“[I]t is only noncompliance with federal law that renders a State’s criminal judgment susceptible to collateral attack in the federal courts.” (emphasis in original)
How later courts described this case
- “[I]t is only noncompliance with federal law that renders a State’s criminal judgment susceptible to collateral attack in the federal courts.” (emphasis in original)
- “The proper forum to challenge the execution of a sentence is the district where the prisoner is confined.”
- “[S]tate courts are the ultimate expositors of state law . . . .”
- “[W]e have repeatedly held that it is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state-court determinations on state-law questions.” (internal quotation marks omitted)
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
Case No. 2:24-cv-06327-DOC-AJR Date: August 22, 2024
Page 1 of 5
Title: Jimmie E. Stephens v. Warden J. Schultz et al.,
DOCKET ENTRY: ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE WHY THIS ACTION SHOULD
NOT BE TRANSFERRED TO THE EASTERN DISTRICT
OF CALIFORNIA PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1404(A) OR
DISMISSED FOR FAILURE TO STATE A COGNIZABLE
HABEAS CLAIM
PRESENT:
HONORABLE A. JOEL RICHLIN, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
_ Claudia Garcia-Marquez_ _______None_______ __None__
Deputy Clerk Court Reporter/Recorder Tape No.
ATTORNEYS PRESENT FOR PETITIONER: ATTORNEYS PRESENT FOR RESPONDENTS:
None Present None Present
PROCEEDINGS: (IN CHAMBERS)
On July 19, 2024, Jimmie E. Stephens (“Petitioner”), a pro se state prisoner
currently in the custody of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation
(“CDCR”) at California State Prison Solano, in Vacaville, CA (“CSP-Solano”),
constructively filed1 a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254
(“Petition”). (Dkt. 1.) The Petition appears to challenge CDCR’s Board of Parole
1 Under the “mailbox rule,” when a pro se prisoner gives prison authorities a pleading to
mail to court, the Court deems the pleading constructively filed on the date it is signed.
See Roberts v. Marshall, 627 F.3d 768, 770 n.1 (9th Cir. 2010). Here, the Court uses July
19, 2024 as the constructive filing date because Petitioner’s signature on the Petition is
dated July 19, 2024. (Dkt. 1 at 15.)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
Case No. 2:24-cv-06327-DOC-AJR Date: August 22, 2024
Page 2 of 5
Title: Jimmie E. Stephens v. Warden J. Schultz et al.,
Hearings’ (“BPH”) determination as to Petitioner’s suitability for parole. (Id. at 7 (“5-2-
24 was [P]etitioner’s 5th BPH Suitability for Release Denial, when BPH used 4[-]year[-
]old write-ups” to deny Petitioner parole.).) The Petition also seems to allege claims under
California’s Racial Justice Act that Petitioner asserts protects prisoners, “especially . . .
African Americans, who[] do longer [s]entences than other [r]aces [because of] BPH.”
(Id. at 5.)
Upon review of the Petition, it appears that venue for this action properly lies
within the Eastern District of California and that in the interest of justice, this action
should be transferred to that judicial district.
“Where an application for a writ of habeas corpus is made by a person in custody
under the judgment and sentence of a State court of a State which contains two or
more Federal judicial districts, the application may be filed in the district court for
the district wherein such person is in custody or in the district court for the district
within which the State court was held which convicted and sentenced him and each
of such district courts shall have concurrent jurisdiction to entertain the
application.”
28 U.S.C. § 2241(d).
Nevertheless, “[t]he district court for the district wherein such an application is
filed in the exercise of its discretion and in furtherance of justice may transfer the
application to the other district court for hearing and determination.” Id.
The general practice of California district courts is to transfer habeas actions
challenging a denial of parole to the district where the petitioner is confined. See
Bayramoglu v. Ochoa, 2011 WL 2462489, at *1 (C.D. Cal. June 21, 2011) (finding that
the proper forum for a claim related to the denial of parole is the district of confinement);
Gaddis v. Marshall, 2007 WL 4533140, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 12, 2007) (“[T]he district of
confinement is the preferable forum to review the execution of a sentence, such as a parole
denial claim.”); Cerny v. California Bd. of Prison Terms, 2006 WL 2784708, at *1 (N.D.
Cal. Sept. 26, 2006) (same); Jones v. Dep’t of Corr., Bd. of Prison Terms, 1995 WL
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
Case No. 2:24-cv-06327-DOC-AJR Date: August 22, 2024
Page 3 of 5
Title: Jimmie E. Stephens v. Warden J. Schultz et al.,
28454, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 1995) (same); see Dunne v. Henman, 875 F.2d 244, 249
(9th Cir. 1989) (“The proper forum to challenge the execution of a sentence is the district
where the prisoner is confined.”); accord Thomas v. United States, 50 F.3d 16 (9th Cir.
1995).
While Petitioner was convicted in Los Angeles County, he is confined at CSP-
Solano. (Dkt. 1 at 1). CSP-Solano is located in Vacaville, Solano County, California,
which lies within the Eastern District of California. See 28 U.S.C. § 84(b). Because
Petitioner’s claims relate to the denial of parole - in other words, the execution of his
sentence - venue is proper in the Eastern District of California. Therefore, the Court
concludes that it appears that this action should proceed in the Eastern District of
California rather than the Central District of California. See Braden v. 30th Judicial
Circuit Court of Kentucky, 410 U.S. 484, 494 (1973) (“The expense and risk of
transporting the petitioner to the [district of conviction], should his presence at a hearing
prove necessary, would in all likelihood be outweighed by the difficulties of transporting
records and witnesses from [the district of conviction] to the district where petitioner is
confined.”).
Further, the Court notes that Petitioner’s challenge to the BPH’s decision appears to
be based, in whole or in part on California’s Racial Justice Act2 (“CRJA”). (See Dkt. 1 at
5, 17.) Petitioner is advised that, to the extent he intends to seek relief based on the
CRJA, Petitioner cannot state a cognizable habeas claim. Indeed, the Supreme Court has
“stated many times that federal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law.”
Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67 (1991) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Wilson
v. Corcoran, 562 U.S. 1, 5 (2010) (“[I]t is only noncompliance with federal law that
renders a State’s criminal judgment susceptible to collateral attack in the federal courts.”
(emphasis in original)).
2 The CRJA was enacted in 2020 and is codified in California Penal Code section 745.
Under the CRJA, a defendant who can show that his conviction or sentence was based on
his race, ethnicity, or national origin is entitled to have his conviction or sentence
vacated. Cal. Penal Code § 745(e)(2)(A)(B).
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
Case No. 2:24-cv-06327-DOC-AJR Date: August 22, 2024
Page 4 of 5
Title: Jimmie E. Stephens v. Warden J. Schultz et al.,
Moreover, this Court cannot redetermine an issue of state law. See Waddington v.
Sarausad, 555 U.S. 179, 192 n.5 (2009) (“[W]e have repeatedly held that it is not the
province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state-court determinations on state-law
questions.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 691
(1975) (“[S]tate courts are the ultimate expositors of state law . . . .”). The Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act’s Section 2254 only grants this Court authority to review
violations of federal law, not claims arising under the CRJA. See, e.g., Wynn v. Foulk,
2021 WL 6135325, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 29, 2021) (holding that claim for relief under
CRJA was not cognizable on federal habeas under § 2254); Montgomery v. Matteson,
2022 WL 16556042, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 2022) (same), report and recommendation
adopted, 2022 WL 16556011 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 31, 2022); Muniz v. Phillips, 2024 WL
1343127, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2024) (“Claims brought under the CJRA are likewise
not cognizable under federal habeas review.”).
Finally, Petitioner is advised that the U.S. Supreme Court severely limited federal
court review of state parole board hearings in Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. 216 (2011).
Swarthout acknowledged that California law creates a liberty interest in parole protected
by the Due Process Clause, which is reasonable and requires fair procedures. Id. at 219-
20. However, Swarthout also held that due process is satisfied where an inmate “is
allowed an opportunity to be heard and was provided a statement of the reasons why
parole was denied.” Id. at 220 (citing Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal and
Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 16 (1979)). Swarthout bars any challenge to the
sufficiency of the evidence to support the Board’s decision. See Roberts v. Hartley, 640
F.3d at 1046 (itI “makes no difference that [the petitioner] may have been subjected to a
misapplication of California’s ‘some evidence’ standard. A state’s misapplication of its
own laws does not provide a basis for granting” relief.); Miller v. Oregon Bd. of Parole
and Post-Prison Supervision, 642 F.3d 711, 717 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding that the issue was
not whether the Board’s parole denial was substantively reasonable,” or whether the Board
correctly applied state parole standards, but simply was “whether the state provided Miller
with the minimum procedural due process outline in [Swarthout v.] Cooke”). Thus, to the
extent Petitioner seeks to challenges the BPH’s decision based on the evidence used at that
hearing, it appears that challenge would be barred under Swarthout.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
Case No. 2:24-cv-06327-DOC-AJR Date: August 22, 2024
Page 5 of 5
Title: Jimmie E. Stephens v. Warden J. Schultz et al.,
Accordingly, Petitioner is hereby ORDERED TO SHOW CAUSE, by
September 13, 2024, why this action should not be transferred to the U.S. District Court
for the Eastern District of California or dismissed for failure to state a cognizable habeas
claim. Petitioner may satisfy this Order by filing a declaration setting forth any reason
why venue should remain in the Central District of California, stating a basis other than
the CJRA for his challenge of the BPH’s decision, and stating why Swarthout does not bar
his claim.
Instead of filing a response to the instant Order, Petitioner may request a
voluntary dismissal of this action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a).
A Notice of Dismissal form is attached for Petitioner’s convenience. However,
Petitioner is advised that any dismissed claims may later be subject to the applicable
statute of limitations. Petitioner is expressly warned that failure to timely file a
response to this Order will result in a recommendation that this action be dismissed
with prejudice for failure to comply with Court orders and failure to prosecute. See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b).
The Clerk of the Court is directed to serve a copy of this Order upon Petitioner at
his address of record.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Attachment:
CV-09, Notice of Dismissal Pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 41(a) or (c).