Opinion

Miller v. Board of Paroles

Court
Court of Appeals of Tennessee
Filed
Mar 24, 1999
Status
Published
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 30.1%

The opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

FILED

March 24, 1999

JAMES R. MILLER, ) Cecil Crowson, Jr.

) Appellate Court Clerk

Petitioner/Appellant, )

) Appeal No.

) 01-A-01-9804-CH-00177

VS. )

) Davidson Chancery

) No. 97-3423-III

TENNESSEE BOARD OF PAROLES, )

)

Respondent/Appellee. )

APPEALED FROM THE CHANCERY COURT OF DAVIDSON COUNTY

AT NASHVILLE, TENNESSEE

THE HONORABLE ELLEN HOBBS LYLE, CHANCELLOR

JAMES R. MILLER, #135058

South Central Correctional Facility

P. O. Box 279

Clifton, Tennessee 38425-0279

Pro Se/Petitioner/Appellant

JOHN KNOX WALKUP

Attorney General & Reporter

PATRICIA C. KUSSMANN

Assistant Attorney General

425 Fifth Avenue North

Nashville, Tennessee 37243

Attorney for Respondent/Appellee

AFFIRMED AND REMANDED

BEN H. CANTRELL

PRESIDING JUDGE, M.S.

CONCUR:

KOCH, J.

CAIN, J.

MEMORANDUM OPINION1

An inmate in the custody of the Department of Correction filed a petition

for writ of certiorari, claiming that the Board of Paroles acted unconstitutionally in

refusing to parole him. The chancery court dismissed the petition. We affirm the

chancery court.

I.

On May 11, 1990, James R. Miller pled guilty to charges of rape, incest

and aggravated rape, and was sentenced to eighteen years imprisonment. The victim

was his daughter, who was less than thirteen years of age at the time. Mr. Miller first

became eligible for parole consideration in 1993. The Parole Board declined to parole

him because of the seriousness of his offenses and the need to complete a sex

offender treatment program. After the next parole hearing in 1995, he was again

denied parole. The Board cited as their reasons the seriousness of the offense and

negative disciplinary reports. On March 12, 1997, Mr. Miller came up for a hearing

again, and the Board again voted to deny parole because of the seriousness of his

offenses.

On October 15, 1997, Mr. Miller filed a petition for writ of certiorari to

review the action of the Parole Board. The Parole Board moved to dismiss the

petition on the ground that it failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.

The trial court dismissed the petition on March 2, 1998. This appeal followed.

1

Rule 10(b) of the Rules of the Court of Appeals reads as follows:

The Court, with the concurrence of all judges participating in the case, may

affirm, reverse or modify the actions of the trial court by memorandum opinion when

a form al opin ion w ould h ave n o pre ced entia l value . W hen a cas e is de cided by

memorandum opinion it shall be designated “MEMORAN DUM OPINION,” shall not be

published, and s hall not be cited or relied on for any reason in a subsequent unrelated

case.

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II.

A petition for writ of certiorari must be filed within sixty days of the entry

of the order or judgment appealed from. Tenn. Code Ann. §27-9-102. Failure to file

a petition within the sixty day time limit results in the trial court losing jurisdiction of the

case. Fairhaven v. Tennessee Health Facilities Commission, 566 S.W.2d 885 (Tenn.

App. 1976). Since over seven months elapsed between the decision of the Parole

Board and the filing of Mr. Miller’s petition, it appears that the petition should have

been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. We note however, that even if Mr. Miller’s

petition had been timely filed, the court would still have been compelled to find it to

have no merit.

Large portions of both Mr. Miller’s petition for writ of certiorari and his

brief on appeal are devoted to challenges to his conviction. Mr. Miller claims that the

indictment was faulty, and that he pled guilty on the advice of a court-appointed

attorney who assured him that if he did so he would be home in five months. Of

course the Board of Paroles had no part in Mr. Miller’s conviction and sentencing, and

neither the chancery court nor this court has any jurisdiction over those matters.

The remainder of Mr. Miller’s argument is that the Board acted

unconstitutionally or illegally by basing its decision on the seriousness of his offense.

The courts of this state have had several opportunities to examine the question of

whether seriousness of offense is a constitutionally valid basis for denial of parole,

and have determined that it is. South v. Board of Paroles, 946 S.W.2d 310, 312

(Tenn. App. 1996); Arnold v. Board of Paroles, 956 S.W.2d 478, 482 (Tenn. 1997).

We note that the legislature has authorized the Board of Paroles to deny

parole if release would depreciate the seriousness of the offense, Tenn. Code Ann.

§ 4-35-503(b)(2). Rule No. 1100-1-1-.06(3)(b) of the Board of Paroles follows the

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legislative directive. Certainly, it would depreciate the seriousness of Mr. Miller’s

conduct if he were not severely punished for it. We thus find that the Board’s actions

cannot be considered unconstitutional or illegal.

III.

The order of the trial court is affirmed. Remand this cause to the

Chancery Court of Davidson County for further proceedings consistent with this

opinion. Tax the costs on appeal to the appellant.

_________________________________

BEN H. CANTRELL,

PRESIDING JUDGE, M.S.

CONCUR:

_____________________________

WILLIAM C. KOCH, JR., JUDGE

_____________________________

WILLIAM B. CAIN, JUDGE

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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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