Escalante v. Hammel

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

DALLAS DIVISION

LEANDRO ESCALANTE, §

§

Plaintiff, §

§

V. § No. 3:23-cv-1871-L-BN

§

PRESTON HAMMEL, ET AL., §

§

Defendants. §

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Plaintiff Leandro Escalante filed a pro se complaint against the City of Irving,

Texas and two of its police officers alleging that, during a traffic stop in October 2021,

his constitutional rights were violated. See Dkt. No. 3.

United States District Judge Sam A. Lindsay referred Escalante’s lawsuit to

the undersigned United States magistrate judge for pretrial management under 28

U.S.C. § 636(b) and a standing order of reference.

The Court granted a motion to dismiss the original complaint but also granted

Escalante leave to file an amended complaint. See Escalante v. Hammel, No. 3:23-cv-

1871-L-BN, 2024 WL 2886879 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 15, 2024), rec. accepted in part, 2024

WL 2186858 (N.D. Tex. May 15, 2024) (“Escalante I”).

Escalante timely filed a first amended complaint alleging claims under the

Fourth Amendment (for unreasonable seizure, malicious prosecution, conspiracy, and

supervisory liability) against three defendants in their individual capacities (two

Irving police officers, Preston Hammel and Nestor Munoz, and Irving’s chief of police,

Derick Miller) [Dkt. No. 24] (the “FAC”).

Defendants Hammel, Munoz, and Miller moved to dismiss the FAC under

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Dkt. No. 25. Escalante responded, and

Defendants replied. See Dkt. Nos. 26-28.

The undersigned now enters these findings of fact, conclusions of law, and

recommendation that, for the reasons and to the extent set out below, the Court

should grant the motion to dismiss and dismiss this lawsuit with prejudice.

Legal Standards

In deciding a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim on which relief may

be granted under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court “accepts all well-pleaded facts as true,

viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” In re Katrina Canal

Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 205-06 (5th Cir. 2007).

Such a motion is therefore “not meant to resolve disputed facts or test the

merits of a lawsuit” and “instead must show that, even in the plaintiff’s best-case

scenario, the complaint does not state a plausible case for relief.” Sewell v. Monroe

City Sch. Bd., 974 F.3d 577, 581 (5th Cir. 2020).

Even so, a plaintiff must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007), and must

plead those facts with enough specificity “to raise a right to relief above the

speculative level,” id. at 555.

“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that

allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the

misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Cf. Bryant v. Ditech

Fin., L.L.C., No. 23-10416, 2024 WL 890122, at *3 (5th Cir. Mar. 1, 2024) (“[J]ust as

plaintiffs cannot state a claim using speculation, defendants cannot defeat plausible

inferences using speculation.”).

“The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks

for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556

U.S. at 678. So, “[w]here a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a

defendant’s liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of

entitlement to relief.” Id. (cleaned up; quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557); see, e.g.,

Parker v. Landry, 935 F.3d 9, 17 (1st Cir. 2019) (Where “a complaint reveals random

puffs of smoke but nothing resembling real signs of fire, the plausibility standard is

not satisfied.”).

And, while Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) does not mandate detailed

factual allegations, it does require that a plaintiff allege more than labels and

conclusions. So, while a court must accept a plaintiff’s factual allegations as true, it

is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.”

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

Consequently, a threadbare or formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause

of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, will not suffice. See id.;

Armstrong v. Ashley, 60 F.4th 262, 269 (5th Cir. 2023) (“[T]he court does not ‘presume

true a number of categories of statements, including legal conclusions; mere labels;

threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action; conclusory statements; and

naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.’” (quoting Harmon v. City of

Arlington, Tex., 16 F.4th 1159, 1162-63 (5th Cir. 2021))).

And, so, “to survive a motion to dismiss” under Twombly and Iqbal, plaintiffs

must “plead facts sufficient to show” that the claims asserted have “substantive

plausibility” by stating “simply, concisely, and directly events” that they contend

entitle them to relief. Johnson v. City of Shelby, Miss., 574 U.S. 10, 12 (2014) (per

curiam) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)-(3), (d)(1), (e)); cf. Brown v. Tarrant Cnty., Tex.,

985 F.3d 489, 494 (5th Cir. 2021) (While “[p]ro se complaints receive a ‘liberal

construction,’” “mere conclusory allegations on a critical issue are insufficient.”

(cleaned up)).

Aside from “matters of which judicial notice may be taken under Federal Rule

of Evidence 201,” Inclusive Communities Project, 920 F.2d at 900 (citations omitted),

a court cannot look beyond the pleadings in deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, see

Spivey v. Robertson, 197 F.3d 772, 774 (5th Cir. 1999); see also Basic Capital Mgmt.,

Inc. v. Dynex Capital, Inc., 976 F.3d 585, 589 (5th Cir. 2020) (Federal Rule of Evidence

201(d) “expressly provides that a court ‘may take judicial notice at any stage of the

proceeding,’ and our precedents confirm judicially noticed facts may be considered in

ruling on a 12(b)(6) motion.” (citations omitted)).

But pleadings in the Rule 12(b)(6) context include attachments to the

complaint. In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007); see

also Gill as Next Friend of K.C.R. v. Judd, 941 F.3d 504, 511 (11th Cir. 2019) (“The

Civil Rules provide that an attachment to a complaint generally becomes ‘part of the

pleading for all purposes,’ including for ruling on a motion to dismiss.” (quoting FED.

R. CIV. P. 10(c); citations omitted)).

And, “[w]hen ‘an allegation is contradicted by the contents of an exhibit

attached to the pleading, then indeed the exhibit and not the allegation controls.’”

Rogers v. City of Yoakrum, 660 F. App’x 279, 285 n.6 (5th Cir. 2016) (per curiam)

(quoting United States ex rel. Riley v. St. Luke’s Episcopal Hosp., 355 F.3d 370, 377

(5th Cir. 2004) (citing, in turn, Simmons v. Peavy-Welsh Lumber Co., 113 F.2d 812,

813 (5th Cir. 1940))).

Documents “attache[d] to a motion to dismiss are considered to be part of the

pleadings, if they are referred to in the plaintiff’s complaint and are central to her

claim.” Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 224 F.3d 496, 498-99 (5th Cir. 2000)

(quoting Venture Assocs. Corp. v. Zenith Data Sys. Corp., 987 F.2d 429, 431 (7th Cir.

1993)).

And, while the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit “has not

articulated a test for determining when a document is central to a plaintiff’s claims,

the case law suggests that documents are central when they are necessary to

establish an element of one of the plaintiff’s claims. Thus, when a plaintiff’s claim is

based on the terms of a contract, the documents constituting the contract are central

to the plaintiff’s claim.” Kaye v. Lone Star Fund V (U.S.), L.P., 453 B.R. 645, 662 (N.D.

Tex. 2011).

But, “if a document referenced in the plaintiff’s complaint is merely evidence

of an element of the plaintiff’s claim, then the court may not incorporate it into the

complaint.” Id.

Analysis

“Based on Officer Hammel’s stopping Escalante for his failing to stop at a stop

line [and making a wide right turn] early on the morning of October 14, 2021, for

which Hammel issued Escalante a traffic ticket, which was later dismissed,”

Escalante I, 2024 WL 2886879, at *3, Escalante now brings civil claims against

Hammel, Munoz, and Miller (all in their individual capacities) under 42 U.S.C. §

1983, alleging that the defendants violated rights protected by the Fourth

Amendment.

“Escalante’s claims include that Hammel’s traffic stop was a seizure that

violated the Fourth Amendment, that Munoz is liable under a theory of bystander

liability, that there existed a conspiracy in violation of Section 1983, that he was

maliciously prosecuted in violation of the Fourth Amendment, and that [Miller, as

the police chief, who was not involved with the stop itself, also] is liable.” Escalante I,

2024 WL 2886879, at *3.

Preliminarily, Escalante filed with the FAC a USB (or thumb) drive containing

videos of the traffic stop captured on dash and body cameras. By doing so – effectively

attaching the videos to the FAC as exhibits – Escalante made the videos “part of the

pleadings for all purposes.” FED. R. CIV. P. 10(c).

And, “where video recordings are included in the pleadings … the video

depictions of events, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, should be

adopted over the factual allegations in the complaint if the video ‘blatantly

contradict[s]’ those allegations.” Harmon, 16 F.4th at 1163 (quoting Scott v. Harris,

550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007); footnote omitted); see also Sligh v. City of Conroe, Tex., 87

F.4th 290, 298 (5th Cir. 2023) (per curiam) (“If an allegation is qualified by the

contents of an exhibit attached to the pleadings, but the exhibit instead contradicts

the allegation, ‘the exhibit and not the allegation controls.’” (quoting Riley, 355 F.3d

at 377)); Kokesh v. Curlee, 14 F.4th 382, 385 n.2 (5th Cir. 2021) (“Although all alleged

facts are taken as if they are true, facts established by a video record control when

they clearly contradict the facts contained in a pleading…. There are several points

of material fact on which the video clearly contradicts Kokesh’s alleged facts. On these

facts, the video will control.” (citing Scott, 550 U.S. at 380-81; Riley, 355 F.3d at 377));

Hoffman v. L & M Arts, No. 3:10-cv-953-D, 2011 WL 3567419, at *9 (N.D. Tex. Aug.

15, 2011) (Simmons “instruct[s] that a genuine conflict between the complaint and a

pleading exhibit requires that the court accept the exhibit rather than the factual

allegations as true.”).

And, as the Court previously set out,

“[t]he Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and

seizures.” United States v. Wright, 57 F.4th 524, 530 (5th Cir. 2023)

(citations omitted).

And “[w]hen the police stop a vehicle and detain the occupants,

they have effected a Fourth Amendment ‘seizure’” that is commonly

called a Terry stop. Johnson v. Thibodeaux City, 887 F.3d 726, 733 (5th

Cir. 2018) (citing United States v. Brigham, 382 F.3d 500, 506 (5th Cir.

2004) (en banc)); see also Wright, 57 F.4th at 530 (“A Terry stop is a

special category of Fourth Amendment seizures, in which an officer may

briefly detain an individual for further investigation, if the officer has

reasonable suspicion the individual is engaged in criminal activity.”

(cleaned up; citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968); Dunaway v. New

York, 442 U.S. 200, 210 (1979))).

To “review the legality” of Terry stops, courts “first examine

whether the officer’s action was justified at its inception and then

inquire whether the officer’s subsequent actions were reasonably related

in scope to the circumstances that justified the stop.” United States v.

Henry, 37 F.4th 173, 176 (5th Cir. 2022) (per curiam) (citing Brigham,

382 F.3d at 506).

“The ‘touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness,’

and reasonableness is measured ‘in objective terms by examining the

totality of the circumstances .... eschew[ing] bright-line rules, instead

emphasizing the fact-specific nature of the reasonableness inquiry.’”

United States v. Del Angel, No. 20-20258, 2022 WL 1549479 (5th Cir.

May 17, 2022) (per curiam) (quoting Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248,

250 (1991); Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39 (1996)).

“Reasonableness requires a balancing of the public interest with

an individual’s right to be free from arbitrary intrusions by law

enforcement,” while “courts must allow officers to draw on their own

experience and specialized training to make inferences from and

deductions about the cumulative information available to them that

might well elude an untrained person.” Henry, 37 F.4th at 176-77

(cleaned up); see also United States v. Aguilar, DR-07-CR-844(1),(2)-

AML, 2008 WL 11357945, at *5 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 29, 2008) (“It is generally

reasonable for a police officer to stop a vehicle when there is probable

cause that a traffic violation has occurred.” (citing Delaware v. Prouse,

440 U.S. 648, 659 (1979))).

Escalante I, 2024 WL 2886879, at *3-*4.

The facts alleged – and the videos attached to the FAC – reflect that the stop

was justified at its inception.

Asked why the stop was made, Hammel responded – and a video recording

shows – that Escalante both failed to stop prior to the marked stop line and made a

wide right turn. See TEX. TRANSP. CODE § 544.010(c) (“An operator required to stop

by this section shall stop at a clearly marked stop line.”); id. § 545.101(a) (“To make

a right turn at an intersection, an operator shall make both the approach and the

turn as closely as practicable to the right-hand curb or edge of the roadway.”); United

States v. Onyeri, 996 F.3d 274, 279 (5th Cir. 2021) (The officer’s “observation of this

traffic violation” – “an improper turn ‘into the number one lane’ in violation of Texas

Transportation Code § 545.101” – “gave him an objectively grounded legal

justification – and sufficient probable cause – to initiate the stop.” (citation omitted));

Aguilar, 2008 WL 11357945, at *5 (where the driver defendant “committed numerous

traffic violations,” including violations of Section 544.010, “find[ing] that the original

traffic stop did not violate either of the Defendants’ Fourth Amendment rights”).

And Hammel’s “subsequent actions” during the brief, less-than-15-minute stop

– requesting Escalante’s driver’s license and proof of insurance and attempting to

reconcile a conflict between the two as to Escalante’s address, all while Escalante was

argumentative and resistant to cooperating with routine requests – “were reasonably

related in scope to the circumstances.” Henry, 37 F.4th at 176; see Johnson, 887 F.3d

at 734 (“[A]n officer’s actions after a legitimate stop [must] be ‘reasonably related to

the circumstances that justified the stop, or to dispel[ ] his reasonable suspicion [that]

developed during the stop.’ [And a] reasonable detention ‘must be temporary and last

no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop, unless further

reasonable suspicion, supported by articulable facts, emerges.’” (quoting Brigham,

382 F.3d at 507)); Henry, 37 F.4th at 176 (“There is no constitutional impediment to

a law enforcement officer’s request to examine a driver’s license during a traffic stop

and run a computer check.” (footnote omitted)).

Given this caselaw, neither does Escalante allege a plausible Fourth

Amendment claim based on Hammel’s asking Escalante the name of his son twice

and later informing Escalante that his son had an active warrant, while walking

away after telling Escalante that he was free to go.

And, because Escalante fails to allege that the traffic stop violated the Fourth

Amendment, he has not plausibly alleged that Munoz is liable under a theory of

bystander liability. See, e.g., Whitley v. Hanna, 726 F.3d 631, 646 (5th Cir. 2013)

(“[A]n officer may be liable under § 1983 under a theory of bystander liability where

the officer ‘(1) knows that a fellow officer is violating an individual’s constitutional

rights; (2) has a reasonable opportunity to prevent the harm; and (3) chooses not to

act.’” (cleaned up; quoting Randall v. Prince George’s Cnty., Md., 302 F.3d 188, 204

(4th Cir. 2002))).

The lack of a plausibly alleged constitutional violation also precludes

Escalante’s conspiracy claim. See Terwilliger v. Reyna, 4 F.4th 270, 285 (5th Cir.

2021) (“To support a conspiracy claim under § 1983, the plaintiff must allege facts

that suggest ‘an agreement between the ... defendants to commit an illegal act’ and

‘an actual deprivation of constitutional rights.’” (quoting Cinel v. Connick, 15 F.3d

1338, 1343 (5th Cir. 1994))).

Escalante similarly has not alleged a plausible malicious prosecution claim, a

required element of which is “the absence of probable cause for [the resulting

criminal] proceeding.” Armstrong, 60 F.4th at 279 (quoting Gordy v. Burns, 294 F.3d

722, 727 (5th Cir. 2002)); see id. at 279 n.15 (“Importantly, because an unlawful

seizure is the threshold element, if the prosecution is supported by probable cause on

at least one charge, then a malicious prosecution claim cannot move forward.” (citing

Thompson v. Clark, 596 U.S. 36, 43 n.2 (2022))); Sessanga v. City of DeSoto Police

Dep’t, No. 3:24-cv-950-G-BN, 2024 WL 4682750, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 23, 2024) (“And,

so, [a plaintiff’s] argument that police officers violated his right to be free from

malicious prosecution ‘requires [the officers] to have acted in the absence of probable

cause.’” (quoting Matthews v. Green, No. 23-10178, 2024 WL 448352, at *3 (5th Cir.

Feb. 6, 2024) (per curiam))), rec. accepted, 2024 WL 4683661 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 4, 2024).

And, for all the reasons set out above, Escalante has not alleged a plausible

claim against Chief Miller based on the single traffic stop.

“Supervisory officials are accountable for their own acts of deliberate

indifference and for implementing unconstitutional policies that causally result in

injury to the plaintiff.” Alderson v. Concordia Par. Corr. Facility, 848 F.3d 415, 420

(5th Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (citation omitted); see also Blakely v. Andrade, 360 F.

Supp. 3d 453, 489 (N.D. Tex. 2019) (as against an individual defendant, absent

plausible allegations to support supervisory liability, “[t]here must be some showing

of personal involvement by a particular individual defendant to prevail against that

individual” under Section 1983 (citation omitted)).

Deliberate indifference “is a stringent standard of fault, requiring proof that a

municipal actor disregarded a known or obvious consequence of his action.” Brown,

520 U.S. at 410. And “[e]stablishing deliberate indifference generally requires a

‘pattern of similar violations’ arising from a policy ‘so clearly inadequate as to be

obviously likely to result in a constitutional violation.’” Covington v. City of

Madisonville, Tex., 812 F. App’x 219, 225 (5th Cir. 2020) (cleaned up; quoting Burge

v. St. Tammany Par., 336 F.3d 363, 370 (5th Cir. 2003)).

The Court should therefore grant the motion to dismiss.

And the Court should now dismiss this lawsuit with prejudice because

Escalante was allowed to file an amended complaint after the Court informed him of

the insufficiency of his initial complaint and has thus now pleaded his best case. See,

e.g., Wiggins v. La. State Univ. – Health Care Servs. Div., 710 F. App’x 625, 627 (5th

Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (“Ordinarily, a pro se litigant should be offered an opportunity

to amend his complaint before it is dismissed. Rule 15(a) provides that leave to amend

shall be freely given when justice so requires. The language of this rule evinces a bias

in favor of granting leave to amend. Granting leave to amend, however, is not

required if the plaintiff has already pleaded her best case. A plaintiff has pleaded her

best case after she is apprised of the insufficiency of her complaint. A plaintiff may

indicate she has not pleaded her best case by stating material facts that she would

include in an amended complaint to overcome the deficiencies identified by the court.

Similarly, a district court need not grant a futile motion to amend.” (cleaned up)).

Recommendation

The Court should grant Defendants’ amended motion to dismiss the first

amended complaint [Dkt. No. 25] and dismiss this lawsuit with prejudice.

A copy of these findings, conclusions, and recommendation shall be served on

all parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of these

findings, conclusions, and recommendation must file specific written objections

within 14 days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED. R. CIV.

P. 72(b). In order to be specific, an objection must identify the specific finding or

recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and

specify the place in the magistrate judge’s findings, conclusions, and recommendation

where the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by

reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure

to file specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the

factual findings and legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or

adopted by the district court, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v.

United Servs. Auto. Assn, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996).

DATED: November 18, 2024

Lee

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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