holding that “§ 1983” permits 4 “monetary recovery against officials who violated ‘clearly established’ federal law”
How later courts described this case
- holding that “§ 1983” permits 4 “monetary recovery against officials who violated ‘clearly established’ federal law”
- granting IFP motion when the plaintiff 24 and his spouse earned about $1,250 per month with $2,350 in monthly expenses, no 25 savings, and additional assets totaling $256,500
- discussing the appropriateness of due-process notice in various 9 towing contexts
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
2 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
3 V incent d/b/a Vincent Patrick PRICE, Case No.: 24-cv-1758-AGS-BLM
4 Plaintiff,
ORDER GRANTING IN FORMA
5 v. PAUPERIS MOTION (ECF 2) AND
SCREENING AND DISMISSING
6 SAN DIEGO POLICE DEPARTMENT,
COMPLAINT (ECF 1)
A-Z Towing,
7
Defendants.
8
9 Plaintiff Vincent Patrick Price’s motion to proceed without paying the initial filing
10 fee is granted. But his complaint does not state a claim for relief. The Court thus dismisses
11 the case with leave to amend.
12 IFP MOTION
13 Typically, parties instituting a civil action in a United States district court must pay
14 filing fees of $405.1 See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). But if granted the right to proceed in forma
15 pauperis, a plaintiff need not pay those fees. Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177
16 (9th Cir. 1999).
17 Price claims to have assets of $1,200 in cash and two cars valued at $12,000. (ECF 2,
18 at 1–3.) But he is unemployed, only made $100 dollars last month, and reports living
19 expenses that equal those earnings. (ECF 2, at 5.) Based on these claims, the Court finds
20 that Price has sufficiently shown an inability to pay the initial fees. See Blount v. Saul, No.
21 21-cv-0679-BLM, 2021 WL 1561453, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 21, 2021) (“It is well-settled
22 that a party need not be completely destitute to proceed IFP.”); see also Escobedo v.
23 Applebees, 787 F.3d 1226, 1228 (9th Cir. 2015) (granting IFP motion when the plaintiff
24 and his spouse earned about $1,250 per month with $2,350 in monthly expenses, no
25 savings, and additional assets totaling $256,500).
26
27 1 In addition to the $350 statutory fee, civil litigants must pay an additional
administrative fee of $55. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a); Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees,
28
1 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) SCREENING
2 When reviewing an IFP motion, the court must screen the complaint and dismiss it
3 if it is “frivolous or malicious,” “fails to state a claim,” or seeks monetary relief from a
4 defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d
5 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 2000). “The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed
6 to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as
7 the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim.” Watison
8 v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). Rule 12(b)(6) requires a complaint “contain
9 sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
10 face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (cleaned up). Courts must consider the
11 complaint in its entirety,” including “documents incorporated into the complaint by
12 reference” to be part of the pleading when determining whether the plaintiff has stated a
13 claim upon which relief may be granted. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd.,
14 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007).
15 Price brings a civil-right claim based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the San Diego
16 Police Department and A-Z Towing because his car was towed from a public street in
17 San Diego. (ECF 1, at 4.) Price asserts that this towing violated his rights because the
18 “license plate” he has “on this Automobile” says the car is “EXEMPT” due to U.C.C.
19 provisions, “D.O.T. EXEMPT,” and a “PRIVATE - AUTOMOBILE.” (Id. at 4, 8.) Price
20 seeks damages between “$69,120,000–$432,000,000” because that same license plate has
21 a “Notice of FEE Schedule” whereby “you agree to pay $10,000 for each minute delayed
22 or detained from a non-emergency traffic stop.” (Id. at 4.) But in his complaint, he indicates
23 he is willing “in good faith” to “mitigate damages to $1,600 per minute.” (Id.) He also
24 seeks injunctive relief (Id.)
25 To say that this claim as written is frivolous is to give it more than its due. A § 1983
26 civil-rights claim permits recovery against state officials for the “deprivation of any rights,
27 privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983
28 (emphasis added). A license plate that is apparently not issued by any sovereignty is not a
1 basis of law for the purposes of § 1983. (See ECF 1, at 8 (picture of the license plate
2 claiming to be from “The Republic for the Several States of the Union,” albeit in fancy
3 script)); see also Tanzin v. Tanvir, 592 U.S. 43, 50 (2020) (holding that “§ 1983” permits
4 “monetary recovery against officials who violated ‘clearly established’ federal law”).
5 Although he does not say as much, perhaps Price intends to bring a claim under due
6 process for the towing, separate and apart from his frivolous license-plate theory. That is
7 certainly a common enough theory. See, e.g., Clement v. City of Glendale, 518 F.3d 1090,
8 1093–95 (9th Cir. 2008) (discussing the appropriateness of due-process notice in various
9 towing contexts). The problem with this reimagining of Price’s complaint is that his own
10 exhibits appear to foreclose it as an avenue of relief. After all, his attached license plate
11 photos show no evidence that his car was registered with the state and authorized to be on
12 the public roads, and the content of Price’s license plate strongly suggests it was not so
13 registered. (ECF 1, at 7–8 (claiming to be “exempt”)); see Cal. Vehicle Code 5204(a)(1)
14 (requiring license plate “tabs” showing the registration dates). The Ninth Circuit has
15 recognized that a “tow” without notice may be “appropriate where there are no current
16 registration stickers.” Clement, 518 F.3d at 1094–95. Regardless, even reconceived this
17 way, this complaint does not plausibly state a claim.
18 Nonetheless, a “district court should not dismiss a pro se complaint without leave to
19 amend unless it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured
20 by amendment.” Rosati v. Igbinoso, 791 F.3d 1037, 1039 (9th Cir. 2015) (cleaned up). In
21 light of Price’s pro se status, the Court grants him an opportunity to amend his pleading to
22 address the above defects and set out a plausible claim.
23 CONCLUSION
24 Price’s IFP motion (ECF 2) is GRANTED. But his complaint is DISMISSED with
25 leave to amend. By December 20, 2024, Price must file any amended complaint, remedying
26 the identified deficiencies. If he fails to do so by that date, the Court may enter a final order
27 dismissing this case, based both on his failure to state a claim and his failure to prosecute
28 in compliance with a court order requiring amendment. “If a plaintiff does not take
1 || advantage of the opportunity to fix his complaint, a district court may convert the dismissal
2 || of the complaint into dismissal of the entire action.” Lira v. Herrera, 427 F.3d 1164, 1169
3 Cir. 2005).
4 || Dated: November 27, 2024
6 Andrew G. Schopler
, United States District Judge
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