Garcia v. Montford Unit

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

LUBBOCK DIVISION

OSCAR N. GARCIA, §

Institutional ID No. 01647430, §

§

Plaintiff, §

§ CIVIL ACTION NO, 5:23-CV-133-BV

v. §

§

CHANTAL A, FLORES, §

§

Defendant. §

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND

RECOMMENDATION AND ORDER OF TRANSFER

Pro se Plaintiff Oscar N. Garcia filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming

violations of his constitutional rights while incarcerated at the John Montford Unit of the

Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Dkt. No. 1. Because not all parties have

consented to jurisdiction by the magistrate judge, the undersigned submits these findings,

conclusions, and recommendations and orders this case transferred back to the Honorable

Sam R. Cummings, Senior United States District Judge, for further proceedings.

1. Factual and Procedural Background

The facts in this case arise from an incident that occurred on September 20, 2021,

when Garcia was an inmate in the Montford Unit of the Texas Department of Criminal

Justice, where Defendant Chantal A. Flores was employed as a correctional officer. Dkt.

Nos, 1, 22. Garcia alleges that on that date, Officer Flores passed out commissary items,

but some of the things Garcia ordered and was expecting were missing. Dkt. Nos. | at 4;

16 at 2; 22 at3. As result, Garcia “started to beat [his] head on [the] door [and] walls.”

Dkt. No. 16 at 4. Garcia then “asked to speak to rank” and “told Flores [he] needed to go

to seclusion” because he was feeling “suicidal and homicidal” due to the missing

commissary items, Dkt. No. | at 4; Dkt. No. 16 at 4 (cleaned up). Garcia also “told

Flores [he] was going to kill [himself and start[] cutting [him]self and wrap bags around

[his] face to suffocate fhim|]self.” Dkt. No. 16 at 2.

According to Garcia, Flores did nothing to help. Jd. Instead, she “just laugh[ed]

and walked away.” /d. At an unspecified time that same day, “Flores [came] to

[Garcia’s] door and sa[id] ‘stop that’” when she saw him bleeding and that he had

“written on walls with blood,” but Garcia did not stop. /d. at 2. Garcia further asserts

Flores saw him “trying to suffocate [him]self’ and in response, she “lock[ed] the door

again.” Jd. at 8. He disputes that he ever declined medical treatment and claims that he

was “stuck in [his] cell” until he was found unconscious the next day. Jd. at 4—5.

Garcia filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging multiple claims against the

prison and certain individuals employed there. Dkt. No. 1. The assigned district judge

transferred Garcia’s case for preliminary screening under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e) and

1915A(b). Dkt. Nos. 9, 11, 15, 16, 22, 23, 24, 26. After careful review, the magistrate

judge dismissed most of Garcia’s claims. Dkt. No. 22. Only one claim—that Officer

Flores failed to protect Garcia from harming himself and attempting suicide—survived

screening. Dkt. No. 22, On that claim, the magistrate judge required an answer, Dkt.

Nos, 22, 29. Flores answered on October 16, 2024. Dkt. No. 34.

2. Legal standards for an Eighth Amendment failure-to-protect claim

To state a constitutional claim for failure to protect, a plaintiff must show: (1) he

was subjected to conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm; and (2) prison

officials were deliberately indifferent to his need for protection. Neals v. Norwood, 59

F.3d 530, 533 (Sth Cir. 1995), A prison official who demonstrates “deliberate

indifference” to a substantial risk of serious harm violates an inmate’s Eighth

Amendment rights. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 828 (1994). “A jailer has a duty

to not act with subjective deliberate indifference to a known substantial risk of suicide”

and “cannot disregard precautions he knows should be taken.” Cope v. Cogdill, 3 F.4th

198, 209 (Sth Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted), Prison

officials must guard against current threats as well as sufficiently imminent dangers that

may cause harm in the future. Horton v. Cockrell, 70 F.3d 397, 400-01 (Sth Cir, 1995).

Deliberate indifference “is an extremely high standard” to meet, and prison

officials act with such indifference only if they know an inmate faces a substantial risk of

serious harm and they disregard that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to

alleviate it. Domino v. Tex. Dep’t of Crim. Just., 239 F.3d 752, 756 (Sth Cir, 2001);

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. Consequently, officials’ failure to alleviate risk they should

have perceived, but did not, does not constitute deliberate indifference. See id. at 837—

38. Rather, the inmate must show that the official actually knew of and disregarded the

excessive risk to inmate safety. /d. at 837. Thus, the prison official “must both be aware

of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm

exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Jd. The known risk must be more than just

some level of risk and must be “excessive.” Brewster v. Dretke, 587 F.3d 764, 770 (Sth

Cir, 2009).

A prisoner seeking to establish an Eighth Amendment violation need not show that

prison officials believed harm would actually occur-—“it is enough that the official acted

or failed to act despite his knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm.” Farmer, 511

U.S. at 842. “To sustain his constitutional claim, [the inmate] must demonstrate

something approaching a total unconcern for his welfare in the face of serious risks, or a

conscious, culpable refusal to prevent harm[.]” Aamilton vy. Dretke, No. 7:06-CV-043-0,

2009 WL 320777, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 10, 2009) (alterations in original) (quoting King

v. Fairman, 997 F.2d 259, 261 (7th Cir. 1993)).

Application of standards to Garcia’s claim

Accepting Garcia’s factual allegations as true, as is required at this juncture,

Garcia has adequately alleged that he was subjected to conditions posing a substantial

risk of serious harm when he reported having suicidal and homicidal thoughts, asked to

be placed in seclusion, and was ignored. See Hyatt v, Thomas, 843 F.3d 172, 178 (Sth

Cir, 2016) (holding a jury could draw a reasonable inference that an officer was aware of

a “sufficiently substantial risk” of harm where the officer knew the detainee had a history

of depression, he had previously attempted suicide, and his wife communicated that she

believed him to be suicidal). Likewise, Garcia’s physical manifestations of self-harm—

including banging his head on the door and walls, cutting himself, and attempting to

suffocate himself—arguably demonstrate a substantial risk of harm, See Dyer v.

Houston, 964 F.3d 374, 381-82, 384 (Sth Cir. 2020) (finding that where officers “had

custody of a delusional detainee who was severely harming himself” by repeatedly and

violently striking his head and failed to seek medical treatment, there was a “genuine

dispute” as to whether officers were deliberately indifferent); Thompson vy. Upshur Cnty.,

245 F.3d 447, 464 (Sth Cir. 2001) (determining that a reasonable jailer would have

recognized a constitutional obligation to summon medical assistance where, among other

things, the jailer was aware that the detainee was hallucinating and injuring himself in his

cell).

Moreover, according to Garcia, Flores was fully aware of the risk of harm posed

because he expressly told her that he intended to kill himself, and later, she personally

observed that he was bleeding. Dkt. No. 16 at 1-2. Despite this purported knowledge,

Flores allegedly disregarded the risk of harm Garcia posed to himself because she “just

laugh[ed] and walked away[.]” Jd. at 4. Flores also allegedly failed to guard Garcia

against the threats he posed to himself when she “lock[ed] the door again” after she saw

Garcia bleeding from cutting himself. /d. at 8. Thus, Garcia has adequately alleged that

Flores acted with deliberate indifference. See Nagle v. Gusman, 61 F. Supp. 3d 609,

628-30 (E.D. La. 2014) (finding that a defendant acted with deliberate indifference when

he left a suicidal detainee unobserved on at least three occasions without taking measures

to protect the detainee from harm).

4, Recommendation

Given the timeframe in the referral order, this case should be transferred back to

the presiding Senior United States District Judge for implementation of a scheduling

order, Because Flores asserted the affirmative defense of qualified immunity, it is the

undersigned’s RECOMMENDATION that the Court enter limited scheduling order

requiring Flores to file a dispositive motion for the purpose of making a preliminary

determination on qualified immunity. See Dkt. No. 34 at 6 (raising several defenses,

including qualified immunity). Alternatively, the undersigned recommends that a Rule

16 scheduling order be entered, setting dates certain for pretrial deadlines and filing

dispositive motions.

The undersigned magistrate judge ORDERS that this case be transferred back to

the docket of the Senior United States District Judge. This case shall hereinafter be

designated as Civil Action Number 5:23-cv-133-C.

5, Right to Object

A copy of these findings, conclusions, and recommendation shall be served on all

parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of these

findings, conclusions, and recommendation must file specific written objections within

fourteen days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (2016); FED. R.

Civ, P. 72(b). To be specific, an objection must identify the specific finding, conclusion,

or recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and

specify the place in the magistrate judge’s Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendation

where the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by

reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific, Failure to

file specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual

findings and legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the

district court, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United Servs. Auto.

Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (Sth Cir. 1996).

SO ORDERED on November 24, 2024.

AMANDA ‘AMY’ R. BURCH

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE