to search the
persons and possessions of everyone arrested on probable
cause, with or without any reason to suspect that the person
is armed or carrying contraband.” United States v. Jackson, 377
F.3d 715, 716 (7th Cir. 2004) (discussing the search of a defend-
ant who was “stopped for a traffic violation, arrested, and
taken into custody”) (citing Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260
(1973) and United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973)). Cor-
rigan thus could constitutionally search Pryor incident to ar-
rest. Such a search can be “‘a relatively extensive exploration
of the person.’” Campbell v. Miller, 499 F.3d 711, 717 (7th Cir.
2007) (citing Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235). But it becomes unlaw-
ful when the search is conducted in a manner that is “‘extreme
or patently abusive.’” Id. (citing Robinson, 414 U.S. at 236).
The district court correctly found that Corrigan’s two
searches of Pryor were not “extreme or patently abusive.”
First, there is no support in the record that Corrigan searched
Pryor for sexual gratification or to humiliate him. Second,
there was no evidence that Corrigan exposed Pryor’s private
parts to the public. At most, as Pryor argues, the searches ex-
posed his boxers. But this contention is insufficient to create a
genuine issue of fact about whether the search exposed his
private parts. See United States v. Williams, 209 F.3d 940, 943–
44 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that an officer may conduct “a full
search of the person,” including “pat[ting]-down” and subse-
quently “sliding his hand under [a defendant’s] waistband
and down the back part of his pants,” as long as the defendant
22 No. 23-1463
“was never disrobed or exposed to the public”). Third, Pryor
alleges that during the first search Corrigan “searched him
thoroughly, going up his boxers, [and] into his private area”
and during the second search Corrigan “put his hand down
inside the front of Plaintiff’s boxers and searched, touching
his genitals.” But those allegations, even if true, do not
amount to a strip or body cavity search. See id. Thus, there is
no factual support to establish that Corrigan’s two searches
incident to arrest were unlawful. 9
III. Jury Trial
Pryor also challenges many of the evidentiary and proce-
dural rulings before and at the jury trial. The evidentiary rul-
ings, including on motions in limine, are reviewed for abuse
of discretion. Turubchuk, 958 F.3d at 548. When rulings involve
a question of law, though, review is de novo. Id. We also re-
view jury instruction decisions for abuse of discretion.
E.E.O.C. v. AutoZone, Inc., 809 F.3d 916, 921–22 (7th Cir. 2016).
And harmlessness is evaluated “in light of the entire record,”
9 Pryor also claims the district court abused its discretion when it
barred him from testifying as to the “cumulative effect” of the three
searches. He says Cantona’s third search was unreasonable because Cor-
rigan had already searched him two times. But the district court correctly
noted that Pryor first raised this argument one week before trial. It was
not offered in the complaint, during discovery, or in the cross–motions for
summary judgment. Because Pryor tried to add a new theory of liability
just before trial, the district court did not abuse its discretion in precluding
it. See FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)(2); Liebhart v. SPX Corp., 917 F.3d 952, 964 (7th
Cir. 2019) (explaining when a court can deny an amendment under Rule
15). Further, any error that might have occurred on this point was harm-
less. Cantona denied performing a third search. He testified he “was not
even on the scene until way later.” So, any theory of cumulative effect
would not have affected the jury’s decision.
No. 23-1463 23
and “[w]here there are several errors, each of which is harm-
less in its own right, a new trial may still be granted if the cu-
mulative effect of those otherwise harmless errors deprives a
litigant of a fair trial.” Nelson v. City of Chicago, 810 F.3d 1061,
1075 (7th Cir. 2016) (citing Barber v. City of Chicago, 725 F.3d
702, 715 (7th Cir. 2013)).
Pryor claims the district court erred in: (1) allowing evi-
dence regarding Corrigan’s and Cantona’s drug surveillance;
(2) barring Pryor from testifying that he was not involved in
illegal drug activity and that the police did not locate any
drugs during the incident; (3) allowing Corrigan to testify
about his knowledge of the area and limiting Pryor’s testi-
mony about race; (4) allowing Corrigan’s statements made in
his dashcam video and testimony at trial; and (5) denying
Pryor’s jury instruction regarding who would pay any judg-
ment.
A. Surveillance Evidence
Pryor sought to bar all evidence about the drug surveil-
lance conducted before his arrest. He claims the court erred in
admitting that evidence because the officers did not observe
any criminal activity and the informant’s name was never dis-
closed. Surveillance evidence thus would be “speculative and
grossly prejudicial to plaintiff.”
The district court denied in part and granted in part
Pryor’s motion. In a lengthy order, the court explained this
evidence was relevant for two reasons. First, surveillance in-
formation “provides important context for the traffic stop.”
Second, “the suspicion of drug-related activity also has a
bearing on the reasonableness of the use of force.”
24 No. 23-1463
Courts consider the totality of the circumstances to evalu-
ate whether an officer used more force than reasonably neces-
sary to effectuate an arrest. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 396; Phillips
v. Cmty. Ins. Corp., 678 F.3d 513, 519 (7th Cir. 2012). This can
include “the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect
poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or oth-
ers, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting
to evade arrest by flight.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396; see also
Turner v. City of Champaign, 979 F.3d 563, 567 (7th Cir. 2020).
And “[i]n order to assess objective reasonableness, the [jury]
must consider all the circumstances.” Johnson, 576 F.3d at 660.
Here, the evidence about the drug surveillance provided
context for the jury when they viewed the dashcam videos.
This included why multiple police officers followed the van,
the circumstances of the traffic stop and foot chase, and the
chronology of events. Without this context, the district court
found, the jury would have difficulty “understanding why
the traffic stop played out as it did,” as there would be a
“chronological gap and a conceptual hole in the story if the
jury watched the videos without some explanation for how
the whole thing got started.” See United States v. Boros, 668
F.3d 901, 907 (7th Cir. 2012) (“[O]ne measure of relevance is
whether its exclusion would leave a chronological and con-
ceptual void in the story.”) (quotations omitted); Whitehead v.
Bond, 680 F.3d 919, 930–31 (7th Cir. 2012) (evidence giving rise
to a traffic stop is relevant to an excessive force claim and not
unfairly prejudicial).
As the district court stated, the drug surveillance infor-
mation was relevant to Corrigan’s use of force based on the
Seventh Circuit Pattern Jury Instructions and an in-depth
analysis of the Graham factors. For example, the surveillance
No. 23-1463 25
“created a suspicion that the occupants of the van were en-
gaged in criminal activity” and provided important context
for the flight. It also spoke to the “severity of the crime” and
situated Corrigan’s perception of the threat. Accordingly, the
court did not abuse its discretion in allowing this limited in-
formation into evidence at trial.
Pryor does not dispute that the drug surveillance goes to
the reasonableness of Corrigan’s use of force. Instead, Pryor
asserts the district court endorsed “a drug stop and arrest, ab-
sent any showing of probable cause or reasonable suspicion.”
He claims that characterization provided defendants “a justi-
fication for the use of force on Plaintiff.” But the record does
not support Pryor’s argument. Defendants did not discuss
probable cause at trial, and they did not argue that this was a
drug stop or drug arrest. In fact, the court denied defendants’
motion to instruct the jury that Corrigan had probable cause
to arrest Pryor and that the initial tackle was a reasonable use
of force.
Pryor also contends the district court erred in allowing the
informant to remain confidential because it “ruled that the in-
formation [provided by the informant] was not relevant to
Plaintiff’s interaction with the police later on Fenton Street.”
First, during depositions, Pryor learned what the informant
had told Cantona and why Cantona believed the informant
was reliable. Second, Pryor misstates the court’s ruling. The
court said, “Plaintiff does not adequately demonstrate how
the identity of the alleged informant is relevant to Plaintiff's
arrest for obstruction of Officer Corrigan.” It was not an abuse
of its discretion to rule that the identity of the informant—al-
legedly to evaluate reliability—is irrelevant to Pryor’s exces-
sive force or illegal search claims.
26 No. 23-1463
B. Pryor’s Barred Testimony and Presentation of Admis-
sions
Under Federal Rule of Evidence 403, relevant evidence
“may be excluded if its probative value is substantially out-
weighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.” United States v.
Earls, 704 F.3d 466, 471 (7th Cir. 2012). To Pryor, the district
court abused its discretion by barring his testimony and
defendants’ discovery responses showing that he was not in-
volved in illegal drug activity and that the police did not lo-
cate any drugs on his person or in the van. Pryor submits that
the district court’s rulings “weighed heavily in Defendants’
favor, with Defendants being allowed to claim that Plaintiff
was involved in drug trafficking, and Plaintiff being unable to
counter that.”
Yet before trial, the district court made multiple decisions
favorable to Pryor about his alleged drug activity. The court
ruled that “Defendants may not introduce evidence, testi-
mony, or arguments indicating that they believed that Plain-
tiff is a drug dealer.” And “Defendants should not suggest or
argue to the jury that Pryor was, in fact, engaged in drug-re-
lated illegality.” In sum, “Defendants should not paint Plain-
tiff as a drug dealer, or anything of that sort.” The court
further alleviated prejudice to Pryor by barring evidence that
Corrigan found cash on Pryor during his search. This pre-
cluded an inference that Pryor had “drug money” on him.
The district court also properly discussed the risks of prej-
udice against defendants, aiming to limit equally what both
parties could discuss. The court found that “the risks of unfair
prejudice tug in both directions.” “[T]he fact that Pryor did
not possess any drugs has low probative value, if any.” And
“[w]hether Pryor in fact possessed drugs has no bearing on
No. 23-1463 27
whether Officer Corrigan exercised reasonable force when he
struck Pryor.” Again, the district court explained that “the
reasonableness of force turns on the knowledge of the officer
at that moment in time, not in hindsight. … And here, the
search of Pryor took place after Corrigan restrained him, not
before.” So, Pryor could “not argue that the traffic stop, the
physical interaction, or the arrest were unlawful because he
was not in fact involved in the drug trade.”
At the beginning of trial, the court instructed the jury:
During trial, you may hear evidence that the po-
lice performed the traffic stop in connection
with a drug-related investigation. Mr. Pryor
was not arrested for a drug-related offense. Mr.
Pryor was not charged with a drug-related of-
fense.
The court repeated this instruction near the end of trial. Dur-
ing two pre-trial conferences, Pryor’s counsel agreed with this
approach.
Moreover, at trial Pryor’s counsel mentioned the lack of
drugs multiple times, including when Pryor testified:
Q. Okay. Were you arrested for a drug offense
that day?
A. No, I was not.
Q. Were you charged with a drug offense?
A. No, I was not.
And Pryor’s counsel had a similar conversation with Corrigan
during his testimony:
28 No. 23-1463
Q. You did not arrest Mr. Pryor for a drug of-
fense, did you?
A. No, I did not.
Q. You did not charge him with a drug offense,
right?
A. No, I did not.
Further, despite the trial court precluding the parties from
discussing the details of the drug surveillance, Pryor’s coun-
sel argued in closing:
Remember Mr. Cantona’s testimony. He said he
conducted a surveillance of a Kane Street resi-
dence, a conversion van, and someone named
Raymond Johnson. His surveillance consisted
of watching 1020 Kane Street for a van. He saw
no drug transaction. He saw no criminal activ-
ity. He didn’t have enough information to go to
a judge to get a search warrant for the Kane
Street property.
Thus, although the court prohibited Pryor from testifying
that he was not involved with drugs, the jury knew that Pryor
was not arrested for or charged with a drug-related offense.
This mitigated the risk that the jury would be misled into
thinking that Pryor was involved with illegal drug activity
and that the police located drugs on Pryor—the facts Pryor
wanted to testify about.
With this full view of the evidence, we do not see any
abuse of discretion in the district court’s limits on Pryor’s tes-
timony and his presentation of admissions on the lack of drug
activity.
No. 23-1463 29
C. Geographic Area and Race-Based Testimony
Pryor’s next argument stems from three district court rul-
ings on motions in limine. First, defendants could not testify
that the arrest took place in a “high crime area.” Second, Cor-
rigan could testify about his knowledge of specific incidents
in that area. Third, Pryor could not testify about the race-
based reasons for his actions.
The district court allowed Corrigan to testify about spe-
cific incidents he was aware of when he arrested Pryor, in-
cluding that members of his unit had recently been shot at in
the area. The court reasoned that “knowledge of specific acts
of violence against police officers in the area is relevant to the
reasonableness of the use of force.” The court explained this
was “part of the ‘totality of the circumstances’” necessary to
determine whether an officer used more force than reasona-
bly necessary to effectuate an arrest. See Graham, 490 U.S. at
396; Phillips, 678 F.3d at 519. And it commented that “[s]uch
acts have a bearing on how a reasonable officer would have
responded in that situation … [because a] reasonable officer
could take a need for personal safety into account.” The dis-
trict court did not abuse its discretion in allowing Corrigan to
testify to specific acts of violence because it was relevant to
Pryor’s excessive force claim.
Next, Pryor does not address whether Corrigan’s
knowledge of specific instances in the same area where he was
arrested is relevant to the reasonableness of force. Instead,
Pryor submits it was unfair that Corrigan was allowed to tes-
tify to the above, while Pryor was barred from telling the jury
that he was afraid of the police and exited the van because “he
had seen on the news what police have done to other black
men.” But Pryor does not explain how his two statements are
30 No. 23-1463
relevant to the excessive force or illegal search claims. Even
more, the court did allow Pryor to tell the jury that he was
afraid, the court just limited Pryor’s explanation of why. (“If
he was afraid, he can testify that he was afraid. There is no
need to tell the jury why he felt afraid. He can testify about
what he did, but he cannot get into social justice issues writ
large.”).
The district court concluded that the testimony Pryor
sought to introduce was more prejudicial than probative and
was “likely to distract and confuse the jury.” It was “not
aware of any evidence suggesting that racial animus played a
role in the events in question.” Generalized evidence about
the police, such as a “‘code of silence’ is unduly prejudicial
and may not be used at trial.” Townsend v. Benya, 287 F. Supp.
2d 868, 876 (N.D. Ill. 2003). So, the court did not abuse its dis-
cretion by barring Pryor from making irrelevant, race–related
statements.
D. Corrigan’s Dashcam Statements and Testimony
Pryor argues the district court abused its discretion when
it allowed the jury to hear Corrigan’s statements, captured in
the dashcam video. He claims the statements were hearsay
that confused the issues, misled the jury, and improperly
played to jurors’ sympathies. But Pryor is incorrect for several
reasons.
First, Corrigan’s statements recorded by the dashcam
were not hearsay. Defendants did not offer Corrigan’s state-
ments to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Rather, they
offered the statements to show Corrigan’s state of mind and
rebut a claim of actual malice, which was directly relevant to
Pryor’s punitive damages claim. See FED. R. EVID. 801(c)(2).
No. 23-1463 31
Second, Pryor argues that by playing the video, “Defend-
ants succeeded in instructing the jury erroneously on the
law.” Pryor, pointing to Corrigan’s statements that Pryor
should not have exited the vehicle, claims Corrigan’s sum-
mary of the law was incorrect. But Corrigan did not use the
words “legal” or “illegal” in his discussion with Pryor about
exiting the van. Instead, he said, “when police stop the car and
you get out and run from it, that’s a problem” and “the crazy
part is that when you normally get stopped by the police, you
don’t run from the car, that’s the crazy part.”
The district court found Corrigan’s statements relevant to
Pryor’s malice claim. It concluded there was “little risk that
the jury will be confused about the governing law based on
the short statement.” The court’s jury instructions cement that
conclusion:
Any statement of the law comes from the Court
only. It does not come from any statements
made by any of the parties, including anything
said in the videos during the conversation be-
tween Plaintiff Pryor and Defendant Corrigan.
And Pryor’s counsel approved the instruction—“we would
strongly be in favor of such an instruction.”
Third, Pryor contends the district court should not have
allowed the jury to hear Corrigan’s statements that he did not
know whether Pryor had a gun, followed by “I got a family.
You know what? I’d like to go home tonight.” Pryor also ob-
jects to the court permitting Corrigan to explain why he made
those statements. Nevertheless, Federal Rule of Evidence 106
provides that “[i]f a party introduces all or part of a statement,
an adverse party may require the introduction … of any other
32 No. 23-1463
part—or any other statement—that in fairness ought to be
considered at the same time.” And the “adverse party may do
so over a hearsay objection.” Id. So, the entirety of this ex-
change was permissible.
Fourth, Pryor challenges the district court’s decision to al-
low Corrigan’s testimony about his fears that Pryor may be a
dangerous person. As explained above, given the context of
the incident, Corrigan had reason to fear that Pryor possessed
a gun. See Jones, 900 F.3d at 449. And Corrigan’s fear that Pryor
posed a danger is directly relevant to his justification for force.
Fifth, Corrigan’s statement that Pryor was a dangerous
person because he was a “maybe person” was relevant and
not unduly prejudicial. At trial Corrigan testified twice that
Pryor was a “maybe person.” The first time, the district court
sustained Pryor’s objection that it was inadmissible as expert
testimony. But the second time, defense counsel asked,
“where in your training do you receive that information?”
And Pryor’s counsel did not object until Corrigan laid the
foundation of his training. Then, the district court limited
Corrigan’s testimony to “what he saw and how it related to
his training and how it matched up.”
As Corrigan explained, the most dangerous type of person
for an officer to come across in the field is a “maybe person”—
someone who says one thing but whose actions indicate oth-
erwise. Corrigan’s testimony about his observations of Pryor
on the day of the incident, and how that related with his train-
ing, is relevant to his justification for using force. We therefore
affirm the district court’s ruling. And given the district court’s
limiting instruction, any error was harmless. See United States
v. York, 572 F.3d 415, 421–22 (7th Cir. 2009) (district court’s
failure to identify officer as expert was harmless when
No. 23-1463 33
knowledge and experience “would have easily qualified [the
witness] as an expert had the court conducted the formal Rule
702 analysis”).
E. Jury Instructions
Finally, Pryor asserts the district court should have in-
structed the jury that the City of Aurora, not the individual
defendants, would pay any judgment. He claims the district
court improperly implied to the jurors during voir dire that
Corrigan and Cantona would pay any judgment. Specifically,
two jurors had concerns with awarding a judgment in Pryor’s
favor if Corrigan and Cantona had to pay. But the court
granted Pryor’s motion to remove the first juror for cause.
And the second juror consistently stated he would be fair to
both sides, and that if the evidence favored Pryor, he would
return a verdict in favor of Pryor even though Corrigan and
Cantona are sued individually.
Even more, any evidence or argument about indemnifica-
tion is barred at trial as irrelevant and highly prejudicial
under Federal Rules of Evidence 401 and 403. See Lawson v.
Trowbridge, 153 F.3d 368, 378–79 (7th Cir. 1998); Betts v. City of
Chicago, 784 F. Supp. 2d 1020, 1030 (N.D. Ill. 2011); Christmas
v. City of Chicago, 691 F. Supp. 2d 811, 819 (N.D. Ill. 2010). The
only exception is when defendants raise an officer’s inability
to pay damages; then, a plaintiff may introduce evidence of
indemnification. See Lawson, 153 F.3d at 378–79.
Defendants did not introduce any evidence regarding
Corrigan’s or Cantona’s inability to pay. In fact, defendants
did not oppose Pryor’s motion in limine—which the district
court granted—barring defendants from using financial cir-
cumstances as a defense to Pryor’s request for punitive
34 No. 23-1463
damages. So, the district court was within its discretion not to
instruct the jury that the City of Aurora, not the individual
defendants, would pay any judgment.
IV. Conclusion
The district court properly granted defendants’ summary
judgment motion on Pryor’s § 1983 claims. And the district
court did not abuse its discretion in its evidentiary and proce-
dural rulings before and at trial. For these reasons, we AFFIRM.
No. 23-1463 35
ROVNER, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in
part. This court has oft warned that judges must resist “the
siren song that tempts courts into making factual determina-
tions at the summary judgment phase.” Gupta v. Melloh, 19
F.4th 990, 996 (7th Cir. 2021). Some courts have justified suc-
cumbing to that impulse by referencing the Supreme Court’s
statement in Scott v. Harris that “[w]hen opposing parties tell
two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by
the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court
should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of rul-
ing on a motion for summary judgment.” Scott v. Harris, 550
U.S. 372, 380 (2007). Scott did not announce a new rule, but
merely applied an old rule to new technology—police dash-
cam video. It has always been the case that on summary judg-
ment a court need not credit facts that are so incredible or im-
plausible that no reasonable fact finder could believe them.
Payne v. Pauley, 337 F.3d 767, 773 (7th Cir. 2003); Hurt v. Wise,
880 F.3d 831, 840 (7th Cir. 2018) (explaining how this rule ap-
plies to video evidence). Outside of this narrow scenario of
implausibility, however, fact finding remains firmly within
the province of the jury. It is the right of the parties to fully
present their evidence to a fact finder, explain discrepancies,
describe nuances, caution against biases, or offer expert testi-
mony about the evidence. It is only after this full airing of ev-
idence that a fact finder will be in a sufficient position to
weigh evidence, decide which inferences to draw from the
facts, and resolve factual disputes. See Johnson v. Advoc. Health
& Hosps. Corp., 892 F.3d 887, 893 (7th Cir. 2018). In upholding
the district court’s dismissal on summary judgment, the ma-
jority has usurped the jury’s role by making its own factual
determinations from the disputed video evidence. For this
reason, I dissent from the majority’s holdings affirming
36 No. 23-1463
summary judgment as to the false arrest and excessive force
claims. I concur as to the remaining issues.
Fact finding is essential to evaluations of probable cause
because those determinations depend on the facts and cir-
cumstances known to the reasonable officer at the scene. D.C.
v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 57 (2018). Only when there are no mate-
rial facts in dispute may a court decide whether officers had
probable cause as a matter of law. Braun v. Vill. of Palatine, 56
F.4th 542, 550 (7th Cir. 2022) (quoting Holloway v. City of Mil-
waukee, 43 F.4th 760, 769 (7th Cir. 2022)).
A police officer has probable cause to arrest if a reasonable
officer, knowing all of the facts and circumstances known to
that officer, would believe that the individual in question has
committed or is committing a crime. United States v. Cherry,
920 F.3d 1126, 1133 (7th Cir. 2019). It follows that the question
for this case is: what crime could a reasonable officer believe
Pryor had committed or was committing? As the majority
points out, Officer Corrigan could have been subjectively in-
correct in his reasoning; probable cause looks through an ob-
jective lens to the reasonable officer. United States v. Wanjiku,
919 F.3d 472, 487 (7th Cir. 2019).
1. Probable cause for resisting arrest at the moment of seizure?
At the moment Officer Corrigan arrived at the scene, he
could not have arrested Pryor for resisting arrest. In Illinois,
an officer may not arrest a suspect for resisting arrest unless
there is an underlying offense. It is true, as the majority points
out, that the Illinois legislature did not codify this concept into
statutory law until 2021 (see 720 ILCS 5/31-1(d)), but it had
been established by caselaw in Illinois for some time. See Ab-
bott v. Sangamon Cnty., Ill., 705 F.3d 706, 720 (7th Cir. 2013)
No. 23-1463 37
(noting that the officer lacked probable cause to arrest the de-
fendant for resisting arrest under Illinois law, inasmuch as
there had been no arrest or attempted arrest prior to that
point); People v. Slaymaker, 2015 IL App (2d) 130528, ¶ 13, 27
N.E.3d 642, 645 (explaining that the statute prohibiting resist-
ing arrest does not apply where police are not effectuating an
arrest); People v. Agnew-Downs, 936 N.E.2d 166, 174 (Ill. App.
Ct. 2010) (noting that the trial court recognized that pinpoint-
ing the time of arrest was crucial in determining whether the
defendant had in fact resisted arrest). In any event, in addition
to the Illinois case law at the time and the now-confirmatory
statutory law, common sense dictates that one cannot be ar-
rested for resisting arrest before an arrest has been attempted.
2. Probable cause for obstructing a police officer for leaving a law-
ful stop?
The majority concludes that a reasonable officer in Corri-
gan’s position could have surmised that Pryor was leaving a
lawful traffic stop, and therefore had probable cause to arrest
him for resisting or obstructing a police officer pursuant to
720 ILCS 5/31-1. Majority Op. at 11 (citing People v. Johnson, 945
N.E.2d 2, 7, 14–15 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010)). That statute prohibits a
person from “obstruct[ing] the performance by one known to
the person to be a peace officer … of any authorized act within
his official capacity,” (720 ILCS 5/31-1(a)), which has been in-
terpreted to mean “conduct [that] interpose[s] an obstacle that
impedes or hinders the officer in the performance of his
38 No. 23-1463
authorized duties.” People v. Baskerville, 2012 IL 111056, ¶ 23,
963 N.E.2d 898, 905. 1
The majority and I are in agreement that “a traffic stop of
a car communicates to a reasonable passenger that he or she
is not free to terminate the encounter with the police and
move about at will.” Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 333
(2009). 2 And we need not spend time deciding at what precise
1 The statute, 720 ILCS 5/31-1(a), includes both the terms “resisting”
and “obstructing a peace officer.” Illinois courts do not appear to distin-
guish charges based on “resisting” from those on “obstructing.” In dis-
cussing whether the statute requires proof of a physical act, however, the
Illinois Supreme court noted that the statute contains two separate verbs—
“resist” and “obstruct”—and then reasoned that because “resist implies
some type of physical exertion,” the word “obstruct” must have a different
meaning in the statute. Baskerville, 2012 IL 111056 ¶ 25; 963 N.E.2d at 905–
06. The court concluded that “obstructing” a peace officer can involve ei-
ther physical or non-physical acts that impede, hinder, interrupt, prevent,
or delay peace officers from performing their duties. Id. ¶¶ 23–25(2012);
963 N.E.2d at 905. Mere argument will not suffice for obstruction. Neither
does it require physical resistance. “That inquiry is for the trier of fact,
based upon the facts and circumstances of each case.” Id. ¶¶ 22–23, 936
N.E.2d at 904–05. In short, the Illinois Supreme Court distinguished “re-
sisting” from “obstructing” for the purposes of inferring the types of acts
the legislature meant to include, but it is unclear whether a person could
be charged with separate crimes under this statute. For our purposes, the
answer to this question is not important.
2 The Illinois Supreme Court has concluded that a traffic stop is anal-
ogous to a Terry investigative stop. People v. Bass, 2021 IL 125434, ¶ 15, 182
N.E.3d 714, 719 (citing Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 251 (2007)). Thus,
its reasonableness is viewed through a Fourth Amendment lens to deter-
mine “whether the officer’s action was justified at its inception, and
whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which jus-
tified the interference in the first place.” Id. (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.
1, 20, (1968)). The majority concludes that Pryor was arrested the moment
(continued)
No. 23-1463 39
moment the stop here became a full arrest. If Pryor fled, it
would be illegal for him to have done so from a valid Terry
stop. A Terry stop is a temporary seizure, but it is a seizure
nevertheless. It “imposes a substantial intrusion on a person’s
liberty” and restrains that person’s freedom. United States v.
Street, 917 F.3d 586, 592–93 (7th Cir. 2019). Consequently, un-
der Illinois law, “if the passenger flees, he is attempting to
avoid detention by an officer who has a valid right to seize
him. Since the police officer has the right to detain him, flight
by that passenger has been held to constitute an offense of ob-
struction of a peace officer, which constitutes a Class A mis-
demeanor.” Johnson, 945 N.E.2d at 12–13 (citing People v. Hold-
man, 383 N.E.2d 155, 159 (Ill. 1978) and People v. Jones, 613
N.E.2d 354, 357 (Ill. Ct. App. 1993)).
These cases speak of “flight,” which the majority softens
to “leaving a lawful traffic stop.” Indeed, in People v. Johnson,
cited by the majority, the defendant passenger, when
stopped, suddenly exited the vehicle and started running,
and was apprehended a block away. The Johnson court relied
on Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000), for the proposition
that when an individual flees from police in a high-crime area,
a police officer has the requisite reasonable suspicion that the
individual was involved in criminal activity to conduct a
Terry stop. Johnson, 945 N.E.2d at 6–7.
In this case the question remains, did Pryor flee? Some
parts of the dashcam video require no inference drawing. For
Officer Corrigan ordered him to get on the ground. For my purposes the
distinction does not matter, as I also conclude that Pryor was obligated to
submit to the authority of the officers irrespective of whether it was a Terry
stop or a full arrest. My analysis turns instead on the factual inquiry as to
whether Pryor was, in fact, submitting.
40 No. 23-1463
example, by my count, Pryor took approximately three to four
steps from the van door to the back corner of the van as Of-
ficer Isaak ran past him in pursuit of the driver and Officers
Corrigan and Christoffel were still en route. (R. 202, Corrigan
dashcam at 0:53-0:55). He then took seven faster steps from
the back of the van to the front of Officer Isaak’s police vehicle
before Officers Corrigan and Christoffel arrived. (Id. at 0:56-
0:59). He took his final step once he was in front of Officer
Isaak’s police vehicle, as he took his hands out of his pockets
(or perhaps away from the pants he was holding up) and
parked himself motionless, in front of Officer Isaak’s vehicle,
with his hands in the air. (Id. at 0:59); (R. 202, Isaak dashcam
at 0:52-0:54). That is exactly where he stood when Officers
Corrigan and Christoffel arrived. Despite the majority’s de-
scription of Pryor’s actions as “fleeing,” (Majority Op. at 16),
I surmise that many people would be surprised to learn that
a passenger who takes twelve steps from their car door toward
the pursuing police car and then stops, dead still, with his
hands in the air in front of that police car, has fled the scene
of a traffic stop.
A party ought to have the opportunity to explain to a jury
the many reasons why a person might take a few steps away
from the vehicle during a traffic stop. Pryor’s post hoc expla-
nation—that he wanted to get in front of the dashcam for his
protection—is certainly among them. Many people who have
been pulled over might view themselves as being more le-
gally and physically protected in front of a recording dash-
cam. After all, both the potential suspect and the officer know
that a person in a car has access to various sorts of items that
might put the officer’s life and safety in jeopardy—including
the car itself. It was for these safety reasons that the Supreme
Court ruled that a police officer may order either a driver or
No. 23-1463 41
passenger of a lawfully stopped car to exit the vehicle. Penn-
sylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 110–11 (1977) (driver); Mary-
land v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 413–15 (1997) (passenger). And it
is undoubtedly true that there are parents who have lectured
their children, “if you are stopped by the police, get your
hands in the air and get in front of a video camera.” For that
reason, a driver or passenger might wish to exit a car and im-
mediately put her hands in the air or place them on the hood
to signal to the police officer that she is of no danger to the
officer. Or perhaps a driver might exit a car to step over the
guardrail to avoid being struck on a narrow shoulder in the
dark. See, e.g., Mimms, 434 U.S. at 111 (noting the dangers of
traffic stops near moving traffic).
Whatever we, as individuals, think of the wisdom of exit-
ing a vehicle when stopped by the police, Illinois law does not
forbid it. In fact, in People v. Kotlinski, the Illinois Appellate
court found that “the mere act of stepping outside the car was
not an act of obstruction, because [the officer] never told de-
fendant he had to stay inside the car.” People v. Kotlinski, 2011
IL App (2d) 101251, ¶ 45 & ¶46 n. 6, 959 N.E.2d 1230, 1240 &
n.6 (further explaining that the officer “admitted that he never
told defendant that he could not get out of the car. Therefore,
when defendant opened the door and stood outside of the car,
he was not disobeying any order.”). And in People v. Smith,
the appellate court highlighted that it was the refusal to obey
an officer’s command to remain in the car that gave the officer
probable cause to arrest for obstruction when the driver left
his vehicle to enter his house. People v. Smith, 2013 IL App (3d)
110477, ¶ 21-23, 77 N.E.3d 87, 91–92. In sum, if an officer in-
structs a person to remain in the car, exiting it might consti-
tute obstruction, but barring that instruction, there is simply
no statutory or case law in Illinois that could make a
42 No. 23-1463
reasonable officer, even under qualified immunity analysis,
believe that a passenger in a car had obstructed a peace officer
by exiting the car and remaining close to the scene. See Kotlin-
ski, 2011 IL App (2d) 101251, ¶ 45 & ¶46 n. 6, 959 N.E.2d at
1240 & n.6; Smith, 2013 IL App (3d) 110477, ¶ 21-23, 77 N.E.3d
at 91–92.
Importantly, when Pryor took his seven steps from the
back of the van to the front of Officer Isaak’s police vehicle,
there were no police officers on site. Officer Isaak had left the
scene to apprehend the fleeing driver, and Officers Corrigan
and Christoffel were driving toward the scene, but had yet to
arrive. During the entire twelve steps that Pryor took, no of-
ficer told him to stay in the van, to stop moving, or to do, or
refrain from doing anything. In fact, there was no officer on
site to give him any direction at all. No Illinois caselaw or stat-
ute indicates that a suspect is fleeing if he takes twelve steps
and then stands still with his hands in the air in front of a po-
lice car, where no officer had directed the passenger to remain
in the car, or was even on the scene. I have concerns about any
opinion from this court that concludes or implies otherwise.
This is, however, but one of my concerns. The other stems
from the troubling trend in which appellate courts become
fact finders by watching video, and drawing their own infer-
ences, rather than leaving the fact finding to the trial court and
jury. See Erwin Chemerinsky, A Troubling Take on Excessive-
Force Claims, Trial, July 2007, at 74, 76. As I noted above, prob-
able cause depends on the facts and circumstances known to
the reasonable officer at the scene, and therefore heavily relies
on fact-based determinations. Wesby, 583 U.S. at 57. Those
facts must be found by a jury.
No. 23-1463 43
Because Pryor alleges a violation of his constitutional
rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, any evaluation of liability
requires the court to address the additional question of quali-
fied immunity. “[Q]ualified immunity protects government
officials ‘from liability for civil damages insofar as their con-
duct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitu-
tional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known.’” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). In reviewing a
defendant’s motion for summary judgment based on quali-
fied immunity, a court considers “(1) whether the facts, taken
in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, show that the de-
fendant violated a constitutional right; and (2) whether the
constitutional right was clearly established at [that] time.” Es-
tate of Clark v. Walker, 865 F.3d 544, 550 (7th Cir. 2017). In the
case of a false arrest, “[e]ven if, in hindsight, it appears that
probable cause was lacking, qualified immunity is still avail-
able if the arresting officers reasonably could have believed
the arrest to be lawful, in light of clearly established law and
the information the arresting officers possessed. This is often
called arguable probable cause.” Hurt, 880 F.3d at 841
(cleaned up), overruled on other grounds by Lewis v. City of Chi-
cago, 914 F.3d 472 (7th Cir. 2019). In this case we must ask
whether the video conclusively resolves whether the officers
had arguable probable cause.
Pryor alleges that he was submitting to the authority of the
officers by standing still in front of the dashcam with his
hands up. The defendants allege that Pryor was fleeing. This
is a classic factual dispute involving the drawing of inferences
from what is depicted on a video and therefore cannot be re-
solved on summary judgment. See Hurt, 880 F.3d at 840. On
summary judgment, a court may not make credibility
44 No. 23-1463
determinations, weigh the evidence, or decide which infer-
ences to draw from the facts, or resolve swearing contests.
Johnson, 892 F.3d at 893 (citing Payne, 337 F.3d at 770). For pur-
poses of a qualified immunity determination on summary
judgment, this court must resolve inferences in Pryor’s favor
rather than resolve any disputes. See Hurt, 880 F.3d at 840.
The majority, however, asserts that this is a factual dispute
that can be resolved on summary judgment because “the vid-
eos tell their own story.” Majority Op. at 3. The majority cites
Scott for the proposition that “when parties tell two different
stories, ‘one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record,’
we ‘should not adopt that version of the facts… .’” Majority
Op. at 3 (quoting Scott, 550 U.S. at 380) (ellipsis in original).
As I alluded to above, the exception in Scott to the usual
rules prohibiting fact finding on summary judgment, how-
ever, is a “narrow, pragmatic exception allowing appellants
to contest the district court’s determination that material facts
are genuinely disputed,” but only where the video “utterly
discredit[s]” the non-movant’s version of the facts. Gant v.
Hartman, 924 F.3d 445, 449 (7th Cir. 2019). “Video evidence …
can eviscerate a factual dispute only when the video is so de-
finitive that there could be no reasonable disagreement about
what the video depicts.” Kailin v. Vill. of Gurnee, 77 F.4th 476,
481 (7th Cir. 2023) (citing Scott, 550 U.S. at 380). It cannot be
used when it does not clearly and definitively resolve a mate-
rial disputed fact. Id. at 482 (declining to apply the Scott ex-
ception when video does not clearly show the events in ques-
tion); Gupta, 19 F.4th at 998 (reversing summary judgment
where “reasonable jurors could certainly disagree about what
[the video] reveals about the events of the night.”); Ferguson
v. McDonough, 13 F.4th 574, 581 (7th Cir. 2021) (explaining that
No. 23-1463 45
Scott does not apply where the video is open to multiple in-
terpretation); Jackson v. Curry, 888 F.3d 259, 264 (7th Cir. 2018)
(same).
As this court explained in Gant,
Scott does not hold that courts should reject a
plaintiff’s account on summary judgment
whenever documentary evidence, such as a
video, offers some support for a governmental
officer’s version of events. Instead, Scott holds
that where the trial court’s determination that a
fact is subject to reasonable dispute is blatantly
and demonstrably false, a court of appeals may
say so … .
Id. at 450 (internal citations omitted). Only in the rare case,
however, will video evidence leave no room for interpretation
by a fact finder. Kailin, 77 F.4th at 481. 3
The line between the permissible and impermissible use of
video evidence is therefore clear: video evidence can only be
used when it “blatantly contradict[s],” or “utterly discredits”
the non-movant’s facts, or assures us beyond doubt that the
non-movant’s facts are “blatantly and demonstrably false.”
Scott, 550 U.S. at 380, Gant, 924 F.3d at 449–50. Was the light
3 The majority states that the cases that I cite for the proposition that it
is improper to rely on videos can be distinguished on their facts. Undoubt-
edly the clarity and content of videos will differ case-to-case, but here
these cases are only cited for the pure legal proposition that courts cannot
use video evidence to resolve disputed factual issues on summary judg-
ment, unless no reasonable juror could watch the video and come to the
opposite conclusion. For this proposition, factual differences in the video
are irrelevant.
46 No. 23-1463
green or red? Did the car swerve over the double yellow line
or not? Who threw the first punch? Did the defendant stop at
a stop sign or not? See, e.g. United States v. Norville, 43 F.4th
680, 682 (7th Cir. 2022). These are all questions that can be re-
solved if both the video evidence and the inferences that can
be drawn from it is clear and uncontroverted. Video evidence
cannot resolve disputes where reasonable jurors could disa-
gree about what the video reveals. Gupta, 19 F.4th at 998; Fer-
guson, 13 F.4th at 581; Jackson, 888 F.3d at 264. More im-
portantly, in some cases, the actual events depicted in the
video may be “plainly portrayed,” as the majority states, but
the interpretation of, and inferences from, that evidence still
must be left to a jury. For example, a video may clearly show
a defendant wrapping his two arms around another person.
That act is plainly portrayed, but a jury may still have to in-
terpret whether the video depicts a hug or a violent assault,
and do so based on an interpretation of the evidence as a
whole. This is what juries do; not judges on motions for sum-
mary judgment.
In this case the video evidence supports either interpreta-
tion of the facts—a reasonable juror could conclude either that
Pryor’s twelve steps constituted flight, or that he was posi-
tioning himself in front of a squad car to safely submit to the
authority of the police. I do not see anything in the video that
would make Pryor’s version of the facts impossible or bla-
tantly and demonstrably false as would be required for an ap-
plication of Scott. I urge readers to watch the video in the dis-
trict court record at R. 201, and ask themselves “can I defini-
tively and unquestionably determine that Pryor was fleeing,
or might he have been repositioning himself in front of the
police dashcam and then submitting to their authority, or is
there perhaps yet another interpretation of his movements?”
No. 23-1463 47
More importantly, readers should ask themselves, “could a
reasonable juror, perhaps one with different experiences in
the world than I have, disagree with what I think is happen-
ing in this video?” 4
There is good reason to leave fact finding to a jury. By
granting a motion for summary judgment we are barring non-
moving parties from exercising an essential element of our
adversarial court system. Trials allow parties to fully air com-
peting inferences about video evidence by, among other
things, cross examining witnesses, using closing arguments to
frame video evidence in light of the surrounding circum-
stances, and by presenting expert testimony about the bene-
fits and limitations of video evidence. As Gilbert and Sullivan
said, “things are seldom as they seem,” and video evidence
often proves this adage. A trial gives parties the opportunity
to explain why this might be so. For example, researchers
have demonstrated that prior attitudes toward the police (as
measured by survey questions) can predict what a viewers’
conclusions will be about what they have seen on police body
4 Although that video is available on the district court docket at R. 201,
it is cumbersome for the public to access. A member of the public must
first contact the Certified Copy Desk, wait for an invoice, pay the invoice,
wait for the payment to be processed, and then wait for a URL via email.
If, in fact, it becomes more common for district courts and appellate courts
to decide cases based on video evidence, it will be imperative to have more
easily available public access to those videos. A litigant ought to be able
to argue to the court about the ways in which the videos in her particular
case are similar to or different from the videos analyzed by courts in other
cases. Moreover, a transparent court system requires the public to have
easy access to the videos on which courts are relying in granting summary
judgment.
48 No. 23-1463
camera footage. Seth W. Stoughton, Police Body-Worn Cameras,
96 N.C. L. Rev. 1363, 1407 (2018). A party might wish to sub-
mit other expert evidence about various biases inherent in
video evidence itself. See Nora G. McNeil, Perceptual and Cog-
nitive Biases in the Uptake of Police Body-Worn Camera Footage:
Implications and Suggestions for Introduction of Video Evidence at
Trial, 41 Quinnipiac L. Rev. 499, 504–538 (2023) (compiling re-
search on various forms of perceptual and cognitive biases in
police camera evidence including bias due to the point of
view of the camera, camera angle, the prominence of people
and objects in the visual field, speed and movement, how
much detail the viewer must attend to, and distortions caused
by wide-angle lenses.). It is a rare case indeed where the video
evidence leaves no room for interpretation or qualification.
See Kailin, 77 F.4th at 481.
Because the video evidence here can be subject to more
than one interpretation, the court must apply the usual rules
on summary judgment and take the facts in the light most fa-
vorable to Pryor—that is, that he was submitting to officers
and not fleeing the scene of an arrest, particularly where no
officers gave him any command not to move from his vehicle
to the pursuing officer’s police car. In that case, no reasonable
officer could have believed an arrest for flight to be lawful.
3. Probable cause for obstruction by refusing the order to get on the
ground?
Likewise, a jury should have been given the opportunity
to determine whether Pryor was obstructing a police officer
by not immediately complying with Officer Corrigan’s order
to “get on the ground.” The relevant events for this inquiry
No. 23-1463 49
are described second-by-second in the footnote below. 5 But
before turning to the factual question, it is helpful to explore
5 Isaak’s dashcam video caught all of the video from the time Pryor
walked in front of his vehicle and put up his hands until Officer Corrigan
tackled him to the ground. The video submitted to the jury and contained
in the record, however, contains no audio. (R. 202) Officer Corrigan’s
dashcam recording, on the other hand, contained both audio and video
recordings, but for much of the time the video is obscured by Isaak’s police
vehicle. (R. 202) To coordinate the actions in the Isaak video with the
sound in the Corrigan video, I synchronized the actions that were visible
in both videos and charted each second. The results are in the chart below.
From this chart I conclude that there were at most three to four seconds
between the time that Officer Corrigan first yelled to Pryor to “get down”
and when he began the leg sweep to tackle him.
second Corrigan dashcam Isaak dashcam
0 0:58 Pryor’s left foot steps in 0:52 Pryor’s left foot steps in
front of Isaak’s police vehicle front of Isaak’s police vehicle camera
1 0:59 1st “get on the ground” 0:53 Pryor shuffles in front of
Isaak’s police vehicle and faces the
vehicle
2 1:00 Corrigan runs toward 0:54 Pryor raises his hand above
Pryor his head
3 1:01 2d “get on the ground” 0:55 Pryor starts to lower his
(no video of events) hands
5 1:02 3d “get on the ground” 0:56 Corrigan enters the frame
(no video of events) and puts his hands on Pryor
6 1:03 inaudible yelling (no 0:57 Corrigan pushes Pryor into
video of events) position
7 1:04 Corrigan yells “down” 0:58 start of Corrigan’s leg
(no video of events) sweep
8 1:05 Pryor on way down 0:59 Pryor on way down
9 1:06 Pryor on the ground 1:00 Pryor on the ground
50 No. 23-1463
generally what it means to resist arrest or obstruct a police
officer in Illinois. Under Illinois law, a citizen may not use
force in resisting an arrest, regardless of whether the arrest in
question is lawful or unlawful. 720 ILCS 5/7–7; People v. Vil-
larreal, 604 N.E.2d 923, 926 (Ill. 1992). But non-physical re-
sistance such as “[v]erbal resistance or argument alone, even
the use of abusive language, is not a violation of the statute.”
People v. Berardi, 948 N.E.2d 98, 103 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011). The
question for this case is what should a court make of Pryor’s
inaction, rather than his actions—that is, his failure to move
when instructed? In People v. Baskerville, the Illinois Supreme
Court sought to clarify the middle ground between mere ar-
gument and a physical act—conduct such as providing false
information, refusing to disperse or leave a scene, advising
suspects on how to escape arrest, or refusing to exit a vehicle.
Baskerville, 2012 IL 111056, ¶¶ 22–25. The Illinois Supreme
Court held that:
Although a person may commit obstruction of a
peace officer by means of a physical act, this
type of conduct is neither an essential element
of nor the exclusive means of committing an ob-
struction. The legislative focus of section 31–1(a)
is on the tendency of the conduct to interpose an
obstacle that impedes or hinders the officer in
the performance of his authorized duties. That
inquiry is for the trier of fact, based upon the facts
and circumstances of each case.
Id. ¶ 23, 963 N.E.2d at 905 (emphasis mine). In other words,
rather than focusing on action versus inaction, a court must
focus instead on individual facts and discern whether, based
on those circumstances, the defendant impeded the officer’s
No. 23-1463 51
authorized act. People v. Synnott, 811 N.E.2d 236, 240 (Ill. App.
Ct. 2004). Two Illinois Appellate Court cases demonstrate the
importance of this individualized factual discernment. In
Synnott, the appellate court found obstruction where the de-
fendant refused to exit his vehicle but did so while holding
firmly onto the steering wheel. Synnott, 811 N.E.2d at 238, 241.
The appellate court in Kotlinski, distinguished Synnott, and
opined that merely remaining stationary in the face of an or-
der (in that particular case, a 21-second delay before comply-
ing with an order to get back in the car) would not constitute
knowing and intentional obstruction. Kotlinski, 2011 IL App
(2d) 101251, ¶¶ 47–48, 959 N.E.2d at 1240–41.
Any individualized assessment of whether an individual
impeded an officer must focus on whether the suspect’s ac-
tion posed a material impediment to the officer’s actions. Peo-
ple v. Mehta, 2020 IL App (3d) 180020, ¶ 26, 156 N.E.3d 608,
614. In other words, even though “an act might hinder or im-
pede an official act in the technical sense, that hindrance or
impediment may be so minimal as to not be considered a vi-
olation of” 720 ILCS 5/31-1. Id. ¶ 21, 156 N.E.3d at 613.
Whether the defendant’s conduct actually posed a material
impediment to the administration of justice is a factual ques-
tion. Id. ¶ 17, 29, 156 N.E.3d at 612, 614–15.
“[T]he length of any delay or the brevity of any impedi-
ment is a factor, if not the primary factor, in determining
whether a given defendant has materially obstructed the ac-
tions of police.” Id. ¶ 32, 156 N.E.3d at 615 . See also, e.g., People
v. Taylor, 2012 IL App (2d) 110222, ¶ 17, 972 N.E.2d 753, 758-
59 (ten-minute delay not a material impediment); People v. Co-
mage, 946 N.E.2d 313, 319 (Ill. 2011) (20-second delay to look
for dropped drugs did not constitute obstruction); Berardi, 948
52 No. 23-1463
N.E.2d at 103 (short encounter with verbal disagreement only
did not constitute obstruction); Kotlinski, 2011 IL App (2d)
101251, ¶¶ 49–50, 959 N.E.2d at 1241–42 (no obstruction
where defendant delayed getting back in the vehicle for 21
seconds after being ordered to do so). In this case, the video
reveals that there were a mere 3-4 seconds between the time
that Officer Corrigan first yelled “get on the ground” and
when he began the process of tackling Pryor to the ground. In
comparison to the cases above, such a short delay likely
would not be a material impediment.
Officer safety is also a significant factor in determining
whether a suspect has materially obstructed police activity.
“[A]ny behavior that actually threatens an officer’s safety or
even places an officer in fear for his or her safety is a signifi-
cant impediment to the officer’s performance of his or her du-
ties.” Synnott, 811 N.E.3d at 228. And importantly, “obstruc-
tive acts that may not create a material impediment in one set
of circumstances may nevertheless create such an impedi-
ment in other circumstances.” Mehta, 2020 IL App (3d) 180020,
¶ 33, 156 N.E.3d at 615. “For example, actions that do not
amount to material obstruction in a misdemeanor stop may
nevertheless be considered a material impediment in a more
fraught situation, such as the hot pursuit of a violent suspect.”
Id. ¶ 34, 156 N.E.3d at 616.
Officer Corrigan arrived to face a rapidly unfolding situa-
tion. The officers had received a tip that led them to believe
the people in the van were involved in crack cocaine produc-
tion. 6 The driver immediately took off running with Officer
6 Of course, the tipster was incorrect. Officers found no drugs on
Pryor, the others in the van, or anywhere in the areas near the scene that
(continued)
No. 23-1463 53
Isaak in pursuit. The majority and I agree that these circum-
stances would allow reasonable officers to use some amount
of force to temporarily detain the passengers to ensure officer
safety while the officers assessed whether they had probable
cause to arrest. See United States v. Olson, 41 F.4th 792, 799 (7th
Cir. 2022). I will discuss further the appropriateness of the use
of force in a moment. I discuss it now only to make clear the
important distinction between whether use of some force
could have been a lawful part of a Terry stop to protect officer
safety (if not excessive, it most certainly could) and whether,
after securing their safety, the officers had probable cause to
arrest Pryor for obstructing a police officer (I conclude they
did not).
Returning to the question of probable cause for refusing
the order to get on the ground, here too, the facts are con-
tested, and the majority recognizes the dispute. The majority
opinion acknowledges that “Pryor claims that he was not
given time to get on the ground,” but nevertheless later con-
cludes that “Pryor refused Corrigan’s order to ‘get on the
ground.’” Id. at 5, 12. Once again, the video evidence is open
to inference and interpretation. The video would not preclude
a reasonable jury from concluding that Pryor did not have
time to get himself to the ground in the three seconds between
the first commend to “get on the ground,” and the leg sweep,
or perhaps that he was lowering his hands in preparation to
do so (most people need to use their hands to support them-
selves as they get face down on the ground without injuring
themselves). Or a reasonable jury could look at the video and
conclude that three seconds was sufficient for Pryor to
they searched, including with a drug sniffing dog. But for purposes of
probable cause, we consider the knowledge the officers had at the time.
54 No. 23-1463
process the command and get to the ground. They might view
the hand-lowering as more evidence of Pryor’s failure to sub-
mit. Because the video is not definitive, a court must take the
facts in the light most favorable to Pryor. I would conclude
that, although Pryor could have conducted the leg sweep for
his safety, given the Illinois law requiring material hindrance,
no reasonable officer could conclude that he had probable
cause to arrest Pryor for obstructing an officer for failing to
get on the ground in the three seconds between when Pryor
gave the order to “get on the ground” and when he began to
take him down. C.f. Brumitt v. Smith, 102 F.4th 444, 448 (7th
Cir. 2024) (assuming a police officer would need more than
four seconds to register that he had knocked a suspect uncon-
scious and then to stop applying force).
Of course, probable cause depends on the totality of the
circumstances and cannot necessarily be evaluated by looking
at each individual part of an event in isolation. Wesby, 583 U.S.
at 60. In Wesby, the Supreme Court criticized the appellate
panel majority for evaluating each of the facts one-by-one ra-
ther than considering the whole picture. Id. In Wesby, how-
ever, the Supreme Court spent six paragraphs detailing myr-
iad facts of which the officers would have been aware that to-
gether supported a probable cause determination. Wesby, 583
U.S. at 57–60. In this case, the officers saw Pryor engage in two
relevant actions—his twelve steps from the van to Officer
Isaak’s police vehicle, and his three-second delay getting to
the ground. The other factor known to the officers at the
time—that people in the van might be involved in the drug
trade—supported Corrigan’s need to secure the scene, but
had no relevance to the obstruction charges. Once again, I em-
phasize that for purposes of probable cause, this court is not
evaluating whether the officers, viewing the totality of the
No. 23-1463 55
circumstances, could have used reasonable force to secure the
scene for their safety. They undoubtedly could. Instead, this
court should be evaluating whether a reasonable officer,
viewing the totality of the circumstances after the scene had
been secured, could have concluded that he had probable
cause to arrest Pryor for obstruction.
Although courts give police officers a wide berth for mak-
ing probable cause determinations in the heat of the moment
in rapidly changing chaotic situations (Abbott, 705 F.3d at
714), once Officer Corrigan subdued and handcuffed Pryor
for his protection, he had plenty of time to determine whether
he had probable cause to arrest him for committing the crime
of obstruction of a police officer. See, e.g., Phillips v. Cmty. Ins.
Corp., 678 F.3d 513, 526 (7th Cir. 2012) (explaining that once
the scene has been secured, a court need no longer give offic-
ers the same benefit of the doubt for actions taken in tense,
uncertain, and rapidly evolving situations).
In sum, given that the video evidence does not conclu-
sively and definitively resolve whether Pryor was resisting
arrest or obstructing a law enforcement officer, the district
court should have allowed this determination to be made by
a jury and should not have granted summary judgment in the
officers’ favor on these claims.
4. Probable cause for resisting arrest during the handcuffing?
Once the officers had the scene secured and Pryor in hand-
cuffs could they have arrested him for resisting arrest during
the handcuffing process? For much of this part of the video
where Corrigan and Pryor are both on the ground, the action
is obscured by Officer Corrigan’s body and takes place rather
far away. The video does not clearly portray, for instance,
56 No. 23-1463
whether Pryor is resisting or moving his face to get it off the
icy pavement, whether he was attempting to place his hands
behind his back or resisting Officer Corrigan’s attempts to do
so, whether it would have been anatomically possible for him
to get his hands behind his back from certain positions, and
whether he was applying force to his arms or not. Officer Cor-
rigan tells him to “stop fighting,” (Corrigan dashcam at 1:07,
1:13, 1:37), but Pryor, responds that he is “not fighting” and
pointed out that he had submitted to the officers with his
hands up. (Corrigan dashcam at 1:07, 1:37, 2:05, 3:02). The dis-
trict court noted that “Pryor appeared to lay motionless as the
officer continued to yell ‘stop fighting’ and ‘don't move!’”
R. 141 at 10; Pryor v. Corrigan, No. 17-CV-1968, 2021 WL
1192581, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 30, 2021) (citing Corrigan dash-
cam at 1:39-41). Neither Corrigan’s nor Pryor’s words provide
definitive evidence of what was actually happening. Both
knew they were being recorded, and their statements may
have been performative rather than accurate descriptions of
the actions of the other. 7 For all the reasons I describe above,
the question of resistance during the handcuffing is a factual
determination for a jury and cannot be resolved on summary
judgment.
7See Ajay Sandhu, Camera-Friendly Policing: How the Police Respond to
Cameras and Photographers, 14 Surveillance & Soc’y 78–89 (2016); Josiah
Bates, Bodycam Footage Hasn’t Brought the Police Accountability Advocates
Thought It Would, Pulitzer Ctr., Dec. 12, 2023.
No. 23-1463 57
5. Excessive force 8
As I noted above several times, the officers could use rea-
sonable force to subdue Pryor during the Terry stop (or the
arrest, if it became one) provided the force exercised was in
proportion to the threat posed. Phillips, 678 F.3d at 519. “Our
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has long recognized that
the right to make an … investigatory stop necessarily carries
with it the right to use some degree of physical coercion or
threat thereof to effect it.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396
(1989); see also United States v. Lopez, 907 F.3d 472, 478–79 (7th
Cir. 2018) (“With the authority to stop comes the authority to
require the subject to submit to the stop, and to use reasonable
force to make him submit.”). In the case of either an arrest or
a Terry seizure, a court must evaluate whether the officer’s ac-
tions were objectively reasonable in light of the totality of the
facts and circumstances confronting that officer. Graham, 490
U.S. at 396. When considering the reasonableness of force in a
Terry stop, a court must examine “whether the surrounding
circumstances would support an officer’s legitimate fear for
personal safety. No two encounters are identical, so there is
no litmus-paper test for determining when a seizure exceeds
the bounds of an investigative stop and becomes an arrest,”
or when the force used in seizure becomes excessive. Olson,
41 F.4th at 799 (internal citations omitted). “And because of
8 The leg sweep and tackle appear to be the only issues of excessive
force remaining, as the district court allowed the question of excessive
force on Officer Corrigan’s punches to Pryor’s head to go to a jury. Pryor
does not raise any other excessive force claims. Pryor does assert that the
district court erred when it cleaved the full arrest into parts—allowing the
head strikes to go to a jury, but dismissing the tackle on summary judg-
ment, but the majority has found no error, and I see no reason to address
the issue in this concurrence/dissent.
58 No. 23-1463
this fact-intensive nature of the inquiry, we have noted that
‘since the Graham reasonableness inquiry nearly always re-
quires a jury to sift through disputed factual contentions, and
to draw inferences therefrom, we have held on many occa-
sions that summary judgment or judgment as a matter of law
in excessive force cases should be granted sparingly.” Gupta,
19 F.4th at 996 (quoting Abdullahi v. City of Madison, 423 F.3d
763, 773 (7th Cir. 2005)); Siler v. City of Kenosha, 957 F.3d 751,
759 (7th Cir. 2020) (“The obligation to consider the totality of
the circumstances in these cases often makes resort to sum-
mary judgment inappropriate.”). The majority does not ex-
plain why this case is so exceptional that it warrants skirting
the usual assumption that a reasonableness inquiry requires
a jury to sift through the facts.
As this court noted in Gupta, therefore, a court cannot de-
termine whether an officer used greater force than was rea-
sonably necessary until a fact finder resolves whether the of-
ficer needed to use force to effectuate the arrest. Gupta, 19
F.4th at 996. That assessment depends on, among other
things, a determination of whether the suspect was, in fact ob-
structing or resisting arrest. And the evaluation of qualified
immunity requires the same assessment of material fact—
whether a reasonable officer could have concluded that Pryor
was obstructing the officers or resisting arrest. Our caselaw
provides officers plenty of notice that they cannot use signifi-
cant force on a suspect who is not resisting. Gupta, 19 F.4th at
1001; Miller v. Gonzalez, 761 F.3d 822, 829 (7th Cir. 2014). 9 The
9 The majority argues in footnote 8 that the facts in these two cases are
not similar to those in the case before us. I cite these cases only for the legal
proposition that police cannot use significant force on a non-resisting
(continued)
No. 23-1463 59
question of excessive force, therefore, requires a resolution of
the disputed question of whether Pryor was resisting arrest at
the time he was tackled, or whether he was submitting to the
authority of the officers.
For these reasons, I would have reversed the district
court’s summary judgment decision which removed from the
jury factual determinations that were the jury’s to make. I con-
cur with the majority’s conclusions about the legality of the
searches, the district court’s rulings at trial, and in all other
respects.
suspect. Comparing the facts of cases is only relevant to step two of a qual-
ified immunity analysis—that is, in trying to determine whether a consti-
tutional right was clearly established at the time. Estate of Clark, 865 F.3d
at 550. The majority does not dispute, nor can it, that at the time of the
events in question, a police officer would have been on notice that officers
cannot use significant force on a suspect who is not resisting. See Gupta, 19
F.4th at 1001; Miller, 761 F.3d at 829. Because the video does not clearly
indicate whether Pryor was resisting or not, this fact is for a jury to deter-
mine.